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RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense Approved for public release; distribution unlimited NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE War by Other Means BUILDING COMPLETE AND BALANCED CAPABILITIES FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY David C. Gompert and John Gordon IV With Adam Grissom, David R. Frelinger, Seth G. Jones, Martin C. Libicki, Edward O'Connell, Brooke K. Stearns, Robert E. Hunter RAND COUNTERINSURGENCY STUDY • FINAL REPORT The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R ® is a registered trademark. © Copyright 2008 RAND Corporation All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from RAND. Published 2008 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: order@rand.org Cover Design by Stephen Bloodsworth The research described in this report was prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The research was conducted in the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the OSD, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community under Contract W74V8H-06-C-0002. DoD photo by Staff Sgt. Stacy L. Pearsall, U.S. Air Force Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Gompert, David C. War by other means : building complete and balanced capabilities for counterinsurgency / David C. Gompert, John Gordon IV. p. cm. — (Rand counterinsurgency study final report) Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-0-8330-4309-2 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Counterinsurgency—United States. 2. Insurgency. 3. Terrorism—Prevention. 4. Institution building—Government policy—United States. 5. United States— Foreign relations—2001– 6. Islamic fundamentalism—Political aspects. 7. United States—Military policy—21st century. 8. Security, International—21st century. 9. Strategy. I. Gordon, John, 1956– II. Title. III. Title: Building complete and balanced capabilities for counterinsurgency. U241.M485 2007 355.02'180973—dc22 2008001580 iii Preface In early 2006, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) asked RAND’s National Defense Research Institute to conduct a compre- hensive study of insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN), with a view toward how the United States should improve its capabilities for such conflicts in the 21st century. is is the capstone report of that study, drawing from a dozen RAND research papers on specific cases, issues, and aspects of insurgency and COIN. e study included an examination of 89 insurgencies since World War II to learn why and how insurgencies begin, grow, and are resolved. It also analyzed the current challenge of what is becoming known as global insurgency, exemplified by the global jihadist movement, as well as lessons about both insurgency and COIN from a number of cases, including Iraq and Afghanistan. e conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan provide the current policy context for this study. To be clear, however, the study is concerned with deficiencies in U.S. capabilities revealed in those conflicts, not with how to end them satisfactorily. Most new investments to improve U.S. COIN capabilities would not yield capabilities of immediate use. at said, to the extent that the findings can help the United States tackle the problems it faces in Iraq and Afghanistan, this would be a bonus. Regardless of how Iraq and Afghanistan turn out in the short term, the United States and its international partners will not have seen the last of this sort of challenge, and they must become better prepared than they have been for today’s insurgencies. It is a mistake to regard COIN as just another form of warfare. Insurgencies are movements in which opponents of established govern- iv War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced COIN Capabilities ing authorities use violence and other means to wrest the support of the population away from those authorities. Military force is but one instrument of COIN available for use in such contests, and it ought to be subordinate to a political strategy of offering the people a govern- ment deserving of their support. Improvements in local governance, legal systems, public services, and economic conditions may be at least as important as military operations, though the former often depend on the success of the latter. Even in providing security, the military is not the only agency involved: Law enforcement and information shar- ing are at least as important as combat forces in countering most insur- gencies. Accordingly, this report addresses not only military capabili- ties but all important security capabilities and civil instruments that must be strengthened for effective COIN. us, with the encourage- ment of its sponsor, the study’s findings are not confined to the domain of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). Success of COIN depends on the quality and performance of the government that is directly threatened by insurgency—a lesson relearned the hard way in Iraq and Afghanistan. If a government is seen by its people as illegitimate, sectarian, inept, or otherwise unre- sponsive to their needs, it is unlikely that the United States can save it from insurgency, perhaps not even from its own people. At the same time, the United States may be able to buy time, create “political space,” and offer assistance for the threatened government to make the reforms that are required to overcome the appeal or fear of the insurgents and thus to win the competition for the population’s confidence and alle- giance. Indeed, U.S backing must be contingent on such reforms or it will not work. Of course, the United States is not alone in its ability to help: U.S. global and regional allies, ad hoc collaborators, and interna- tional organizations have considerable capacity to do so. erefore, this report will address security and civil COIN capabilities of three actors: local states, the United States, and U.S. partners. e history of insurgencies and the particular challenges of COIN in this era of globalization and Islamic militancy demand humility and realism regarding COIN. eory is easier than practice; plans more impressive than execution. As enemies go, insurgents tend to be highly dedicated, resourceful, and aware of the terrain, especially the “human terrain,” in which they challenge the state’s control. COIN is messier, riskier, less predictable, and often nastier than intended. Mistakes are inevitable and, given the political essence of the conflict, often conse- quential. For these reasons, while it is obviously important to have the best possible U.S. capabilities for COIN, there is no assurance that these will produce the outcomes we seek at the costs and losses we might expect. Again, defective local government and deficient local security services can cancel out the advantages of even superior U.S. forces and massive assistance. is reality argues for hedging against disappointment both in the capabilities that the United States builds and in the COIN cam- paigns that it enters. us, capabilities should be adequate both to carry out plans and to recover from plans gone awry, as they often do. is study comes at a moment of anxiety about the ability of the United States to counter 21st-century insurgency, especially the Islamic-extremist sort. Given this, this study is meant to be objective, systematic, comprehensive, and accessible—all hallmarks of RAND work. e report has three parts: (I) the challenge of insurgency in the 21st century, (II) the capabilities needed to meet this challenge, and (III) the investments and other measures required to create these capabilities. Some of the recommendations in Part III pertain to mili- tary capabilities, including recommendations for training, techno- logical innovation, material investment, and organizational change. Some apply to other agencies within the U.S. government, notably the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Develop- ment (USAID). Some call for creating multilateral COIN capabilities, especially among U.S. partners and international organizations. By design, this report is a sweeping examination of capabilities for COIN. As such, it does not go into as much depth on every aspect of this subject as would narrower treatment of each aspect. While the authors are unhesitating in their general findings, many of the spe- cific proposals derived from those findings are offered not as the final word but for the sake of prompting further, focused analysis. ese are turbulent times in world politics and security, which is reflected in the dynamic and diverse nature of insurgency and the changing requirements for COIN. Research on COIN has just begun to reflect the implications of globalization. At such a juncture, this report and Preface v vi War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced COIN Capabilities the study on which it is based have sought to venture new, if unproven, ideas to enrich debate and prompt innovation. A significant measure of speculative analysis is inevitable and desirable. Of course, an effort is made to qualify the analysis and findings accordingly. e reader looking for guidance on whether and where the United States should engage in COIN will not find it here. Every insurgency is different in circumstances, character, and importance to U.S. inter- ests. Judgments about U.S. involvement, especially with direct military force, can be taken only in the light of those considerations, and with great care. Neither is this a manual on COIN tactics, which the U.S. military has recently refreshed. In concentrating on capabilities, this study is about creating options, not about whether and how the United States should act in a given case. at said, because the study judges the strategic and operational challenges to U.S. interests posed by 21st- century insurgency to be formidable, it recommends correspondingly strong capabilities so that the United States can succeed at COIN when it must. Whatever the future holds for Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States cannot afford to shirk from the challenge of Islamist insurgency. As noted, numerous other products of this study are or soon will be in the public domain. ese include: Byting Back—Regaining Information Superiority Against 21st- Century Insurgents: RAND Counterinsurgency Study—Volume 1, by Martin C. Libicki, David C. Gompert, David R. Frelinger, and Raymond Smith Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003–2006): RAND Counterinsur- gency Study—Volume 2, by Bruce Pirnie and Edward O’Connell Heads We Win—e Cognitive Side of Counterinsurgency (COIN): RAND Counterinsurgency Study—Paper 1, by David C. Gompert Subversion and Insurgency: RAND Counterinsurgency Study— Paper 2, by William Rosenau Understanding Proto-Insurgencies: RAND Counterinsurgency Study —Paper 3 , by Daniel Byman Money in the Bank—Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations: RAND Counterinsurgency Study—Paper 4, • • • • • • by Angel Rabasa, Peter Chalk, Ivan Khilko, and Paraag Shukla, and Lesley Anne Warner Rethinking Counterinsurgency—A British Perspective: RAND Counterinsurgency Study—Paper 5, by John Mackinlay and Alison al-Baddawy. RAND hopes that political leaders, government officials, military officers, other practitioners, policy researchers, scholars, journalists, and concerned citizens will benefit from this growing body of work, including this final report. is research was sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy (ISDP) Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combat- ant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community. For more information on RAND’s ISDP Center, contact the Director, James Dobbins. He can be reached by email at james_ dobbins@rand.org; by phone at 703-413-1100, extension 5134; or by mail at the RAND Corporation, 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050. More information about RAND is available at http:// www.rand.org. • Preface vii [...]... Number of Insurgencies by Region, Sorted by Outcome 377 Number of Insurgencies as a Function of the Local Religion, Sorted by Outcome 378 xix xx War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced COIN Capabilities A.4 A.5 A.6 A.7 A.8 A.9 A.10 A.11 A.12 A.13 A.14 A.15 A.16 A.17 A.18 A.19 A.20 A.21 A.22 Surviving Insurgencies After N Years, Sorted by Outcome ... Insurgencies by Decade of Onset, Sorted by Outcome 380 Number of Insurgencies by Country Income, Sorted by Outcome 381 Number of Insurgencies by Level of Urbanization, Sorted by Outcome 381 Number of Insurgencies by Goal of Insurgents, Sorted by Outcome ... Insurgencies by Force Ratio, Sorted by Outcome 383 Number of Insurgencies by Insurgent Competence, Sorted by Outcome 384 Number of Insurgencies by Insurgent Popularity, Sorted by Outcome 384 Number of Non-Secessionist Insurgencies by Insurgent Popularity, Sorted by Outcome... Insurgencies by Insurgent Structure, Sorted by Outcome 385 Number of Insurgencies by Insurgent Use of Terror, Sorted by Outcome 386 Number of Insurgencies by Level of State Support, Sorted by Outcome 387 Number of Insurgencies by Type of Sanctuary, Sorted by Outcome... Insurgencies by the Presence and Removal of Dominant Military Leader, Sorted by Outcome 388 Number of Insurgencies by Type of Government, Sorted by Outcome 389 Number of Insurgencies by Government Competence, Sorted by Outcome 390 Number of Insurgencies by Government Competence, Sorted by Outcome... of Insurgencies by Government Popularity, Sorted by Outcome 391 Number of Insurgencies by Government Popularity, Sorted by Outcome (Insurgencies Motivated by Secession or Autonomy Excluded) 391 Tables A.23 A.24 B.1 B.2 B.3 B.4 D.1 xxi Insurgencies for Which the Government Had Direct Support from Other Countries... 133 National Registry-Census, ID Cards, and Vetting 137 Three-Dimensional Awareness 139 Embedded Video 140 xii War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced COIN Capabilities National Wiki ... 242 xvii xviii War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced COIN Capabilities 12.1 13.1 13.2 A.1 Investing in Complete and Balanced COIN 298 Merging Defense Options 337 Variable Civil-Military COIN Units 343 Length of Insurgency in Years from Shortest to Longest, Sorted by Outcome ... replacing their losses As the United States xxiii xxiv War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced COIN Capabilities considers what capabilities it needs, it should define this conflict as a contest to persuade Muslim populations to choose human dignity and progress and to reject violent religious tyranny This seemingly easy choice is complicated by the belief of many Muslims, not entirely unfounded,... active and influential Thus, while al Qaeda clearly does not control Hamas, leaders of the latter warn of the danger that the Palestinian cause will be swept up into the 1 Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, MIPT Terrorism Database, 2007 As of October 25, 2007: http://www.tkb.org xxvi War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced COIN Capabilities wider, more radical, insatiable jihad . regard COIN as just another form of warfare. Insurgencies are movements in which opponents of established govern- iv War by Other Means: Building Complete. W74V8H-06-C-0002. DoD photo by Staff Sgt. Stacy L. Pearsall, U.S. Air Force Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Gompert, David C. War by other means : building