The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets 3 docx

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_1 pot

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_1 pot

... 36 Chapter 3. The Strategic Approach 3. 3.2 The Intersection of the Graphs of v 1 (·, 1) and v 2 (·, 1) In our subsequent analysis the intersection of the graphs of v 1 (·, 1) and v 2 (·, ... follows. If the state is [S, i, x] and the action Player i takes is “reject”, then the new state is [S, i]; if the action is “accept”, then the new state is [x]. If the sta...
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The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_2 ppt

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_2 ppt

... v 2 (1, 1) x 2 ≥ 0 3 proposes x ∗ e 1 e 2 e 3 accepts x 3 ≥ v 3 (x ∗ 3 , 1) x 3 ≥ 0 x 3 ≥ 0 x 3 ≥ v 3 (1, 1) Transitions If, in any state y, any Player i proposes x with x i > y i , then go to state ... the payoff x 2 ≥ η. If he rejects the offer, then the state remains 62 Chapter 3. The Strategic Approach η, and, given Player 1’s strategy, the best action for P...
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The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_3 docx

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_3 docx

... Kalai–Smoro- dinsky solution) and Dasgupta and Maskin (1989) and Anbarci (19 93) (the solution that selects the Pareto efficient point on the line through the dis- agreement point that divides the set of individually ... has the following properties. 1. If the strategies of Players 2 H and 2 L call for them both to reject an offer, then these strategies also call for them to...
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The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_4 pptx

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_4 pptx

... that the game is independent of the realization of the types: the strategy sets of the different types of buyer, and of seller, are the same, and the outcome of bargaining is a function only of the ... state. The number of buyers and the number of sellers in the m arket remain constant over time. The 1 23 5.4 Delay in Reaching Agreement 105 ability π H , and...
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The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_5 pdf

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_5 pdf

... new partners Figure 7.2 The structure of events withi n some period t. S and B stand for the seller and the buyer, and Y and N stand for acceptance and rejection. The numbers beside the branches are the probabilities ... type in the market. Then the limit of the unique market equilibrium price p ∗ as δ → 1 has the property that the area above the horizontal l...
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The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_6 ppt

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_6 ppt

... agents have information only about the index of the period and the names of the sellers and buyers in the market. (Thus they know more than just the numbers of sellers and buyers in the market.) ... follow their equilibrium strategies, then the agent uses these strategies to form a belief about the events in other matches. If p is different from the offer made in th...
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The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_7 doc

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_7 doc

... events. The other party can either accept or reject the proposal. In the event of acceptance, the parties trade, and the game ends. In the event of rejection, the match dissolves, and the seller ... buyer has the “right” to purchase the seller’s unit at the price p ∗ . If buyer i has the right, then in the equilibrium the seller offers buyer i, and no other bu...
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The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_8 pptx

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_8 pptx

... 67 simultaneous offers, 67, 76–81 bargaining game of alternating offers, 29–65, 81–86  i , 33 assumptions on preferences, 33 35 A1, 33 A2, 33 A3, 33 A4, 33 A5, 34 , 53 54 A6, 35 , 48 with asymmetric delays, ... Commitment and Sequential Bargaining , Economic Journal 102, 37 8 38 7. [66] Mutho o, A. (19 93) , “Sequential Bargaining and Competition”, Economic Theory 3,...
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Recommendations from the American Thoracic Society, CDC, and the Infectious Diseases Society of America docx

Recommendations from the American Thoracic Society, CDC, and the Infectious Diseases Society of America docx

... who do the work of public health, their skills and capacities, the places where they work, the way they are organized, the equipment and systems available to them, and the fiscal resources they ... illness and the specific nature and circumstances of the contact between the patient and exposed persons. Vol. 54 / RR-12 Recommendations and Reports 27 history, and...
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bargaining and markets - martin j. osborne

bargaining and markets - martin j. osborne

... Contents 3. The Strategic Approach: A Model of Alternating Offers 29 3. 1 The Strategic Approach 29 3. 2 The Structure of Bargaining 30 3. 3 Preferences 32 3. 4 Strategies 37 3. 5 Strategies as Automata 39 3. 6 ... of X), and the other player (j) either accepts the offer (chooses Y ) or rejects it (chooses N). If the offer is accepted, then the bargaining ends, an...
Ngày tải lên : 08/04/2014, 12:15
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