Climate change, scarcity and conflict in global policy

Prometheus The Chain of Climate Change, Scarcity and Conflict in Global Politics Nnaemeka E Enemchukwu Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3474844 Climate Change, Scarcity and Conflict By Nnaemeka E Enemchukwu Prometheus Prometheus Scholar Series Special Research Unit The Prometheus Article Series June 2019 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3474844 Prometheus Scholar Seriesđ âNnaemeka E Enemchukwu, 2019 University of Nigeria, Nsukka Department of History and International Studies nnaemeka.enemchukwu.197155@unn.edu.ng nnaemekaclassic@gmail.com All rights reserved Except as permitted under current legislation, no part of this work may be photocopied, stored in a retrieval system, published, performed in public, adapted, broadcast, transmitted, recorded, or reproduced in any form or by any means, without the prior permission of the copyright owner Telephone: +2348145090546 Internet: www.prometheusscholarseries.org G-mail: prometheus.scholarseries@gmail.com Lagos Enugu Ogun How to Cite: Nnaemeka Enemchukwu, The Chain of Climate Change, Scarcity and Conflict in Global Politics (Lagos: Prometheus Scholar Series, 2019) Prometheus …Igniting Your Fire for Excellence! Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3474844 Abstract: To state that climate change and environment issues are becoming increasingly important in the realm of International Relations is an understatement Mitigation and adaptation debates, strategies and mechanisms are all developed at the international level, often demonstrating the nuances of international politics and governance The changes experienced in the environment have in many ways been identified as plausible causes of violent intergroup conflict These changes include greenhouse-induced climate change, stratospheric ozone depletion, degradation and loss of good agricultural land, degradation and removal of forests, depletion and pollution of fresh water supplies, and depletion of fisheries The notion is that there is a complex linkage between environment, scarcity and conflict among competing groups in the international system Policy makers, national and international actors, and academics are left in bewilderment as they sought to identify how conflict can be environmentally induced However, some sectors believe that environment does not directly or exclusively causes violent conflicts rather they are a subset of the whole It upon these contending issues that this study attempts to examine the relationship between environment, scarcity and conflict And in any way contemporary conflicts have direct linkages to scare resources as some circles of thought believe? The study also will identify contending issues of these chain of events – environment-scarcityconflict – that are prevailing discourse in the international system Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3474844 INTRODUCTION The political and strategic impact of surging populations, spreading disease, deforestation and soil erosion, water depletion, air pollution, and possibly, rising sea levels — developments that will prompt mass migration and, in turn, incite group conflicts — will be the core foreign-policy challenge [in the twenty-first century] — Robert Kaplan.1 Environmental topics have appeared more and more frequently on the international agenda over the past three decades An increasing number of people, at least in Western countries, believe that human economic and social activity is taking place in a way that threatens the environment.2 In the past fifty years, more people have been added to the world’s population than in all previous millennia of human existence A vastly increasing global pursuing higher standards of living is a potential threat to the environment.3 Oil and natural gas, water, food, and minerals are critical to ensuring human wellbeing and prosperity Due to expanding economic activities, growing population, and climate change these resources have become increasingly sensitive to higher prices, supply shortages, and export restrictions There is also a threat of intergroup conflict The mismatch between future demand and supply is crystallizing into one of the most complex and urgent issues policymakers faces in the 21st Century Unless the challenges arising from these scarcities are confronted in a comprehensive and proactive manner, world economies will stagnate and political power will diminish in the international system To this end, this essay examines nexus between the environment, scarcity and conflict in the international system It argues that contemporary issues in the international system are experiencing a paradigm shift, especially as changes in the environment are determined by the actions and inactions of humans The results that emanates from environmental alteration have far reaching consequences hence the political and academic attention on a global scale Robert, Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy,” Atlantic Monthly, Feb 1994, 43-76 cited in Daniel Schwartz and Ashbindu Singh, Environmental Conditions, Resources, and Conflicts An Introductory Overview and Data Collection (Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 1999), Robert Jackson and George Sorenson, Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches Fifth Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 288-289 Jackson and Sorenson, Introduction to International Relations, 289 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3474844 Climate Change, Scarcity and Conflict Risks As concern over both climate change and resource scarcity has increased in recent years, so speculation has grown that they will lead to increased risk or incidence of violent conflict Former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, for example, said in 2007 that “changes in our environment and the resulting upheavals - from droughts to inundated coastal areas to loss of arable lands - are likely to become a major driver of war and conflict”.4 However, while climate change and resource scarcity pose risks – especially for poor people and fragile states, which as discussed below are most vulnerable to their effects – caution is needed in forecasting their effects, particularly in the area of violent conflict In part, this is because the impacts of resource scarcity or climate change will in practice almost always blur with those of other risk drivers, with the effect that it becomes extremely difficult to attribute particular impacts solely to climate change or resource scarcity The rise in the number of undernourished people from 854 million people in 2007 to over billion in late 2009, for example, is only partly attributable to the effects of the food price spike: also critical were the subsequent effects of the global downturn, which further eroded the purchasing power of many poor people.5 Similarly, while poor people are undoubtedly vulnerable to the direct impacts of climate change, the most far-reaching effects of global warming may be the indirect “consequences of consequences” – such as political instability, economic weakness, food insecurity or large-scale migration.6 Secondly, it is important to remember that the actual risk of violent conflict posed by climate change or resource scarcity depends as much on the vulnerability of populations, ecosystems, economies and institutions as on the strength of climate or scarcity impacts The fact that poor people are more exposed to price spikes, resource scarcity and climate impacts is well-established, for example – as is the fact that environmental risks are among Ban Ki-moon, “Address to the United Nations International School – UN Conference on “Global Warming: Confronting the Crisis,” 2007, http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/search_ full.asp?statID=70,cited in Alex Evans, Resource Scarcity, Climate Change and the Risk of Violent Conflict (New York: Center on International Cooperation, 2009), Food and Agriculture Organization, “1.02 Billion People Hungry,” FAO news release, 19 June 2009, http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/20568/icode/, see also, Alex Evans, Resource Scarcity, 6 D Smith, and J Vivekananda, A Climate of Conflict: The links between climate change, peace and war (London: International Alert, 2007) Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3474844 the most frequent, costly and impactful causes of the kinds of shock that can cause people to become poor in the first place, and that make escape from poverty so difficult Similarly, the institutional and political weaknesses of fragile states have been argued to make them more susceptible to conflict risk arising from climate change and resource scarcity A 2007 report from International Alert, for example, found that 46 countries, home to 2.7 billion people, would experience a “high risk of violent conflict” as a result of climate change interacting with economic, social and political problems, while in a further 56 countries with 1.2 billion inhabitants “the institutions of government will have great difficulty taking the strain of climate change on top of all their other current challenges”.8 Climate change and resource scarcity are rarely, if ever, the sole cause of violent conflict, then: instead, they are better understood as ‘threat multipliers’ that will in practice interact both with other risk drivers, and with diverse sources of vulnerability.9 However, this is not to say that climate and scarcity not increase the risk of violent conflict On the contrary, as a United Nations Environment Programme report recently argued: “the exploitation of natural resources and related environmental stresses can be implicated in all phases of the conflict cycle, from contributing to the outbreak and perpetuation of violence to undermining prospects for peace”.10 Evans citing Kahl states that there are a range of evidences for the argument that scarcity can increase the risk of violent conflict, including quantitative studies that suggest population size and density are significant conflict risk factors, and statistical work indicating that countries highly dependent on natural resources, as well as those experiencing high rates of deforestation and soil degradation or low per capita availability of arable land and freshwater, have higher than average risks of conflict.11 Evans citing further a study group led by E Miguel, who examined rainfall variation in Africa as an instrumental variable for economic growth in order to estimate the impact of R., Heltberg, and P.B Siegel, Climate Change: Challenges for Social Protection in Africa Paper prepared for conference on Social Protection for the Poorest in Africa (Washington DC: World Bank, 2008) Smith and Vivekananda, A Climate of Conflict Evans, Resource Scarcity, Evans, Resource Scarcity, 10 Evans, Resource Scarcity, 11 Evans, Resource Scarcity, 6, see also C Kahl, States, Scarcity and Civil Strife in the Developing World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006) Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3474844 economic growth on civil conflict.12 Their research found a strong causal relationship between lower economic growth (measured via rainfall) and increased conflict risk: a five per cent decline in annual economic growth increased the risk of civil conflict the following year by more than one half.13 The authors found that their results applied across a wide variety of different contexts in Africa, with similar findings in richer, more democratic, more ethnically diverse or more mountainous countries, and noted that their findings resonated with previous studies that found economic variables to be more important determinants of civil war than political “grievances”.14 More recently, a study led by Burke found strong historical linkages between civil war and temperature in Africa, with warmer years significantly increasing the likelihood of war (a 1°C rise in temperature leads to a 4.5 per cent increase in civil war in the same year) When combined with projections of future temperature trends as a result of climate change, they found, historical data suggest a roughly 54 per cent increase in armed conflict incidence by 2030, or “an additional 393,000 battle deaths if future wars are as deadly as recent wars”.15 Overall, however, the data on the links between resource scarcity and conflict risk remain limited.16 Relatively few quantitative studies have so far been undertaken in this area, and those that have (including both of the studies cited immediately above) rely on state-based data that excludes conflicts that not directly involve the state, such as clashes among pastoralist groups in Northern Kenya.17 In particular, much of the utility of the quantitative data that does exist rests on an implicit assumption that the future will be like the past – which may well be open to question, given the unpredictable and non-linear nature of future impacts of climate change, as discussed earlier An alternative, non-quantitative approach rests on identifying examples of specific cases of recent conflicts in which scarcity of basic natural resources played a significant role, E Miguel, S Satyanath, and E Sergenti, “Economic Shocks and Conflict: An Instrumental Variable Approach,” Journal of Political Economy 112, no (2004) 13 Evans, Resource Scarcity, 6; Miguel, etal, “Economic Shocks and Conflict.” 14 Evans, Resource Scarcity, See also P Collier, and A Hoeffler, “On Economic Causes of Civil War.” Oxford Econ Papers 50 (October 1998): 563–73 15 M Burke, E Miguel, S Satyanath, J Dykema, and D Lobell, “Warming increases the risk of civil war in Africa”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 106, no 49 (8 December 2009) 16 Evans, Resource Scarcity, 17 Evans, Resource Scarcity, 7 12 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3474844 and exploring how resource availability interacted in such instances with other factors, such as governance and its role in defining perceptions and fostering grievance or supporting resilience For example, competition for land was identified as a significant part of the backdrop to the post-election violence in Kenya in early 2008, and to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda; water and land have both been identified as conflict drivers in Ethiopia and in Darfur.18 Above all, while it is possible to use both quantitative and qualitative approaches to identify particular instances in which scarcity and conflict may be correlated, the deeper question is how they are linked, and what are the specific transmission mechanisms through which scarcity can lead to conflict – or vice versa This question is explored in the next section of the paper Environment, Scarcity and Conflict: Some Case Studies In this section, this study attempts an examination of some cases on how environmental needs, goods, and services, being in short supply among competing ends, have frequently led to conflicts In this study, drawing evidences of previous events, the argument is that renewable resources are second-layer causes of conflict First of these case studies is the climate change, is the chain of conflict and migration in the Sahel Dubbed “ground zero” for climate change due to its extreme climatic conditions and highly vulnerable population, the Sahel has faced massive population growth, pervasive poverty, food insecurity, and chronic instability for decades With a majority of the population directly dependent on natural resources for its livelihood, the predicted impacts of climate change for resource availability and food security in the region could be dramatic In December 2011, during the climate change negotiations in Durban, a joint study19 was launched, that analysed regional trends in temperature, rainfall, droughts and flooding over the past 40 years, and their implications for the availability of natural resources, 18 Evans, Resource Scarcity, The study was authored by the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) in cooperation with the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the United Nations University (UNU), as well as the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS) 19 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3474844 livelihoods, migration and conflict in 17 West African countries from the Atlantic coast to Chad The study addresses climate change as a “threat multiplier” that exacerbates existing vulnerabilities, and looks at how climate change, migration and conflict are interlinked through complex influencing factors that include economic, social and political issues The study had two complementary objectives: (i) to analyse the historical climate trends in the region, identify hotspots, and determine the potential implications for natural resourcedependent livelihoods; and (ii) to provide recommendations for improving conflict and migration sensitivity in adaptation planning, investments and policies across the region It uses an innovative mapping process to identify “climate hotspots” where climatic changes have been the most severe and which warrant focused adaptation planning and other follow-up activities The analysis detected significant changes in regional climatic conditions, including an overall rise in mean seasonal temperature from 1970 to 2006 of approximately 1°C, with a greater increase of between 1.5°C to 2°C observed in far eastern Chad and northern Mali and Mauritania The study also shows that the frequency of floods and the area covered by flooding have increased in parts of the region over the past24 years, for example with large areas of southern Burk ina Faso, western Niger and northern Nigeria experiencing up to 10 floods during this period.20 The study has found that the impacts of such changing climatic conditions on the availability of natural resources, combined with factors such as population growth and weak governance, have led to greater competition over scarce resources and to changing migration patterns in the region It highlights the importance of including conflict and migration sensitivities in adaptation planning and programming, promoting regional cooperation and the need to invest in early-warning, conflict prevention and conflict resolution mechanism on the local, national and regional levels In Nigeria for instance as the area of Chad continues to face desertification, herders are forced to migrate southwards into Nigeria The area of Benue State is a hotbed of violence between herders and farmers 20 United Nations Environment Programme, Livelihood Security: Climate Change, Migration and Conflict in the Sahel (Geneva: UNEP, 2011) Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3474844 Secondly, there is an observation that strategic control of resources, and the financial wealth that such control brings, has often motivated internal armed movements 21 The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in 2009 found that 40 per cent of all intra-state conflicts are linked to the appropriation or control of natural resources Charles Taylor’s violent appropriation of timber and mineral rights, in both Liberia and Sierra Leone, was conducted as a means to finance the rebel forces of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia.22 Additionally, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola’s sale of blood diamonds not only allowed for the financing of war but also resulted in the procurement of political support from the nations of Togo and Burkina Faso.23 In both cases, the presence of natural resources led to the commercialisation of armed conflict Collier and Hoeffler in 2004 found that an abundance of resources heightens the risk of violent conflict, due to this prize of control.24 Within this understanding it is the profit of these resources that allow the continuation of armed movements in Aceh, Indonesia; Biafra, Nigeria; and across the globe.25 Such sub-national conflicts provide the thesis with its most important evidence Thirdly, the patterns of violence have been shaped especially in the aspect of geographical effect on nationalism Thomas Homer-Dixon explored the potential for violence at a local level as a result of environmental degradation and resource scarcity He identified two patterns of environmentally driven conflict: elite resource capture and ecological marginalisation, triggering migration to ecological fragile areas Importantly, these routes to conflict both involve elite and economic interests in their fulfilment.26 Homer-Dixon cites the Moorish appropriation of newly fertile farmland in Mauritania, which resulted in skirmishes between the nation and Senegal, as evidence of violence stemming from elite resource capture However, the problems that created this conflict lay 21 M T Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (New York: Henry Holt & Company 2001) 22 Klare, Resource Wars 23 P Le Billon, “The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts,” Political Geography 20, no (2001): 561-583 24 P Collier, and A Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 56, no (2004): 563-595 25 Ed Atkins, “Environmental Conflict: A Misnomer?” in Environment, Climate Change and International Relations, ed., Gustavo Sosa-Nunez and Ed Atkins, (Bristol, England: E-International Relations, 2016), 101 26 Homer-Dixon, “Environmental Scarcities,” 10 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3474844 beyond the events of resource capture that provided an immediate cause Anne Guest reported that such origins can be found in the struggle to develop a Mauritanian national identity in the post-independence era, which resulted in the patronage of the Moorish majority and the political and economic exclusion of the African minority 27 Similar events occurred in Aceh, Indonesia, where a separatist struggle, although enveloped in a situation of resource capture, occurred in the context of national identity construction.28 Fourthly, the scarcity of arable land in rural areas and the effect of migration have provoked conflict In rural Pakistan, land scarcity has prompted the economically strong social groups to access the most productive land and forests, thereby forcing small farmers to ecologically marginal lands In the wake of their ecological marginalization, organized gangs have formed with increasing regularity Their illegal activity has sparked a series of reprisals from the land-owning elite Although widespread conflict has been avoided, incidents occur regularly Ecological marginalization has also forced many rural Pakistanis to migrate to large urban centres Swelling urban populations have exacerbated urban slums which suffer from a chronic shortage of basic urban resources such as tap water Coupled with the authorities’ difficulties to meet these growing demands, the economically strong social groups have successfully appropriated urban amenities which they rent or resell at excessively high costs to poor immigrants Economic inequalities have heightened tensions between long-standing ethnic rivals, and created conditions with a high potential for violence Urban violence has been occurring in the cities of Hyderabad, Islamabad, and Rawalpindi The most severe incidents have occurred in the nation’s capital, Karachi In Karachi, competition over increasingly scarce urban resources such as electrical power, have induced a series of incidents between the Punjabis, Pathans, and Sindhi peoples.29 Fifthly, the altercation between human against humans and its effects on the environment cannot be deluded in this study The case of oil contamination in the Ogoniland region of the Niger delta is another example whereby extensive and severe environmental pollution from oil extraction and transport is a major source of conflict A Guest, “Conflict and Cooperation in a Context of Change: A Case Study of the Senegal River Basin,” in Boundaries in Question: New Directions in International Relations, eds J MacMillan and A Linklater (London: Pinter, 1995) 28 E Aspinall, “The Construction of Grievance,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no (2007): 950972 29 Homer-Dixon, “Environmental Scarcities,” 15 11 27 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3474844 between local communities, Government authorities and the main oil operator Covering around 1,000 km2 in Rivers State, Ogoniland has been the site of oil industry operations since the late 1950s The region has a tragic history of pollution from oil spills, oil well fires and oil theft coupled with artisanal refining by residents As a result, this region has a history of tensions and conflicts between people, government agencies and the oil industry characterized by a lack of trust, paralysis and blame, set against increasing poverty of local communities and increasingly degraded natural resources including land, mangroves, drinking water and fisheries.30 After decades of negotiations, recriminations, initiatives and protests, the parties to the conflict have failed to agree on how to address the legacy of oil contamination In an effort to overcome this impasse, UNEP was requested to act as a third party and “honest broker” in conducting the first independent and scientific assessment of the oil contamination The assessment aimed to establish a common and objective information base, identify urgent risks and clean-up needs, and inform the conflict resolution process UNEP’s field observations and scientific investigations found that oil contamination in Ogoniland is widespread and severely impacting many components of the environment and local livelihoods Even though the oil industry is no longer active in Ogoniland due to the on-going conflict, oil spills continue to occur with alarming regularity Remote sensing revealed the rapid proliferation in the past two years of artisanal refining, whereby crude oil is distilled in makeshift facilities The study found that this illegal activity is endangering lives and causing pockets of environmental devastation in Ogoniland and neighbouring areas The assessment also found that overlapping authorities and responsibilities between ministries and a lack of resources within key agencies has serious implications for environmental management on the ground, including enforcement of the legal framework for environmental protection The study concluded that the environmental restoration of Ogoniland is possible but may take 25 to 30 years.31 Lastly, in considering water conflicts we should also note the importance of intrastate water tensions, which are related to inter-state conflicts Water conflicts are related to a wide range of other socio-political tensions, such as border disputes or mega projects such as 30 United Nations Interagency Framework Team for Preventive Action, Renewable Resources and Conflict (Geneva: United Nation, 2012), 36 31 UNEP, ‘Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland,’ (Geneva: UNEP, 2011) 12 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3474844 dams and reservoirs, environmental problems, or political identity A range of instruments may be deployed, including: lobbying, open and hidden negotiations, violence, network building, recourse to international organizations, and the actions of elites The availability of fresh water has also long been a challenge for the Gaza Strip, which is one of the most densely populated areas in the world UNEP’s assessment found that on the one hand, demand-induced water scarcity has been driven by rising population levels and increasing demands for drinking and irrigation With a population growth rate of approximately 3.8 percent, the population has steadily risen from 1,022,207 in 1997 to 1,416,543 in 2007, an increase of nearly 40 percent on a total area of 378 square kilometres.32As a result, over pumping of the Coastal Aquifer, which stretches from Israel in the north to Egypt to the southwest, is estimated to be 130-150 percent over the sustainable yield This has resulted in saltwater intrusion into the aquifer, with 70 percent of the water now estimated to be contaminated with brackish salt water.33 On the other hand, supplyinduced scarcity has been caused by a combination of conflict, a lack of waste water treatment, leakages within the distribution network, and heavy use of fertilizers and pesticides for agriculture Prior to the escalation of hostilities in December 2008 and January 2009, the people of the Gaza Strip received only half of the water needed to meet international standards World Health Organisation (WHO) noted that 80 percent of this water did not meet international drinking water standards The destruction of wells, tanks and distribution networks for water supply and sewage during the hostilities, as well as the blockade that Israel has placed on the Gaza Strip since January 2009, preventing tools, cement, and other basic supplies from reaching the population, have further challenged an already dire situation Reducing water scarcity and addressing sustainable water management will be a critical component of any long-term peace building process in the region.34 Main, Steven, Cockroaches, ‘X-Men’ and the “Black Day”: Food Security and the Russian Federation, (London: Defence Academy of the UK, Research & Assessment Branch, 2009), see also, UNFTPA, Renewable Resources and Conflict, 40 33 Policy Department Sustainable Economic Development, Agriculture, rural economic development and food security (The Hague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, 2008), 13 34 UNEP, ‘Environmental Assessment of the Gaza Strip, Following the Escalation of Hostilities in December2008-January 2009,’ (Geneva: UNEP, 2009) 13 32 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3474844 Impact Assessment This study has projected that environment studies is taking the centre stage in global politics The use of resources of the environment by humans, in a bid to improve the standards of living has caused severe harm to the environment itself These harms have spilled over to conflicts What does this mean? There is a vicious circle of danger This might look complex; however, the simplest explanation is this: humans explore resources to improve living standards and in the process of utilization alter the environmental resources once again For instance the gas flares in oil exploration harms the atmosphere, such as causing depletion, and this in turn creating greenhouse effects which harms renewable resources like vegetation The environment has deposits of renewable resources, such as forests, water bodies, and all other resources that can over time be may be replaced over time by natural processes, or is inexhaustible, such as solar energy The conflict over scarce renewable resources especially in forest zones of South America and East and West Africa had been orchestrated by climate change The death toll over battle for vegetation reserves has forced international political actors and academics to check the intricacies that make conflict environmentally induced This study not diverting, thinks that when resources are scare, greed and grievances and inevitable among competing groups In the aspect of nonrenewable resources, are those in limited supply that cannot be replaced or can be replaced only over extremely long periods of time Non-renewable resources include fossil fuels and mineral deposits, such as iron ore and gold ore Sometimes these resources have longevity; its demand is very high, especially when it has a global consumerism The conflict that emanates from however, is what scholars have termed ‘resource curse’ which is prevalent in Africa and Middle East The conflict over non-renewable creates a delusion which is that these materials are in abundance, easily to access and highly sought for globally thus has inflicted injuries on polities as a result of structural problems caused by poor governance Nigeria for instance has large oil reserve yet the poverty rate is alarming and one is forced to rethink were the income generated from crude oil go to? The issue is simple The governance creates artificial poverty, in a subtle sense, scarcity, when the environment itself has great deposits of wealth Grievances arises when the standard of living is poor compared to the income generated from resources 14 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3474844 BIBLIOGRAPHY Aspinall, E “The Construction of Grievance.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no (2007): 950-972 Atkins, Ed “Environmental Conflict: A Misnomer?” In Environment, Climate Change and International Relations, edited by Gustavo Sosa-Nunez and Ed Atkins, 99—143 Bristol, England: E-International Relations, 2016 Burke, M., E Miguel, S Satyanath, J Dykema, and D Lobell “Warming increases the risk of civil war in Africa.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 106, no 49 (8 December 2009) Collier, P and A Hoeffler “Greed and Grievance in Civil War.” Oxford Economic Papers 56, no (2004): 563-595 Collier, P., and A Hoeffler “On Economic Causes of Civil War.” Oxford Econ Papers 50 (October 1998): 563–73 Evans, Alex Resource Scarcity, Climate Change and the Risk of Violent Conflict New York: Center on International Cooperation, 2009 Food and Agriculture Organization “1.02 Billion People Hungry.” FAO News Release 19 June 2009 http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/20568/icode/ Guest, A “Conflict and Cooperation in a Context of Change: A Case Study of the Senegal River Basin.” In Boundaries in Question: New Directions in International Relations, edited by J MacMillan and A Linklater London: Pinter, 1995 Heltberg, R., and P.B Siegel, Climate Change: Challenges for Social Protection in Africa Paper prepared for conference on Social Protection for the Poorest in Africa Washington DC: World Bank, 2008 Hendrix, Cullen S and Marcus Noland Confronting the Curse The Economics and Geopolitics of Natural Resource Governance Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2014 Jackson Robert and George Sorenson Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches Fifth Edition Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013 Kahl, C States, Scarcity and Civil Strife in the Developing World Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006 Ki-moon, Ban Address to the United Nations International School – UN Conference on “Global Warming: Confronting the Crisis 2007 http://www.un.org/apps/n ews/infocus/sgspeeches/s earch_ full.asp?statID=70 15 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3474844 Klare, M T Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict New York: Henry Holt & Company 2001 Le Billon, P “The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts.” Political Geography 20, no (2001): 561-583 Miguel, E., S Satyanath, and E Sergenti “Economic Shocks and Conflict: An Instrumental Variable Approach.” Journal of Political Economy 112, no (2004) Policy Department Sustainable Economic Development Agriculture, Rural Economic Development and Food Security The Hague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, 2008 Reed, David In Pursuit of Prosperity: U.S Foreign Policy in an Era of Natural Resources Scarcity Routledge: New York, 2014 Schnurr, Matthew A and Larry A Swatuk “Towards Critical Environmental Security.” In Natural Resources and Social Conflict Towards Critical Environmental Security, edited by Matthew A Schnurr and Larry A Swatuk, 1-14 London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012 Schwartz Daniel and Ashbindu Singh Environmental Conditions, Resources, and Conflicts An Introductory Overview and Data Collection Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 1999 Smith, D and J Vivekananda A Climate of Conflict: The Links between Climate Change, Peace and War London: International Alert, 2007 Stephen, Matthew D “Rising Powers, Global Capitalism and Liberal Global Governance: A Historical Materialist Account of the BRICs Challenge.”European Journal of International Relations 20, no (2014): 912-938 Stoett, Peter “What are we really looking for? From Eco-Violence to Environmental Injustice.” In Natural Resources and Social Conflict Towards Critical Environmental Security, edited by Matthew A Schnurr and Larry A Swatuk, 15-32 London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012 UNEP “Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland.” Geneva: UNEP, 2011 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) “Environmental Assessment of the Gaza Strip, Following the Escalation of Hostilities in December 2008-January 2009.” Geneva: UNEP, 2009 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Livelihood Security: Climate Change, Migration and Conflict in the Sahel Geneva: UNEP, 2011 16 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3474844 United Nations Interagency Framework Team for Preventive Action Renewable Resources and Conflict Geneva: United Nation, 2012 17 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3474844 ... sensitivities in adaptation planning and programming, promoting regional cooperation and the need to invest in early-warning, conflict prevention and conflict resolution mechanism on the local, national and. .. lack of trust, paralysis and blame, set against increasing poverty of local communities and increasingly degraded natural resources including land, mangroves, drinking water and fisheries.30 After... populated areas in the world UNEP’s assessment found that on the one hand, demand-induced water scarcity has been driven by rising population levels and increasing demands for drinking and irrigation