The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets 2 ppt

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_1 pot

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_1 pot

... M 1 and M 2 be the suprema of Player 1’s and Player 2 s payoffs over SPEs of the subgames in which Players 1 and 2, respectively, make the first offer. Similarly, let m 1 and m 2 be the infima of these ... 3.3.3)). Then (3.3) implies that y ∗ 1 = δ 1 x ∗ 1 and x ∗ 2 = δ 2 y ∗ 2 , so that x ∗ =  1 −δ 2 1 −δ 1 δ 2 , δ 2 (1 −δ 1 ) 1 −δ 1 δ 2  and y ∗ =  δ 1...

Ngày tải lên: 22/06/2014, 17:20

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The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_2 ppt

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_2 ppt

... out. Let M 1 and m 2 be defined as in the proof of Proposition 3.5. By the arguments in Steps 1 and 2 of the proof of Theorem 3.4 we have m 2 ≥ 1 − δM 1 and M 1 ≤ 1 −δm 2 , so that m 2 ≥ 1/(1 + ... e to the boundary of S then, despite the compatibility of these demands, there is a positive probability that the outcome is the dis- agreement point d, rather than th...

Ngày tải lên: 22/06/2014, 17:20

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The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_3 docx

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_3 docx

... represent the players’ preferences by δ t 1 w 1 (x 1 ) and δ t 2 w 2 (x 2 ), where δ 1 = δ 2 , and construct the set S using the utility functions w 1 and w 2 , then the limit of the agreement ... has the following properties. 1. If the strategies of Players 2 H and 2 L call for them both to reject an offer, then these strategies also call for them to make...

Ngày tải lên: 22/06/2014, 17:20

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The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_4 pptx

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_4 pptx

... S 2 . For any efficient mechanism M = (p, θ) we have σ(s 2 ) = β(b 1 ) = 1 /2. If M satisfies IR and IC, then from (5.1) and (5 .2) we have U M (s 1 ) ≥ (s 2 −s 1 ) /2 and U M (b 2 ) ≥ (b 2 −b 1 ) /2. ... b 2 ) = (s 1 + b 2 ) /2 = α +η /2, b 2 −p(s 2 , b 2 ) = p(s 1 , b 1 ), and θ(s 2 , b 2 ) = θ(s 1 , b 1 ). This condition expresses the symmetry between a buy...

Ngày tải lên: 22/06/2014, 17:20

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The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_5 pdf

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_5 pdf

... new partners Figure 7 .2 The structure of events withi n some period t. S and B stand for the seller and the buyer, and Y and N stand for acceptance and rejection. The numbers beside the branches are the probabilities ... type in the market. Then the limit of the unique market equilibrium price p ∗ as δ → 1 has the property that the area above the horizontal...

Ngày tải lên: 22/06/2014, 17:20

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The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_6 ppt

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_6 ppt

... with the bundle c 2 or enters period t + 2 with that bundle. B ut V k 2 (c 2 , t + 2) ≤ V k 2 (c 2 , t + 1) = u k 2 (c 2 ) by Steps 2 and 3. So the fact that u k 2 (c 2 − z) > u k 2 (c 2 ), and ... agents have information only about the index of the period and the names of the sellers and buyers in the market. (Thus they know more than jus...

Ngày tải lên: 22/06/2014, 17:20

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The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_7 doc

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_7 doc

... events. The other party can either accept or reject the proposal. In the event of acceptance, the parties trade, and the game ends. In the event of rejection, the match dissolves, and the seller ... buyer has the “right” to purchase the seller’s unit at the price p ∗ . If buyer i has the right, then in the equilibrium the seller offers buyer i, and no other bu...

Ngày tải lên: 22/06/2014, 17:20

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The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_8 pptx

The Free Information Society Bargaining and Markets_8 pptx

... frontier, 15 symmetric, 12, 14 bargaining solution, 10 asymmetric Nash, 21 , 22 Kalai–Smoro d inksy, 22 Nash, 13, 15 without I IA, 21 22 without INV, 21 without PAR, 22 without SYM, 21 beliefs, 95 optimistic, ... Game”, Theory and Decision 26 , 81–90. [67] Fershtman, C. (1990), The Importance of the Age nda in Bargaining , Games and Economic Behavior 2, 22 4 23 8. [6...

Ngày tải lên: 22/06/2014, 17:20

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Recommendations from the American Thoracic Society, CDC, and the Infectious Diseases Society of America docx

Recommendations from the American Thoracic Society, CDC, and the Infectious Diseases Society of America docx

... who do the work of public health, their skills and capacities, the places where they work, the way they are organized, the equipment and systems available to them, and the fiscal resources they ... illness and the specific nature and circumstances of the contact between the patient and exposed persons. Vol. 54 / RR- 12 Recommendations and Reports 27 history,...

Ngày tải lên: 06/03/2014, 04:20

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