The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets 5 pdf

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_1 pot

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_1 pot

... follows. If the state is [S, i, x] and the action Player i takes is “reject”, then the new state is [S, i]; if the action is “accept”, then the new state is [x]. If the state is [S, i] and the action ... bargainers is the first to make an offer. If the player who starts the bargaining has the preferences  2 while the player who is the first to respond has the p...
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The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_2 ppt

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_2 ppt

... S is clos e to the boundary of S then, despite the compatibility of these demands, there is a positive probability that the outcome is the dis- agreement point d, rather than the agreement (σ 1 , ... role in the development of the theory. The game consists of a single stage, in which the two players simultane- ously announce “demands”. If these are compatible, then each play...
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The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_3 docx

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_3 docx

... may depend upon b oth the offer at t = 1 and the rejected offer at t = 0. The case in which these offers are x 1 and x 0 is shown in Figure 5. 1. If Player 1 accepts the counteroffer, then the game ends; ... to let H be the outcome in which the profit of the firm is zero and the union members receive a wage that they regard as equivalent to the compensation they get durin...
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The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_4 pptx

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_4 pptx

... that the game is independent of the realization of the types: the strategy sets of the different types of buyer, and of seller, are the same, and the outcome of bargaining is a function only of the ... state. The number of buyers and the number of sellers in the m arket remain constant over time. The 123 5. 4 Delay in Reaching Agreement 1 05 ability π H , and...
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The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_5 pdf

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_5 pdf

... new partners Figure 7.2 The structure of events withi n some period t. S and B stand for the seller and the buyer, and Y and N stand for acceptance and rejection. The numbers beside the branches are the probabilities ... type in the market. Then the limit of the unique market equilibrium price p ∗ as δ → 1 has the property that the area above the horizontal l...
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The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_6 ppt

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_6 ppt

... agents have information only about the index of the period and the names of the sellers and buyers in the market. (Thus they know more than just the numbers of sellers and buyers in the market.) ... follow their equilibrium strategies, then the agent uses these strategies to form a belief about the events in other matches. If p is different from the offer made in th...
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The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_7 doc

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_7 doc

... events. The other party can either accept or reject the proposal. In the event of acceptance, the parties trade, and the game ends. In the event of rejection, the match dissolves, and the seller ... buyer has the “right” to purchase the seller’s unit at the price p ∗ . If buyer i has the right, then in the equilibrium the seller offers buyer i, and no other bu...
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The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_8 pptx

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_8 pptx

... the Interpretation of Game Theory”, Econometrica 59 , 909–924. [ 65, 156 ] Rubinstein, A., and A. Wolinsky (19 85) , “Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining , Econometrica 53 , 1133–1 150 . ... separate at the end of the bargaining session even if they have a special “personal relationship”. The chance that they will be reunited is the same as the chance that ea...
Ngày tải lên : 22/06/2014, 17:20
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Recommendations from the American Thoracic Society, CDC, and the Infectious Diseases Society of America docx

Recommendations from the American Thoracic Society, CDC, and the Infectious Diseases Society of America docx

... illness and the specific nature and circumstances of the contact between the patient and exposed persons. Vol. 54 / RR-12 Recommendations and Reports 27 history, and chest radiograph), and treat and ... organized, the equipment and systems available to them, and the fiscal resources they command) represents the public health infrastructure for TB control. The...
Ngày tải lên : 06/03/2014, 04:20
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bargaining and markets - martin j. osborne

bargaining and markets - martin j. osborne

... dimension. Thus the question arises whether the demand and supply functions of the competitive model should be applied to the stock of agents in the market or to the flow of agents through the market. ... one of the players, say i, proposes an agreement (a member of X), and the other player (j) either accepts the offer (chooses Y ) or rejects it (chooses N). If the offe...
Ngày tải lên : 08/04/2014, 12:15
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