The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets 6 ppt

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_1 pot

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_1 pot

... follows. If the state is [S, i, x] and the action Player i takes is “reject”, then the new state is [S, i]; if the action is “accept”, then the new state is [x]. If the state is [S, i] and the action ... one of the bargainers is the first to make an offer. If the player who starts the bargaining has the preferences  2 while the player who is the first to respon...
Ngày tải lên : 22/06/2014, 17:20
  • 23
  • 216
  • 0
The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_2 ppt

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_2 ppt

... the payoff x 2 ≥ η. If he rejects the offer, then the state remains 62 Chapter 3. The Strategic Approach η, and, given Player 1’s strategy, the best action for Player 2 is either to prop os e the ... S is clos e to the boundary of S then, despite the compatibility of these demands, there is a positive probability that the outcome is the dis- agreement point d, rather than...
Ngày tải lên : 22/06/2014, 17:20
  • 23
  • 108
  • 0
The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_3 docx

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_3 docx

... has the following properties. 1. If the strategies of Players 2 H and 2 L call for them both to reject an offer, then these strategies also call for them to make the same counteroffer. 2. If the ... represent the players’ preferences by δ t 1 w 1 (x 1 ) and δ t 2 w 2 (x 2 ), where δ 1 = δ 2 , and construct the set S using the utility functions w 1 and w 2 , then the lim...
Ngày tải lên : 22/06/2014, 17:20
  • 23
  • 211
  • 0
The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_4 pptx

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_4 pptx

... that the game is independent of the realization of the types: the strategy sets of the different types of buyer, and of seller, are the same, and the outcome of bargaining is a function only of the ... in Sections 6. 3 and 6. 4 in which each trader decides whether or not to enter the market. The primitives in these models are the numbers of traders considering e...
Ngày tải lên : 22/06/2014, 17:20
  • 23
  • 151
  • 0
The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_5 pdf

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_5 pdf

... new partners Figure 7.2 The structure of events withi n some period t. S and B stand for the seller and the buyer, and Y and N stand for acceptance and rejection. The numbers beside the branches are the probabilities ... then by (6. 3) and (6. 4) we have V s = V b = 0. But then agreement must be reached. The rest follows from substituting the values of V s and V...
Ngày tải lên : 22/06/2014, 17:20
  • 23
  • 271
  • 0
The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_6 ppt

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_6 ppt

... agents have information only about the index of the period and the names of the sellers and buyers in the market. (Thus they know more than just the numbers of sellers and buyers in the market.) ... follow their equilibrium strategies, then the agent uses these strategies to form a belief about the events in other matches. If p is different from the offer made in th...
Ngày tải lên : 22/06/2014, 17:20
  • 23
  • 186
  • 0
The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_7 doc

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_7 doc

... events. The other party can either accept or reject the proposal. In the event of acceptance, the parties trade, and the game ends. In the event of rejection, the match dissolves, and the seller ... buyer has the “right” to purchase the seller’s unit at the price p ∗ . If buyer i has the right, then in the equilibrium the seller offers buyer i, and no other bu...
Ngày tải lên : 22/06/2014, 17:20
  • 23
  • 188
  • 0
The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_8 pptx

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_8 pptx

... separate at the end of the bargaining session even if they have a special “personal relationship”. The chance that they will be reunited is the same as the chance that each of them will meet another ... ante and ex post pricing, 187 many d ivisibl e goods agent characterized by (k, c), 160 allocation , 162 competit ive allocation, 162 curvature assumption, 158, 165 , 166 – 1...
Ngày tải lên : 22/06/2014, 17:20
  • 21
  • 136
  • 0
Recommendations from the American Thoracic Society, CDC, and the Infectious Diseases Society of America docx

Recommendations from the American Thoracic Society, CDC, and the Infectious Diseases Society of America docx

... organized, the equipment and systems available to them, and the fiscal resources they command) represents the public health infrastructure for TB control. The responsibility for TB control and prevention ... illness and the specific nature and circumstances of the contact between the patient and exposed persons. Vol. 54 / RR-12 Recommendations and Reports 27 histor...
Ngày tải lên : 06/03/2014, 04:20
  • 84
  • 847
  • 0
bargaining and markets - martin j. osborne

bargaining and markets - martin j. osborne

... of X), and the other player (j) either accepts the offer (chooses Y ) or rejects it (chooses N). If the offer is accepted, then the bargaining ends, and the agreement is implemented. If the offer ... dimension. Thus the question arises whether the demand and supply functions of the competitive model should be applied to the stock of agents in the market or to the...
Ngày tải lên : 08/04/2014, 12:15
  • 228
  • 591
  • 0