Concern for enviroment and individual attitudes forward international trade in developing countries

Concern for the Environment and Individual Attitudes towards International Trade in Developing Countries Thomas Bernauer and Quynh Nguyen http://www.ib.ethz.ch/people/bernauer Abstract Many political leaders of the Global South oppose linkages between environmental standards and trade liberalization We examine whether citizens in developing countries share this position Whereas a recent study finds that in developed countries environmental concerns are associated with protectionist sentiments, we hypothesize that citizens in poor countries are likely to view the trade-environment nexus in a more positive light We fielded a combination of surveys and conjoint experiments in Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Vietnam to test this argument The results show that respondents express concerns about negative implications of trade for the environment However, individuals with greener preferences are also more supportive of trade liberalization Furthermore, and in contrast to prevailing government rhetoric, the majority of respondents support environmental clauses in trade agreements The main policy implication is that – irrespective of green protectionism rhetoric – there exists room for more ambitious efforts to include environmental standards in international trade agreements Electronic copy copy available Electronic available at: at:https://ssrn.com/abstract=2462039 http://ssrn.com/abstract=2462039 Introduction A closer look at the academic literature on international trade and the environment (e.g., Anderson 1997; Anderson and Blackhurst 1992; Bechtel et al 2012; Bhagwati 2002; Ferrantino 1997; Franzen and Meyer 2012; Spilker 2013; Whalley 1991) and on the positions of governments in international trade liberalization efforts raises interesting questions about preferences of developing countries in this regard Political leaders from advanced industrialized countries have, over the past decades, increasingly insisted on linking environmental protection issues with trade liberalization (Bechtel and Tosun 2009; Drezner 2005; Hultberg and Barbier 2004; Schott 2004) This insistence has led to an institutionalized debate in the World Trade Organization (Trade and Environment Committee), but has thus far not resulted in any amendments of WTO agreements in this direction (Dagne 2010; WTO Secretariat 2014) Outside the WTO, however, trade liberalization efforts have increasingly focused on bilateral or minilateral preferential trade agreements (PTAs) In contrast to the WTO, where negotiations and agreements involve the entire WTO membership (currently 159 member states), countries are free to select any (willing) other country worldwide for an agreement And they are de facto free to design the contents of PTAs according to their preferences, as long as the new PTA does not clearly violate WTO commitments (Mansfield and Milner 1999: 612-15; WTO 2011) The possibility to discriminate among potential PTA partner countries (which in the WTO is precluded by the most favored nation (MFN) principle) has opened the door for countries that seek to condition trade liberalization on environmental protection standards (Author) Based on economic and ideological reasoning, many PTAs that have been concluded in the past decades include environmental protection standards – according to a recent WTO count for the years 1958 to 2011, 46 out of 100 PTAs include environmental provisions (WTO 2011) The economic reasoning for such standards derives from a level playing field argument (e.g., Bernauer and Caduff 2004; Prakash and Potoski While no amendments to the GATT/WTO agreements have been adopted, there are legal exceptions that allow members to take regulatory measures, including trade restrictions, to achieve legitimate policy objectives (e.g., the protection of human, animal or plant life and health, and natural resources) (WTO Secretariat 2014) These include “the development of environmental standards; enforcement of national environmental laws; establishment of sanctions for violation of environmental laws; publications of laws” (WTO 2011) Electronic copy copy available Electronic available at: at:https://ssrn.com/abstract=2462039 http://ssrn.com/abstract=2462039 2006; Vogel 1995; 1997) On the assumption that higher environmental standards increase production costs in industries producing tradable goods, producers in country A that are subject to higher environmental standards will insist that their competitors in country B should be subject to similar standards Whether higher environmental standards in fact lead to comparative disadvantages, and in what industries and under what conditions this may be the case, remains contested (Jaffe et al 1995; Mulatu et al 2001; Xu 1999) Nevertheless, it has become common practice for industries in countries with higher environmental standards to make such claims in the context of trade negotiations and to insist on addressing this issue in PTAs Such industry pressure has induced governments of countries with high environmental protection standards to seek environmental clauses in PTAs with countries that have lower environmental standards (e.g., the US and Canada vis-à-vis Mexico in NAFTA) The ideological motivation derives from widespread sentiments in many advanced industrialized countries that many poor countries suffer from major environmental degradation problems Assuming that trade with these countries may worsen these problems, they believe that trade with poor countries should be avoided, or PTAs should be used to push the governments of such countries into accepting improved environmental protection standards, and to prevent relocation of dirty industries from the North to the South This is where an interesting question about potential differences between elite preferences and ordinary citizen preferences arises Recent research on the relationship between environmental and trade preferences in advanced industrialized countries finds that citizens with greener preferences are more skeptical about trade liberalization (Bechtel et al 2012) With this in mind, it appears that governments of industrialized countries are – besides being influenced by industry pressure for a level playing field – catering to widespread voter demand when insisting on environmental clauses in PTAs and placing trade-environment issues on the WTO agenda What about developing countries? Not surprisingly, a statement by Laurence Summers, then at the World Bank, in a leaked email (December 12, 1991) was strongly condemned by many policymakers and NGO leaders from industrialized countries Summers noted: Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2462039 “… Just between you and me, shouldn't the World Bank be encouraging MORE migration of the dirty industries to the LDCs [Least Developed Countries]? … The measurements of the costs of health impairing pollution depends on the foregone earnings from increased morbidity and mortality… the economic logic behind dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest wage country is impeccable and we should face up to that…I've always thought that under-populated countries in Africa are vastly UNDER-polluted, their air quality is probably vastly inefficiently low compared to Los Angeles or Mexico City…The demand for a clean environment for aesthetic and health reasons is likely to have very high income elasticity….Clearly trade in goods that embody aesthetic pollution concerns could be welfare enhancing…The problem with the arguments against all of these proposals for more pollution in LDCs (intrinsic rights to certain goods, moral reasons, social concerns, lack of adequate markets, etc.) could be turned around and used more or less effectively against every Bank proposal for liberalization.” More interestingly, however, it appears that the statement by Summers lines up quite well with the preferences of many political and economic leaders from the Global South These leaders have, on countless occasions, condemned what they consider green protectionism by industrialized countries At the 1994 GATT Marrakesh Ministerial Meeting the then-acting Minister of International Trade and Industry of Malaysia, Dato’ Seri Rafidah Aziz, stated that environmental issues are being used to promote protectionist motives, particularly to keep out imports from countries that have a competitive edge and comparative advantage (Trade Negotiations Committee 1994) More recently, at the preparatory meeting of the UN Conference on Sustainable Development in May 2010 in New York, the Chinese delegation stressed that “(…) the international community should create an enabling environment for green development We should resolutely oppose the practice of erecting “green barriers” and engaging in trade protectionism under the pretext of environmental protection.” (Third World Network, May 22nd 2010) In yet another example, India’s Special Envoy on Climate Change, Shyam Saran, warned that doors “should not open for protectionism under [the] green label That is something which would be a very negative development.” (The Economic Times, March 25th 2009) Environmental and development activists tend to interpret such statements as evidence for transnational capitalist collusion at the expense of ordinary citizens in developing countries For instance, they claim that “[e]lites in the [S]outh may benefit from GATT but experience suggests that the majority of people in the [S]outh will lose” (InterPress Third World News Agency, December 27th 1993) They believe that developing country leaders tend to profit personally from attracting dirty foreign Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2462039 investment, but pass on negative environmental consequences to (usually poorer parts of) their population Accordingly, while advocates of this view demand that citizens of poor countries need to be protected from such abuse, by avoiding trade liberalization, via environmental clauses in trade agreements, or by other means, proponents of the Environmental Kuznets Curve argue (similar to Summers’ argument above) that poor people may actually not mind more pollution if polluting foreign investment and trade generates additional income for them (Dasgupta et al 2002; Frankel and Romer 1999; Grossman and Kruger 1995; Johnson et al 2007) Interestingly, we know only very little about how citizens in developing countries evaluate the trade-environment relationship Results from the World Public Opinion Survey (2006/’07), which includes samples from both developed and some developing countries 3, suggest that citizens from developing countries are, like their counterparts in rich countries, also concerned about the effects of trade on the environment and in fact support environmental standards within trade agreements (The Chicago Council on Global Affairs 2007) However, and despite the high salience of this topic (especially with regards to the international trade governance debate), research on the trade-environment linkage has thus far focused almost exclusively on the macro-level and has bypassed this issue This is the gap this paper seeks to address We start by developing a theoretical argument on how citizens in developing countries are likely to evaluate the trade-environment relationship The argument is constructed from two perspectives that are motivated by existing political debates on the issue First, we shed light on whether individuals with greener attitudes are more (or less) likely to hold pro-trade preferences While recent research points to a negative relationship in advanced industrialized countries (Bechtel et al 2012) we hypothesize that this relationship is likely to be positive in poor countries Second, because the trade-environment issue has become particularly salient in the context of PTAs, we develop an argument concerning partner countries for preferential trade agreements We hypothesize that developing countries are more likely to favor PTA partner countries with higher environmental standards, and to favor PTAs that include environmental protection clauses The surveys were conducted in 19 countries: Argentina, Armenia, Australia, China, France, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Mexico, Palestinian Territories, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Korea, Thailand, Ukraine, and United States Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2462039 To test these hypotheses we fielded a combination of standard surveys and conjoint experiments in three developing countries that differ in their economic and political system characteristics as well as their environmental protection record: Costa Rica (mature democracy, upper-income developing country, high environmental standards), Nicaragua (partly democratic, low-income developing country, low environmental standards), and Vietnam (autocracy, low-income developing country, low environmental standards) The results show that, especially in the two poorer countries in our sample, which also have lower environmental protection standards (Nicaragua and Vietnam), individuals with greener preferences are more supportive of international trade They also show that individuals prefer PTAs with countries that have higher environmental standards, and that they prefer environmental clauses in PTAs The main policy implication that derives from these findings is that – irrespective of green protectionism rhetoric on the part of political and economic elites – there exists room for more ambitious efforts to incorporate environmental standards in international trade agreements The remainder of the paper is structured as follows After a brief review of the existing literature (section 2) we develop two hypotheses, one focusing more generally on how environmental and trade attitudes are related, the other focusing on environmental standards and PTAs (section 3) We then present the empirical design (section 4) and the results (sections and 6) and end with suggestions for further research (section 7) Economic and non-economic determinants of trade preferences Most research on individual trade preferences focuses on the micro-level ramifications of standard trade theories Its arguments are derived from the factor endowments (Stolper-Samuelson) and the specific-factors (Ricardo-Viner) model These theories posit that the ways in which trade policies affect wages and employment opportunities are the main conduits through which individuals experience globalization That is, individual trade policy preferences are shaped by how trade affects income and overall economic welfare Individuals who stand to gain materially from economic openness tend to support it, while those who are expected Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2462039 to lose tend to favor protectionism To the extent that individuals are motivated by material self-interest, the two models make clear-cut and distinct predictions about who should support trade and who should oppose trade Early scholarship on individual trade preference formation has found at least partial empirical support for the arguments derived from economic trade theory (e.g., Beaulieu 2002; Hiscox 2002; Magee et al 1989; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; O’Rourke and Sinnott 2001; Rogowski 1987; Scheve and Slaughter 2001) Recent research has challenged the view that trade preferences are mainly a function of expected distributional implications of economic openness One frequently voiced criticism is that explanations based on material self-interest neglect effects of ideological or cultural factors (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; O’Rourke and Sinnott 2001) For example, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006) question whether observed positive effects of skill levels (usually measured by education level) on trade preferences reflect the factor endowments logic They argue that the positive effect of education on (pro-) trade preferences may rather reflect a situation where individuals who have benefited from more education are more aware of the economic benefits of trade, hold a more cosmopolitan worldview, and exhibit greater tolerance of different cultures and out-groups (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006) Other studies point in the same direction They have examined the influence of noneconomic factors on trade preference formation, for instance fairness considerations, nationalism, and xenophobia (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006; Herrmann et al 2001; Kaltenthaler et al 2004; Lu et al 2012; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; O’Rourke and Sinnott 2001) More specific to the question pursued in this paper, Bechtel, Bernauer and Meyer (2012) have examined how individual attitudes towards the environmental affect trade preferences They argue that as a result of intense public debates over the environmental consequences of global economic exchange political leaders from advanced industrialized countries have, over the past two decades, increasingly insisted on the inclusion of environmental protection standards in international trade agreements (Bechtel and Tosun 2009; Drezner 2005; Hultberg and Barbier 2004) To test this presumption, they rely on survey data from Switzerland The analysis shows Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2462039 that individuals with stronger pro-environment attitudes are significantly more likely to hold more negative views on international trade The latter line of research has two limitations that we seek to address in this paper First, it focuses on advanced industrialized countries While we know very little about the determinants of trade preferences in developing countries more generally, there is virtually no systematic evidence on whether and how individuals in developing countries view the trade-environment nexus The World Public Opinion Survey (2006/’07) includes two questions on the trade-environment relationship It is the only survey we know of that gauges, among other issues, public opinion on the tradeenvironment nexus Its results indicate that citizens from various countries around the world are concerned about the environmental effects of trade In none of the countries polled large majorities believe that trade is good for the environment However, China (57%) and India (51%) rank among the most optimistic with respect trade impacts on the environment Furthermore, the results reveal that public support for the inclusion of “minimum standards for the protection of the environment” in trade agreements is very high in developing countries In China and India endorsement of environmental standards amounts to 85% and 60%, respectively However, the construction of these items and the survey as a whole does not allow for an in-depth micro-level analysis of the trade-environment nexus Other surveys, including the standard multinational surveys that are widely used in the political science literature (e.g., the World Values Survey) not include the required information either Second, the existing evidence is correlational We therefore add to research in this area by focusing on developing countries and by using a combination of correlational and experimental approaches Environmental attitudes and trade preferences In this section we develop arguments that shed light on citizens’ views on the tradeenvironment relationship We so from two distinct perspectives First, we focus on whether individuals with greener attitudes are more (or less) likely to hold pro-trade preferences While recent research points to a negative relationship in advanced industrialized countries (Bechtel et al 2012), we hypothesize that this relationship is likely to be positive in poorer countries This argument will be empirically evaluated Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2462039 within a correlational framework Second, we examine the environment-trade linkage through the perspective of trading-partner choices, focusing on whether individuals prefer their country to trade with countries characterized by higher (or lower) environmental standards, and whether they prefer environmental standards in PTAs, even if imposed from the outside This argument is empirically evaluated by means of a conjoint experiment 3.1 Effect of environmental attitudes on trade preferences A considerable body of scientific evidence suggests that trade and environmental degradation are causally related, though the relationship is quite complex Increased trade expands the scale of economic activity, which tends to cause more environmental degradation However, it also tends to increase welfare and, as suggested by the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) literature, is therefore conducive to environmental protection (Anderson 1997; Bechtel et al 2012; Ferrantino 1997; Franzen and Meyer 2010) The EKC literature in fact argues, for these reasons, that pollution first increases when poor economies grow and at some point starts to decrease The turning point of the EKC can result from several processes, the main determinants being changes in economic structure (from manufacturing to services) and changes in public demand and government supply of environmental protection (Bernauer and Koubi 2009) What does this argument imply for linkages between environmental attitudes and trade preferences in developing countries, as opposed to advanced industrialized countries? Let’s start with the latter type of countries Bechtel et al (2012), the only study on the subject to date, focuses on advanced industrialized countries They argue that environmental concerns help us understand how individuals evaluate the costs and benefits of economic integration Specifically, they hypothesize that individuals holding stronger pro-environment attitudes are more likely to be skeptical about international trade and more likely to favor protectionist policies Using survey data from a high-income country, Switzerland, they find that respondents’ reported concerns for the environment indeed correlate positively with protectionist attitudes We explored various experimental designs with convenience samples However, we found it nearly impossible to construct treatments (e.g information priming for environmental problems) that could effectively manipulate environmental attitudes of individuals Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2462039 This argument rests on a specific causal structure between environmental attitudes and trade preferences, which is not discussed in that study It implies that individuals form their environmental attitudes prior to evaluating the pros and cons of international trade and thus forming trade preferences We not know of any study that has explicitly tested this assumption Nonetheless, it appears plausible because exposure to the natural environment, and thus also to environmental degradation problems, tends to start very early in childhood, and many environmental problems can be experienced visually and physically (e.g., land degradation, deforestation, water and air pollution) In contrast, international trade is a more complex and remote phenomenon, and preferences with respect to international trade are thus likely to take shape later in life and might also be less stable – again an assumption that has not yet been assessed empirically If we accept that environmental attitudes have an effect on trade preferences, rather than the other way around, we can think about the implications of different income levels for the environment-trade nexus To start with, existing studies using multilevel analysis of individual level data for several countries show that individual level income matters less for environmental attitudes than national level income (Franzen and Meyer 2010) This finding makes sense intuitively, because when individuals are asked about their preferences concerning environmental protection, the frame of reference is usually the country And this means that they are likely to think more in terms of whether the country could or should afford more environmental protection, rather than whether they personally could or should afford it How are different national income levels then likely to impact on the perceived environment-trade relationship? Bechtel et al (2012) draw mainly on research on postmodern values and value change (e.g., Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Flanagan 1987) to argue that individuals with greener attitudes are more likely to prefer trade protection However, the postmaterialism argument appears to focus mainly on explaining environmental attitudes and leaves it somewhat unclear how postmaterialist attitudes could affect trade preferences We thus outline a more complete argument on how (national) income levels could affect the tradeenvironment relationship as perceived by individuals Following the EKC argument, individuals in rich countries are likely to exhibit stronger preferences for environmental protection At the same time, they are facing 10 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2462039 for the full sample we find that less educated respondents are more attracted to countries with higher environmental standards, whereas the results for highly educated persons are insignificant This suggests that the underlying logic may be one in which environmental standards are interpreted by respondents as general cues about the social value system of the potential partner country, and thus in the sense of a psychic distance concept Further research could explore whether more highly educated people might be more motivated by an economic calculus concerning effects of environmental standards on comparative advantage, whereas respondents at lower education levels interpret environmental standards more in the sense of general cues about social value systems We obtained somewhat similar results when splitting the samples by household income level However, as noted above, the income data is much more incomplete and probably biased Conclusion Overall, the empirical analysis offers strong support for our arguments on how citizens in the Global South evaluate the trade-environment nexus In contrast to recent findings for advanced industrialized countries, we observe that citizens in the three developing countries examined prefer both trade liberalization and environmental protection – even though they are aware that trade may have negative effects on the natural environment They prefer trade partners with higher environmental standards, and they strongly prefer their government to accept demands by industrialized countries for inclusion of environmental standards in trade agreements The policy implications of these findings are twofold First, there appears to be little public support for serving as the receiving end in processes of relocation of dirty industries away from advanced industrialized countries Second, the results are orthogonal to the rhetoric of many policymakers from developing countries who object to trade-environment linkages and to demands by industrialized countries for inclusion of environmental protection standards in trade agreements This implies that there probably is considerable room for more ambitious efforts to condition further trade liberalization on measures for preventing trade-related environmental degradation 27 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2462039 As noted above, the testing of Hypothesis relies on a correlational approach, as the very large majority of other studies on trade preferences does Further research could try and develop an experimental design that would allow for effective manipulation of environmental attitudes and preferences, and thus for a causal analysis of the hypothesis In addition, further research could explore in greater detail whether individuals from developing countries are in fact following the EKC reasoning that is, presumably, underlying Hypothesis The question why citizens of developing countries prefer their governments to accept Northern demands for environmental clauses in trade agreements also deserves further analysis We not think that this finding is driven by social desirability bias However, more systematic testing could use framing experiments to find out in detail whether the underlying causal logic corresponds to what we are assuming 28 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2462039 References Anderson, Kym 1997 “Social Policy Dimensions of Economic Integration: Environmental and Labor Standards.” In Regionalism Versus Multilateral Trade Arrangements, eds Takatoshi Ito and Anne O Krueger Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 57-590 Anderson, Kym, and Richard Blackhurst 1992 The Greening of World Trade Issues London: Harvester Wheatsheaf Beaulieu, Eugene, and Michael Napier 2009 “Why are women more protectionist than men?” Presentation at Empirical Investigations in Trade and Investment, Keio University, Tokyo, Japan March 19 Beaulieu, Eugene 2002 “Factor or Industry Cleavages in Trade Policy? 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A Global Perspective.” World Development 27 (7): 1215-1226 33 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2462039 Appendix Table A1 Key socio-economic differences between Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Vietnam (adapted from Author) Costa Rica Nicaragua Vietnam Level of economic development Human Development Index 62 129 127 Gross National Income per capita (2005 constant PPP terms) 2012 $10,863 $2,551 $2,970 Economic openness / trade policy GATT/WTO Membership GATT: 1991 GATT: 1950 WTO: 2005 WTO: 1995 WTO: 1995 PTAs CACM, CARICOM, EU, DRCAFTA, EFTA, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Canada, Mexico, China, Singapore, CACM, DR-CAFTA, Chinese Taipei Average tariff rate 3.1% 2.6% 5.7% Trade of goods and services (% of GDP) 79 106 156 EU, ASEAN, TPP, China, Japan, Korea, India Source: WDI, 2014 Environmental standards Environmental Performance Index 2014 54 90 136 Table A2: Sample distribution by stratification of urbanity 34 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2462039 Table A3: Question wording of items for dependent variable Table A4 Results from confirmatory factor analysis: Trade preferences Table A5 Correlations between independent variables 35 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2462039 Table A5: Regression results for environmental attitudes and trade preferences COSTA RICA NICARAGUA VIETNAM TRADE_GENERAL (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) Environment_JobLoss 0.003 (0.004) 0.012** (0.005) 0.701*** 0.01** (0.005) 0.009 (0.010) 0.006 (0.005) 0.002 (0.003) 0.009 (0.006) 0.019*** (0.006) -0.009 (0.011) 0.638*** 0.002 (0.004) 0.729*** 0.001 (0.004) -0.008 (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) 0.011 (0.007) 0.019*** (0.006) -0.014 (0.011) 0.689*** 0.732*** 0.002 (0.004) -0.016** (0.007) -0.008*** (0.003) -0.006* (0.003) 0.014* (0.008) -0.004 (0.005) 0.019** (0.007) 0.775*** (0.012) (0.026) (0.015) (0.027) (0.011) (0.025) Obs Adj R2 814 -0.0007 814 0.0148 798 0.0067 798 0.0168 1384 -0.0006 1383 0.0111 Environment_LivStand -0.002 (0.005) -0.003 (0.005) -0.008 (0.010) (0.004) 0.03*** (0.006) 0.029*** (0.006) 0.008 (0.010) 0.006 (0.005) 0.013*** (0.004) 0.012*** (0.004) -0.016** (0.007) -0.009*** (0.003) Gender - Age - Education - Employment - Income Satisfaction - Urban - Constant Gender - Age - - - Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2462039 - - Education - Employment - Income Satisfaction - Urban 0.743*** (0.004) 0.011 (0.007) 0.019*** (0.006) -0.014 (0.011) 0.703*** (0.018) Obs Adj R2 Environment_GovSpend Constant 0.636*** 0.699*** -0.006* (0.003) 0.014* (0.008) -0.004 (0.005) 0.019** (0.007) 0.743*** (0.029) (0.020) (0.030) (0.013) (0.026) 815 -0.001 815 0.0146 798 0.0301 798 0.041 1384 0.0052 1383 0.0168 0.018** (0.007) 0.035*** (0.008) 0.644*** 0.035*** (0.008) 0.01 (0.010) 0.006 (0.005) (0.003) 0.009 (0.006) 0.021*** (0.006) -0.008 (0.011) 0.577*** 0.036*** (0.008) 0.691*** 0.016** (0.007) -0.008 (0.010) (0.004) -0.001 (0.004) 0.011 (0.007) 0.018*** (0.006) -0.014 (0.011) 0.657*** 0.636*** 0.037*** (0.008) -0.017** (0.007) -0.008*** (0.003) -0.006** (0.003) 0.015* (0.008) -0.004 (0.005) 0.019*** (0.007) 0.677*** (0.018) (0.028) (0.023) (0.032) (0.022) (0.031) 814 814 798 798 1384 1383 - Age - Education - Employment - Income Satisfaction - Urban - Obs - 0.001 (0.003) 0.008 (0.006) 0.02*** (0.006) -0.01 (0.011) 0.572*** Gender Constant - - - - 37 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2462039 Adj R2 0.0067 0.0208 0.02 0.0325 0.0143 0.0271 Standard errors are shown in parentheses ***p