Social Science for Counterterrorism pdf

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Limited Electronic Distribution Rights Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore the RAND National Defense Research Institute View document details For More Information This PDF document was made available from www.rand.org as a public service of the RAND Corporation. 6 Jump down to document THE ARTS CHILD POLICY CIVIL JUSTICE EDUCATION ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS NATIONAL SECURITY POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SUBSTANCE ABUSE TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. Purchase this document Browse Books & Publications Make a charitable contribution Support RAND This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. Paul K. Davis, Kim Cragin, Editors Darcy Noricks, Todd C. Helmus, Christopher Paul, Claude Berrebi, Brian A. Jackson, Gaga Gvineria, Michael Egner, and Benjamin Bahney, Contributors Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense Approved for public release; distribution unlimited NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE Social Science for Counterterrorism Putting the Pieces Together The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R ® is a registered trademark. © Copyright 2009 RAND Corporation Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND documents to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND documents are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND permissions page (http://www.rand.org/publications/permissions.html). Published 2009 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: order@rand.org Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN 978-0-8330-4706-9 The research described in this report was prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The research was conducted in the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the OSD, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community under Contract W74V8H-06-C-0002. iii Preface is monograph surveys social-science literature relating to counter- terrorism. It also takes first steps toward integrating the knowledge reflected in that literature and suggesting theories and methods to inform analysis and modeling. Our project was sponsored by the Mod- eling and Simulation Coordination Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, with oversight provided by James Bexfield, the Director of Planning and Analytical Support in OSD’s Program Analysis and Eval- uation. Comments and questions are welcome and should be addressed to the editors and project leaders: Paul K. Davis (Santa Monica, Cali- fornia; 310-451-6912; pdavis@rand.org) and Kim Cragin (Arlington, Virginia; 703-413-1100, extension 5666; cragin@rand.org). is research was conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center spon- sored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Uni- fied Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community. For more information on RAND’s International Security and Defense Policy Center, contact the Director, James Dobbins. He can be reached by email at James Dobbins@rand.org; by phone at 703-413-1100, extension 5134; or by mail at the RAND Corporation, 1200 S. Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202. More information about RAND is available at www.rand.org. v Contents Preface iii Figures xiii Tables xv Summary xvii Acknowledgments liii CHAPTER ONE Introduction 1 Paul K. Davis and Kim Cragin Background 1 e Challenge Posed 1 Approach 2 Challenge and Objectives 2 Organizing Questions 3 Scope and Character of Inquiry 3 Definitions 3 Disciplinary Scope 4 Structuring the Research and Monograph 5 Analytical Guidance 7 Bibliography 9 Endnotes 10 CHAPTER TWO e Root Causes of Terrorism 11 Darcy M.E. Noricks Introduction 11 vi Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together Objectives 11 e Political Violence Literature 11 Factors 13 Precipitant Versus Permissive Factors 13 Categories of Permissive Factors 14 Conclusions: Making Sense of the Factors 42 Implications for Strategy, Policy, and Research 47 Critical Tasks for Future Research: What Should We Tackle First? 50 Methodological and Measurement Problems 50 Leaders Versus Followers 52 Distinguishing Types of Terrorism 53 Bibliography 55 Endnotes 68 CHAPTER THREE Why and How Some People Become Terrorists 71 Todd C. Helmus Introduction 71 Radicalizing Social Groups 74 General Observations 74 Terrorist Recruitment 77 Bottom-Up Peer Groups 78 Alienation 81 Desire for Change 82 Political Change: Desire for an Independent State and to Sow Anarchy 83 Religious Changes: Caliphate and Millennialism 84 Single-Issue Change: Environmental Rights and Anti-Abortion 84 Discrimination 85 Desire to Respond to Grievance 86 Personal Grievance: Revenge 87 Collective Grievance: Duty to Defend 89 Identity 90 Perceived Rewards 91 Religious Rewards 91 Social Status 92 Contents vii Financial Rewards 93 Friendship 93 Excitement 94 Relationships and Hierarchies 94 Possible Implications for Policy 98 Bibliography 99 Endnotes 109 CHAPTER FOUR How Do Terrorists Generate and Maintain Support? 113 Christopher Paul Introduction 113 Objectives 113 Disciplinary Approaches to Studying Support for Terrorism 113 What Do We Mean by “Support”? 115 Relationships to Topics in Other Papers 117 Support Factors 117 Types of Support Needed and Sources for at Support 117 Individual Decisions to Support 121 Cautions, Consensus, and Disagreements 134 Cautions 134 Consensus 135 Disagreements 136 Making Sense of the Myriad of Factors 136 Implications for Strategy and Policy 140 Bibliography 142 Endnotes 150 CHAPTER FIVE e Economics of Terrorism and Counterterrorism: What Matters and Is Rational-Choice eory Helpful? 151 Claude Berrebi Introduction 151 Relationships Between Terrorism and Postulated Root Causes 152 Conventional Wisdom 152 Poverty and Education 153 viii Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together Religion 164 Mental Health and Irrationality 167 Summary 169 Rational-Choice Approach 169 Defining Terms: What Is a Rational-Choice Model? 169 Evidence 170 What Might Rational-Choice Models Look Like? 179 Potential Implications for Counterterrorism 192 Bibliography 194 Endnotes 202 CHAPTER SIX Organizational Decisionmaking by Terrorist Groups 209 Brian A. Jackson Introduction 209 How Different Disciplines Approach is Question 210 Relationship to Companion Papers 211 Understanding Terrorist Group Decisionmaking 212 e Implications of Group Structure and Functioning on Decisionmaking 214 Factors Influencing Group Decisionmaking 221 Nature of the Evidence on Terrorist Group Decisionmaking: Agreements and Disagreements 233 Relationships and Hierarchies 233 Implications for Strategy and Policy 235 Bibliography 241 Endnotes 249 CHAPTER SEVEN How Does Terrorism End? 257 Gaga Gvineria Introduction 257 Modes of Decline 258 Processes, Developments, and Factors Contributing to the End of Terrorism 261 Substantial Success 261 [...]... skills) RAND MG849-S.3 xxviii Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together organization itself must be more cautious and must worry increasingly about internal penetration That public support is very important to terrorist organizations is perhaps the strongest conclusion from social science affecting the counterterrorism policy issue The factor tree for this discussion is shown... benefit Group provision of social services Charismatic, entrepreneurial leadership; group propaganda xxix RAND MG849-S.4 Cultural obligations Summary Lack of opportunity for ors xxx Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together whether a terrorist organization and its actions are considered legitimate and effective may all be better targets for change efforts How Terrorists Make Decisions... grievance and desire for revenge Personal attacks on self or loved ones Effects of post-traumatic stress disorder Political change Independence of state Anarchy Single-issue change Environment Abortion Animal rights Charismatic, entrepreneurial leadership RAND MG849-S.2 Summary Social, economic, and political discrimination; other broad contextual factors xxv xxvi Social Science for Counterterrorism: ... Measures 476 B.5 End-of-Terrorism Measures 480 Summary Objectives Social science has much to say that should inform strategies for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency Unfortunately, the relevant literature has been quite fragmented and seemingly inconsistent across sources Our study was an attempt to do better—not only... xviii Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together 3 How do terrorists generate and sustain support? 4 What determines terrorists’ decisions and behaviors? What are the roles of, for example, ideology, religion, and rational choice? 5 How and why does terrorism decline? 6 Why do individuals disengage or deradicalize? 7 How can “strategic communications” be more or less effective? For. .. rationality (for example, the inability to gather the information needed for idealized rational-analytic calculations, and misperceptions), the many cognitive biases that afflict human decisionmaking (for example, the consequence of selecting data that reinforce preferences, of demonizing adversaries), the character of individual leaders (such as their risktaking propensity), emotions (for example,... risktaking propensity), emotions (for example, the fervor that commanders seek to build before battles or the fears that can paralyze), physiological xxxiv Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together circumstances (such as exhaustion and, variously, paranoia or paralysis), and leaders’ idiosyncrasies (for example, those of Shoko Ashahara of Aum Shinrikyo) The study of such considerations... 344 x Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together Delegitimization 348 Conclusion 352 Bibliography 355 CHAPTER TEN Cross-Cutting Observations and Some Implications for Policymakers... with a perceived duty to defend a people or achieve revenge for either personal or collective wrong The second is a passion for change, which might be religious (as in establishing an Islamic caliphate) or political (as in revolution against repression) These two factors form the ideological basis for terrorism and constitute overt reasons for terror action Neither is in itself a necessary factor but... personal, as in a desire for revenge against those who killed or imprisoned friends or family Personal traumatization, often manifested in post-traumatic stress disorder, may exacerbate motivations for revenge An alternative motivational set involves the passionate desire for change (the right branch), which may be related to political change (for example, independence), religious change (for example, establishing . Contributors Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense Approved for public release; distribution unlimited NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE Social Science for. 402 11.2. Relative Strengths of eory-Informed and Atheoretical Empirical Work 405 xvi Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together