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The Implementation Game pot

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Cấu trúc

  • Contents

  • List of Figure and Tables

  • List of Abbreviations

  • 1. The TRIPS Implementation Game: A Fight for Ideas

    • 1.1. An Introduction to the Politics of IP and TRIPS

    • 1.2. Variation in TRIPS Implementation

    • 1.3. Existing Literature and Popular Narratives

    • 1.4. Explaining Variation in TRIPS Implementation

    • 1.5. Why This Book Matters

    • 1.6. Methods and Sources

    • 1.7. Scope

  • 2. Developing Countries in the Global IP System

    • 2.1. The Colonial Era: Variation and External Control

    • 2.2. The Post-colonial Era: Reform and Resistance

    • 2.3. The Counteroffensive for Stronger IP Protection

    • 2.4. Implementation Amidst Contestation

  • 3. Variation in TRIPS Implementation (1995–2007)

    • 3.1. The TRIPS Outcome

    • 3.2. Variation in the Timing of TRIPS Implementation

    • 3.3. Variation in IP Standards and Use of TRIPS Flexibilities

    • 3.4. A Typology of Variation

    • 3.5. An Economic Explanation?

    • 3.6. The Case for Political Analysis

  • 4. Post-TRIPS Tensions and Global IP Debates

    • 4.1. The Push for TRIPS-Plus

    • 4.2. The Resurgence of Developing Country Confidence

    • 4.3. Growing Complexity in the Global IP System

    • 4.4. Expanding Teams of Players

    • 4.5. Conclusion

  • 5. International Pressures on Developing Countries

    • 5.1. Economic Pressure

    • 5.2. Resistance and Retaliation

    • 5.3. Ideational Power

    • 5.4. Capacity building

    • 5.5. Conclusion

  • 6. The Developing Country Dimension: How National Politics Mattered

    • 6.1. Government Capacity on IP Decision-Making

    • 6.2. Public Engagement

    • 6.3. Government Coordination

    • 6.4. Mini Studies of Variation

    • 6.5. Conclusion

  • 7. TRIPS Implementation in Francophone Africa

    • 7.1. IP Reforms in the Poorest Countries: Expectations and Reality

    • 7.2. From Colonization to the Revised Bangui Agreement

    • 7.3. The Revised Bangui Agreement

    • 7.4. The Bangui Revision Process

    • 7.5. Capacity-building and Delegation in a Policymaking Vacuum

    • 7.6. Conclusion

  • 8. The Implementation Game and the Variation Puzzle

    • 8.1. Global IP Politics

    • 8.2. International Pressures

    • 8.3. The National Dimension

    • 8.4. Further Findings on Variation

    • 8.5. Developing Countries in Evolving Global IP Debates

    • 8.6. A Development-Oriented IP Agenda

  • Appendices

    • 1. Selection of interviews

    • 2. Timeline of international IP agreements

    • 3. Examples of increase in IP standards in developing country WTO members from 1988 to 2007

    • 4. Variation in use of copyright flexibilities by selected developing country WTO members in the Asia-Pacific

    • 5. Examples of developing countries with bilateral agreements that include IP provisions

    • 6. Variation in TRIPS-plus provisions of selected U.S. FTAs

    • 7. U.S. Special 301 pressure on developing country WTO members and WTO disputes filed (1995–2007)

  • Bibliography

  • Index

    • A

    • B

    • C

    • D

    • E

    • F

    • G

    • H

    • I

    • J

    • K

    • L

    • M

    • N

    • O

    • P

    • Q

    • R

    • S

    • T

    • U

    • V

    • W

    • Y

    • Z

Nội dung

[...]... competitors, the United States recruited Japan and the European Union to support their campaign extend the length and breadth of IP rights at the international level In order to gain ‘maximum returns’ from increasing trade in IP-related goods and services,25 they worked to add IP to the agenda of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations Developing countries opposed this effort They viewed the prospect of strengthened... licence.61 A further aspect of variation concerns the implementation of TRIPS enforcement provisions TRIPS deadlines prompted most developing countries to tighten their laws on enforcement, but the legal approaches to enforcement and the scale of resources devoted to the task varied widely.62 The task of mapping variation between countries is complicated by the fact that few countries regularly gather their... of the variation we see ought to be taken seriously as a subject of comparative analysis as the genuineness of the observed reforms may differ While each of these three approaches provides important insights into the reasons for aspects of the diversity in TRIPS implementation, none alone can account for the degree and distribution of variation The challenge at hand is to draw together and build on these... involved, and examine how their interplay contributed to variation in TRIPS implementation The second is to balance a search for general conclusions with a recognition of the complexity of global IP politics, the broad scope of TRIPS, and the diversity of the group of countries under examination This book advances the metaphor of TRIPS implementation as a complex political game Developed and developing... services Through these and other IP rights (including geographical indications, plant breeders’ rights, and utility models), governments grant inventors or creators private 5 The Implementation Game rights to use, transfer, or profit from their work for a specified period of time These rights enable IP holders to legally control (with certain conditions) the circumstances under which others can use their ‘products... intentionally left blank 1 The TRIPS Implementation Game: A Fight for Ideas The World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is the centrepiece of the global system of rules, institutions, and practices governing the ownership and flow of knowledge, technology, and other intellectual assets TRIPS emerged from the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement... enforcement of IP rights 10 The TRIPS Implementation Game: A Fight for Ideas at the border and within the domestic market In addition, TRIPS incorporates provisions of many earlier WIPO and bilateral agreements, extending them to a broader group of countries and linking them for the first time to an effective enforcement mechanism (the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding).51 For the most part, developed... countries from ‘going backward’ by reducing their level of IP protection Further, the links between TRIPS and the suite of other WTO agreements concluded as part of the Uruguay Round make it more difficult than ever before for developing countries to shy from their international IP commitments 1.2 Variation in TRIPS Implementation Despite their dissatisfaction with TRIPS, the Agreement spurred IP reforms across... TRIPS ignored the diversity of national needs and forced them to sacrifice the ‘policy space’11 that richer countries had harnessed in early stages of their growth Given the vocal concern expressed by developing countries during the TRIPS negotiations and after it came into force, one would reasonably expect them to have taken full advantage of the possibilities the Agreement provides to tailor implementation. .. commitment on the part of governments, particularly where countries new they faced little prospect of retaliation for non-compliance For the weakest countries especially, the argument is that some of the TRIPS implementation that occurred on paper was simply a mechanical response to international obligations rather than an indication of a real intention to make changes on the ground The implication of the ‘empty . x0 y0 w0 h0" alt="" The Implementation Game This page intentionally left blank The Implementation Game The TRIPS Agreement and the Global Politics of. Cataloging in Publication Data Deere, Carolyn. The implementation game : the trips agreement, developing countries and the global politics of intellectual property

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