The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets 7 doc

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_1 pot

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_1 pot

... follows. If the state is [S, i, x] and the action Player i takes is “reject”, then the new state is [S, i]; if the action is “accept”, then the new state is [x]. If the state is [S, i] and the action ... bargainers is the first to make an offer. If the player who starts the bargaining has the preferences  2 while the player who is the first to respond has the p...
Ngày tải lên : 22/06/2014, 17:20
  • 23
  • 216
  • 0
The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_2 ppt

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_2 ppt

... S is clos e to the boundary of S then, despite the compatibility of these demands, there is a positive probability that the outcome is the dis- agreement point d, rather than the agreement (σ 1 , ... role in the development of the theory. The game consists of a single stage, in which the two players simultane- ously announce “demands”. If these are compatible, then each play...
Ngày tải lên : 22/06/2014, 17:20
  • 23
  • 108
  • 0
The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_3 docx

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_3 docx

... Binmore (1987a, 1987c) and by van Damme (19 87) . Roth (1989) further discusses the relationship between the subgame per- fect equilibrium of the game with breakdown and the Nash solution, and Herrero ... has the following properties. 1. If the strategies of Players 2 H and 2 L call for them both to reject an offer, then these strategies also call for them to make the sam...
Ngày tải lên : 22/06/2014, 17:20
  • 23
  • 211
  • 0
The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_4 pptx

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_4 pptx

... that the game is independent of the realization of the types: the strategy sets of the different types of buyer, and of seller, are the same, and the outcome of bargaining is a function only of the ... the same as that between S 1 and B 1 , and that the utilities obtained by S 1 and B 2 are the same. The conditions IR ∗ and SY reduce the choice of a mech...
Ngày tải lên : 22/06/2014, 17:20
  • 23
  • 151
  • 0
The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_5 pdf

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_5 pdf

... new partners Figure 7. 2 The structure of events withi n some period t. S and B stand for the seller and the buyer, and Y and N stand for acceptance and rejection. The numbers beside the branches are the probabilities ... y ∗ satisfy the four equations (7. 1), (7. 2), (7. 3), (7. 4), the two equations (7. 7) and (7. 8) with u s = U s and u b = U b , and the...
Ngày tải lên : 22/06/2014, 17:20
  • 23
  • 271
  • 0
The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_6 ppt

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_6 ppt

... agents have information only about the index of the period and the names of the sellers and buyers in the market. (Thus they know more than just the numbers of sellers and buyers in the market.) ... follow their equilibrium strategies, then the agent uses these strategies to form a belief about the events in other matches. If p is different from the offer made in th...
Ngày tải lên : 22/06/2014, 17:20
  • 23
  • 186
  • 0
The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_7 doc

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_7 doc

... events. The other party can either accept or reject the proposal. In the event of acceptance, the parties trade, and the game ends. In the event of rejection, the match dissolves, and the seller ... buyer has the “right” to purchase the seller’s unit at the price p ∗ . If buyer i has the right, then in the equilibrium the seller offers buyer i, and no other bu...
Ngày tải lên : 22/06/2014, 17:20
  • 23
  • 188
  • 0
The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_8 pptx

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_8 pptx

... 93 X, 92 (x, t), 92 bargaining game with risk of breakdown, 71 76 assumptions on preferences, 73 74 B1, 73 B2, 73 B3, 73 subgame perfect equilibrium, 75 and Nash solution, 75 76 and time preference, ... 104–1 07 demand game, 76 –81 definition, 77 Nash equilibria, 77 perturbed, 78 –81 definition, 78 Nash equilibria and Na sh solution, 79 disagreement event, 9 , 32...
Ngày tải lên : 22/06/2014, 17:20
  • 21
  • 136
  • 0
Tài liệu THE NETWORKING AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM doc

Tài liệu THE NETWORKING AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM doc

... 1,110 .7 342.5 6 67. 4 76 5.4 400.5 174 .7 196.6 150.1 3,8 07. 9 Table 7. FY 2013 Budget Requests 1 Totals may not sum correctly due to rounding 2 DoD budget includes funding from OSD, NSA, and the ... supporting the request; and 2012 and 2013 activities by agency. Copyright Information This is a work of the U.S. Government and is in the public domain. It may...
Ngày tải lên : 20/02/2014, 05:21
  • 80
  • 384
  • 0
Recommendations from the American Thoracic Society, CDC, and the Infectious Diseases Society of America docx

Recommendations from the American Thoracic Society, CDC, and the Infectious Diseases Society of America docx

... illness and the specific nature and circumstances of the contact between the patient and exposed persons. Vol. 54 / RR-12 Recommendations and Reports 27 history, and chest radiograph), and treat and ... organized, the equipment and systems available to them, and the fiscal resources they command) represents the public health infrastructure for TB control. The...
Ngày tải lên : 06/03/2014, 04:20
  • 84
  • 847
  • 0
Từ khóa: