Problemstatement .I 1.2Objectivesofthestudy
Generalobjective
Analysiso f housingc r e d i t programf o r urbanh o u s e h o l d s b y a n a l y s i s the probabilityofcreditforhouseholdandthedeterminantsaffecttoloanamount.
Specificobjective
- Theresearchanalyzestherelationshipbetweenurbanhouseholdsandcreditmarkett o f i n d o u t relation o f characteristics a n d e n d o w m e n t o f urbanhousehol dsandcharacteristicsofloantochancetoborrow,loanamount.
-Inaddition,housing financeprojectdostrengthenandcapacitybuilding to developVietNam'shousingfinancesystem.
Researchq u e s t i o n
Summaryonresearchmethodology a n d data
Themethodisused,includingstatisticalanddescriptiveanalysis,reviewofhistoricaltrends,andcomparativ emethods.Apartform,quantitativemethodisextensivelyused.
Households are a significant focus in social science, with definitions varying among economists, feminists, and anthropologists Ringen (1991) characterizes a household as a group of at least two individuals who pool their incomes and utilize them collectively In this context, income is not strictly divided among members; instead, cooperation in income usage allows households to maximize their financial resources more effectively than if each member operated independently Despite this understanding, there is ongoing debate regarding the boundaries of the household concept Economists, in particular, regard the household as a crucial analytical unit, developing theories based on household behavior modeling Their economic models typically explore two main themes: one that examines consumption and production separately or together in an integrated framework, and another that focuses on market conditions and the interplay between households and markets for land, labor, and credit.
Creditisthetradeofmoney,goodsorservicesatthepresenttimeforapaymentinthefuture.Creditcanb eprovidedinmanydifferentformsandunderawidevarietyofarrangements( K i n n o n Sc o t t , 2000)
Borrowingisonesideofcredit.Ingeneral,borrowingisdefinedasthattobetransferredpropertyrightonagivenob ject(e.g.sumofmoney)inexchangeforimplementingobligationofaclaimonspecifiedobject(e.g.a certainsumofmoney)atspecifiedpointoft i m e i n t h e f u t u r e I n e x t e n s i o n o f t h i s d e f i n i t i o n , b o r r o w i n g b y h o u s e h o l d s , particularlyurbanhouseholdisdefinedasactivitie sofhouseholdstoobtainexternalresourcestosupportotherhouseholdactivitieswithobligationtorepa yinfuture.Inotherway,borrowingismadebyhouseholdtofinancehousehold'sbudgetdeficit.
Housingcreditmarketthepresenceofheterogeneityamongdifferenthouseholdinducestosituation wherebyhouseholdsfallintobudgetdeficitwhilesomeothersareinbudgetsurplus.Therefore,th edeficithouseholdsdesiretoborrowinordertocovertheirdeficitwhilesurplushouseholdsa l s o desiretolendoutfortheiri n t e r e s t Consequently, householdcreditmarketise stablishedtofacilitateborrowingandlendingofhouseholds.Creditmarketfunctionistotransferpurchasing powerfromsurplushouseholdstodeficitonesbyissuingandacquiringofmoney-denominateddebt.
Increditscoringmethod,thecreditworthinesscanbemeasuredbythevaluesbasingonthecharacteristi cs.However,therearesomecorefactorsthatareusuallyusedincreditmanagement(Kapoor,Dlabay,Hughes,20 01).Theyare:
Credita n a l y s i s i s a p r o c e s s o f c o l l e c t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n , a n a l y z i n g i n f o r m a t i o n w i t hsciencesmethodfortheaimtounderstandclearaboutclientsandtheirbusin essprojects,servingprocessofshort- termloandecision.Creditanalysisisanimportantstepwiththepurposeusingtomakeloandecision:a cceptorrejectissuingcredit.Inordertomakecreditdecisionbanksmustdothreestepsfollowing:
- Collectingsu ffi cie nt &accurateinformation.
Bycreditanalysis,bankscanreplacetheirexperiencesabouthouseholdandtheirprojectappliedforloan withscientificallyargumentandevidencesrelyoninformationanddataprocessing.Therefore,credit analysishelpbanksavoidingtwotypesofmistake:(1)givecreditforbadclient,(2)andrejectingthegoodone.
Analysiscontents:analysisshouldbetargetedevaluationofcapacityrepayingloanthatmean,iteva luatewhethercustomercanrepayseedmoneyandinterestornot.Toappreciaterepa ymentcapacityofcompany,wehavetodeterminedfactorseffectingtocustomer’srepaying- debtcapacity.Inotherhand,creditanalysiscontentsshouldbeconcentratedintoanalyzefactorse ffectingtoabilitytomeetobligation.Basically,abilityofrepayingloanisinfluencedby:
Chung(2000).Creditrationingisaconditionofloanmarketinwhichthelendersupplyoffundislesst hanborrowerdemandatthequotedcontractterm.Inotherwords,itmeansthatthereisexcessdemand. Increditmarket,creditrationingappearstobeaninefficientsituationofcreditmarket,wherei nterestratedoesnotworkwelltobalancesupplyanddemandsides.
Therearetwomajorwaystoexplorecausesofcreditrationing.Firstly,traditionalviewsconsider creditrationingresultedfromgovernmentinterventionsoncreditmarketbyimposinginte restrateceilingonlendinginstitutions.Interestrateisexogenouslyheldundermarketclearin glevel.Withinterestratekeepartificiallylow,somepotentialborrowerswhowant toborrowarerationed.S e c o n d l y , afterthedemise ofthetraditionaltheories,anewapproach tocreditrationingwasdeveloped.T h e n e w a p p r o a c h a r g u e d t h a t p e r m a n e n t creditr a t i o n i n g i s consideredasanequilibriumphenomenonratherthanatemporaryphenomenon.Mod erntheoriesidentifyproblemsofmoralhazardandadverseselectionincreditmarketas a sourceof creditrationingwheninformationis distributedasymmetiicallya m o n g marketparticipants.
Fragmentationofcreditmarketstronglyaffectstheborrowingbehaviorsofurbanhousehold s.Fragmentationofcreditmarket,firstly,isthoughtasaconsequenceoftherepressi veg o v e r n m e n t p o l i c y C e i l i n g r a te ondepositan d loanrateimposedb ycentralbankinducestoseverecreditrationinginformalfinancialsector.Resultingfro minter- linkagebetweenformalandinformalfinancialmarketstheunsatisfieddeman dofhouseholdsforformalloanflowsintoinformalfinancialsectorandputdemandforinfor malloanstoriseup.Secondly, it isviewedthatfragmentation ofhouseholdcreditmarketiscausedbystructuralandinstitutionalf e a t u r e s ofcreditm arketi n developingcountries I n addition, fragmentationofcreditmarketmay alsoresultfromweaknessintheinfrastructure
6 thatsupportsthefinancialsystem.Thirdly,anotherperspectiveonfragmentationofcreditmarket arguesthatformalandinformalfinancial sectorsareparalleldevelopedbecausetheyservedifferentsegmentsofcreditmarket.
In conclusion, under perfect credit market conditions, borrowing and saving enable urban households to maximize their utility over time The demand for loans is influenced by household resources, incomes, and activities, which are referred to as "demand-side effects." Conversely, credit market conditions and the relationship between urban households and financial intermediaries impact their borrowing capabilities Inefficiencies in the credit market can prevent potential borrowers from accessing credit, while the severity of credit rationing explains the constraints faced by urban households Additionally, the fragmentation of the credit market accounts for varying borrowing behaviors among these households Ultimately, borrowing by urban households is significantly influenced by both demand-side and supply-side factors.
Asia is experiencing rapid urbanization, with a significant portion of its population living in poverty Approximately 25% of urban residents in Asia are below the poverty line, with countries like India and China housing about one-third of the region's urban population in challenging conditions For instance, in Mumbai, around 50% of its 12 million residents live in slums or on the streets This contributes to the global homeless population, which exceeds 100 million To address the basic needs of its urban population, Asia will require an investment of approximately $280 billion annually over the next 30 years.
Thelackofhousingaccessisoneofthemostseriousandwidespreadconsequencesandcausesofpo vertyinAsiancities.Theimprovementsinhousingthatareimportanttoimprovingthequ alityoflifeamongthepooroftendoesnotreceivetheattentiontheydeservefrompolicymakers(Da niere,1 9 9 6 )
T o makeanyappreciableimprovement,substantialgovernmentspendingisneeded,bot hinthephysicalexpansionofthecity’sinfrastructurea ndimplementationo f povertya lle viationprograms.Buttressedbytheheritageofliteraturethatarguestheimportanceofa ffordableandimprovedhousingin urbanpovertyreduction(see,forexample,Mitlin,2001),theimmediateresearchissueis howpoorfamiliescanaccessurbansheltermoreaffordably.
TheSingaporepublichousingdevelopmenthasattractedkeenresearchinterest(see,forexample,Won gandYeh,1985;Yuenetal,1999)butfewhaveclarifiedthepublichousing-urbanpoverty nexus.Thisprovidesthestartingpointforthepresent analysisoftheperformanceo f housingdevelopment.
According to Global Urban Development Magazine, significant economic development in Singapore has been crucial for housing improvements The government took deliberate actions to diversify the economy and create employment opportunities, resulting in a remarkable average GDP growth of 8.6% per year from 1965 to 1999 This economic expansion boosted nominal household income, increasing real per capita GDP from S$4,000 in 1965 to S$32,000 in 1999, while maintaining low inflation rates of around 2-3% annually Additionally, average monthly household income rose by 6.7% per year from 1988 to 1998, contributing to a surge in asset ownership Consequently, homeownership of public flats grew significantly, rising from 26% in 1970 to 92% of the housing stock by 1999.
Singapore's approach to public housing financing highlights its significant role in economic progress and job creation Established in 1960, the Housing Development Board (HDB) has successfully constructed over 850,000 housing units, alongside commercial and industrial premises, schools, community facilities, parks, and markets This extensive development not only enhances living conditions for the underprivileged but also generates numerous construction jobs, demonstrating a strong multiplier effect on the economy Scholars like Sandilands (1992) have noted that the construction sector outpaces overall GDP growth, emphasizing its critical role in economic development Additionally, the public sector housing construction is recognized for its pump-priming effect on the economy (Krause et al., 1987).
Aswithmanyothercities,Singapore’squesttoprovidei t s poorresidentswith go odlivingenvironmentcisnotnew.Adequateshelterwiththepromiseofadecentlifeofdignity,goo dhealth,safety,happinessandhopeisonethemethathasbeenrepeatedinternationallyandenshrine dinsuccessiveUnitedNationsdeclarations(see,forexample,
UNCHS,1 9 9 8 ; 1 9 9 9 ; WorldB a n k , 1 9 9 3 ) TheS i n g a p o r e d ev e l o p me n t e x p e r i e n c e , however,showsthatpublichousing(evenhigh- rise)forthelowerincomefamiliesneednotdegenerateintopolarizedandmarginalenvironments.Non etheless,thereemergenceofthehomelessunderscorestheurgency forfurtherresearch.Inparticular,thetrendtowardstallerhousingpresentschallengesTh epoorofSingaporedonothavethealternativetooptoutofthishousing.Inthisregard,wearereminde dofMitlin’s(2001,p5l2)exhortationtounderstandandfollowtherealitiesofthepoorinthecontinui ngefforttocreateaffordablehousingthatseektoaddresstheirdiverseneeds.
Insummary,Singapore’ssystemofhousingdevelopmentwithasingleempoweredauthori tyresponsibleforhousingdeliverymaynotbethemodelforallcountries,buteffectivepragmaticmana gementprinciples(suchasinclusivehousingandwideninghomeownershipopportunityforlower- income families,directedassistanceforlow- incomerenterhouseholdsa n d continualre vie w ofhousingaccess) apply inmo stcontexts.Thereisagrowingliteraturethatemphasizesacomprehensiveapproachtohousing.Sim ilartosituationofChinaandThailandorotherAsiancountries,VietNamcangetthemostsuitablelessonsforhousing marketandpolicyinthewayofeconomicdevelopment,
China’shousingmarketandpolicycontextarerelativelyunique,differingfromthoseoftheuropean dtheUS,includingthepost-
’shomeownership- orientedhousingpolices.Inthissectionandthroughoutthepaperthediscussionfocusesonurbanhousing policyonlybe.causeofthedifferentrulesandinstitutionalarrangementgoverningho usinginruralandurbanareas.
Aseconomic‘reformsdeepenedinthe1990sChina’spolicymakerssoughttoprivatizemuch ofthepublicly-ownedhousingstockthathadbeenpreviouslyrentedfromthestateorstate- ownedenterprises(SOEs).Indoingsothegovernmentwasmotivatedbyanumberoffactors ,foremostofwhichwasthefactthatmaintenancecostlevelsranwellabovethenominalrentspaidbytenants.Zhang( 2003)citesfiguresindicatingthatasof1991rentongovernment-ownedhousingaveraged0.13Y/ m2oflivingspace(enterprise- ownedhousingwasevencheaper)whileupkeepexpensesaveraged2.31 reformsdesigned t o encouraget h e development o f housingm a r k e t s L i u , Par k,a n dZheng’s(2002)analysisoftherelationshipbetweenhousinginvestmentandecono micgrowthfoundsignificantpositiverelationshipsoverboththeshortandlongruns:anotherimportant policymotivationforspurringdevelopmentofhousingmarkets.
TheHousingProvidentFund(HPF)wasdesignedin1992tohelpweanemployeesfromworkplaceh ousingprovision.Assuch,itwaspairedwithreformofthesalarysystem.Insteadofprovidinghousingdirec tlyandpayingemployeesacorrespondinglylowersalary,theprogram’sgoalwastoenlistpublicsectorempl oyeesinthedevelopmentofthecommercialhousingmarketbyraisingtheirincomes butsiphoningtheincreaseintosavingsaccountsdedicatedtohousing,whilereducingtheirin- kindhousingbenefit,therebyencouragingthemtofindhousinginthemarketplace(Wang2001 ).Thereformwaspartofamoregeneralefforttohaveindividualsandmarketsreplacegovernmentandwor kunitsastheentitiesresponsibleforhousing finance(Lee2000).Becauseemployerparticipationisnotmandatoryintheprivatesector,theprimaryH PFbeneficiariesaregovernment,party,SOE,andotherpublicsectorworkers,althoughsomeprivatefirmsandf oreignjointventuresalsomatchemployeecontributions.
InarecentoverviewofChina’shousingpolicy,Sun(2004)criticizesthetargetingoftheHPFsystem.Th isisreinforcedb y thefactthatevenmostworkingl o we r - i n c o me householdsarenotinthekind ofofficial,full- time,andtypicallypublicsectorpositionslikelytocarryanHPFbenefit.
Theotherprincipalh o m e o w n e r s h i p - o r i e n t e d p u b l i c policyi s thedevelopment o f‘affordablehousing’(J/ng/ iShiyongFangor‘economicandcomfortablehousing’).Thepolicyisdesignedforlower-middle- andmiddle-incomeurbanresidentsandinvolvesgovernmentsubsidiesandprofitcapsfordevelopers.
In May 2005, key representatives from Thailand, including Vice Minister of Finance Veerachai Veerametheekul and other notable leaders from the Government Housing Bank and National Housing Authority, participated in the international conference titled “More Than Shelter: Housing as an Instrument of Economic and Social Development,” organized by Harvard University’s Joint Center for Housing Studies in Bellagio, Italy The event also featured important leaders from the USA, Mexico, South Africa, and Kenya Following the conference, delegates from the five participating countries endorsed the “Bellagio Housing Declaration,” emphasizing the critical role of housing in fostering economic and social development.
Declaration”affirmingthatsound,sanitaryandaffordablehousingforeveryoneiscentraltothewell- beingofnations.Italsoreaffirmedthathousingismorethanshelter;itisapowerfulenginethatcreateso pportunityandeconomicgrowth.Severalotherprincipleswerealsopromulgated:
(b)Housinga s a n e n g i n e o f s o c i a l a n d e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t : H o u s i n g b r i n g ssignificantbenefitsintermsofemploymentcreation,domesticcapitalmobilizationand socialwellbeinginthefaceofthemajorchallengesposedbypopulationgrowthandurbanization. (SeeseminardetailsandBellagioHousingDeclarationinGHBNewsletter,41stedition,2005)Theconclus ionsfrom thismostimportantconferenceindicatedthatmanycountriesrecognizedthathousingismorethanshelt er.Itisoneoflife’sessentialsandaprocessorengineofeconomicandsocialdevelopment.TheGovernmentshould giveahigh-priorityforestablishingalong-termhousingpolicyandstrategy.
In1962,KoreaNationHousingCorporation(KNHC)wasestablishedwiththemissionofimprovingthepublic livingstandardsandwelfarethroughhousingconstructionandurbanredevelopment.
KNHCi s a 1 0 0 percents t a t e - o w n e d c o m p a n y D u e t o i t s s t r o n g l i n k s w i t h t h egovernment,ithasbeenprovid eddirectfundingassistancebythegovernmentintheformofequitycontributionsandloansfromtheNationalHousin gFund.
KNHC'sorganizationconsistsofMainOfficewith20Divisionsunder4HeadDivisionsand1 Resea rchI n s t i t u t e , 2RegionalH e a d D i v i s i o n s i n SeoulandGyeonggi,and 1 0Branc hOfficesinothermajorcities.
At o t a l o f 3 , 0 7 6 e m p l o y e e s i s w o r k i n g a t K N H C , i n c l u d i n g 7 e x e c u t i v e s , 8 4 4 administrativeofficials(27%ằ),1,721engineeringofficials (56%) and504researchersand clerks( 1 7% ằ)
Asoftheendof2001,assetsamountto14,374billionwon,liabilitiesto9,301billionwon,capitalto5,07 3billionwon.Itssalesareupto3,274billionwon.
However,theliabilities,theaccruedinterestofwhichshouldbepaidbyKNHC,areonly2,254billionwo noftotal9,301billionwon.
Tenantsand.housingbuyerswillpaytheinterestexpensesoftherest(7,047billionwon) housingunitfornationalhousingstabilizationuntilnow,butwillbegintolaystrong emphasisontheimprovementofqualitytocomplywiththechangeoflifefromnow.
KNHCwillb ereborna s afuture- orientedc o r p o r a t i o n w i t h higheradditivevalueto realizeurbandevelopmentandhousingwelfare.
Moody'ss a i d s u c h a trackr e c o r d o f g o v e r n m e n t a s s i s t a n c e a n d t h e possib il ityt h a tgovernmentwillcontinuetoprovidefinancial help‘ensuresKNHC'sfinancialviabilityandoperationalsoundness.(websiteofGOLIATH— Businessknowledgeondemand).
Anyfuturechangesinratingwouldoccurifthecountry'ssovereignratingischanged,itsaid.Downwar dpressuremay occurifthegovernment'sfiscalconditionweakens,orifthecorporationisprivatized.
RivalratingsagencyStandard& Poors(S&P)alsogavethecorporationa foreign- currencycreditratingof"Aminus"andadomestic- currencyratingof"A."S&P'soutlookforthecorporation'screditratingis"stable."
Thecreditratingreflectsthecorporation'sfirmstatusintheSouthKoreanhousingmarketanditshousingprojectsfo rthecountry'slow-incomepeople.
Housing loans for households are accessible in various countries, including Finland, the UK, Japan, Spain, Portugal, Italy, France, Norway, Sweden, the US, Australia, Germany, Belgium, Thailand, and the Philippines There is a notable concern regarding household indebtedness, yet simulation-based analyses on this topic are scarce, with descriptive analyses being more prevalent Theoretical frameworks, such as the Permanent Income Hypothesis introduced by Milton Friedman in 1957, suggest that individuals base their consumption on perceived 'normal' income, despite short-term income fluctuations, which can lead to borrowing Similarly, the Lifecycle Hypothesis highlights the influence of wealth changes on consumption but does not address household indebtedness issues directly This discussion centers on the determinants of housing loans and the loan amounts influenced by household indebtedness.
Housing demand is influenced by households' choices regarding neighborhood selection, whether to own or rent, and the amount of housing services required Research conducted by Carol Rapaport on Tampa, Florida households illustrates this concept through a model that considers various factors, including the price of housing services, property tax rates, income, household characteristics, and local public goods These elements interact to shape the housing decisions made by different households across communities.
Householdincomeandthepriceofthecompositecommodityareexogenous.Thepriceofhousin greflectsthesupplypriceofhousingandanycapitalizationofthecommunitymixofpublicservicesandtaxlevels.P isconstantacrossallinanygivenj,butdiffersacrossHjjurisdictionsandacrosstenurestatus.
ClusandRalph(2007)alsohadresearchofhousingdemand Beyondmoney, monetarypolicyandfinancialdevelopmentshousingmarketsarecertainlyalsoinfluencedbyotherfact ors,suchastaxes,demographicsandotherdevelopmentsdeterminingthedemandforhousing.Thisrese archalsostatedtherelationsbetweenhousingloanandhousingdemand.MarcoSalvi(2 007)alsopresentedthemodelforthedemandofhousingintheGreaterZuricharea.Besidesthat,therearejustfe wempiricalofhousingdemandsuchasBajariandKahn(2002);Ferreira(2004);Bayer,McMillan,R uben(2002).Allthesepapersexposeanalysisconcernedtohousingdemand.Theseliter aturesofhousingdemandprovethathousingdemandisalwaysburningissueinmanycountries intheworld.
Thereseemtobehardlyanytheoriesondeterminantsofhousingloanforhousehold.Instead,therearen umerousempiricalanalysesonhouseholds’debtservicingdifficulties.
Maya n d T u d e l a ( 2 0 0 5 ) u s e d Britishd a t a t o s t u d y w h i c h factorsd e t e r m i n e d thelikelihoodofh a v i n g d e b t s e r v i c i n g d i f f i c u l t i e s U n e m p l o y m e n t , highl e v e l s o f indebtednessandahighproportionofnon-collateral debtincreasedthelikelihoodofproblems.Difficultiesseemedtobeofpermanentnature;pastprob lemswereagoodpredictoroffutureproblems.Therewasalmostnoevidenceofhousingwealthpreventing difficulties.Thismightbedue serviceloans.Hence,theavailabilityofcollateralisoflimiteduseinpreventingreported difficulties,eventhoughcollateralcertainlyreducesbanks’creditrisks.
MayandTudelaintroduceanewconcept,namely‘debt-at- risk’,anindicatorofcreditrisk.Itissimplythesumofhouseholdlevelhousingdebtmultipliedbytheho useholdlevellikelihoodoffinancialdistress.Ifitispossibletoidentifythedeterminantsofthelikelihoodofdistr ess,andifmicroleveldataareavailable,itispossibletocalculatetheaggregateamountof‘debtatrisk’andhowitwou ldreacttochangesintheparameters,suchasincome,age,housevalue,housesize,etc.Thesectionsafterofthispap erapplythisconcept.
LiuandLee(1997)usedv ar i o u s methodstostudythedeterminantso f housinglo andefaultsinTaiwan.Severalfactors,includingtheloan-to- valueratioandthelevelofeducation,s e e m e d t o c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e o c c u r r e n c e o f p r o b l e m s P r o b l e m s w e r e particularlyc o m m o n p l a c e a m o n g theyoungest.
CairnsandPryce(2005)foundwithBritishdatathathouseholddebtservicingabilitywas anincreasingfunctioninthelevelofeducation,ageandmarriedstatus.Familieswithmany childrenweremorelikelytohaveproblems.Geographicfactorsseemedtoplaysomerole.Parti ally,Bowie-
Anincreaseinthenumberofchildreninahouseholdisassociatedwithhigheroutgoingsandlessavailable financestorepaydebt.Itisworthexploringtheirexperienceofmaintainingpaymen ts.However,withineachyearcomparisonbetweenhouseholdswithdifferentnumbersofchildrencon firmsthat,inmostcases,asthenumberofchildrenincreasestherateofrepaymentdifficultyandarrearsincre ases.
Onewouldexpectthathouseholdincomewould haveastrongrelationshipwiththeprobabilityofhouseholdex p e ri e nc in g mortga ge ar re ar s
Ingeneral,onewouldexpectthatasanindividualgetsolder,theirstatus,incomeandfinancialstabilitywi llalsoincrease.
SimilartothecaseinHDBank,theexpectedresult likesresultofBowie- CairnsandPryce.TheresultofregressionofthisresearchwillbeshowndetailsinchapterIV.
Research indicates that several key variables significantly influence the likelihood of obtaining a housing loan, including income, age, sex, house value, house size, principal, residential status, occupation, interest, marital status, and credit type In the context of Vietnam, the author focuses on specific variables such as sex, age, education, income, size, house value, maturity, collateral, and loan amount to assess the probability of securing a housing loan Vietnamese banks typically offer housing credit with standard conditions related to principal, income, interest, and maturity However, given the pressures of economic development and integration into the global economy, commercial banks in Vietnam should implement more flexible and diversified housing credit programs to cater to various needs This research aims to build a model that identifies significant variables affecting the probability of obtaining a housing loan, ultimately enabling commercial banks to develop more effective housing credit programs tailored to borrower characteristics.
Del-RioandYoung(2005a)concludedthatnon-collateral loansinBritainweretypicallytakenbypeoplewhowereintheirtwenties,hadnochildren, wererelativelywelleducated,wereemployedandhadoptimisticexpectations.
Brown,Garino,TaylorandPrice(2003)found thatoptimismseemedtostrengthenthedemandfornon- collateralloans,eventhoughafteracertainlevelthedegreeofoptimismhadnoimpact.Factorssuchasspous eincomeandsavingsseemedtohavenoimpact.
2003.Householddebthadbeenonincrease,especiallyamongtheyoungesthouseholdsan dthosewithlowincome.Thegrowthoffinancialwealthhad takenplaceaboveall inhouseholdswithnodebt.
Magri(2002)studiedtheoccurrenceofdebtamongItalianhouseholds.Higherincomestre ngthenboththe‘demandforloansandtheavailabilityofcredit,whereasbeinganentrepreneur strengthenedthedemandforcreditbutmadeitmoredifficulttoobtainloans.
BrownandTaylor(2005)studiedthedeterminationofhouseholdfinancialwealthanddebtintheUK,German yandtheUS.Therewasaclearcorrelationbetweenfinancialwealthanddebt.Ifhouseholdswithnodebtwer eexcluded,thecorrelationvanished. overthelifecycle.Themodeloftheseauthorsmayalsobeusedtoassesstheimpactofchangesintheincom eprocess.Thefirstsimulationtheyconsiderisanunanticipateddeclineinthenon- propertyincomeofpensioners.Thiscouldbethoughtofasarisingfromacutinthestatepensionoraworse ninginpayoutsfromcompanypensions.Itismodeledas20%pointdeclineintheagepremiumin oldagethatisassumedtobepermanentandoccursunexpectedlyinthe2026—
30period(itreducesthenon-propertyincomeof thoseover60by20%).Whentheshockoccurs,allcohortsreducetheirconsumptionof goodsandhousing,butthosewhowillhavejust retiredreducetheirconsumptionthemostastheyexperiencethelargestproportionatede clineintheirlifetimeincome.Thedeclineofaround12%(forthoseaged61
65)intheirimmediatespendingissmallerthanthedeclineintheirnon- propertyincomebecausetheirspendingisalsodependentonwealthwhichisnotaffectedbythechangeininco me.ThisresultisthesimilartothisresearchandinVietNam.Whentheoldofhouseholderincreasesorthehou seholderisonretire,theprobabilityofhousingcreditdecreases.
Crook(2001)analyzedthe1995USSurveyofConsumerFinancesdata;thedemandforhousehold loansseemedtobeanincreasingfunctioninincomeandfamilysize.
DavydoffandNaacke(2005)presentedapurelydescriptivereportonthedistributionofhousinga ndconsumer loansinFrance,Britain,GermanyandItaly.HousingloanswereparticularlycommonplaceintheU KbutremarkablyexceptionalinItaly,eventhoughowner- occupiedhousingisparticularlycommonplaceinItaly.Inallthecountriesthedeterminantsofhousingloa namountwererathersimilar.
Lendingornotandhowmuchforlendingareoneofthemostimportantaspectsofboththelenderandtheborro wer.Therearealsoresearchesconcernedloanamount.Similartothemodelofhousingloan,themodelofh ousingloanamountisbuiltwithvariablesassex,age,education,income,size,housevalue,maturity.Inrea l,thismodelhasdetailanalysisofhousingcreditforthehousehold.
ThebasicmodelofChung(2000)basedonassumptionsthatthereisahouseholdlivesintwoperiodswithin aperfectmarket.Thehouseholdhasainter-temporalutilityfunctionandbehavesrationally.
Generally,thebasicmodelindicatesthefactorsaffectinghouseholddemandforloanarecurrentconsu mptionlevel,incomeandasset.Itimpliesthatthedemandofhouseholdfor
16 loanisfunctionofhouseholdasset,incomeandconsumption.Theirrelationshipsare showedinthefollowingequation:A=A;+QY;+rY
WhereAs isinitialamountofassets;YiIsthecurrentincome;Yisfutureincome;andrismarketrateofinte rest.Theequationexplicitlyindicatesthatthedemandofhouseholdsforloan risesifpreferenceforcurrentconsumptionbeinghighorexpectedincomeincreasingo r a mountofinitialassetsandcurrentincomeaswellasinterestratesdropping.
Thus,thebasicmodelshowsthatborrowing,alongwithsaving,allowsthehouseholdto smoothitsconsumptionpathandtomaximizeitsutilityovertime.
Inextensionofthebasicmodel,suchfactorsashouseholdresources,activitiesandflowsofresourcesareincl udedtoidentifydeterminantsofthedemandofhouseholdsforloan;andsomeassumptions a r e changed T h e models h o w s thatt h e de ma nd o f urbanhouseholdsforloanincrea seswithitsliquidityrequirementsforactivities.Chung(2000)writethatlevelofhouseholdbudgetdeficitdeter minesthelevelofborrowing:B=dR- ;wwhheerreeBBisthelevelofborrowing;dRisthe changeinassets;Yj isincomejthofthehousehold;andFgistheoutflowofexpendituretofinanceactivitygg.
Increasesinsuchhousehold‘activitiesasconsumption,productionandinvestmentcreateincreasingo u t f l o w s o f household r e s o u r c e s I f i n f l o w o f resources f r o m i n c o m e generatinga ctivitiesandassetswouldnotmeetoutflows,demandforloanmayrise.Theaboveequationshowsthat thedemandofthehouseholdforcreditappearswhenflowsofincomeandchangesinhousehold'sr esourcesdonotmeetdemandforfundingthehouseholdactivities.
Hence,thedemandforloanappearsand riseswhenhouseholddeficitgap appears andbroadens.Thedemandofthehouseholdforloanisdeterminedbyhouseholdresourcesandactivities. 2.3.5Empiricalmodelsappliedinpreviousstudies
Egerta n d Mih al jek ( 2 0 0 7 ) h av e b o t h s h o w n thath o u s e p r i c e d y n a m i c s a r e u suallymodeledintermsofchangesinhousingdemandandsupply(seeexHMTreasury,2003).Onthedem andside,keyfactorsaretypicallytakentobeexpectedchangeinhouseprices(PH),householdincome(Y),there alrateonhousingloans(r),financialwealth(WE),demographicandlabormarketfactors(D),theexpectedra teofreturnonhousing(e)andavectorofotherdemandshifters(X).Thelattermayinclude3proxiesforthelocation,a geandstateofhousing,orinstitutionalfactorsthatfacilitateorhinderhouseholds’ accesstothehousingmarket,suchasfinancial innovationonthemortgageandhousing loanmarkets:
Sexton(1977)suggestedsomecharacteristicsoftheborroweraffectedtothelendersuchas:goodcreditrecor d,married,single,divorcedorseparated,numberofdependents,age,primarymonthlyincome,presenceo fextraincome,homeowner,homerenter,hometelephone,creditedi n v e s t i g a t i o n made
OzlemOzdemir(2004)constructeda conceptualmodeltoexplaintherelationshipbetweenconsumercreditclients’paymentperfo rmanceandcreditcategory,interestrate,sex,age,maritalstatus,income,loansize,maturity,residentialstatu sandoccupation.Theequationofthemodelisasfollows:
Paymentperformance— § 0 +§1CreditType+§2Interest+§3Sex+§4Age+§5MaritalStatus+§6Income+§7Principal+ §8NumberofPayments(1)+§9ResidentialStatus+§10Occupation+E2
Descriptiveandregressionanalysisareusedtoanalyzethedeterminantsofintensityoflendingi nThaibanksb e t w e e n 1 9 9 2 and1 9 9 6 Sincetheird e p e n de n t variable is co ntinuoustheauthorusestheOLSmethodtoestimatethefollowingequation.
Creditriskorborrowercharacteristicsvariablesincludeavectorofjvariablesthatshowthedirectandindirectcreditofth eborrowersuchasassetsize,age,liabilities-to-assetsratio,currentratio,interestcoverageratio,andthelike,
Relationshipfactorsrepresentavectoroftvariablesthatshowtherelationshipbetweentheborrower andfirmsuchashousebankstatus,relationduration,andnumber ofbanksthattheborrowerhasrelationshipswith.
Otherrepresentsavectorofrvariablesthatcapturestheyearsoflending,banktypeofthelendingbanks,sector classification,etc. crepresentstheerrortermwithalltheclassicalassumptions,andn,§,y,‹pand$areconstantstobeestim ated.
ModelappliedbyL.Ellis,J.LawsonandL.Roberts-Thomson( 2 0 0 3 )
Fromt h e r esul t o f ane c o n o m e t r i c m o d e l , t h r e e k e y v a r i a b l e s e f f e c t t o t h eh o us in gleverageforhouseholdasageofthenhouseholdhead,householdincomeandhouseholdhou singwealth.
Ml, ,M4=dummyvariablesindicatingmaritalstatus,andL, ,L7=dum myvariablesindicatinglocation.
Insummary,therearemanystudiestoanalyzehousingcreditforhousehold.Therearealsomanycharacters effecttotheprobabilityofgettingaloanandloanamount.Inlimitedcondition,theauthorjus tconstructsthemodels withvariableswhichcanbegottenthedataandinformation.Thedetailofthemodelforthisresearchwill beshowninthenextchapterIII.
Thisc h a p t e r w i l l p r e s e n t stepb y s t e p t h e w a y ofi m p l e m e n t a t i o n ana lyzinga n dprocessing thed a t a c o l l e c t e d T h e s t u d y w i l l e m p l o y d e s c r i p t i v e s t a t i s t i c s a n d econometricmodeltoexaminetherelationshipbetweenthedependentvariableandi ndependentvariables.Theanalysisaimsatfindingoutthedeterminantsofprobabilitytogetahousingloanan ddeterminantsofloanamount.
The aboveanalyticalgroundproposesthatcharacteristics,endowmentsofhouseholdsandloa ncharacteristicswoulddeterminetheprobabilityofgettingahousingloanofaborrower.Therefore,thefollowin ghypothesesareraised.
Hypothesis2 : forhousingborrowers,l o a n amountorlevelofborrowing,LAwould dependoncharacteristicsandendowments‘ofhousehold,andcharacteristicsofloan.
LA -f(vectorofhouseholdendowments,vectorofhouseholdcharacteristics,vectorof loancharacteristics) SubjecttoB=l
Thismodelshowsthedeterminantsoftheprobabilitytogethousingloan.Thetesteddet erminantsoftheprobabilitytogetahousingloanaresex,age,educationlevel,incomeofborrowerandHo wdothevariablesaffecttotheprobabilitytoborrowofurbanhouseholdsandwhichvaria ble isstronglyaffectstheprobabilitytoborrowofurbanhouseholds.Thevariabledefinitionofthismodelasf ollow:
Theprobabilitytoget‘ahousingloanforhousehold:thisvariableismeasuredbasingoncriterionso f creditanalysissuchas credit policy,charactersoftheborrower,paymentplanning
Sex:isoneofthehousehold’character.Thisdemographicvariableisalsoinputthemodeltoc hecktheinfluenceofborrowergendertoprobabilitytogetahousingloanandloanamount.
Ageofhouseholder:thisfactorisoneofthekeyfactorsforanalysisofhousingcreditfromba nk.Ageshowsthatthehouseholderisonworkinglaborageornot.Inaddition,inworkinglaborage,agealsosh owshouseholder’sjobexperienceandjobposition.Thisaffectsstronglytheirincome.
Incomeo f household:t h e l e v e l a n d the s t a b i l i t y of incomea r e important f a c t o r s i n evaluatingthecapacityofrepaymentfromhousehold.
Sizeofhousehold:thisfactoraffectsstronglysavingsandexpendituresofhousehold.Bec auseanincreaseinthenumberofchildreninahouseholdisassociatedwithhigheroutgoingsandlessavailablef inancestorepaydebt,itisworthexploringtheirexperienceofmaintainingpayments.
Numberofincomeearnersinhousehold:thisfactorvigorouslyimpacttosavingsand incomeofhousehold.Themoreincomeearners,themoresavingsare.
Valuesofhouse:housevalueisvaluated asacollateralsecurityincasewithoutcollateralforhousingSloan.Besideshousevalueshowthesavingsofh ouseholdatthetimewherethehouseholdgettheloanandtheloanamountwhichthehouseholdwanttoget.
Maturity:intuitively,probabilityofcreditforhousingincreaseswhenmaturityincreasesbecause thelonger term, themoreprobabilityofperiodicrepaymentfromhousehold.Itmeansthatthelongerterm,thesmallerp eriodicprincipalandinterestofhousehold.
Collateral:Assetpledgeincaseofdefault.Ifloanwasguaranteedbymortgageorpledgeasset,itwillceme ntresponsibilityandobligationofborrower.In caseofinsolvent,collateralturntobesecondreceivableofbanks,however,mortgageorsecurityas sethasaccommodatetorealisticc o n d i t i o n s
Loanamountorloansize:effecttoprobabilityofcreditdelinquencyincreases whentheloansizeincreases.Sothisfactorwilldefineapositiverelationshipbetweenloansizeandhousehol d’paybackperformance,assumingthereisnoinflation.Thelendersgenerallyprefergiving thiskindofcreditforlowerloansizeinordertodecreasetheirrisk.
Thesecondmodelattemptstoprovethat characteristicsandendowmentsofhousehold,andloancharacteristicsdetermineloanamou ntsborrowed.Thetesteddeterminantsofloana m o u n t a r e a g e o f households, h o u s e h o l d size,house o f value,householdexpenditure,occupationsofhouseholdmembersand numbersofdependants Which factoraresignificantdeterminantsofloanamount.Howdothesefactorseffecttoloan amount.Thevariabledefinitionofthismodelasfollow:
Theloanamountofhousingloan forhousehold:thisvariableismeasuredb a s i n g on privatecharacteristicsofborrowersandstatusofborrowers’household.
Firstly,twodependentvariables(Bvariable-possibilitytogetahousingloaninmodell andLAvariable-loanamountinmodel2)arechosentoanswerthestudyquestions.
Secondly,accordingtotheabovestudiesinLiteratureReviewchapter,itcanbeseenthatmanyfactorsareablet oinfluencetheprobabilitytogetahousingloananddeterminantofloanamount.Thisresearchjustconcentrates someimportantfactorseffectstronglytoresultofthemodel1&2asfollows:
B=f(SEX,AGE,EDU,INCOME,SIZE,HHNO,HOUSEVAL,MATUR,COL,LA).
LA-f(SEX,AGE,EDU,INCOME,SIZE,HHNO,HOUSEVAL,MATUR).
B- + a ; S E X + a AGE+ a EDU+ I NCOME +a5SIZE+HHNO+ a7HOUSEVAL+ agMATUR+a9COLL+aieLA
Bistheprobabilitytogetahousingloan.It’sabinaryvariablehavingtwovalues(0;1).Value[TJ meansacasethatborrowergotahousingloanwhilevalue[0]indicatesacasethatborrowerwasref used.
3 EDU:Adummyvariablethatequalsto1ifeducationlevelofhouseholdhead ishigherthancollegelevel;and0ifnot.
9 COLL:Collateralisdummyvariable.Itequals1ifborrowerofferscollateraland0ifnot.
LA:Loanamountisthecurrencyvalueofthehousingloanthattheborrowers askedthebank.It’smeasuredinmillionVND.
+ Ifthehouseholdheadisaman,theprobabilitytogetahousingloan wouldbehigherthanthecasethatthehouseholdheadisawom an.Inthiscase,theexpectedsignis(+);incontrar y,theexpectedsignis(-).
2 AGE - More agei s l e s s p r o b ab i l i t y to getloan, especiallythepersonisatretiredage.Almostof thisgrouppeoplearenotabletogetloan.
3 EDU + Ifthehouseholdheadhashighereducationlevel,theprobab ilitytogethousingloanwouldbehigher.Inthis case,theexpectedsignis(+);incontrary,theexpectedsi gnis(-).
7 HOUSEVAL + Household hashousevalueasmuchaspossiblebecauseh o u s e v a l u e i s t h e c o l l a t e r a l o f t h e housingl oa n andhousevalueis highwhichmeansthatloa n amountfrombank islowandriskfromthehouseholdalsoislow.
8 MATUR + Longtermofloanmaturityissynonymouswithincrea singpaymentformhousehold.Thelongermaturityof housingloan,thesmallertheperiodicprincip lewhichtheymusttopay.Itmeans thattheirincomeensurerepaymentfromhousehold.
9 COL + Ift h e h o u s e h o l d headhascollateral,t h epr obabilitytogethousing loanwould behigher.Inthiscase,theexpectedsignis(+);incontrary,theex pectedsignis(-).
10 LA - Thelessrequired loana m o u n t , theh i g h e r probabilitytogetthehousingloanis.
LA+biSEX+ bAGE+baEDU+ b‹INCOME+ bSIZE+b6HHNO+ b7HOUSEVAL+b8MATUR
LA:Loanamount(millionVND).LAinthesecondmodelisdifferentfromtheLAinthefi rstmodel.Here,itistherealloanamountthattheborrowergotfromthebank.
8 MATUR:Loanmaturity.It’smeasureinmonth. ằ Expectedsignsofthevariables’coefficients:
SEX + Ift h e h o u s e h o l d h e a d i s a m a n , t h e l o a namountwouldbehigherthanthecasethattheh ouseholdheadisawoman.Inthiscase,theexpected signis(+);incontrary,theexpectedsignis(-).
3 EDU + Ift h e h o u s e h o l d h e a d h a s h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n higher.Inthiscase,theexpectedsignis(+);in contrary,theexpectedsignis(-).
5 SIZE - Bigs i z e o f h o u s e h o l d ist o i n c r e a s e expe ndituretogetherwithd e c r e a s i n g incomea swellasdecreasingpayment.Itmeansthatbiggersi zeislessloanamount.
6 HHNO Morehouseholdnumbercanearnmoreincomealongwith increasingpaymentcapacity.Somorehouseh oldnumbercanearnismoreloanamount.
+ Householdha s housevalueasmuchaspossi blebecausehousevalueisthecollateralofthehousin gl o a n and h o u s e v a l u e i s highwhichmeans thatloanamount frombankislowandriskfromthehouseholdalsoislo
8 MATUR + Longt e r m o f l o a n m a t u r i t y i s s y n o n yw. m o u swithincreasingpaymentformhousehold. Thelongermaturityofhousing loan,thesmallertheperiodicprinciplewhichtheymustto pay.Itmeansthattheirincomeensurerepaymentfro mhousehold.S o morematurityismoreloa namount.
2isthesimilartothemodel1.Butthesignofagevariableisdifferentfromthemodel2.Theagevariableint hemodel2willbepositivesign.Inlaborage,themoreageisthehigherworkingpositionandincome.
Dataincludes bothindividualinformationandhouseholdinformation oftheborrower.Theborrowersarethepersonswhocangethousingloan(inmodel1&2)andcannotgethousingl oan(inmodel1).
The authorwanttoapplytheresultofthisresearchtorealityofVietnameseeconomyespecially HDBankcase.NowVietNamhasmanydifficultiestofacethehighinflation,economic crisisallindustries,tighteningmoneypolicyofSBV Oncemoreimportantthingistheviolentco mpetitioninbankingfieldatthetimeofundertakingtoparticipateinW T O T h i s r e s e a r c h w i l l h a v e m a n y m e a n i n g f o r ban kt o f i n d o u t t h e s t a b l e developingstrategyparticularinc ustomerlendingbusiness.The author hasafortunatechangetojoinmodemprojectofbankinallmodule(kernel,generalledger,customerlen ding,branchteller ).That’scorebankingproject.Almostofdataforthisthesiscanbeextractedfromthecorebanki ngsystem.AnotherfortuneissupportandpermissionofHDBankgeneraldirectortoallowandtosignad ecisionfortheauthortogetthedata.
- Loaninformationandcustomerinformationfromheadofficeandbrancheso fHDBankinHCMC.Becauseofgeographicconditions,it’sdifficulttogetdataofsomevaria blessuchassizeofhousehold,thenumberofhouseholdcan earnincome fromarchivesofbranchesareoutHCMC.
- Loaninformationandcustomerinformationmusthasenoughforallvariablesofthesissucha s:sex,age,education,incomeofhousehold,sizeofhousehold,housevalue,maturityloan,collateral,loa namount.
DataisusedintheanalysisfromthecorebankingofHCMCHousingDevelopmentBank.Thea nalyzeddataareoftheyear2005,2006and2007.Thereasonwhychoosetheseyearare:
Thesamplesizeconsistsof306observedcases.Ofwhich,thereare198casesgettingahousingloanfromtheHD Bankand108casesrefusedtogettheloan.ComparedtothetotalborrowingcasesoftheHCMCbranchoftheH DBank,thesampleoccupies21.7%.
Themethodisusedwhichcalled“proportionatestratifiedsampling”(eachstratumisproperlyreprese ntedsothatthesamplesizedrawnfromthestratumisproportionatetothestratum’sshareofthetotalpopulati on).
Bythepossibilitytogetaloan:thepopulationisdividedintotwostratums:thecasest hatw e r e a c c e p t e d a n d r e f u s e d t o getthehousing l o a n ( 6 5 % a n d 3 5 % ofc asesaskingloanfromtheHDBank—figure2.1).
2007.Ineachyear,t h e sa mp le s aredrawnfollowingthepercentageo f eachstr atum ( a c c e p t e d andrefusedtogetahousingloan).
Alldataforhousingl o a n waspickedu p fromcorebankings y s t e m Afterthat,da ta will begroupbyyearbybranchandselectedbycommonconditionsasfollows:
- Observationn u m b e r o f e v e r y y e a r w i l l b e e x t r a c t e d b y b e l o w g r o w t h r a t e o f housingloan amount.S o withthecustomerw h o c a n gethousingl o a n , thereare24observationsinyear2005,48inyear2006and126in year2007.Similartothecustomerwhocannotgethousingloan,thereare12observationsiny ear2005,24inyear2006,72inyear2007correspondingtothegrowthratesof43%and2 83%incomparisontothepreviousyears.
Figure2.1sho ws thest ru ct ur e ofthepossibilityt o gethousingloanornot.Totally, thesamplesizeconsistsof306cases,ofwhich,1 9 8 casesareoftheoneswhocouldgeth ousingl o a n du r i n g theperiod2 0 0 5 -
Figure2 2 s h o w s thestructureofs a m p l e s in everyyearbyprobabilityandimprobability.Theobservationwillbepickedfollowbygro wthratepercentageoftotalhousingloanamount.Totalhousingloanamountinyear2005,2006, 2007are413,591,2268billionVNDwithinturnpercentageare43%
(year2007comparewith2006).Sowiththecustomercan‘gethousing loan,thereare24observationsinyear2005,48inyear2006and126iny e a r 2 0 0 7 Similart o t h e c u s t o m e r c a n n o t g e t h o u s i n g loan,thereare12observationsinyear2005,24inyear2006,72inyear2007. Figure2.2:Structureofsamplespossibilitytogetahousingloan.
Descriptiveanalysiswillbeappliedinthestudytounderstandthecentraltendency,thedispersionandthedistri butionofthesamples.DetailofstatisticaltestfordescriptiveanalysiswillbepresentedinchapterIV(item4 3).
- Multico-linearitytest:Multico-linearitytestslinearrelationshipsbetweentwoor moreexplanatoryvariables.
- Autocorrelationtest:Durbin-Watson(DW)testwillbeusedforautocorrelationof variables.
AlldataofthisthesiswillberunbySPSSsoftwareincludesanalysessuchas:statistical testsfordescriptiveanalysis,correlationanalysis,testsforvalidityofspecificmodels.
4.1 Situationofhousingcreditprogramf o r urbanho us eho l d i n HeChiMinhC i t y 4.1.1Housingdemandsofurbanhouseholdandsupplyofhousing
3m'/person.InHCMC,thereare150,000temporarydwellings,including43,000dilapidated housesand24,000slumhousesalongthecanalsandsmallrivers.Ofthetotal54.4millionin'ofurbanho using,32millionin'requiresimmediaterepairandmaintenance,and1.7millionin'needstoberem ovedfornewhousingconstruction.
SinceDoiMoi,theprivatesectorhasproducedabout70%ofthenewhousinginHanoiandabout60%i nHCMC(DLHofHanoi,1995).Therearedifferencesintheconceptofthe"privatesector"ofurbanhousi ngproductionbetweenVietNamandotherlowincomecountries.InVietNamtheprivatesecto rcovershousingproductionbyhouseholdusingtheirownfundstoproduce housingfortheirpersonal use.Becauseit’sdifficultforhouseholdtogetahousingloan,housingfinanceandtheboomofhousingconstr uctionincivilsectorafterDoiMoiaswellasthederegulationinhousingsector.Theauthoritieshavethehousing loanprogramasfollows:
TheNationalStrategyonHousinguptotheYear2010isstillunder studybytheMOC.Althoughthedraftstrategyatthismomentjusts h o w s somegeneral strategyhaspresentedtheprimaryconceptsonhousingdevelopmentwhichisconcerned withfinancingfromthecommercialbanksandfinancialorganizations.
Vietnam's financial system, despite significant reforms since 1988, remains underdeveloped and heavily dominated by state-owned banks Non-bank financial institutions and the securities market are relatively small, highlighting the system's weaknesses The transition from a planned to a market economy has led to institutional weaknesses that affect both the overall economy and the financial market Additionally, Vietnam's financial system shares characteristics with those of other developing countries, such as a monopolistic credit market dominated by state-owned banks, an incomplete credit market, and the absence of certain markets like credit insurance These challenges are exacerbated by repressive financial policies.
,Governmenthasbeentaking strictly controlover interestratesandoperationsofbankingsector.Therefore,interestrateshavebeenkeptunderthe marketclearingrates;andextensionofcreditisbiasedtowardsprioritysectors.
Theurbancreditmarketishighlyfragmented.Theformalandinformalsectorsco- exist.Theformalfinancialsect or includesgovernmentbanks,privatebanks,a ndcreditcooperativesandcreditschemes.Amongtheformalfinancialinstitutions,alargenumberoffo rmalloansconcentrateonruralhouseholdsratherthanurbanhouseholds.Onthehand, theinformalfinancialsectorincludesprivatemoneylenders,relativesandfriendsandotherin dividuals.Theyhavebeenactiveinthecreditmarket.
Ramanathan(2005)statethatADBwillhelpabout137,000lowincomeurbanresidentsinVietNa mtobuyorimprovetheirhomesthroughanapprovedloanforUS$30millionequivalentthatwillsupportth eestablishmentofanaffordablehousingfinancesystem.
AccordingtoADBsource(2003),ADBProjectEconomistAlfredoPerdiguerostatedthat"About65%oftheurban populationlacksaccesstoaffordablefinance forhousingconstructiono r improvement,s o theyhavetoresortt o informal s o u r c e s su ch asmoneylenders,friends,relativesandcreditassociations"and“Theprojectwillim prove
Vietnam's urban population has been growing at an annual rate of 3.8%, reaching 19 million people, which is nearly a quarter of the total population as of 2000 Despite government efforts to improve housing for low-income residents, urban housing conditions have worsened, with only 25% of urban households living in permanent structures and nearly 40% occupying areas smaller than 36 square meters Projections indicate that urbanization could increase to 46 million people, or 45% of the population, by 2020 The government has implemented various policies and strategies for housing development, including establishing a housing finance facility within the State Bank of Vietnam This facility will enable participating financial institutions to originate and refinance loans, eventually evolving into an independent mortgage refinance agency to attract additional funding through bonds or securities The total cost of the housing project is estimated at $51.8 million, with 58% funded by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), which provides loans with a 32-year term and a grace period of eight years at a low interest rate The State Bank of Vietnam serves as the executing agency for this project, set for completion by the end of 2007.
GovernmentandADBhaveparticularplanningforhousingloanandhousingdevelopment.Fo llowingtheinclusioninthe2002countryprogramoftechnicalassistancetopreparetheHou singFinanceProject,anADBFact-FindingMissionvisitedVietNamd u r i n g 4-
8March2002.TheMissionhelddiscussionswithofficials fromtheSBV,theMinistr yo f Construction,t h eMinistryo f Planning a n d I n v e s t m e n t , a n d theMinistryofFi nance.F o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n s w it h allstakeholders, th e issuesreacheda nunders tandingwiththeGovernmentincludedas:
(1)FollowingarequestfromtheGovernmentforsupporttothehousingfinancesectorinVietNam,ADB approvedthepreparationofastudytoassessthehousingfinancesectoratthenationallevel,includingthephysical,in stitutional,andfinancialaspects.
(2)ThehousingfinancesectorisrelativelyundevelopedinVietNam.Thisreflectstheunderdevelopednature ofthewiderbankingandcapitalmarketsectorsthat arealsoinneedofsignificantreformand restructuring. recognizinglegalownershiprightsthroughtheissuanceofbuildingownershipandland usecertificates.
(4)Althoughthesereformshavehadasignificantimpactonthehousingsector,manyconstraintsstillr emain.Theseincludelackof(i)coordinationbetweenthegovernmentagenciesresponsible forthehousingsectorandthefinancialsector;
(iii)aninstitutionalandregulatoryframeworkforthehousingfinancesector; (iv)savingsschemeslinkedtohousingimprovementsanddevelopment;(v)long- termcapitalfinancingforhousing;and(vi)asystemoftransparent,well-justified,andtargetedsubsidies.
(5)Althoughnofinancialinstitutionsfocusexclusivelyonhousingfinance,manyhavesho wninterest inthe sectorandhaveinvestedpartoftheirportfoliosinthehousingsector.Thestructureofthehousingfinan cemarketinVietNamhasfourtiers.AtthetopisSBV,responsibleforsettingthe policyandregulatoryenvironmentforfinancialinstitutionsandmonitoringtheirprudenti alandoperationalperformance.Atthesecondlevel,therearestatebankswhoarerarelyengagedinprov idinghousingloanstohomeownersalthoughtheymayfinanceloanstohousingdevelopme ntandconstructioncompanies.ThisgroupincludestheBankforInvestmentandDevelopmentof VietNam,IndustrialandCommercialBankofVietNam,andBankforForeignTradeofVietNam.Asu bcategoryofthesecondtieristheprovincialhousingdevelopmentfunds,whichprovideconstruc tionanddevelopmentfinanceloanstohousingd e v e l o p me n t andconstructionc ompaniesaswellasfacilitatehousingloanfinancetohomepurchasersassociatedwiththefinancedhousi ngdevelopmentprojects.ThemostactiveinstitutioninthissubcategoryistheHoChiMinhCityInvestmentFu ndforUrbanDevelopment.
Athirdlevelcomprisestheretailhousingbankswhicharecurrentlyengagedinprovidinghousingloans.Th eyincludeAsiaCommercialBan k, HaNoiHousingBank,HoChiMinhCityHousi ngB a n k, MekongDelta HousingBank,andVietNamBankforAgricultureandRu ralDevelopment.Finally,thereareotherfinancialinstitutionsandconsumercreditorganizationsthatprovides mallloanstohomeowners.
(6)SocialsurveyspreparedundertheADB- fundedstudyandothersurveyspreparedbyotherorganizationsinHoChiMinhCity(HCM C)revealedthatmostlow- incomefamilieswouldpayaroundD50millionfornewhousing,whilesomecouldpayuptoD70mi llion.Theresultsoftheaffordabilityanalysisillustrateclearlythatmostlow- incomehouseholdscanaffordloansatmarketinterestratesifmedium-andlong- termfinancingwouldbeavailable.
The HCMC People's Committee is set to submit the official housing development program to the Government following the establishment of the National Strategy on Housing Although the program's details are not finalized, the Department of Planning and Investment (DPI) aims to increase housing availability from the current 5.8 square meters per person to 7.0 square meters per person To achieve this target, the city requires the development of 48 million square meters of housing HCMC plans to contribute 12 million square meters through expansion and an additional 36 million square meters through new developments, necessitating 5,400 hectares of land The city intends to secure 900 hectares for high-rise buildings and 4,500 hectares for residential areas in the suburbs The housing program consists of five key components, as stated by the Department of House-Land.
In 2007, Vietnam experienced significant economic growth after joining the WTO, achieving a GDP increase of 8.5%, the highest in a decade Recognized by global economic experts as the safest country for investment in Asia and second worldwide, Vietnam faced challenges such as unprecedented oil and gold prices, high inflation, and a struggling stock market Despite these obstacles, Vietnam capitalized on environmental changes that positively impacted its socio-economic development With a young, educated, and motivated workforce, HDBank, supported by its Executive Board and Management, has successfully set and pursued ambitious targets.
In2 0 0 7 , t h e c h a r t e r e d c a p i t a l w a s V N D 5 0 0 b i l l i o n ; t o t a l a s s e t s o f H D B a n k a p p r o x reachedVND14,000billion,equivalentto244%rise;themobilizedcapitalgainedVND12 ,456billion,withariseof284%;thetotalliabilitiesreachedVND8,912billionofthe233%oincrease.Wit hthegoodcontrol,thebaddebtwasunder0.3%oftotalliabilities.TheprofitbeforetaxwasVND168 billionequivalentto78%rise.Thedividendratein2006was1 6 % T h e HDBank’networkwas continuallyopenedmore20businesslocationsnationwideint o t a l l y 40branches.The staffintotalisupto1 0 0 0 T h e technologym o d e r n i z a t i o n p r o j e c t —
C o r e bankingw a s g o i n g the“ G o Live” l a u n c h issuccessful-atthisrighttime.
In 2008, the finance and monetary market faced significant uncertainty, marked by intense competition among banks, a shortage of skilled management, and limited government policies regarding securities trade, which raised potential risks in the real estate market To address these challenges, HDBank implemented a strategy to become a leading, diverse, and operational bank, focusing on enhancing its financial capacity by increasing its chartered capital to VND 2,000 billion, strengthening its brand, and diversifying its service offerings based on core banking principles The bank also prioritized improving management practices to align with international standards, boosting asset value and share liquidity Additionally, HDBank sought strategic partnerships to enhance competitive capacity and expand business performance sustainably while developing human resources through motivational policies In 2008, the bank committed to ensuring shareholder interests with a minimum dividend rate of 12% per year.
In2007,withyoung,higheducatedandenthusiasticstaffaswellasExecutiveBoard’sfullsupportsandonconsider ableattentionofBoardofManagement,HDBank’operationgainedgreatresultsbyitsnewmanagementstruct ure,orientationandchangesshowedasfollow:
TheprofitbeforetaxreachedVND168billion,equivalentto178%risecomparedtothat oftheyear2006.
Totalincome:777billion,suchasLoaninterest433billionfor55.8%oftotalincome,Non-
TotalExpenses:609billion,suchasOperationexpense490billionfor80.8%oftotalexpe nses,Managementexpense81billion(13.4%),theprovisionofcreditlosses27billion(4.4%),other expenses10billion(1.7%).
ThecapitalmobilizationplayedthekeyroletomeetthecapitalneedsofHDBank.In2007,thetotalca pitalmobilizationin HDBank’networkgainedVND1 2 ,4 56 bi l li on , increaseby284%compared t o 2006.Thisachievementw a s fro mtheapp licationofflexibleinterestratesinthemarket,servicequalityenhancement,networkopeni ngsnationwidewhichmade thecustomerssatisfiedandcomfortablewithHDBank’services.
As of December 31, 2007, credit operations accounted for 56% of total income, with outstanding debts reaching VND 8,912 billion, which is 71.6% of mobilized capital This marked a 95% increase over the planned target and a remarkable 233% rise compared to 2006 The bad debt ratio was low, at 0.3% for VND 27.9 billion, while the bad debt with loss possibility was VND 9.65 billion, representing 0.1% In 2007, HDBank launched marketing programs to enhance customer satisfaction by introducing new credit services, particularly in housing credit, which offered terms ranging from 10 to 15 years for households and 25 to 30 years for Phu My Hung housing purchases Additionally, credit programs were developed for low-income individuals and small to medium enterprises under ADB-sponsored initiatives.
Fé2.4GFOW thofloanoutstandingdebtsinHDBank( S o u r c e an nualreportofHDBankintheyear2 0 0 7 )
Theorybac 1Majorconcepts
Banking theory
Increditscoringmethod,thecreditworthinesscanbemeasuredbythevaluesbasingonthecharacteristi cs.However,therearesomecorefactorsthatareusuallyusedincreditmanagement(Kapoor,Dlabay,Hughes,20 01).Theyare:
Credita n a l y s i s i s a p r o c e s s o f c o l l e c t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n , a n a l y z i n g i n f o r m a t i o n w i t hsciencesmethodfortheaimtounderstandclearaboutclientsandtheirbusin essprojects,servingprocessofshort- termloandecision.Creditanalysisisanimportantstepwiththepurposeusingtomakeloandecision:a cceptorrejectissuingcredit.Inordertomakecreditdecisionbanksmustdothreestepsfollowing:
- Collectingsu ffi cie nt &accurateinformation.
Bycreditanalysis,bankscanreplacetheirexperiencesabouthouseholdandtheirprojectappliedforloan withscientificallyargumentandevidencesrelyoninformationanddataprocessing.Therefore,credit analysishelpbanksavoidingtwotypesofmistake:(1)givecreditforbadclient,(2)andrejectingthegoodone.
Analysiscontents:analysisshouldbetargetedevaluationofcapacityrepayingloanthatmean,iteva luatewhethercustomercanrepayseedmoneyandinterestornot.Toappreciaterepa ymentcapacityofcompany,wehavetodeterminedfactorseffectingtocustomer’srepaying- debtcapacity.Inotherhand,creditanalysiscontentsshouldbeconcentratedintoanalyzefactorse ffectingtoabilitytomeetobligation.Basically,abilityofrepayingloanisinfluencedby:
Chung(2000).Creditrationingisaconditionofloanmarketinwhichthelendersupplyoffundislesst hanborrowerdemandatthequotedcontractterm.Inotherwords,itmeansthatthereisexcessdemand. Increditmarket,creditrationingappearstobeaninefficientsituationofcreditmarket,wherei nterestratedoesnotworkwelltobalancesupplyanddemandsides.
Therearetwomajorwaystoexplorecausesofcreditrationing.Firstly,traditionalviewsconsider creditrationingresultedfromgovernmentinterventionsoncreditmarketbyimposinginte restrateceilingonlendinginstitutions.Interestrateisexogenouslyheldundermarketclearin glevel.Withinterestratekeepartificiallylow,somepotentialborrowerswhowant toborrowarerationed.S e c o n d l y , afterthedemise ofthetraditionaltheories,anewapproach tocreditrationingwasdeveloped.T h e n e w a p p r o a c h a r g u e d t h a t p e r m a n e n t creditr a t i o n i n g i s consideredasanequilibriumphenomenonratherthanatemporaryphenomenon.Mod erntheoriesidentifyproblemsofmoralhazardandadverseselectionincreditmarketas a sourceof creditrationingwheninformationis distributedasymmetiicallya m o n g marketparticipants.
Fragmentationofcreditmarketstronglyaffectstheborrowingbehaviorsofurbanhousehold s.Fragmentationofcreditmarket,firstly,isthoughtasaconsequenceoftherepressi veg o v e r n m e n t p o l i c y C e i l i n g r a te ondepositan d loanrateimposedb ycentralbankinducestoseverecreditrationinginformalfinancialsector.Resultingfro minter- linkagebetweenformalandinformalfinancialmarketstheunsatisfieddeman dofhouseholdsforformalloanflowsintoinformalfinancialsectorandputdemandforinfor malloanstoriseup.Secondly, it isviewedthatfragmentation ofhouseholdcreditmarketiscausedbystructuralandinstitutionalf e a t u r e s ofcreditm arketi n developingcountries I n addition, fragmentationofcreditmarketmay alsoresultfromweaknessintheinfrastructure
6 thatsupportsthefinancialsystem.Thirdly,anotherperspectiveonfragmentationofcreditmarket arguesthatformalandinformalfinancial sectorsareparalleldevelopedbecausetheyservedifferentsegmentsofcreditmarket.
In conclusion, under an ideal credit market, urban households can optimize their utility over time through both borrowing and saving The demand for loans is influenced by household resources, income, and activities, known as "demand-side effects." Conversely, credit market conditions and the relationship between urban households and financial intermediaries significantly impact borrowing behavior Inefficiencies in the credit market can prevent potential borrowers from accessing credit, while the severity of credit rationing explains the constraints faced by urban households Additionally, the fragmentation of the credit market contributes to varied borrowing behaviors among these households Ultimately, borrowing by urban households is shaped by both demand and supply-side factors.
The urban population in Asia is rapidly increasing, similar to trends in Latin America and Africa, and it is home to the largest concentration of impoverished individuals globally Approximately 25% of Asia's urban residents live below the poverty line, with higher proportions in certain countries India and China account for about one-third of the region's urban population, many of whom experience relative poverty For instance, in Mumbai, around 50% of its 12 million residents live in slums or on the streets, contributing to a global homeless population exceeding 100 million To address the basic needs of its urban population, Asia will require an estimated investment of $280 billion annually over the next 30 years in housing and related urban sectors.
Thelackofhousingaccessisoneofthemostseriousandwidespreadconsequencesandcausesofpo vertyinAsiancities.Theimprovementsinhousingthatareimportanttoimprovingthequ alityoflifeamongthepooroftendoesnotreceivetheattentiontheydeservefrompolicymakers(Da niere,1 9 9 6 )
T o makeanyappreciableimprovement,substantialgovernmentspendingisneeded,bot hinthephysicalexpansionofthecity’sinfrastructurea ndimplementationo f povertya lle viationprograms.Buttressedbytheheritageofliteraturethatarguestheimportanceofa ffordableandimprovedhousingin urbanpovertyreduction(see,forexample,Mitlin,2001),theimmediateresearchissueis howpoorfamiliescanaccessurbansheltermoreaffordably.
TheSingaporepublichousingdevelopmenthasattractedkeenresearchinterest(see,forexample,Won gandYeh,1985;Yuenetal,1999)butfewhaveclarifiedthepublichousing-urbanpoverty nexus.Thisprovidesthestartingpointforthepresent analysisoftheperformanceo f housingdevelopment.
According to Global Urban Development Magazine in Singapore (GUDS, 2007), significant economic development has been crucial for housing improvements in the country Deliberate actions were taken to diversify the economy and create employment opportunities, resulting in an average real GDP growth of 8.6% per year from 1965 to 1999 This economic growth led to a substantial increase in nominal household income, with real per capita GDP rising from S$4,000 in 1965 to S$32,000 in 1999, while inflation remained low at around 2-3% per year Additionally, from 1988 to 1998, the average monthly household income grew by 6.7% annually, contributing to a higher rate of asset ownership The proportion of homeownership in public flats surged from 26% in 1970 to 92% of the housing stock by 1999.
Singapore's public housing financing is closely tied to the nation's economic progress, showcasing its potential for job creation Established in 1960, the Housing Development Board (HDB) has constructed over 850,000 residential units, along with commercial and industrial spaces, schools, community facilities, parks, markets, and car parks by the year 2000 This extensive construction not only enhances living conditions for the underprivileged but also generates significant employment opportunities, demonstrating a high multiplier effect on the economy Scholars like Sandilands (1992) have highlighted the construction sector's role as a leading industry, with growth rates surpassing overall GDP growth, while others have noted the stimulating effect of public sector housing projects on the economy (Krause et al., 1987).
Aswithmanyothercities,Singapore’squesttoprovidei t s poorresidentswith go odlivingenvironmentcisnotnew.Adequateshelterwiththepromiseofadecentlifeofdignity,goo dhealth,safety,happinessandhopeisonethemethathasbeenrepeatedinternationallyandenshrine dinsuccessiveUnitedNationsdeclarations(see,forexample,
UNCHS,1 9 9 8 ; 1 9 9 9 ; WorldB a n k , 1 9 9 3 ) TheS i n g a p o r e d ev e l o p me n t e x p e r i e n c e , however,showsthatpublichousing(evenhigh- rise)forthelowerincomefamiliesneednotdegenerateintopolarizedandmarginalenvironments.Non etheless,thereemergenceofthehomelessunderscorestheurgency forfurtherresearch.Inparticular,thetrendtowardstallerhousingpresentschallengesTh epoorofSingaporedonothavethealternativetooptoutofthishousing.Inthisregard,wearereminde dofMitlin’s(2001,p5l2)exhortationtounderstandandfollowtherealitiesofthepoorinthecontinui ngefforttocreateaffordablehousingthatseektoaddresstheirdiverseneeds.
Insummary,Singapore’ssystemofhousingdevelopmentwithasingleempoweredauthori tyresponsibleforhousingdeliverymaynotbethemodelforallcountries,buteffectivepragmaticmana gementprinciples(suchasinclusivehousingandwideninghomeownershipopportunityforlower- income families,directedassistanceforlow- incomerenterhouseholdsa n d continualre vie w ofhousingaccess) apply inmo stcontexts.Thereisagrowingliteraturethatemphasizesacomprehensiveapproachtohousing.Sim ilartosituationofChinaandThailandorotherAsiancountries,VietNamcangetthemostsuitablelessonsforhousing marketandpolicyinthewayofeconomicdevelopment,
China’shousingmarketandpolicycontextarerelativelyunique,differingfromthoseoftheuropean dtheUS,includingthepost-
’shomeownership- orientedhousingpolices.Inthissectionandthroughoutthepaperthediscussionfocusesonurbanhousing policyonlybe.causeofthedifferentrulesandinstitutionalarrangementgoverningho usinginruralandurbanareas.
Aseconomic‘reformsdeepenedinthe1990sChina’spolicymakerssoughttoprivatizemuch ofthepublicly-ownedhousingstockthathadbeenpreviouslyrentedfromthestateorstate- ownedenterprises(SOEs).Indoingsothegovernmentwasmotivatedbyanumberoffactors ,foremostofwhichwasthefactthatmaintenancecostlevelsranwellabovethenominalrentspaidbytenants.Zhang( 2003)citesfiguresindicatingthatasof1991rentongovernment-ownedhousingaveraged0.13Y/ m2oflivingspace(enterprise- ownedhousingwasevencheaper)whileupkeepexpensesaveraged2.31 reformsdesigned t o encouraget h e development o f housingm a r k e t s L i u , Par k,a n dZheng’s(2002)analysisoftherelationshipbetweenhousinginvestmentandecono micgrowthfoundsignificantpositiverelationshipsoverboththeshortandlongruns:anotherimportant policymotivationforspurringdevelopmentofhousingmarkets.
TheHousingProvidentFund(HPF)wasdesignedin1992tohelpweanemployeesfromworkplaceh ousingprovision.Assuch,itwaspairedwithreformofthesalarysystem.Insteadofprovidinghousingdirec tlyandpayingemployeesacorrespondinglylowersalary,theprogram’sgoalwastoenlistpublicsectorempl oyeesinthedevelopmentofthecommercialhousingmarketbyraisingtheirincomes butsiphoningtheincreaseintosavingsaccountsdedicatedtohousing,whilereducingtheirin- kindhousingbenefit,therebyencouragingthemtofindhousinginthemarketplace(Wang2001 ).Thereformwaspartofamoregeneralefforttohaveindividualsandmarketsreplacegovernmentandwor kunitsastheentitiesresponsibleforhousing finance(Lee2000).Becauseemployerparticipationisnotmandatoryintheprivatesector,theprimaryH PFbeneficiariesaregovernment,party,SOE,andotherpublicsectorworkers,althoughsomeprivatefirmsandf oreignjointventuresalsomatchemployeecontributions.
InarecentoverviewofChina’shousingpolicy,Sun(2004)criticizesthetargetingoftheHPFsystem.Th isisreinforcedb y thefactthatevenmostworkingl o we r - i n c o me householdsarenotinthekind ofofficial,full- time,andtypicallypublicsectorpositionslikelytocarryanHPFbenefit.
Theotherprincipalh o m e o w n e r s h i p - o r i e n t e d p u b l i c policyi s thedevelopment o f‘affordablehousing’(J/ng/ iShiyongFangor‘economicandcomfortablehousing’).Thepolicyisdesignedforlower-middle- andmiddle-incomeurbanresidentsandinvolvesgovernmentsubsidiesandprofitcapsfordevelopers.
In May 2005, key representatives from Thailand, including Veerachai Veerametheekul, Vice Minister of Finance, and Khan Prachuabmob, President of the Government Housing Bank, attended the international conference “More Than Shelter: Housing as an Instrument of Economic and Social Development” organized by Harvard University’s Joint Center for Housing Studies in Bellagio, Italy This event brought together important leaders from the USA, Mexico, South Africa, and Kenya, fostering discussions on housing's role in economic and social development Following the conference, participants from the five countries endorsed the “Bellagio Housing” initiative, highlighting the collaborative effort to enhance housing policies globally.
Declaration”affirmingthatsound,sanitaryandaffordablehousingforeveryoneiscentraltothewell- beingofnations.Italsoreaffirmedthathousingismorethanshelter;itisapowerfulenginethatcreateso pportunityandeconomicgrowth.Severalotherprincipleswerealsopromulgated:
(b)Housinga s a n e n g i n e o f s o c i a l a n d e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t : H o u s i n g b r i n g ssignificantbenefitsintermsofemploymentcreation,domesticcapitalmobilizationand socialwellbeinginthefaceofthemajorchallengesposedbypopulationgrowthandurbanization. (SeeseminardetailsandBellagioHousingDeclarationinGHBNewsletter,41stedition,2005)Theconclus ionsfrom thismostimportantconferenceindicatedthatmanycountriesrecognizedthathousingismorethanshelt er.Itisoneoflife’sessentialsandaprocessorengineofeconomicandsocialdevelopment.TheGovernmentshould giveahigh-priorityforestablishingalong-termhousingpolicyandstrategy.
InKorea
In1962,KoreaNationHousingCorporation(KNHC)wasestablishedwiththemissionofimprovingthepublic livingstandardsandwelfarethroughhousingconstructionandurbanredevelopment.
KNHCi s a 1 0 0 percents t a t e - o w n e d c o m p a n y D u e t o i t s s t r o n g l i n k s w i t h t h egovernment,ithasbeenprovid eddirectfundingassistancebythegovernmentintheformofequitycontributionsandloansfromtheNationalHousin gFund.
KNHC'sorganizationconsistsofMainOfficewith20Divisionsunder4HeadDivisionsand1 Resea rchI n s t i t u t e , 2RegionalH e a d D i v i s i o n s i n SeoulandGyeonggi,and 1 0Branc hOfficesinothermajorcities.
At o t a l o f 3 , 0 7 6 e m p l o y e e s i s w o r k i n g a t K N H C , i n c l u d i n g 7 e x e c u t i v e s , 8 4 4 administrativeofficials(27%ằ),1,721engineeringofficials (56%) and504researchersand clerks( 1 7% ằ)
Asoftheendof2001,assetsamountto14,374billionwon,liabilitiesto9,301billionwon,capitalto5,07 3billionwon.Itssalesareupto3,274billionwon.
However,theliabilities,theaccruedinterestofwhichshouldbepaidbyKNHC,areonly2,254billionwo noftotal9,301billionwon.
Theoreticalmodelsandempiricalstudiesforhousedemand
Generalob servations
Housing loans for households are available in numerous countries, including Finland, the UK, Japan, Spain, Portugal, Italy, France, Norway, Sweden, the US, Australia, Germany, Belgium, Thailand, and the Philippines This is particularly relevant for contributions that view indebtedness as a significant issue However, finding simulation-based analyses on household debt is challenging, with descriptive analyses being more prevalent Theoretical contributions, such as Milton Friedman's permanent income hypothesis from 1957, suggest that individuals base their consumption on what they perceive as their 'normal' income, despite short-term income fluctuations, which may lead to the necessity of loans Similarly, the lifecycle approach emphasizes the influence of wealth changes on consumption but does not address household indebtedness issues This section focuses on the determinants of housing loans and the loan amounts arising from household indebtedness.
Housing demand is influenced by a household's choice of neighborhood, whether to own or rent, and the quantity of housing services required Research conducted by Carol Rapaport on Tampa, Florida households highlights the relationship between various factors affecting housing demand The model includes variables such as the price of housing services, property tax rates, income levels, household characteristics independent of community choice, and local public goods, which together shape individual housing decisions.
Householdincomeandthepriceofthecompositecommodityareexogenous.Thepriceofhousin greflectsthesupplypriceofhousingandanycapitalizationofthecommunitymixofpublicservicesandtaxlevels.P isconstantacrossallinanygivenj,butdiffersacrossHjjurisdictionsandacrosstenurestatus.
ClusandRalph(2007)alsohadresearchofhousingdemand Beyondmoney,monetarypolicyandfinancialdevelopmentshousingmarketsarecertainlyalsoinfluencedbyotherfact ors,suchastaxes,demographicsandotherdevelopmentsdeterminingthedemandforhousing.Thisrese archalsostatedtherelationsbetweenhousingloanandhousingdemand.MarcoSalvi(2007)alsopresentedthemodelforthedemandofhousingintheGreaterZuricharea.Besidesthat,therearejustfe wempiricalofhousingdemandsuchasBajariandKahn(2002);Ferreira(2004);Bayer,McMillan,R uben(2002).Allthesepapersexposeanalysisconcernedtohousingdemand.Theseliter aturesofhousingdemandprovethathousingdemandisalwaysburningissueinmanycountries intheworld.
Determinantsofhousingloan
Thereseemtobehardlyanytheoriesondeterminantsofhousingloanforhousehold.Instead,therearen umerousempiricalanalysesonhouseholds’debtservicingdifficulties.
Maya n d T u d e l a ( 2 0 0 5 ) u s e d Britishd a t a t o s t u d y w h i c h factorsd e t e r m i n e d thelikelihoodofh a v i n g d e b t s e r v i c i n g d i f f i c u l t i e s U n e m p l o y m e n t , highl e v e l s o f indebtednessandahighproportionofnon-collateral debtincreasedthelikelihoodofproblems.Difficultiesseemedtobeofpermanentnature;pastprob lemswereagoodpredictoroffutureproblems.Therewasalmostnoevidenceofhousingwealthpreventing difficulties.Thismightbedue serviceloans.Hence,theavailabilityofcollateralisoflimiteduseinpreventingreported difficulties,eventhoughcollateralcertainlyreducesbanks’creditrisks.
MayandTudelaintroduceanewconcept,namely‘debt-at- risk’,anindicatorofcreditrisk.Itissimplythesumofhouseholdlevelhousingdebtmultipliedbytheho useholdlevellikelihoodoffinancialdistress.Ifitispossibletoidentifythedeterminantsofthelikelihoodofdistr ess,andifmicroleveldataareavailable,itispossibletocalculatetheaggregateamountof‘debtatrisk’andhowitwou ldreacttochangesintheparameters,suchasincome,age,housevalue,housesize,etc.Thesectionsafterofthispap erapplythisconcept.
LiuandLee(1997)usedv ar i o u s methodstostudythedeterminantso f housinglo andefaultsinTaiwan.Severalfactors,includingtheloan-to- valueratioandthelevelofeducation,s e e m e d t o c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e o c c u r r e n c e o f p r o b l e m s P r o b l e m s w e r e particularlyc o m m o n p l a c e a m o n g theyoungest.
CairnsandPryce(2005)foundwithBritishdatathathouseholddebtservicingabilitywas anincreasingfunctioninthelevelofeducation,ageandmarriedstatus.Familieswithmany childrenweremorelikelytohaveproblems.Geographicfactorsseemedtoplaysomerole.Parti ally,Bowie-
Anincreaseinthenumberofchildreninahouseholdisassociatedwithhigheroutgoingsandlessavailable financestorepaydebt.Itisworthexploringtheirexperienceofmaintainingpaymen ts.However,withineachyearcomparisonbetweenhouseholdswithdifferentnumbersofchildrencon firmsthat,inmostcases,asthenumberofchildrenincreasestherateofrepaymentdifficultyandarrearsincre ases.
Onewouldexpectthathouseholdincomewould haveastrongrelationshipwiththeprobabilityofhouseholdex p e ri e nc in g mortga ge ar re ar s
Ingeneral,onewouldexpectthatasanindividualgetsolder,theirstatus,incomeandfinancialstabilitywi llalsoincrease.
SimilartothecaseinHDBank,theexpectedresult likesresultofBowie- CairnsandPryce.TheresultofregressionofthisresearchwillbeshowndetailsinchapterIV.
This research identifies key variables that significantly influence the likelihood of obtaining a housing loan in Vietnam, including income, age, sex, house value, house size, principal, residential status, occupation, interest, marital status, and credit type Given the current economic development and the pressures of global integration, Vietnamese commercial banks should implement more flexible and diverse housing credit programs to cater to various borrower needs The study proposes a model that highlights essential variables such as education, income, size, house value, maturity, collateral, and loan amount, which play a crucial role in determining loan eligibility The findings aim to assist commercial banks in developing targeted housing credit programs that effectively meet borrower characteristics and enhance loan approval success.
Del-RioandYoung(2005a)concludedthatnon-collateral loansinBritainweretypicallytakenbypeoplewhowereintheirtwenties,hadnochildren, wererelativelywelleducated,wereemployedandhadoptimisticexpectations.
Brown,Garino,TaylorandPrice(2003)found thatoptimismseemedtostrengthenthedemandfornon- collateralloans,eventhoughafteracertainlevelthedegreeofoptimismhadnoimpact.Factorssuchasspous eincomeandsavingsseemedtohavenoimpact.
2003.Householddebthadbeenonincrease,especiallyamongtheyoungesthouseholdsan dthosewithlowincome.Thegrowthoffinancialwealthhad takenplaceaboveall inhouseholdswithnodebt.
Magri(2002)studiedtheoccurrenceofdebtamongItalianhouseholds.Higherincomestre ngthenboththe‘demandforloansandtheavailabilityofcredit,whereasbeinganentrepreneur strengthenedthedemandforcreditbutmadeitmoredifficulttoobtainloans.
BrownandTaylor(2005)studiedthedeterminationofhouseholdfinancialwealthanddebtintheUK,German yandtheUS.Therewasaclearcorrelationbetweenfinancialwealthanddebt.Ifhouseholdswithnodebtwer eexcluded,thecorrelationvanished.
Determinantsofloanamount
Theoreticalm od e ls
ThebasicmodelofChung(2000)basedonassumptionsthatthereisahouseholdlivesintwoperiodswithin aperfectmarket.Thehouseholdhasainter-temporalutilityfunctionandbehavesrationally.
Generally,thebasicmodelindicatesthefactorsaffectinghouseholddemandforloanarecurrentconsu mptionlevel,incomeandasset.Itimpliesthatthedemandofhouseholdfor
16 loanisfunctionofhouseholdasset,incomeandconsumption.Theirrelationshipsare showedinthefollowingequation:A=A;+QY;+rY
WhereAs isinitialamountofassets;YiIsthecurrentincome;Yisfutureincome;andrismarketrateofinte rest.Theequationexplicitlyindicatesthatthedemandofhouseholdsforloan risesifpreferenceforcurrentconsumptionbeinghighorexpectedincomeincreasingo r a mountofinitialassetsandcurrentincomeaswellasinterestratesdropping.
Thus,thebasicmodelshowsthatborrowing,alongwithsaving,allowsthehouseholdto smoothitsconsumptionpathandtomaximizeitsutilityovertime.
Inextensionofthebasicmodel,suchfactorsashouseholdresources,activitiesandflowsofresourcesareincl udedtoidentifydeterminantsofthedemandofhouseholdsforloan;andsomeassumptions a r e changed T h e models h o w s thatt h e de ma nd o f urbanhouseholdsforloanincrea seswithitsliquidityrequirementsforactivities.Chung(2000)writethatlevelofhouseholdbudgetdeficitdeter minesthelevelofborrowing:B=dR- ;wwhheerreeBBisthelevelofborrowing;dRisthe changeinassets;Yj isincomejthofthehousehold;andFgistheoutflowofexpendituretofinanceactivitygg.
Increasesinsuchhousehold‘activitiesasconsumption,productionandinvestmentcreateincreasingo u t f l o w s o f household r e s o u r c e s I f i n f l o w o f resources f r o m i n c o m e generatinga ctivitiesandassetswouldnotmeetoutflows,demandforloanmayrise.Theaboveequationshowsthat thedemandofthehouseholdforcreditappearswhenflowsofincomeandchangesinhousehold'sr esourcesdonotmeetdemandforfundingthehouseholdactivities.
Empiricalmodelsappliedinpreviousstudies
Egerta n d Mih al jek ( 2 0 0 7 ) h av e b o t h s h o w n thath o u s e p r i c e d y n a m i c s a r e u suallymodeledintermsofchangesinhousingdemandandsupply(seeexHMTreasury,2003).Onthedem andside,keyfactorsaretypicallytakentobeexpectedchangeinhouseprices(PH),householdincome(Y),there alrateonhousingloans(r),financialwealth(WE),demographicandlabormarketfactors(D),theexpectedra teofreturnonhousing(e)andavectorofotherdemandshifters(X).Thelattermayinclude3proxiesforthelocation,a geandstateofhousing,orinstitutionalfactorsthatfacilitateorhinderhouseholds’ accesstothehousingmarket,suchasfinancial innovationonthemortgageandhousing loanmarkets:
Sexton(1977)suggestedsomecharacteristicsoftheborroweraffectedtothelendersuchas:goodcreditrecor d,married,single,divorcedorseparated,numberofdependents,age,primarymonthlyincome,presenceo fextraincome,homeowner,homerenter,hometelephone,creditedi n v e s t i g a t i o n made
OzlemOzdemir(2004)constructeda conceptualmodeltoexplaintherelationshipbetweenconsumercreditclients’paymentperfo rmanceandcreditcategory,interestrate,sex,age,maritalstatus,income,loansize,maturity,residentialstatu sandoccupation.Theequationofthemodelisasfollows:
Paymentperformance— § 0 +§1CreditType+§2Interest+§3Sex+§4Age+§5MaritalStatus+§6Income+§7Principal+ §8NumberofPayments(1)+§9ResidentialStatus+§10Occupation+E2
Descriptiveandregressionanalysisareusedtoanalyzethedeterminantsofintensityoflendingi nThaibanksb e t w e e n 1 9 9 2 and1 9 9 6 Sincetheird e p e n de n t variable is co ntinuoustheauthorusestheOLSmethodtoestimatethefollowingequation.
Creditriskorborrowercharacteristicsvariablesincludeavectorofjvariablesthatshowthedirectandindirectcreditofth eborrowersuchasassetsize,age,liabilities-to-assetsratio,currentratio,interestcoverageratio,andthelike,
Relationshipfactorsrepresentavectoroftvariablesthatshowtherelationshipbetweentheborrower andfirmsuchashousebankstatus,relationduration,andnumber ofbanksthattheborrowerhasrelationshipswith.
Otherrepresentsavectorofrvariablesthatcapturestheyearsoflending,banktypeofthelendingbanks,sector classification,etc. crepresentstheerrortermwithalltheclassicalassumptions,andn,§,y,‹pand$areconstantstobeestim ated.
ModelappliedbyL.Ellis,J.LawsonandL.Roberts-Thomson( 2 0 0 3 )
Fromt h e r esul t o f ane c o n o m e t r i c m o d e l , t h r e e k e y v a r i a b l e s e f f e c t t o t h eh o us in gleverageforhouseholdasageofthenhouseholdhead,householdincomeandhouseholdhou singwealth.
Ml, ,M4=dummyvariablesindicatingmaritalstatus,andL, ,L7=dum myvariablesindicatinglocation.
Insummary,therearemanystudiestoanalyzehousingcreditforhousehold.Therearealsomanycharacters effecttotheprobabilityofgettingaloanandloanamount.Inlimitedcondition,theauthorjus tconstructsthemodels withvariableswhichcanbegottenthedataandinformation.Thedetailofthemodelforthisresearchwill beshowninthenextchapterIII.
Thisc h a p t e r w i l l p r e s e n t stepb y s t e p t h e w a y ofi m p l e m e n t a t i o n ana lyzinga n dprocessing thed a t a c o l l e c t e d T h e s t u d y w i l l e m p l o y d e s c r i p t i v e s t a t i s t i c s a n d econometricmodeltoexaminetherelationshipbetweenthedependentvariableandi ndependentvariables.Theanalysisaimsatfindingoutthedeterminantsofprobabilitytogetahousingloanan ddeterminantsofloanamount.
Analyticalframework
Hypotheses
The aboveanalyticalgroundproposesthatcharacteristics,endowmentsofhouseholdsandloa ncharacteristicswoulddeterminetheprobabilityofgettingahousingloanofaborrower.Therefore,thefollowin ghypothesesareraised.
Hypothesis2 : forhousingborrowers,l o a n amountorlevelofborrowing,LAwould dependoncharacteristicsandendowments‘ofhousehold,andcharacteristicsofloan.
LA -f(vectorofhouseholdendowments,vectorofhouseholdcharacteristics,vectorof loancharacteristics) SubjecttoB=l
Determinantso f theprobability
Thismodelshowsthedeterminantsoftheprobabilitytogethousingloan.Thetesteddet erminantsoftheprobabilitytogetahousingloanaresex,age,educationlevel,incomeofborrowerandHo wdothevariablesaffecttotheprobabilitytoborrowofurbanhouseholdsandwhichvaria ble isstronglyaffectstheprobabilitytoborrowofurbanhouseholds.Thevariabledefinitionofthismodelasf ollow:
Theprobabilitytoget‘ahousingloanforhousehold:thisvariableismeasuredbasingoncriterionso f creditanalysissuchas credit policy,charactersoftheborrower,paymentplanning
Sex:isoneofthehousehold’character.Thisdemographicvariableisalsoinputthemodeltoc hecktheinfluenceofborrowergendertoprobabilitytogetahousingloanandloanamount.
Ageofhouseholder:thisfactorisoneofthekeyfactorsforanalysisofhousingcreditfromba nk.Ageshowsthatthehouseholderisonworkinglaborageornot.Inaddition,inworkinglaborage,agealsosh owshouseholder’sjobexperienceandjobposition.Thisaffectsstronglytheirincome.
Incomeo f household:t h e l e v e l a n d the s t a b i l i t y of incomea r e important f a c t o r s i n evaluatingthecapacityofrepaymentfromhousehold.
Sizeofhousehold:thisfactoraffectsstronglysavingsandexpendituresofhousehold.Bec auseanincreaseinthenumberofchildreninahouseholdisassociatedwithhigheroutgoingsandlessavailablef inancestorepaydebt,itisworthexploringtheirexperienceofmaintainingpayments.
Numberofincomeearnersinhousehold:thisfactorvigorouslyimpacttosavingsand incomeofhousehold.Themoreincomeearners,themoresavingsare.
Valuesofhouse:housevalueisvaluated asacollateralsecurityincasewithoutcollateralforhousingSloan.Besideshousevalueshowthesavingsofh ouseholdatthetimewherethehouseholdgettheloanandtheloanamountwhichthehouseholdwanttoget.
Maturity:intuitively,probabilityofcreditforhousingincreaseswhenmaturityincreasesbecause thelonger term, themoreprobabilityofperiodicrepaymentfromhousehold.Itmeansthatthelongerterm,thesmallerp eriodicprincipalandinterestofhousehold.
Collateral:Assetpledgeincaseofdefault.Ifloanwasguaranteedbymortgageorpledgeasset,itwillceme ntresponsibilityandobligationofborrower.In caseofinsolvent,collateralturntobesecondreceivableofbanks,however,mortgageorsecurityas sethasaccommodatetorealisticc o n d i t i o n s
Loanamountorloansize:effecttoprobabilityofcreditdelinquencyincreases whentheloansizeincreases.Sothisfactorwilldefineapositiverelationshipbetweenloansizeandhousehol d’paybackperformance,assumingthereisnoinflation.Thelendersgenerallyprefergiving thiskindofcreditforlowerloansizeinordertodecreasetheirrisk.
Determinantsofloanamount
Thesecondmodelattemptstoprovethat characteristicsandendowmentsofhousehold,andloancharacteristicsdetermineloanamou ntsborrowed.Thetesteddeterminantsofloana m o u n t a r e a g e o f households, h o u s e h o l d size,house o f value,householdexpenditure,occupationsofhouseholdmembersand numbersofdependants Which factoraresignificantdeterminantsofloanamount.Howdothesefactorseffecttoloan amount.Thevariabledefinitionofthismodelasfollow:
Theloanamountofhousingloan forhousehold:thisvariableismeasuredb a s i n g on privatecharacteristicsofborrowersandstatusofborrowers’household.
Specificempiricalmode ls
Firstly,twodependentvariables(Bvariable-possibilitytogetahousingloaninmodell andLAvariable-loanamountinmodel2)arechosentoanswerthestudyquestions.
Secondly,accordingtotheabovestudiesinLiteratureReviewchapter,itcanbeseenthatmanyfactorsareablet oinfluencetheprobabilitytogetahousingloananddeterminantofloanamount.Thisresearchjustconcentrates someimportantfactorseffectstronglytoresultofthemodel1&2asfollows:
B=f(SEX,AGE,EDU,INCOME,SIZE,HHNO,HOUSEVAL,MATUR,COL,LA).
LA-f(SEX,AGE,EDU,INCOME,SIZE,HHNO,HOUSEVAL,MATUR).
B- + a ; S E X + a AGE+ a EDU+ I NCOME +a5SIZE+HHNO+ a7HOUSEVAL+ agMATUR+a9COLL+aieLA
Bistheprobabilitytogetahousingloan.It’sabinaryvariablehavingtwovalues(0;1).Value[TJ meansacasethatborrowergotahousingloanwhilevalue[0]indicatesacasethatborrowerwasref used.
3 EDU:Adummyvariablethatequalsto1ifeducationlevelofhouseholdhead ishigherthancollegelevel;and0ifnot.
9 COLL:Collateralisdummyvariable.Itequals1ifborrowerofferscollateraland0ifnot.
LA:Loanamountisthecurrencyvalueofthehousingloanthattheborrowers askedthebank.It’smeasuredinmillionVND.
+ Ifthehouseholdheadisaman,theprobabilitytogetahousingloan wouldbehigherthanthecasethatthehouseholdheadisawom an.Inthiscase,theexpectedsignis(+);incontrar y,theexpectedsignis(-).
2 AGE - More agei s l e s s p r o b ab i l i t y to getloan, especiallythepersonisatretiredage.Almostof thisgrouppeoplearenotabletogetloan.
3 EDU + Ifthehouseholdheadhashighereducationlevel,theprobab ilitytogethousingloanwouldbehigher.Inthis case,theexpectedsignis(+);incontrary,theexpectedsi gnis(-).
7 HOUSEVAL + Household hashousevalueasmuchaspossiblebecauseh o u s e v a l u e i s t h e c o l l a t e r a l o f t h e housingl oa n andhousevalueis highwhichmeansthatloa n amountfrombank islowandriskfromthehouseholdalsoislow.
8 MATUR + Longtermofloanmaturityissynonymouswithincrea singpaymentformhousehold.Thelongermaturityof housingloan,thesmallertheperiodicprincip lewhichtheymusttopay.Itmeans thattheirincomeensurerepaymentfromhousehold.
9 COL + Ift h e h o u s e h o l d headhascollateral,t h epr obabilitytogethousing loanwould behigher.Inthiscase,theexpectedsignis(+);incontrary,theex pectedsignis(-).
10 LA - Thelessrequired loana m o u n t , theh i g h e r probabilitytogetthehousingloanis.
LA+biSEX+ bAGE+baEDU+ b‹INCOME+ bSIZE+b6HHNO+ b7HOUSEVAL+b8MATUR
LA:Loanamount(millionVND).LAinthesecondmodelisdifferentfromtheLAinthefi rstmodel.Here,itistherealloanamountthattheborrowergotfromthebank.
8 MATUR:Loanmaturity.It’smeasureinmonth. ằ Expectedsignsofthevariables’coefficients:
SEX + Ift h e h o u s e h o l d h e a d i s a m a n , t h e l o a namountwouldbehigherthanthecasethattheh ouseholdheadisawoman.Inthiscase,theexpected signis(+);incontrary,theexpectedsignis(-).
3 EDU + Ift h e h o u s e h o l d h e a d h a s h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n higher.Inthiscase,theexpectedsignis(+);in contrary,theexpectedsignis(-).
5 SIZE - Bigs i z e o f h o u s e h o l d ist o i n c r e a s e expe ndituretogetherwithd e c r e a s i n g incomea swellasdecreasingpayment.Itmeansthatbiggersi zeislessloanamount.
6 HHNO Morehouseholdnumbercanearnmoreincomealongwith increasingpaymentcapacity.Somorehouseh oldnumbercanearnismoreloanamount.
+ Householdha s housevalueasmuchaspossi blebecausehousevalueisthecollateralofthehousin gl o a n and h o u s e v a l u e i s highwhichmeans thatloanamount frombankislowandriskfromthehouseholdalsoislo
8 MATUR + Longt e r m o f l o a n m a t u r i t y i s s y n o n yw. m o u swithincreasingpaymentformhousehold. Thelongermaturityofhousing loan,thesmallertheperiodicprinciplewhichtheymustto pay.Itmeansthattheirincomeensurerepaymentfro mhousehold.S o morematurityismoreloa namount.
2isthesimilartothemodel1.Butthesignofagevariableisdifferentfromthemodel2.Theagevariableint hemodel2willbepositivesign.Inlaborage,themoreageisthehigherworkingpositionandincome.
Datasource
Datasource
Dataincludes bothindividualinformationandhouseholdinformation oftheborrower.Theborrowersarethepersonswhocangethousingloan(inmodel1&2)andcannotgethousingl oan(inmodel1).
The authorwanttoapplytheresultofthisresearchtorealityofVietnameseeconomyespecially HDBankcase.NowVietNamhasmanydifficultiestofacethehighinflation,economic crisisallindustries,tighteningmoneypolicyofSBV Oncemoreimportantthingistheviolentco mpetitioninbankingfieldatthetimeofundertakingtoparticipateinW T O T h i s r e s e a r c h w i l l h a v e m a n y m e a n i n g f o r ban kt o f i n d o u t t h e s t a b l e developingstrategyparticularinc ustomerlendingbusiness.The author hasafortunatechangetojoinmodemprojectofbankinallmodule(kernel,generalledger,customerlen ding,branchteller ).That’scorebankingproject.Almostofdataforthisthesiscanbeextractedfromthecorebanki ngsystem.AnotherfortuneissupportandpermissionofHDBankgeneraldirectortoallowandtosignad ecisionfortheauthortogetthedata.
- Loaninformationandcustomerinformationfromheadofficeandbrancheso fHDBankinHCMC.Becauseofgeographicconditions,it’sdifficulttogetdataofsomevaria blessuchassizeofhousehold,thenumberofhouseholdcan earnincome fromarchivesofbranchesareoutHCMC.
- Loaninformationandcustomerinformationmusthasenoughforallvariablesofthesissucha s:sex,age,education,incomeofhousehold,sizeofhousehold,housevalue,maturityloan,collateral,loa namount.
DataisusedintheanalysisfromthecorebankingofHCMCHousingDevelopmentBank.Thea nalyzeddataareoftheyear2005,2006and2007.Thereasonwhychoosetheseyearare:
Sampling
Thesamplesizeconsistsof306observedcases.Ofwhich,thereare198casesgettingahousingloanfromtheHD Bankand108casesrefusedtogettheloan.ComparedtothetotalborrowingcasesoftheHCMCbranchoftheH DBank,thesampleoccupies21.7%.
Themethodisusedwhichcalled“proportionatestratifiedsampling”(eachstratumisproperlyreprese ntedsothatthesamplesizedrawnfromthestratumisproportionatetothestratum’sshareofthetotalpopulati on).
Bythepossibilitytogetaloan:thepopulationisdividedintotwostratums:thecasest hatw e r e a c c e p t e d a n d r e f u s e d t o getthehousing l o a n ( 6 5 % a n d 3 5 % ofc asesaskingloanfromtheHDBank—figure2.1).
2007.Ineachyear,t h e sa mp le s aredrawnfollowingthepercentageo f eachstr atum ( a c c e p t e d andrefusedtogetahousingloan).
Alldataforhousingl o a n waspickedu p fromcorebankings y s t e m Afterthat,da ta will begroupbyyearbybranchandselectedbycommonconditionsasfollows:
- Observationn u m b e r o f e v e r y y e a r w i l l b e e x t r a c t e d b y b e l o w g r o w t h r a t e o f housingloan amount.S o withthecustomerw h o c a n gethousingl o a n , thereare24observationsinyear2005,48inyear2006and126in year2007.Similartothecustomerwhocannotgethousingloan,thereare12observationsiny ear2005,24inyear2006,72inyear2007correspondingtothegrowthratesof43%and2 83%incomparisontothepreviousyears.
Figure2.1sho ws thest ru ct ur e ofthepossibilityt o gethousingloanornot.Totally, thesamplesizeconsistsof306cases,ofwhich,1 9 8 casesareoftheoneswhocouldgeth ousingl o a n du r i n g theperiod2 0 0 5 -
Figure2 2 s h o w s thestructureofs a m p l e s in everyyearbyprobabilityandimprobability.Theobservationwillbepickedfollowbygro wthratepercentageoftotalhousingloanamount.Totalhousingloanamountinyear2005,2006, 2007are413,591,2268billionVNDwithinturnpercentageare43%
(year2007comparewith2006).Sowiththecustomercan‘gethousing loan,thereare24observationsinyear2005,48inyear2006and126iny e a r 2 0 0 7 Similart o t h e c u s t o m e r c a n n o t g e t h o u s i n g loan,thereare12observationsinyear2005,24inyear2006,72inyear2007. Figure2.2:Structureofsamplespossibilitytogetahousingloan.
Analysism e t h o d s
Correlationanalysis
Statisticaltestsforvalidityofspecificmodels
- Multico-linearitytest:Multico-linearitytestslinearrelationshipsbetweentwoor moreexplanatoryvariables.
- Autocorrelationtest:Durbin-Watson(DW)testwillbeusedforautocorrelationof variables.
AlldataofthisthesiswillberunbySPSSsoftwareincludesanalysessuchas:statistical testsfordescriptiveanalysis,correlationanalysis,testsforvalidityofspecificmodels.
4.1 Situationofhousingcreditprogramf o r urbanho us eho l d i n HeChiMinhC i t y 4.1.1Housingdemandsofurbanhouseholdandsupplyofhousing
3m'/person.InHCMC,thereare150,000temporarydwellings,including43,000dilapidated housesand24,000slumhousesalongthecanalsandsmallrivers.Ofthetotal54.4millionin'ofurbanho using,32millionin'requiresimmediaterepairandmaintenance,and1.7millionin'needstoberem ovedfornewhousingconstruction.
SinceDoiMoi,theprivatesectorhasproducedabout70%ofthenewhousinginHanoiandabout60%i nHCMC(DLHofHanoi,1995).Therearedifferencesintheconceptofthe"privatesector"ofurbanhousi ngproductionbetweenVietNamandotherlowincomecountries.InVietNamtheprivatesecto rcovershousingproductionbyhouseholdusingtheirownfundstoproduce housingfortheirpersonal use.Becauseit’sdifficultforhouseholdtogetahousingloan,housingfinanceandtheboomofhousingconstr uctionincivilsectorafterDoiMoiaswellasthederegulationinhousingsector.Theauthoritieshavethehousing loanprogramasfollows:
TheNationalStrategyonHousinguptotheYear2010isstillunder studybytheMOC.Althoughthedraftstrategyatthismomentjusts h o w s somegeneral strategyhaspresentedtheprimaryconceptsonhousingdevelopmentwhichisconcerned withfinancingfromthecommercialbanksandfinancialorganizations.
Vietnam's financial system, despite substantial reforms since 1988, remains underdeveloped, primarily dominated by state-owned banks Non-bank financial institutions and the securities market are relatively small, contributing to systemic weaknesses The transition from a planned to a market economy has resulted in institutional weaknesses that affect both the overall economy and the financial market Additionally, Vietnam's financial system shares characteristics with those of other developing countries, such as a monopolistic credit market dominated by state-owned banks, an incomplete credit market, and the absence of certain markets like credit insurance Furthermore, the impact of repressive financial policies has exacerbated these challenges.
,Governmenthasbeentaking strictly controlover interestratesandoperationsofbankingsector.Therefore,interestrateshavebeenkeptunderthe marketclearingrates;andextensionofcreditisbiasedtowardsprioritysectors.
Theurbancreditmarketishighlyfragmented.Theformalandinformalsectorsco- exist.Theformalfinancialsect or includesgovernmentbanks,privatebanks,a ndcreditcooperativesandcreditschemes.Amongtheformalfinancialinstitutions,alargenumberoffo rmalloansconcentrateonruralhouseholdsratherthanurbanhouseholds.Onthehand, theinformalfinancialsectorincludesprivatemoneylenders,relativesandfriendsandotherin dividuals.Theyhavebeenactiveinthecreditmarket.
Ramanathan(2005)statethatADBwillhelpabout137,000lowincomeurbanresidentsinVietNa mtobuyorimprovetheirhomesthroughanapprovedloanforUS$30millionequivalentthatwillsupportth eestablishmentofanaffordablehousingfinancesystem.
AccordingtoADBsource(2003),ADBProjectEconomistAlfredoPerdiguerostatedthat"About65%oftheurban populationlacksaccesstoaffordablefinance forhousingconstructiono r improvement,s o theyhavetoresortt o informal s o u r c e s su ch asmoneylenders,friends,relativesandcreditassociations"and“Theprojectwillim prove
Vietnam's urban population has been growing at an annual rate of 3.8%, reaching 19 million people by 2000, which constitutes nearly a quarter of the total population Despite government efforts to improve housing for low-income residents, conditions have worsened, with only 25% of urban households living in permanent structures and almost 40% in areas smaller than 36 square meters Projections indicate that urbanization could rise to 46 million people, or 45% of the population, by 2020 To address housing development, the government has implemented various policies, including the establishment of a housing finance facility within the State Bank of Vietnam This facility will facilitate loans from participating financial institutions and eventually evolve into an independent mortgage refinance agency to attract additional funding through bonds or securities The Asian Development Bank (ADB) is a key financial source, contributing 58% of the estimated US$51.8 million project cost ADB's loan features a 32-year term with an eight-year grace period, offering a 1% interest rate during the grace period and 1.5% thereafter The State Bank of Vietnam is responsible for executing the project, which is expected to be completed by the end of 2007.
GovernmentandADBhaveparticularplanningforhousingloanandhousingdevelopment.Fo llowingtheinclusioninthe2002countryprogramoftechnicalassistancetopreparetheHou singFinanceProject,anADBFact-FindingMissionvisitedVietNamd u r i n g 4-
8March2002.TheMissionhelddiscussionswithofficials fromtheSBV,theMinistr yo f Construction,t h eMinistryo f Planning a n d I n v e s t m e n t , a n d theMinistryofFi nance.F o l l o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n s w it h allstakeholders, th e issuesreacheda nunders tandingwiththeGovernmentincludedas:
(1)FollowingarequestfromtheGovernmentforsupporttothehousingfinancesectorinVietNam,ADB approvedthepreparationofastudytoassessthehousingfinancesectoratthenationallevel,includingthephysical,in stitutional,andfinancialaspects.
(2)ThehousingfinancesectorisrelativelyundevelopedinVietNam.Thisreflectstheunderdevelopednature ofthewiderbankingandcapitalmarketsectorsthat arealsoinneedofsignificantreformand restructuring. recognizinglegalownershiprightsthroughtheissuanceofbuildingownershipandland usecertificates.
(4)Althoughthesereformshavehadasignificantimpactonthehousingsector,manyconstraintsstillr emain.Theseincludelackof(i)coordinationbetweenthegovernmentagenciesresponsible forthehousingsectorandthefinancialsector;
(iii)aninstitutionalandregulatoryframeworkforthehousingfinancesector; (iv)savingsschemeslinkedtohousingimprovementsanddevelopment;(v)long- termcapitalfinancingforhousing;and(vi)asystemoftransparent,well-justified,andtargetedsubsidies.
(5)Althoughnofinancialinstitutionsfocusexclusivelyonhousingfinance,manyhavesho wninterest inthe sectorandhaveinvestedpartoftheirportfoliosinthehousingsector.Thestructureofthehousingfinan cemarketinVietNamhasfourtiers.AtthetopisSBV,responsibleforsettingthe policyandregulatoryenvironmentforfinancialinstitutionsandmonitoringtheirprudenti alandoperationalperformance.Atthesecondlevel,therearestatebankswhoarerarelyengagedinprov idinghousingloanstohomeownersalthoughtheymayfinanceloanstohousingdevelopme ntandconstructioncompanies.ThisgroupincludestheBankforInvestmentandDevelopmentof VietNam,IndustrialandCommercialBankofVietNam,andBankforForeignTradeofVietNam.Asu bcategoryofthesecondtieristheprovincialhousingdevelopmentfunds,whichprovideconstruc tionanddevelopmentfinanceloanstohousingd e v e l o p me n t andconstructionc ompaniesaswellasfacilitatehousingloanfinancetohomepurchasersassociatedwiththefinancedhousi ngdevelopmentprojects.ThemostactiveinstitutioninthissubcategoryistheHoChiMinhCityInvestmentFu ndforUrbanDevelopment.
Athirdlevelcomprisestheretailhousingbankswhicharecurrentlyengagedinprovidinghousingloans.Th eyincludeAsiaCommercialBan k, HaNoiHousingBank,HoChiMinhCityHousi ngB a n k, MekongDelta HousingBank,andVietNamBankforAgricultureandRu ralDevelopment.Finally,thereareotherfinancialinstitutionsandconsumercreditorganizationsthatprovides mallloanstohomeowners.
(6)SocialsurveyspreparedundertheADB- fundedstudyandothersurveyspreparedbyotherorganizationsinHoChiMinhCity(HCM C)revealedthatmostlow- incomefamilieswouldpayaroundD50millionfornewhousing,whilesomecouldpayuptoD70mi llion.Theresultsoftheaffordabilityanalysisillustrateclearlythatmostlow- incomehouseholdscanaffordloansatmarketinterestratesifmedium-andlong- termfinancingwouldbeavailable.
The HCMC People's Committee is set to submit an official housing development program to the Government following the establishment of the National Strategy on Housing While the program's details are still being finalized, the Department of Planning and Investment (DPI) aims to increase housing availability from 5.8 square meters per person to 7.0 square meters per person To achieve this target, a total of 48 million square meters of housing is necessary, with HCMC planning to provide 12 million square meters through expansion and an additional 36 million square meters through new development This new housing will require 5,400 hectares of land, with plans to secure 900 hectares for high-rise buildings and 4,500 hectares for residential areas in the suburbs The housing program consists of five distinct initiatives as outlined by the Department of House-Land.
In 2007, Vietnam achieved remarkable economic growth, with a GDP increase of 8.5%, the highest in a decade, following its integration into the WTO This progress positioned Vietnam as the safest country for investment in Asia and the second safest globally, according to world economic experts However, challenges persist, including unprecedented oil prices, the highest gold prices in 30 years, high inflation rates, and a rapidly developing real estate market, while the stock market has yet to fully recover Additionally, foreign investment flows have declined, leading to tighter controls on currency rates and liquidity Despite these difficulties, Vietnam has effectively adapted to environmental changes that positively impact socio-economic development With a young, highly educated, and motivated workforce at HDBank, along with robust support from its Executive Board and a clear strategic orientation, HDBank has successfully met its ambitious targets.
In2 0 0 7 , t h e c h a r t e r e d c a p i t a l w a s V N D 5 0 0 b i l l i o n ; t o t a l a s s e t s o f H D B a n k a p p r o x reachedVND14,000billion,equivalentto244%rise;themobilizedcapitalgainedVND12 ,456billion,withariseof284%;thetotalliabilitiesreachedVND8,912billionofthe233%oincrease.Wit hthegoodcontrol,thebaddebtwasunder0.3%oftotalliabilities.TheprofitbeforetaxwasVND168 billionequivalentto78%rise.Thedividendratein2006was1 6 % T h e HDBank’networkwas continuallyopenedmore20businesslocationsnationwideint o t a l l y 40branches.The staffintotalisupto1 0 0 0 T h e technologym o d e r n i z a t i o n p r o j e c t —
C o r e bankingw a s g o i n g the“ G o Live” l a u n c h issuccessful-atthisrighttime.
In 2008, the finance and monetary market faced significant challenges, including intense competition among banks, a shortage of skilled management, and limited government policies affecting securities trading, which raised potential risks in the real estate market In response, HDBank implemented a strategy to become a leading, diverse, and operational bank, focusing on enhancing its financial capacity by increasing its chartered capital to VND 2,000 billion, promoting its brand, and diversifying its services based on core banking principles The bank also prioritized improving management standards to align with international practices, increasing asset value, and enhancing the liquidity of its shares Additionally, HDBank sought strategic partnerships to boost competitive capacity and expand business performance while developing human resources through motivational policies In 2008, the bank committed to ensuring shareholder interests with a minimum dividend rate of 12% per year.
In2007,withyoung,higheducatedandenthusiasticstaffaswellasExecutiveBoard’sfullsupportsandonconsider ableattentionofBoardofManagement,HDBank’operationgainedgreatresultsbyitsnewmanagementstruct ure,orientationandchangesshowedasfollow:
TheprofitbeforetaxreachedVND168billion,equivalentto178%risecomparedtothat oftheyear2006.
Totalincome:777billion,suchasLoaninterest433billionfor55.8%oftotalincome,Non-
TotalExpenses:609billion,suchasOperationexpense490billionfor80.8%oftotalexpe nses,Managementexpense81billion(13.4%),theprovisionofcreditlosses27billion(4.4%),other expenses10billion(1.7%).
ThecapitalmobilizationplayedthekeyroletomeetthecapitalneedsofHDBank.In2007,thetotalca pitalmobilizationin HDBank’networkgainedVND1 2 ,4 56 bi l li on , increaseby284%compared t o 2006.Thisachievementw a s fro mtheapp licationofflexibleinterestratesinthemarket,servicequalityenhancement,networkopeni ngsnationwidewhichmade thecustomerssatisfiedandcomfortablewithHDBank’services.
As of December 31, 2007, credit operations accounted for 56% of total income, with outstanding debts reaching VND 8,912 billion, representing 71.6% of mobilized capital This marked a significant increase of 95% over the planned amount and a 233% rise compared to 2006 The bad debt ratio was low at 0.3%, equating to VND 27.9 billion, while the bad debts with a loss possibility stood at VND 9.65 billion, or 0.1% To enhance customer satisfaction, HDBank launched various marketing programs in 2007, introducing new credit services, particularly in housing credit These included a housing credit program for households with terms ranging from 10 to 15 years, a program for purchasing Phu My Hung houses with terms of 25 to 30 years, and credit initiatives for low-income individuals under ADB-sponsored programs, as well as for small and medium enterprises.
Fé2.4GFOW thofloanoutstandingdebtsinHDBank( S o u r c e an nualreportofHDBankintheyear2 0 0 7 )
HDBank is primarily focused on housing development, offering loans for individuals and households to purchase homes, as well as financing for real estate projects and syndicated loans for new urban developments In the coming years, HDBank plans to introduce and expand its housing credit program, which will provide loans for purchasing, repairing, or building homes Additionally, the bank offers various services to support housing loans, including consultancy on buying and selling properties, assistance with payment and legal procedures, and financial aid for house purchases under collateral agreements The outstanding figures of HDBank's housing credit program from 2005 to 2007 illustrate its growth compared to total loan outstanding amounts.
Housingloanisalong-termfinancialcommitment.HDBankprovides housingloanstoeligiblehouseholdaccordingtoitsmortgageloanpolicyguidelines.Eacheligiblefamil ymayobtainuptotwoconcessionaryratehousingloansfromHDBankiftheyareabletomeetalltheeligibilityrequiremen ts.
Allhouseholdwillbecreditassessedtodeterniinetheamountofloanthatcanbegrantedtothem.Thiswillde pendonthehouseholder'age,household’income,theprevailingloanceiling,theavailabledebitbalance intheCIC(CreditInformation CenteroftheStatebankofVietNam)andotherconditions.
Along—termfinancialcommitmentofhousingcreditprogramislikelyto stretchmorethan10years.Theborrowershouldthereforeassessyourfinancialpositionandbuyahouse withintheirmeans.Theborrowermaywanttofindoutmoreaboutthefollowing:
Theseinformationwillhelpyoutoplanaheadtoensurethatyouhaveenoughcashtopaythemonthlyloaninstall ments.Asfundstomeetbothloanpaymentsandotherexpensesareimportant,HDBANKmayconsideryourotherfina ncialcommitmentswhengrantingaloantocustomers.
ThepurposeoftheHDBankistoreducetherisksinthehousingpaymentandtoactasareliableagentvi abuyer'sopeningofspecialaccount.Inthecaseofdispute,thebankplaystheroleofreconciler.
ThereisahighdemandforhousinginHCMC,andHDBankisprovidingservicestomeetthedemandintheci rcumstancesdescribedinHousingserviceadvertisement.Sellerlistshousestobesoldatthebankandthebuy erslookforhousesinthelist.Whenthesellerandbuyeragree,thebuyerdepositscertainamountofmoneyintheban kwhilethebankprepareslegaldocumentsforthetransaction.Thebankmakesprofitoutoftheservicesprovidedt othebuyers.
Thebankcanprovideadditionalloansupto70%ofthehousingpricetothebuyerwhens/ hepreparesremaining30%.Insuchacase,thebankkeepsallthedocumentsregardingthetransactionasc ollateral,includingtheLandUseRightsCertificate.Intheeventofdefault,thebankconfiscatesthehouseand land,makinguseofthedocumentsitkeeps.
Therearesomeoutlinerswhenusingboxplotforchecking.Datacleaningprocessisusedforrejectingoutliners.Atfir st,thepeoplecannotgethousingloanwhichare108casesandcangethousingloanwhichare198cases.After rejectingsomeoutliners,thepeoplewhocannotgethousingloanwhicharestill97casesandwhoc angethousingloanwhicharestill193cases.Withtheseobservations,thereisfollowingtable1.1:
AJ MATU- SEX AGE EDU- INCOM03 ’SWE HOUSE COLD-
CsM refused get a housing loan Std.
Cases accepted to get a housing loan Mean
\4OUNT RITY CATION NUMBE]C VALUE ATERAL
Fromthistable,therearesomeanalysisandcomparisonofeveryvariablebetween twogroup(group0isofthepeoplewhocannotgethousingloanandgroup1isofthepeoplewhocangethousingloa n).
The average loan amount (LA) for Group 0 is 792.25, significantly higher than the 281.80 average for Group 1, indicating that those who were denied housing loans have considerably larger average loan amounts In fact, Group 0's average is nearly three times that of Group 1, suggesting that loan amount may strongly influence the likelihood of securing a housing loan The T-test results show a significance value of 0.000 for loan amount, confirming its meaningful impact in the model However, HDBank's housing credit policy does not clearly specify the loan amounts available to borrowers, which range from 200 million VND to 1 billion VND, aligning with the needs and financial capacity of households looking to purchase homes.
The average maturity (MATUR) for Group 0 is 65.95, significantly lower than the 105.99 average for Group 1, indicating that those who were refused housing loans had insufficient maturity levels Group 0's maturity is more than one and a half times lower than that of Group 1, suggesting that maturity factors strongly influence the likelihood of securing a housing loan Additionally, the T-test results show a significance value of 0.000 for maturity, confirming its importance in both models Housing credit programs offer maturities ranging from 84 months (7 years) to 240 months (20 years), indicating that borrowers applying for loans with shorter maturities face reduced chances of approval.
MeanofSEXis0.52ingroup0andis0.58ingroup1.MeanofSEXingroup
0andingroup1aresimilar.PolicyofHDBankHousingcreditprogramdoesn’tdistinguishs e x u a l borrower.
The average age of individuals in group 0 is 49.45, significantly higher than the 34.36 average age in group 1, indicating that those who were denied housing loans tend to be older Age is a crucial factor influencing the likelihood of obtaining a housing loan According to the T-test results in Annex 1, the significance value for age is 0.000, demonstrating that the age variable holds significant relevance in both models However, HDBank's housing credit policy does not specify an age limit for borrowers.
MeanofEDUis0.41ingroup0andis0.97ingroup1.MeanofEDUingroup0andingroup1ar esimilar.PolicyofHDBankHousingcreditprogramdoesn’tdistinguisheducationoftheborro wer.
MeanofINCOMEis14.26ingroup0’andis16.78ingroup1.MeanofINCOMEingroup0islowert haningroup1.Itmeansthattheaveragematurityoftheoneswhowererefusedtogetahousingloanislow.I ncomefactorisoneofimportantprobabilityofhousingloan.Besidesthat,inannex1-ResultofT- test,Sig.valueofIncomeis0.003.Thisthing provesthat
INCOMEvariablehassignificantmeaninginbothtwomodels.Housingcreditpolic yofHDBankdoesn’tmentionparticularo r c l e a r h o w m u c h i n c o m e o f the b o r r o w e r I n r e a l , i n c o m e o f householdhassignificanteffecttopossibilityofho usingloanandhousingloan
The average household size in group 0 is 3.52, significantly higher than the 2.7 average in group 1, indicating that those denied housing loans tend to have larger households Size is a crucial factor influencing the likelihood of obtaining a housing loan Additionally, the T-test results in Annex 1 reveal a significance value of 0.000 for age, confirming that the size variable holds substantial importance in both models However, HDBank's housing credit policy lacks clarity on the specific household size requirements for loan eligibility.
MeanofHHNOis2.3ingroup0andis1.89ingroup1.MeanofHHNOingroup0ishigherthanin group1 Itmeansthattheaveragenumberea r n incomeofhouseholdwhowasre fusedtogetahousingloanishigh.HHNOfactorisoneofimportantfactoraffecttoprobabilityofhous ingloan.Besidesthat,inannex1-ResultofT- test,Sig.valueofageis0.000.ThisthingprovesthatHHNOvariablehassignificantmeaninginbothtwomo dels.HousingcreditpolicyofHDBankdoesn’tmentionparticularorclearhowmuchHHNOofthe household.
MeanofHOUSEVALi s 979.42ingroup0andis603.3ingroup1 MeanofHOUSEVALingroup0ishigherthaningroupl.Itmeansthattheaveragehouse valueoftheoneswhowererefusedtogetahousingloanistoohigh.Housevaluefactormaybeaff ectsstronglyprobabilityofhousingloan.Besidesthat, inannex1-ResultofT- test,Sig.valueofhousevalueis0.000 Thisthing provesthatHOUSEVALvariablehassignificantmeaninginbothtwomodels.Housingcreditpolic yofHDBank doesn’tmentionparticularorclearhowmuchhousevaluefortheborrower.Inreal,housevalu eaffectsstronglytopossibilitytogethousingloanandhousingloanamount.
MeanofCOLLis0.58ingroup0andis1.0ingroup1.Thisfactorjustisdummy variable.
Fromaboveanalysis,abilitytogeta.housingloanisinfluencedbymanykeyfactorsas follows: fiLoanamountshouldnotbelarge. fiA g e ofborrower(householder)shouldbeyoung.
4Sizeofhouseholdshouldnotbebig. fiHousevaluefactordependsonloanamountvariable.Ifloanamountis higher,housevaluemustbehigher.However,ifloanamountistoobig,thehousevalueisnotsignificant becauseabilitytogetahousingloandependsonotherfactorsasincome,maturity,etc. fiLongermaturitywilldivideloanamountinsmall principleforb o r r o w e r periodically.
Ingeneral,comparewiththecasesacceptedtogetahousingloan,thecasesrefusedtogetahousingloanhasfeatur esasloanamountappliedtothebankwhichistoohigh,inwhilethematurityisshort,incomeofhouseholdislowandtheh ousevaluetobuyistoohigh.Theseelementsmaynotbereliabilityenoughtoensureloanpayment.Leadin gtotheresultisthebankdoesnotacceptloanapplicationform.
Constant LA MATUR SEX AGE EDU INCOME SIZE HHNO HOUSEVAL COLL
CorrelationMatrixintable4.3,correlationofalmostvariablesislessthan0.5.However, somevariableshavecorrelationwhichismorethan0.5asfollow:
0.881.Thiscoefficientshowsthatthemoreincomeisthelessloanamount.Thisthingissuitabl einrealbecausethepersonhasmoreincometheyusuallyhasmoreassetandwealthormores avings.Itmeansthattheyneedlessmoneyfrombankfortheirloan.
0.587.Thiscoefficientshowsthattheyoungerborroweristhehigherincome.Thismatteris alsoexplainedreasonablybecausethepersonisyoungertheywillhasmorechangetogetman ygoodjobswithhighsalaryordotheirownedbusiness.Sotheirincomeishigher.Besidesth at,thepersonretiresonapensionwhoeffectstothecorrelationresultofageandincomevariable Theolderborroweristhelessincome.
HOUSEVALcorrelation is0.556.Thiscoefficientshowsthatthehigherincome isthehigherhousevalue.Thisthingisreasonableb ecau se theborrowerhasmo reincome,theywillhavemoredemandandmoreabilitytopaybackhousingloan.
0.751.Thiscoefficients h o ws thatthehigherhousevalueisthelowerhousingloana mount.Thisthingisinterpretedthattheborrowerneedstobuyhighhousevaluetheywillhasm oresavingsandmoreincome.Sotheyneedlessmoneyfrombank.
0.556.Thiscoefficientshowsthatthelargerhousehold’sizeisthelessmemberofhousehol dcanearntheincome.Thisthingcanbeexplainedahouseholdusuallyhastwopersonscanearntheincom efromwifeandhusband.Thehouseholdsizeismore,thechildrenorthepersondependstheperso ncanearntheincomeismore.
Insummary,almostcorrelations arelessthan0.5.Andthecorrelationsaremorethan0.5explainedreasonablylikeabove.
Sothemodel will beabletorunwithoutmistakes.Besidest h a t , a l l c o r r e l a t i o n i s m o r e t h a n 0 S o t h i s t h i n g p r o v e s t h a t i n d e p e n d e n tvariableshavedeterminedc or rel a tion withde pendentvariables.
Normalityr e f e r s tonormald i s t r i b u t i o n o f thesample.Histogram, w h i c h c o n s i s t s ofSkewnessandKurtosisfigures,isemployed.
Multic o - l i n e a r i t y r e f e r s t o l i n e a r r e l a t i o n s h i p s betweentwoo r m o r e e x p l a n a t o r yvariables.Infollowingregressionmodels,thereisnodetectionofmultico- linearity: T- statisticishigh,thecorrelationbetweenindependentvariablesislow,andallvariablesbeartheexpectedsign.Itim pliesthatmultico-linearityisnothappeninthesemodels.
Watson( D W ) tes t, w hic h i s them os t c o m m o ntechnique,i s e m p l o y e d T h e o r e t i c a l l y , t h e n u l l h y p o t h e s i s ist h a t D W = 2 , w h i c hcorrespondstonoauto correlation.NullhypothesisisrejectedwhenDWcomesto0or4.
Std.Error oftheEstimate Durbin-Watson
1 8l2(a) 659 647 284 a Predictors:(Constant),COLL,SEX,LA,SIZE,MATUR,EDU,HHNO,INCOME,AGE, HOUSEVAL b DependentVariable:B
Std.Erroro f theEstimate Durbin-Watson
1 841(a) 707 695 117.438 1.921 aPr e di c t or s : (Constant),HOUSEVAL,SEX,MATUR,HHNO,EDU,AGE,INCOME,SIZE bD e p e n d e n t Variable:LA
ThedependentvariableBinthemodel1isabinaryvariabletakesa1or0value.Tohandlethismodel, therearesometheorymodelssuchas:thelinearprobabilitymodel(LPM),thelogitmodel,theprobitmodel andthetobit(censoredregression)model.Inw'hichthelinearprobabilitymodel(LPM)isthemostsuitablemod el1.
WhereXishouseholdincome,Yequals1ifthehouseholdgetthehousingloanandY equals0ifthehouseholddoesn’ttakethehousingloan.
Modelss u c h a s ( * ) , w h i c h e x p r e s s t h e d i c h o t o m o u s Y ; a s a l i n e a r f u n c t i o n o f th eexplanatoryvariable(s)X;,arecalledlinearprobabilitymodels(LPM)sinceE(Y;/
X;),theconditionalexpectationofY;givenX;,canbeinterpretedastheconditionalprobabilitythatt heeventwilloccurgivenXi;tflatis,Pr(Y;-l/X;).Thus,intheprecedingc as e,E(Y; thegivenamountX;.ThejustificationofthenameLPMformodellike(*)canbeseenas follows
Now,lettingPi-probabilitythatYi-1 (thatis,thattheeventoccurs)and1 — i'probability thatYi-
0(thatis,thattheeventdoesnotoccur),thevariable Y;hasthefollowingdis tributio n:
Thatis,the.conditionalexpectationofthemodel(1)can,infact,beinterpreted astheconditionalprobabilityofY;.
- Incl as sif icat ion t a b l e s h o w 9 7 observationsd o n ’ t t a k e t h e h ou si ng l o a n a n d 1 9 3 observations.Theprobabilityofgettinghousingloan(overallpercentage)is66.6%.
- Variablesnotinequation:intotally1 0 independentvariables,independently,thes efollowingvariableshave statisticalmeaningswithdependentvariableis:LA,MATUR,AGE,EDU,SIZE,HHNO,HOUSEV AL,COLL.
- InOmnibusTestofmodelcoefficients,Sig.Model-0.0000.Itmeansthatthemodel havemeaningwhengetallvariablesintheanalysis.
- InModel Summary,withR- squareNagelKerke,theempiricalresultshowthemodelisalmosts u i t a b l e , ex p r es s t o 96 8 % variance.W i t h C o x & S n e l l Tes t h av el es s value(69.7%)buthighenoughtobesuitable.
- Finallythevariablesintheequationshowthat:independentvariableshavestatisticalmeaningswhichare:LA, MATUR,INCOME,HOUSEVALobtaino—95%atleast.Sizevariablehasmeaningato-
90%.Besides,independentvariablesdon’thavestatisticalmeaningsthatare:SEX,AGE,EDU,HHNO,CO LL.
Thesamedataofmodel1withentermethodisb y backwardLRmethod.Seethe resultsofmodeltestingarepresentedintheAnnex3.
TheempiricalresultinbackwardLRmethodisthesameinEntermethodinsomecaseswhicharecasep rocessingsummary,dependentvariable encoding,categoricalvariablesencoding,classificationtable,variablesintheequationandvariable snotintheequation.Cox&SnellandNagelkerkewithallof2methodsisthesameatthefirststepare69.7%an d96.8%.Twomethodshavethesamecoefficientofindependentvariables.Especially,withBackwardLRm ethodhasmoretheprocesswhichcomparesandanalysistheSigfactor.Inordertothemethodremoveindepende ntvariablesstepbystepwhicharehavethelessmeaningSig.result.
TheslopeofMATURv a r i a b l e is0.029,ifhavingincreas e i n aunitch ang e (here 1 month),theprobabilitytogetahousingloanwillincreaseby0.029orabout2.9%.
Theslopevalue of0.903means that foraunitchangeinincome (hereVND1.000.000), ontheaveragetheprobabilityofowningahouseincreasesby0.903orabout90.3%.
ContinuetoHOUSEVAL variablehascoefficientis0.007.ItmeansthatifhousevalueincreasesbyImillionVND,theprobabilityto getahousingloanwillincreaseby0.007orabout0.7%.
BasedonSigvalue,thevariablehaveSigvalueismorethan0.05,willberemovedfromthemodel.Which variable‘hasthebiggestvaluewillberemovedfirstandcontinuetosimilarly.Particularly,althoughtheCOL LvariablehasthebiggestSigvalue,it’sstillkeptinmodel.Sothisvariableisoneofsignificantvariableinreal.
SeetheTable4.3:variablesintheequation.Thereare6steps.Inturn,thevariableswillberemovedwhichareEDU(Si g0.824>0.05)instep2,HHNO(Sig0.726>0.05)instep3,SEX
(Fig0.356>0.05)instep4,COLL(Sig0.997>0.05)instep5andfinallySIZE
Step1 Step2 Step3 Step4 StepS Step6
/l Sig /l Sig B Sig B Sig II Sig B Sig
Table1.5:Regressionresultofmodel1fromstep1tostep6bybackwardmethod:
First,interpretingthisregression,theinterceptof+5.387givethe“probability”thatahouseholdwithzeroinco meandotherindependentvariableswillownahouse.Thesignresultisthesameexpectedsign.
ThefinalresultofthismodeltestinghasfiveremainingvariablesasLA,MATUR,AGE,INCO ME,HOUSEVALandrejectedvariablesasSEX,EDU,SIZE,HHNO,COLL.Thebackwardmeth odhasfinalresultinstep6withthehighestsignificationforr e m a i n i n g v a r i a b l e s T h o s e a r e L A ( 0 0 0 0 ) , M A T U R (0.028),A G E (0.006),INCOME( 0 0 0 0 ) , H O U
A regression analysis conducted by backward LR revealed that the loan amount (LA) and income are the most significant factors influencing the ability to secure a housing loan from HDBank Conversely, variables such as sex, education, household size, household number, and collateral do not significantly affect the likelihood of obtaining a housing loan This indicates that HDBank and other commercial banks in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, do not consider these factors when evaluating loan applications The gender of the borrower, for instance, has no bearing on lending decisions, nor does education level or household size Additionally, collateral is not a decisive factor, as HDBank can lend based on the value of the borrower's house The primary determinants of loan repayment capability are the loan amount, maturity, age, income, and house value, as these factors directly correlate with the borrower's ability to repay the loan Overall, borrowers are advised to propose a loan amount that is manageable to ensure repayment capability.
LAvariable hascoefficientis-0.033.Itmeansthatifthedemand valueofhousingloanincreasesaunitchange(hereVND1.000.000), theprobabilityto getahousingloanwilldecreaseby0.033orabout3.3%o.
TheslopeofMATURvariableis0.025,ifhavingincreaseinaunitchange(here1month),theprob abilitytogetahousingloanwillincreaseby0.025orabout2.5%.
0.298.Itmeansthatifageofhouseholdheaderincreasesaunitchange(here oneyear),theprobabilitywilldecreaseby0.298orabout29.8%.
Theslopevalueo f 0.891meansth at f o r a unitc h a n g e i n i n c o m e (h er eVNDI. 000.000),ontheaveragetheprobabilityofowningahouseincreasesby0.891orabout89.1%.
ContinuetoHOUSEVALvariablehascoefficientis0.007.Itmeansthatifhouse valueincreasesby1millions,theprobabilitytogetahousingloanwillincreaseby
Coefficientofstep6islessthanstepI butSignificantofstep6hasmanymeaningswithmodel.Sostep6isfinalmodelwiththebest.
Similartotheanalysistypeofmodel1,model2justneedtobeanalyzedbybackwardLRmethod.Becausethere’ senoughresulttoanalyzebyonlyBackwardLRmethod.AnymoreinformationcanbeshownietheAnn ex4-Model2-Entermethod.
Thedependentvariableofmodel2isLA.Themodel2has8independentvariables:
SEX,AGE,EDU,INCOME,SIZE,HHNO,HOUSEVAL,MATUR.Thesummary modelhasgoodresultwhichhaveR0.858(85.8%),RSquare0.736(73.6%)andAdjust edRSquare0.724(72.4%ô).Thedetailofanalysisisin4.4.2.3item.
TherearesomevariableshavegoodSig.value(0.05)instep2,AGE(Sig0.369>0.05)instep3,SIZE(Sig0.628>0.05)instep4andfinallyEDU(Sig0.195>0.05)instep5.
The final results of the model testing reveal five significant variables: Maturity, Income, Household Number, and House Value, while variables such as Sex, Age, Size, and Education were rejected The backward elimination method identified the strongest predictors in step 5, with Income (0.000) and House Value (0.000) demonstrating the most substantial effects on the ability to secure a housing loan from HDBank Additionally, Maturity and Household Number also play a critical role in determining a borrower's repayment capability House Value is particularly influential as it serves as collateral for the loan, with regulations requiring borrowers to have collateral that meets a fixed ratio relative to the loan amount While the Age variable was initially significant in model 1, it was deemed irrelevant in model 2, highlighting the importance of selecting the right variables for accurate predictions.
TheslopeofMATURvariableis0.346,ifmaturityofhousingloanincreasesinaunitchange(here1month), thehousingloanamountwillincreaseby0.346(millionYND)orabout34.6%ô.
Theslopevalueof15.345meansthatforaunitchangeinincome(millionVND),ontheaveragehousin gloanamountincreasesby15.345(millionVND).
HHNOvariablehascoefficientis26.925.Itmeansthatifnumberofhousehold canearnincomeincreasesaunitchange(millionVND),thehousingloan amountwillincreaseby26.925(millionVND).
ContinuetoH O U S E V A L v a r i a b l e h a s c o e ff i c i e n t i s 0.129.Itme a n s t h a t i f ho usevalueincreasesby1millions,thehousingloanamountwillincreaseby0.129(millionVND)orabout12.9%ô.
Table1.6:Regressionresultofmodel2fromstep1tostep5bybackwardmethod:
Step1 Step2 Step3 Step4 StepS
Thefirstweakness isatthedatausedtoevaluatetheresultofhousing creditprogramforurbanhousehold.Duetolimitationondataaccess,informationofacustomerandofabankisse curity.Soit’sdifficulttogetdataforthisresearch.Thesamplesarejustonlyselectedfromonebank(HDBank).Becau seofthisreason,thestudypossiblyhasn’tmeasuredcompletelyresultofhousingcreditforurbanhousehold,e speciallyinurbanofVietNam.
Secondly,thestudyhassomedummyvariableslimitsevaluationofprobabilitytogetahousingloan.Be causeinformationofdummyvariablecan notbeget.Sothisthingeffecttotheresultofstudy.
Atlast,attempt toassess thecharactersoftheborrowerforahousingloan,butit’sdifficulttopicku p o t h e r i m p o r t a n t i n f o r m a t i o n o f the b o r r o w e r i n c l u d i n g b a c k g r o u n d , e d u c a t i o n , expenditure,sav ingbymonthly,savingattimetogetaloan,etcoftheborrower.Thesefactorscouldbeimportantdeterminantsofproba bilitytogethousingloananddeterminantsofloanamount.
Firstquestioni s thedemand o f urbanh o u s eh o l d a b o u t housing.I n reala n d insomeabo vestatistical,thedemandofurbanhouseholdisverylarge.Economicdevelopmentandurbanpopulati onincreaserapidly.Besidesthat,urbandevelopmentandhousingsector,especiallyinHanoiandHC MC,isurgentlychallengedbyswellingmigrationfromruralareas,expandinginformalsettlement,etc.Thisimpl iesdemandforhousingwouldincreaseatafasterpaceinurbanVietNamintheshorttermtomediumterm.
Fromempiricalresultinmodel1,thefactorseffectstronglytotheprobabilityofreceivinghousingloa nforborrowerwhichareloanamount,maturity,income,sizeofhousehold,housevaluelikeasacollateral. Fromempiricalresultinmodel2,thefactorseffectstronglytothedeterminantsofloanamount whichareeducation,incomeandhousevalue.
Theseresultsaresimilartotheliteratureandtheexpectation.Thosevariablesareimportantandnecessaryf o r ab anktodecideawidehousingc r e d i t policyf o r householdi n economicdevelopmentsit uation.
Finally,whenhousingcreditprogramisundertakentoeffectivelysupporthousehold,thisthingalsocontributesthe economicdevelopmentandeconomicgrowthindirectly.Theimprovementsinhousingthatareimportanttoim provingthequalityoflifeamongthepooroftendoesnotreceivetheattentiontheydeservefrompolicymakers(Dan iere,1996).
Economicandurbandevelopmentmakeswellingmigrationandahugeofhousingdemand, especiallyinbigcitieslikeHaNoi,HoChiMinhCity,DaNang,etc.Sothegovernmentshouldgivenational- levelprioritytohousingandurbandevelopmentbecauseofitswideeffectsonqualityoflifeaswellaseconomica ndsocialdevelopment.Thegovernmentalsoshoulddevelopprogramsthatwillen‘sureasustainablelongtermh ousingmarket.Inordertofinishthesestabledevelopments,thegeneralimplicationsaresuggestedasfollow:
Firstly,i n g e n e r a l , t h e g o v e r n m e n t s h o u l d e s t a b l i s h a “ H o u s i n g a n d U r b a n D e v e l o p m e n tMinistry”ora“NationalHousingCommittee”thatincludespublicandprivatesectorme mbers.Thecommitteewillberesponsibleforimplementinghousingpolicy,evaluatingandadvisingtheHousingand UrbanDevelopmentMinistryonhowtoexecutepolicies.
Secondly,fromtheresultofthemodel1testing,loanamounteffectstronglytoprobabilitytogetahousingloan.Sototalof housingcreditamountislenttotheeconomywhichiscontrolledandadjustedbySBVandnationalbank.Thegov ernmentshouldfindthesourcesfromotherdomesticandforeignorganizationtofinancethishousingcredit amount.
Thirdly,alsofromtheresultofthemodel1&2testing,incomehasstrongimpacttoprobabilitytogetahousingloanandloana mount.Sothegovernmentshouldimplementanationalhousingpolicyforallincomelevels.Especially,thego vernmentmusthavehousingpoliciesparticularlyforthepoororlow- incomepeople.Theseobjectiveslackofincomeandcapacitytopaythedebt.Thegovernment,particularlySB Vandnationalbanks,have housingcreditpoliciestofinancehousingofthepoorandlowsincomepeople withspecialmechanismandpreferentialtreatmentsuchaslongmaturityofloan,reasonablehousingloanamount, suitabletypeofpayment,etc.
Finally,thegovernmentshouldfindotherfinancefrominternationalfinancialinstitutiontogetcapitalf orfinancinghousingcreditprogramfortheeconomy,especiallyforthepoorandlow- incomepeople.Thengovernmentcancooperateormakepreferentialtreatmentofloanfrominternationalfinanc ialinstitutionsuchasIMF(InternationalMonetaryFund),WB(WorldBank),ADB(AsiaDevelopmentBank),etc.Thes einstitutionalsohavecommitmenttosupportandfinancemacrodevelopmentprojectinVietNam.
Fromtheaboveintroduction, l e n d i n g s i t u a t i o n ofVietNama n d analysisofhousingi s s u e ,housingcreditprogramisnotalsosupporttosolvethesocialandpublicproblembutonlyhelpthebanktoserverele vantandsatisfytheircustomer.Fromtheresultofthisresearch,baseonimportant characters oftheborrowerHDBankshouldhavesuitableandeffectivecreditingstrategyandpolicyimplicationaswe llashousingcreditprogramasfollow:
Diversifying housing credit portfolios is crucial for developing effective housing credit programs Key factors identified through model testing include loan amount, loan maturity, household head's age, income, and house value, which should be considered when designing appropriate housing credit products Establishing and stabilizing housing products requires creating the necessary conditions tailored to borrower characteristics such as sex, age, education, income, and house value, as well as loan specifics like maturity, collateral, and loan amount It is essential to focus on these significant factors to enhance the effectiveness of housing loan products.
SecondimplicationiscontinuingtocooperatewithforeigninstitutionsuchasADB,WB,etctogetmoresourc eofcapital.HDBankhascooperationwithADBforhousingloanbutthisprojectisnoteffectivebecauseofdifficul tyandunsuitablecreditconditions.Sotwopartnerneedtodiscussmoretoadjusthousingloantermsandissue themostcomfortablefortheborrowerespeciallypoorpeoplebaseontheresultcharacteristicofthebo rrowerandthe loaninthisresearch.
Finally,someotherimplicationsaredevelopingsyndicatedloanwithotherbankforbighousingproject,cooperating withrealstatecompanysupportfinancefortheirconstructionorforthehousingbuyer,diversifyingandexpandingpo liciesforlowincomehousehold.
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Working File Def inition Missing Cases Used
User defined missing values are treated as missing.
Statistics for each analysis are based on the cases with no missing or out-of-range data for any variable in the analysis.
T-TEST GROUPS - B(0 1)/MISSING ANALYSIS /VARIABLES - LA MATUR SEX AGE EDU INCOME SIZE HHNO HOUSEVAL COLL /CRITERIA = CI(.95) 0:00:00.46
Sig.(2- tailed) MeanDiff erence Std.ErrorDif ference
Levene's Test for Equalityo f Variances t-testforEqualityofMeans
F Df Sig.(2- tailed) Difference Mean Difference Std.Error
N of Rows in Working Data File
Syntax ser-def ined missing values are treated as missing LOGISTIC REGRESSIONB /METHOD - ENTER LA MATUR SEX AGE EDU INCOME SIZE HHNO
1 23.237(a) 697 968 aE s t i m a t i o n terminatedatiterationnumber20becausemaximumiterationshasbeen reached.Final solutioncannotbefound.
N of Rows in Working Data File Definition of Missing
Handling User defined missing values are treated as missing.
Statistics for each analysis are based on the cases with no missing or out-of-range variable in the analysis. data for any
T-TEST GROUPS = B(01)/MISSING = MATUR SEX ANALYSIS/VARIABLES = LA
AGE EDU INCOME SIZE HHNO HOUSEVAL COLL /CRITERIA = CI(.95) 0:00:00.46
Levene'sTestfor EqualityofVaria nces t-testforEqualityofMeans
Mean Std.Error DifferenceSig.(2- Differenc Differenc
Df tailed) e e Lower Upper variances 15.408 000‘ 16.970 288
Levene'sTestfor EqualityofVaria nces t-testforEqualityofMeans
MeanDif ference Std.ErrorD ifference
Equalvar iances 7823.50 000 -11.846 288 000 -.423 036 -.493 -.352 assumed Equal variancesnot -8.384 96.000 000 -.423 050 -.523 -.323 assumed LogisticRegression
N of Rows in Working Data File Definition of
Syntax User-defined missing values are treated as missing
LOGISTIC REGRESSION B /METHOD - BSTEP(LR) LA MATUR SEX AGE EDU INCOME SIZE HHNO HOUSEVAL COLL /CRITERIA - PIN(.05) POUT(.10) ITERATE(20) CUT(.5)
Model 341.617 5 000 aAnegativeChi-squaresvalueindicatesthatthe.Chi-squaresvaluehasdecreasedfromthepreviousstep.
6 28.022(b) 692 96l aE s t i m a t i o n terminatedatiterationnumber20becausemaximumiterations hasbeenreached.Finalsolution cannotbefound. b Estimationterminatedatiterationnumber10becauseparameterestimateschangedbylessthan.00l.
EDUHHN OCOLL OverallStatistics Step6(e) Variables SEX
.824.824.856.727.918.341.993.830.774.359.756.895.395.805.306.955.117.432.751.485 cVariable(s)removedonstep4:SEX. dV a r i a b l e ( s ) removedo nstep5:CO
LL.eVar ia ble(s) re m civéd onstep6:SIZE.
N of Rows in Working Data File
Handling User-defined missing values are treated as missing.
Statistics are based on cases with no missing values for any variable used.
REGRESSION /MISSING LISTWISE /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA /CRITERIA- PIN(.05) POUT(.10) /NOORIGIN /DEPENDENT LA /METHOD-ENTER MATUR SEX AGE EDU INCOME SIZE HHNO HOUSEVAL Syntax
Additional Memory Required for Residual Plots3980 bytes
VariablesEn ter ed/Remov ed(b )
1 858(a) 736 724 75.596 aP r e d i c t o r s :(Constant),HOUSEVAL,SEX,MATUR,EDU,HHNO,INCOME,AGE,SIZE
561 192 aPredictors:(Constant),HOUSEVAL,SEX,MATUR,EDU,HHNO,INCOME, AGE,SIZE bDependentVariable:LA
N of Rows in Working Data File
Handling ser-defined missing values are treated as missing.
Statistics are based on cases with no missing values for any variable used.
/DEPENDENT LA /METHOD-BACKWARD MATUR SEX AGE EDU INCOME SIZE HHNO HOUSEVAL o:o0:00 l7
Additional Memory Required for Residual Plots4516 bytes
2 Backward(criterion:ProbabilityofF- to-remove>=.100).
3 AGE Backward(criterion:ProbabilityofF-to- remove>-.100).
4 SIZE Backward(criterion:ProbabilityofF-to- remove>-.100).
5 EDU Backward(criterion:ProbabilityofF-to- remove>-.100). aAllrequestedvariablesentered. bDependentVariable:LA
The analysis reveals several predictors influencing the outcomes, including HOUSEVAL, MATUR, EDU, HHNO, INCOME, AGE, and SIZE Each model consistently includes a constant term alongside these variables, indicating their significance in the predictive framework The variations among the models suggest that while some predictors like HOUSEVAL and INCOME are consistently present, others may vary depending on the specific context of the analysis This highlights the complexity of the relationships between these factors and their impact on the results.