Safety Culture Safety Culture To my wife Sandra Safety Culture John Bernard Taylor assessing and Changing the Behaviour of Organisations © John Bernard Taylor 2010 All rights reserved No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmi ed in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher John Bernard Taylor has asserted his moral right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents.
Safety Culture To my wife Sandra Safety Culture Assessing and Changing the Behaviour of Organisations John Bernard Taylor © John Bernard Taylor 2010 All rights reserved No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmi.ed in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher John Bernard Taylor has asserted his moral right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the author of this work Gower Applied Business Research Our programme provides leaders, practitioners, scholars and researchers with thought provoking, cutting edge books that combine conceptual insights, interdisciplinary rigour and practical relevance in key areas of business and management Published by Gower Publishing Limited Wey Court East Union Road Farnham Surrey, GU9 7PT England Ashgate Publishing Company Suite 420 101 Cherry Street Burlington, VT 05401-4405 USA www.gowerpublishing.com British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Taylor, John Bernard Safety culture : assessing and changing the behaviour of organizations (Psychological and behavioural aspects of risk) Industrial safety Evaluation Organizational behavior Evaluation Safety education, Industrial I Title II Series 363.1’163-dc22 ISBN: 978-1-4094-0127-8 (hbk) 978-1-4094-0128-5 (ebk) II Library of Congress Control Number: 2010937247 Contents List of Figures List of Tables Acknowledgements Preface vii ix xi xiii Organisational Safety-Culture Theory Safety-Culture Theory The Integrated Safety-Culture Paradigm Summary Safety-Culture Theory as a Predictive Model Safety-Culture and Event Predictions Summary 39 39 127 Assessing Organisational Safety Culture The Formal and Informal Safety-Culture Dimensions Characteristics and Attributes An Independent Review – ‘Measuring’ Safety-Culture Characteristics and Attributes Quantification of Data Independent Safety-Culture Review Process Output Pictorial Output from the Independent Safety-Culture Review Process A Worked Example of ‘a Safety-Culture Review’ Techniques for Self-Assessment of Safety-Culture Summary 129 129 132 Changing a Safety-Culture A Way Forward The Psychological Implications of Change Making the Change An Organisation’s Self-Generated Change Programme A Modular Assisted Approach to Change Programme Delivery Change Programme Metrics 1 34 37 133 147 148 151 159 161 167 169 169 172 175 176 181 185 vi Safety Culture Leadership for Safety – Soft Skills and Behaviours Making Safety-Culture Change Last Safety Behavioural Observation Techniques Change-Programme Monitoring, Review and Continuous Improvement Summary 191 193 Epilogue Concluding Remarks Summary 195 195 197 Appendix I Appendix II Appendix III Further Reading Index 185 187 189 199 203 205 209 213 List of Figures Figure 1.1 Safety-beliefs and espoused values leading to attitudes and safety-behaviours Figure 1.2 Schematic of safety-culture layers Figure 1.3 A military parade 20 Figure 1.4 The Union Jack 20 Figure 1.5 A barrister’s court wig 21 Figure 1.6 Documents and equipment – artefacts 21 Figure 1.7 The integrated safety-culture paradigm 35 Figure 2.1 VCM reactor vessels layout – plan 62 Figure 2.2 VCM reactor vessels layout – elevation 64 Figure 2.3 ‘Mirror image’ vessels D306 and D310 layout – ground floor 65 Figure 2.4 The location of Tokaimura (Point ‘A’) 80 Figure 2.5 A chain reaction 82 Figure 2.6 A schematic, the approved process in the Conversion Test Building 91 Figure 2.7 The unapproved process using the precipitation tank 95 Figure 2.8 The precipitation tank 97 Figure 2.9 A schematic of the operators’ locations during the criticality event 98 Figure 2.10 A schematic plan of the irradiator facility 111 Figure 3.1 Example – the distribution of attributes for the characteristic – ‘Safety is a clearly recognised value’ 151 Figure 3.2 Example – the distribution of safety-culture characteristics 154 Figure 3.3(a) A possible distribution of safety-culture characteristics for a sample of events 156 Figure 3.3(b) A possible distribution of safety-culture characteristics for a sample of events 158 Figure 4.1 A safety-culture ladder 182 This page has been left blank intentionally List of Tables Table 1.1(a) Antecedents and consequences – current behaviour, middle managers not frequently carry out behavioural observations across a sample of all employees 28 Table 1.1(b) Antecedents and consequences – changed behaviour, middle managers frequently carry out safety behavioural observations across a sample of all employees 29 Table 2.1 Failures of a safety-management system – dropped load event 76 Table 3.1 Safety-culture characteristics 132 Table 3.2 Examples of shared organisational safety-beliefs 134 Table 3.3 Examples of shared organisational safety values 135 Table 3.4 Safety-culture characteristic A – ‘Safety is a clearly recognised value’, attributes, safety-behaviours (informal dimension) and the documented expectations (formal dimension) 136 Table 3.5 Safety-culture characteristic B – ‘Leadership for safety is clear’, attributes, safety-behaviours (informal dimension) and the documented expectations (formal dimension) 139 Table 3.6 Safety-culture characteristic C – ‘Accountability for safety is clear’, attributes safety-behaviours (informal dimension) and the documented expectations (formal dimension) 142 Table 3.7 Attributes for safety-culture characteristics D and E 145 Table 3.8 Criteria for assessing and scoring the degree of presence of an attribute 149 Table 3.9 Panoramic irradiator, testing safety-beliefs and observed behaviours for culture characteristic A 163 Table 4.1 Senior managers’ safety-behaviours 180 Table 4.2 A generative organisation 183 Table 4.3 Maturity model elements and the five safety-culture characteristics 185 Table 5.1 Ten safety-culture questions 198 Table A3.1 Expected responses to the ten safety-culture questions 205 202 safety culture numerical (for example in radiological protection analysis) Risk is more usually a qualitative phenomenon • Safety: Is defined as freedom from the consequences of an unmanaged hazard In reality, absolute safety does not exist There is no state of zero risk and ‘total’ safety • Values: These are preferred, desirable conditions or states Values are states that will, or do, assist in fulfilling beliefs They are the conditions and actions that an organisation holds in high esteem As such, the staff give them high priority and attention Espoused values can be an expression of beliefs through people’s spoken words They can also arise in written artefacts, for example, the company environment, health and safety policy (Espoused values may not however, always reflect ‘true’ beliefs.) • Workforce: People who are assumed to work under a supervisor – plant designers, operators, maintenance engineers, technicians and contractors, etc Appendix II Safety Culture Types A Generative Safety Culture A generative safety culture is a high reliability, low-risk organisation Safety is integrated fully into all business functions risk portfolios The organisation has ‘general unease’ regarding safety and is ever watchful and mindful at all staff levels There is a very high degree of team working high-level of safetyfocused dialogue throughout the organisation It values dialogue and being a team working organisation There is safety training and more safety training Short and effective feedback systems and procedures affecting plant safety are under constant scrutiny Fundamental to achieving a strong safety-culture and generative culture is an organisation which has a high standard of communication between all levels and a high degree of individual safety involvement Key performance indicators for safety play a central role in annual reviews for all in the organisation An open, ‘just culture’ is valued and encouraged by managers Team working (dialogue) to resolve safety issues and gain improvement is encouraged to gain high individual involvement Individuals accept responsibility for their safety and that of others Reactive Safety starts to be taken seriously, but only after incidents is there any action Calculative Safety is treated very seriously There are management systems and much data collection Proactive People try to avoid accidents and start to take a more bottom-up approach 204 safety culture A Pathological Safety Culture In such organisations there are few safety rules There is little or no management commitment to either safety or leadership in setting safety standards The workforce is expected to look after itself regarding keeping safe It is a belief that accidents are part of doing the job Safety is not taken as a serious business risk and there is little awareness of safety technology The organisation aims for the absolute legal minimum regarding safety law Source: Hearts and Minds Programme, available from The Energy Institute, reproduced with the kind permission of Shell International Exploration and Production For further information visit www.energyinst.org.uk/heartsandminds Appendix III Ten Top Questions Responses Table A3.1 Expected responses to the ten safety-culture questions Question Good practice shared safety culture beliefs being tested Good practice shared safety culture values being tested Expected responses for a ‘good’ safety culture Do you agree that the primary accountability for safety on this establishment rests with the regulator? – Accountability for safety rests at all times with managers – The safety of staff, our contractors and the public is our number one priority in all circumstances – Our individual attention to safety is a condition of employment The accountability rests with the Board through the CEO For organisations that are issued with a legal licence to operate high-hazard plants, emphasis on the specific accountabilities of the licensee would be expected Is there a documented displayed health and safety policy signed by the CEO? Accountability for safety rests at all times with managers – The safety of contractors and the public is our number one priority in all circumstances – Our engagement in safe behaviours is necessary for safe operations – We believe in a culture of legal compliance is our minimum requirement – Our individual attention to safety is a condition of employment – That everyone is responsible for safety, our own, others safety and the protection of the facility A positive response would be anticipated here with the health and safety policy being displayed to the reviewer The reviewer would listen for information on the management annual review of the policy and as appropriate the steps taken so that it remains relevant to the business Is there a published set of organisational shared beliefs, values and safetyculture expectations that are placed on all employees? – Belief in safety vigilance at all times – Absolute safety does not exist – Human error is normal and can be expected – Our engagement in safe behaviours is necessary for safe operations – People are fallible and will make mistakes – We believe in a culture of legal compliance is our minimum requirement – Our individual attention to safety is a condition of employment – That respect is given to all safety views as everyone has the right to question and report safety issues – People’s interventions to ensure all potential health and safety incidents are prevented – Everyone has the right to challenge on safety issues The reviewer should anticipate reference to an intranet site, distributed booklets and possibly a periodic poster campaign Particular emphasis will be placed on all managers carrying and frequently referencing back to the organisation’s beliefs, values and safety culture expectation Safety behavioural expectations need to be explained as having been derived and agreed for all levels, from the senior management to the workforce 206 Table A3.1 safety culture Continued Question Good practice shared safety culture beliefs being tested Good practice shared safety culture values being tested Expected responses for a ‘good’ safety culture What actions you personally take to ensure people understand the safety policy, beliefs, values and the safety culture behavioural expectations? – The safety of staff, our contractors and the public is our number one priority in all circumstances – Accountability for safety rests at all times with managers – We believe in safety vigilance at all times – We believe a culture of legal compliance is our minimum requirement – Our individual attention to safety is a condition of employment – We value thorough safety training and competence as essential for safe working – That everyone is responsible for safety: our own, others’ safety and the protection of the facility The reviewer should anticipate reference would be made to the integration of the safety culture programme into the safety management system Emphasis would be expected on the senior managers’ communications strategies Evidence could be presented of a monitoring strategy How many scheduled times per month you discuss safety and observe safety-culture behaviours on this facility? – The safety of staff, our contractors and the public is our number one priority in all circumstances – Accountability for safety rests at all times with managers – Our individual attention to safety is a condition of employment – Teamwork to resolve safety matters is strongly supported – That respect is given to all safety views as everyone has the right to question and report safety issues A schedule, integrated into the management system, would be expected Reference to a strategy and schedule for visiting offices and operational plant should be tabled with implementation evidence What actions you periodically take so that you understand the safety culture status of this facility against good international practice? – Accountability for safety rests at all times with managers – Our individual attention to safety is a condition of employment – That we regularly check and report our safety objectives performance Required action should be demonstrated as a part of the management system Evidence of a periodic self-assessment of the whole organisation or a part of the organisation as the company strategy requires How, in the last month, have you demonstrated to the organisation your personal commitment to a strong safety-culture? – The safety of staff, our contractors and the public is our number one priority in all circumstances – Accountability for safety rests at all times with managers – We believe in safety vigilance at all times – Absolute safety does not exist – That the organisation strives for an open dialogue culture – Our individual attention to safety is a condition of employment – That everyone is responsible for safety: our own, others’ safety and the protection of the facility Possibilities: behavioural observations, managers take part in safety walkabout reviews, carry out cross-organisation presentations, have stopped production due to a safety issue taking priority, opened several safety-training sessions, etc Is safety a standing agenda item at every monthly senior managers meeting? – The safety of staff, our contractors and the public is our number one priority in all circumstances – Accountability for safety rests at all times with managers – That we regularly check and report our safety objectives performance – That all events and near misses are reported as we recognise that there are no minor injuries Agendas presented as evidence Minutes made available where possible appendix iii Table A3.1 207 Concluded Question Good practice shared safety culture beliefs being tested Good practice shared safety culture values being tested Expected responses for a ‘good’ safety culture Do you agree annually to commit resources to safety improvement programmes? – Accountability for safety rests at all times with managers – We believe a culture of legal compliance is our minimum requirement – Absolute safety does not exist – Our individual attention to safety is a condition of employment – We value thorough safety training and competence as essential for safe working – That everyone is responsible for safety: our own, others’ safety and the protection of the facility Documented evidence of a safety-management system review and the publication of a safety improvements budget would be expected: minutes of meetings, evidence in the budget 10 By what means you test that the safetymanagement system is assisting you in managing safety risks on this facility? – Accountability for safety rests at all times with managers We value that we regularly check and report our safety objectives performance Evidence of a formal safety-management system annual review would be expected The review would typically be procedure driven and include safety reactive and proactive key performance indicator outturns, audit report findings, independent review findings, behavioural safety findings, trends The review should be presented as an open dialogue on positive safety matters and areas judged to need improvement A particular strength would be if the management system review was chaired by the CEO As a minimum it would be chaired and attended by senior managers A formal report on the review and actions arising for the organisation in general and the safety management system in particular would be made available for the CEO This would link to the annual safety improvement plan and business risk reduction plan This page has been left blank intentionally Further Reading Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations 1993 ACSNI Human Factors Study Group Third Report: Organising for Safety Published by Her Majesty’s Stationery Office Cox, S and Cox, T 1996 Safety Systems and People Published by Butterworth – Heinemann Ltd E&P Forum 1994 Guidelines for the Development and Application of Health, Safety and Environmental Management Systems Report No 6.36/210 Published by The Oil and Gas Industry Exploration and Production Forum (E&P Forum), London, UK Fidderman, H Health and Safety Bulletin 2003 The Influence of Managers Bulletin No 317 Gehman, H.W Jnr et al 2003 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Published by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Government Printing Office, Washington D.C Guldenmund, F.W 2000 The Nature of Safety Culture: A Review of Theory and Research Safety Science 34(2000), 215–57 Published by Elsevier Science Ltd Health and Safety Executive 1999 Development of a Business Excellence Model of Safety Culture Published by Her Majesty’s Stationery Office Health and Safety Commission 1999 Directors’ Responsibilities for Health and Safety Report INDG 343 02/02 C700 Published by Her Majesty’s Stationery Office Health and Safety Executive 2002 Strategies to Promote Safe Behaviours as Part of a Health and Safety Management System Prepared by the Kiel Centre Research Report 430/2002 Health and Safety Executive 2003 The Role of Management Leadership in Determining Workplace Safety Outcomes Research Report 044 University of Aberdeen Published by Her Majesty’s Stationery Office Health and Safety Executive 2005 A Review of Safety Culture and Safety Climate Literature for the Development of the Safety Culture Inspection Tool Research Report 367 Her Majesty’s Railways Inspectorate Published by Her Majesty’s Stationery Office 210 Safety Culture Hudson, P.T.W and Willekes, F.C 2000 The Hearts and Minds Project in an Operating Company: Developing Tools to Measure Cultural Factors Society of Petroleum Engineers, SPE 61228 SPE International Conference International Atomic Energy Agency Developing Safety Culture in Nuclear Activities Safety Series Report No 11 International Atomic Energy Agency 2002 Key Practical Issues in Strengthening Safety Culture Report by the International Safety Advisory Group 15 International Atomic Energy Agency 2002 Safety Culture in Nuclear Installations International Atomic Energy Agency TECDOC-1329 International Atomic Energy Agency 2006 Application of the Management System for Facilities and Activities Safety Guide GS-G-3.1 International Atomic Energy Agency 2007 Lessons Learned from the JCO Criticality Accident Tokaimura Kennedy, R and Kirwan, B 1995 Safety Culture in Nuclear Installation The Failure Mechanism of Safety Culture International Topical Meeting, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna Kletz, T 1990 Plant Design for Safety a User Friendly Approach Published by Hemisphere Publishing Corporation Kletz, T 1994 Learning From Accidents Published by Butterworth – Heinemann Ltd Komai, J.L et al 1992 The Role of Performance Antecedents and Consequences in Work Motivation Journal of Applied Psychology, 67(3), 334–340 Leveson, N 2004 A New Accident Model for Engineering Safe Systems Safety Science, 42, 237–70 Los Alamos National Laboratory 2000 A Review of Criticality Accidents 2000 Revision LA 13638 Approved for public release, distribution unlimited Manuele, F.A and Christensen, W.C 1999 Safety Through Design Published by the National Safety Council, and NSC Press Product (USA) Marsh, T 1996 University of Manchester Institute of Technology (UK) Developing a Training and Communications Strategy for a Positive Safety Culture Health and Safety Management Conference, London Parker, D Lawrie, M and Hudson, P 2006 A Framework for Understanding the Development of Organisational Safety Culture Safety Science, 44, 551–62 Rasmussen, J 1997 Risk Management in a Dynamic Society: a Modeling Problem Safety Science, 27(2/3), 183–213 Reason, J 2007 Human Error Cambridge University Press Schein, E.H 2004 Organizational Culture and Leadership Third Edition JoseyBass Shell International Exploration and Production Heart and Minds For information visit www.energyinst.org.uk/heartsandminds further reading 211 Taylor, R.H 2002 Improving Health and Safety Performance – Achieving ‘Breakthrough’ Invited Paper to the Institution of Structural Engineers, January 2002 Published by The Structural Engineer 23–7 Taylor, R.H and Rycraft, H.S 2004 Learning From and Preventing Major Accidents Proceedings of IBC Workshop on Effective Safety Management, London, UK The Institution of Nuclear Power Operations 2006 Human Performance Reference Manual INPO 06–003 Transport Canada, Civil Aviation 2006 ‘What is a Safety Management System?’ Technical paper, TP 13739 Published by the Canadian Civil Aviation Turner, B.A 1995 Safety Culture and its Context Procedures of the International Topical Meeting on Safety Culture in Nuclear Installations, America Nuclear Society, Vienna, 321–9 U.S Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board March 2007 Investigation Report Vinyl Chloride Monomer Explosion Report No 2004–10-IL U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region Inspection Report No 03019882/2004003 Approved 19 May 2004 (Author’s note: Panoramic wet source irradiator inspection) U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRC Review of the Tokai Mura Criticality Accident This page has been left blank intentionally Index A antecedents 25, 27–32, 44–46, 78, 109, 179–180, 187, 190, 196 see also definitions artefacts 3–6, 13, 17–19, 21–22, 34–40, 49, 71, 78, 104–105, 108, 152, 154, 187, 196, 200, 202 see also definitions attitudes 1, 11–12, 17, 32–39, 71, 108, 123, 130–133 see also definitions attributes 34–38, 130–148, 151–153, 155–157, 160, 163–166, 171, 193, 195 see also definitions B see also events C chain reaction 60, 81–84, 99 challenge (culture) 10, 13–14, 23–24, 33, 41, 46, 55, 59, 68, 79, 123, 135, 187 change programme 170, 172–193 characteristics 34–38, 55, 129–135, 138, 141, 144–145, 147–148, 1150, 153–162, 171, 175–176, 178–181, 184–185, 292, 195, 199 Chernobyl 1, 2, 186 communications 10, 136–147, 163, 186, 193, 206 see also dialogue culture commitment 6–14, 22–32, 55, 145, 166, 176–180, 199–206 criticality Tokaimura 40, 79–109, 158 Oscillating 81–99 consequences (behavioural) 6–8 see also behaviours continuous improvement 27, 170, 188–193 culture see safety culture beliefs 1, 3–14, 17, 19–26, 31, 34–41, 46–47, 49, 56–57, 61, 70–75, 77, 100–106, 109, 121, 125–134, 136–143, 148–157, 159–167, 171–175, 180–184, 193, 195, 199, 200–202, 205–207 behaviours 2–17, 22–27, 30–31, 45–50, 52, 56–59, 61, 70, 72, 77–79, 100, 104, 104–110, 124–136, 139, 142, 158–167, 171–191, 195–196, 199, 200–201 behavioural observations 27–30, 32, D 38, 61, 139, 190, 206 defence in depth 46–53, 67, 82, 94, Bhopal 50, 52, 55–57, 127, 154, 156, 157 100, 126, 186 214 Safety Culture dialogue culture 7, 13, 17, 23–24, 27, 135, 76–177, 180, 186, 188, 193, 197 Hearts and Minds 181–185, 204 human-performance 1, 25 E informal dimension 17, 136, 151 inherent safety 120,124 International Atomic Energy Authority irradiator 40, 109 isotopes 81, 109 employees 2, 15 ,23 Energy Institute UK 181, 183, 185, 204 enrichment 82–86 espoused values see also values and definitions events Bhopal 30, 40 dropped load event 30, 40 poly vinyl chloride plant event 40, 59 Titanic 40 Tokaimura 40, 79 wet source irradiator event 40, 109 executives 23, 174, 191 see also expectations, and safety culture shaping expectations 6, 17, 23, 134, 136, 163, 167, 188, 298 see also behaviours F fear culture 10, 57, 103, 106, 108, 126, 191 fission 81–99 formal dimension 131, 136, 151, 188 G gamma rays 80–99, 109–122 grays 120 group think 103, 123, 126 H hazard 3, 201–202 see also risk and definitions I J ‘just’ safety culture 5, 134–135, 180, 188, 201 L leadership 22–23, 30, 36, 132, 201 see also safety culture shaping M managers see also safety culture shaping and expectations maturity ladder 162, 181, 184, 192 see also Energy Institute UK methyl isocyanate (MIC) 51 N natural uranium 79 neutrons 79 norms 7–8, 10, 14, 105, 126, 160 nuclear criticality 79 O observational techniques 189, 191 P poly vinyl chloride (PVC) 61 index Q questioning (attitude) 10, 16, 24, 33, 42, 48, 57, 59, 71, 103, 105, 123, 126, 147, 155, 187, 189, 190 see also attitudes R radiation radiation dose 109 shielding 109 units 109 risk 201–202 see also hazard and definitions S safety behavioural expectations 8, 23, 38, 133, 157, 181, 191, 205–206 definition 2, 182, 199 management systems 115, 177, 184, 200, 203 safety culture blame 191, 137, 164, 191, 196 calculative 182, 203 change 6–8, 12, 27, 29, 30–31, 129, 161–162, 167, 172–183, 186, 189, 190–193 see also change programme definitions 2, 182, 199 dimensions see formal dimension and informal dimension elements 2–3, 12, 32, 34–39, 129, 131, 134, 162, 188 see also beliefs, values, artefacts, behaviours generative 195 independent review 133, 159, 161, 167, 177–181, 193, 197, 207 linear model 131 215 maturity model 181, 183–185 ‘measuring’ 3, 17, 128, 131, 133 pathological 55, 162, 182–184, 204 ‘poor’ 3, 8, 48, 104, 130, 157–158, 171, 176, 184, 190, 198 proactive 182, 192 reactive 182 self assessment 161–162, 174, 181, 183–184, 187, 192, 197, 206 shaping 7, 11, 13, 100–101, 146, 186, 195, 197, 201 ‘strong’ 38, 71, 85, 132, 151, 152, 154, 158, 186, 193, 195, 198 Schein, E., Scoring 147–151, 157 see also formal dimension and informal dimension senior managers see also expectations and safety culture shaping shared beliefs 3, 5, 19, 22, 41, 46, 55, 60, 101, 106, 167, 172, 205 Shell International Exploration and Production 181–183, 185, 204 soft skills 31, 137, 140, 164, 180, 185–187, 195 sterilisation 109 sub-culture 7, 10, 95, 147, 153, 173 supervisors see also expectations T Titanic 40 Tokaimura 79 triuranium octoxide 94, 100, 102–105 U uranyl nitrate 80, 86, 90, 92–93, 96, 108, 109 uranium oxide 90 216 Safety Culture V values 3–8, 14–15, 17–27, 32–39, 49, 58, 71, 77, 102, 107, 122, 134– 152, 161, 163–166, 174, 181, 195, 199, 202, 205–207 vinyl chloride monomer (VCM) 59 W wet source irradiator 40, 109 workforce .. .Safety Culture To my wife Sandra Safety Culture Assessing and Changing the Behaviour of Organisations John Bernard Taylor © John Bernard Taylor 2010 All rights reserved No part of this... Integrated Safety- Culture Paradigm Summary Safety- Culture Theory as a Predictive Model Safety- Culture and Event Predictions Summary 39 39 127 Assessing Organisational Safety Culture The Formal and. .. Safety- Culture Theory Safety- Culture Theory The concept of safety- culture emerged from the analysis of the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident Having delivered a severe political and social