the mit press the love of nature and the end of the world the unspoken dimensions of environmental concern dec 2001

... Berkeley. And finally, I would like to express my gratitude to Larry Cohen and ClayMorgan of The MIT Press for the welcoming home they provided the idea thatbecame this book. The Love of Nature and the ... common love of the land, of the samemountain and river, the same fields, the same prevailing wind and the sun and the stars rising and setting beyond certain abiding hills.”3“Abiding loveliness,” ... experience of shared suffering, of which he and his grandfather are the witnesses. And the pain in the grand-father, which led him to be so hard? Unspoken, the food of truth denied, the child...

... its treatment of artifact talk in biology, in terms of the constitution of organic nature and the processes of survival and reproduction, is an explanation of the use of language admittedly ladenwith ... well versedin the theory in question the intuitions of biologists and well-informedphilosophers of biology—could be essential to recovering the role of the term in the theory, and hence its ... have their covering for a double purpose: to keep them at the bottom of the sea, and to protect them when drifted by the tide against rocks. Animals of the molluscous division, which inhabit the...

... excuse, the fanatic who wrecks this world for love of the other. But what are we to say of the fanatic who wrecks this world out of hatred for the other? He sacrifices the very existence of hu-manity ... signifier And what if this is the fundamental mes-sage of monotheism—not the reduction of the Other to the One,but, on the contrary, the acceptance of the fact that the binary signi-fier is always-already ... short and clear definition of the HolySpirit: The Holy Spirit is the entry of the signifier into the world. This is certainly what Freud brought us under the title of death9internal to the transgression...

... toexistbecauseofsomecognitivelimitationonourpart(McGinn1989)—wearetoostupid(orhavethewrongtypeofintelligence)toappreciatetheexplanatoryconnection.Aproperunderstandingofthephysicalandphenomenalfactswould,inreality,showusthatoneexplainstheother.Idonotbelieveanyofthesethreestrategiesareacceptable.Thefirstsimplyflatlyconflictswiththeevidence.Itsproponentsneedtoproducemuchstrongerargumentsthantheyhaveproducedtomakeitaseriouscontender,andIampessimisticthatsuchargumentsexist.Eachoftheothertwostrategiessuffersfromanotherseriousfault:theyareexercisesinexcusemaking.Theexplanatorygapisaninstanceofexplanatoryfailure.Whenconfrontedwithexplanatoryfailure,standardpracticeinscienceistore-evaluatethetheoryforinaccuracyorincompleteness.Thesemovesattempttoblamethepsychologyorperspectiveofthetheorymakersratherthantheontologyofthetheory,andarecompletelyanomalous.Theystandinthewayoftherealpossibilitythatwecanfindabettertheory.InthischapterIwillpursueafourthstrategybytacklingtheproblemmoredirectly.Iwillshowfaultinthetheories,ratherthanthetheory-makers.Mymethodology,Page35then,ismoretraditionalthanthemethodologyoftheotherstrategies.TheconclusionIreach,however,mayseemmoreradical.Iamgoingtoarguethatphysicalthingsare"twofaced"also.Morefactsthanjustthefactsaboutwhattheydoaretrueofthem,andthesefurtherfactsmayfillthegap.Ifthisconclusioniscorrectthentheformofthetheoriestraditionallyemployedinthesciencesneedstobesupplementedbeforewecancrosstheexplanatorygap.Someonepursuingthisstrategyneedstomeetthreechallenges,whichIwilltrytodo.Thefirstchallengeistoavoidbeing ... theabilitytoreproducewithoutgeneratinganyaprioricontradictions,butgiventheradicalincompletenessofhisconceptsvis-à-visthenaturesofthetwophenomenatowhichheappliedthem,nothingreallyfollowsregardingwhatrelationsoflogical(ormetaphysical)possibilitymightholdbetweenthosephenomenathemselves.AretheconceptsusedbyChalmersandtheneodualistmoreadequatethanthevitalist's?Firstwemustask,"whatspecificconceptsdotheyuse?"Onthementalsidetheyuseaconceptofexperiencederivedfromourfirstpersonawarenessofourownconsciousmentalstatesandprocesses.Thenatureoftheseconceptsderivesfromtheirrepresentationalandregulatoryroleinthemonitoringandcontrolofourconsciousmentallife.Theysurelymeetconditionsofadequacyrelativetothatrole.Butinwhatotherrespectsmighttheybeadequateorinadequate?Fortheneodualist'spurposeshisconceptofconsciousexperience,callitCCE,mustbeadequatetolimntheboundariesofconsciousness;whateversatisfiesCCEinanyworldmustPage19beaninstanceofconsciousnessandwhateverfailstofallunderCCEmustequallyfailtobeaninstanceofconsciousness.TheneodualisttreatshisconceptCCEastheuniversal(Protagorean)standardofconsciousness,butthatassumptionseemslessthanplausibleoratleastproblematic.Whyshouldthatconceptofexperiencederivedfromitsroleinregulatingourspecificformofconsciousnessprovideacharacterizationofconsciousnesssufficientlygeneraltodeterminethelogicallypossibleboundariesofconsciousness.PleasenoteIamnotsayingthattheneodualistassumesthatalllogicallypossibleconsciousexperiencemustinvolvethesamespecificphenomenalpropertiesassociatedwithhumanconsciousness;hemostsurelyandrightlydoesnotsaythat.Butwhathedoesimplicitlyassume,thoughmoremodest,isstilluponreflectionimplausible,namelythattheconceptsofconsciousnessthatwecommandonthebasisoftheirapplicationwithinourownself-awarenesscanprovideuswithageneralmeansofdelimitingthelogicallypossibleboundariesofconsciousness.Moreover,thereisafurtherdimensionofadequacyinwhichtheneodualist'sconceptofconsciousnessisevenlessplausiblyuptothetask,onethatisdirectlyrelevanttohisthoughtexperiment.ThequestioniswhetherorUndertherealistalternativethecausalnexushastwoaspects,itseffectiveanditsreceptivefaces.Thesetwofacesarelogicallyinseparable,asonecannothavereceptivenesswithouteffectiveness,andviceversa .The naturalrelationbetweenthesetwofaceswillconstituteacausalnexus.Sincearealistwishestofindatheoryofthisnexus,atheoryofthecausalnexusmustbeatheoryofthedetailedrelationbetweenthesetwofaces.First,findingthemostgeneraltheoryofthecausalnexusrequiresovercomingonetemptingview.Thisistheviewthatconceivesofthereceptiveandtheeffectivepropertiesofindividualsaseachbeingmonadicpropertiesofthoseindividuals.Inplaceofthiscommonsensepicture,onemustsubstituteapictureofreceptivityasaconnection ... 75Page72—TheObjectionTheobjectionIwishtoconsiderinvolvesatwo-prongedattackontheargument.First,theobjectortakesissuewiththeclaimthatstatementslike(i)aboveareanalytic,orthattheycanberenderedintopic-neutralterms.Second,theobjectorrespondstotheobviousquestionthatarisesasaresultofthefirstprongoftheattack:namely,if(i)isneitheranalyticnortopic-neutral,thenwhyistherenoexplanatorygapinESI,givenitsrelianceonthebridgepremise(5)?Theansweristochallengetheassumptiononwhichthequestionisbased,that(5)itselfrequiresanexplanation.Thedenialofanalyticstatusto(i)ispartofageneralchallengetotheanalytic-syntheticdistinction,whichdatesbacktoQuine(1953).Foronething,noonehaseverproducedaconvincingexampleofaconceptualanalysis,asidefrommarginalcaseslike"bachelor"ormathematicalconcepts.Afterall,whatwouldreallygointotheexpansionof"watery"?Isitreallyanalyticthatwaterfallsfromthesky,orisliquidatroomtemperature ?Of course,onecanalwayssaythatwejusthaven'tfoundtherightanalysis,orthatitisbestunderstoodasaclusterconceptwithnoonenecessaryconditionbutaweightedsumofnecessaryconditions.Atthispointtheburdenshiftstotheadvocateofanalyticitytoshowwhyweshouldbelievethereissuchathingastherightanalysistobefound.Therearealotofmovesandcounter-movestomakeatthispoint,andIcan'tdelveintothemhere.6Butsurelyonereasonforthinkingtherehastobeananalysisfortermslike"water"isthatwithoutonewewouldbeatalosstoexplainidentitieslike(5).Thisbringsustothesecondprongoftheattack,removingoneoftheprincipalreasonsforbelievinginthenecessityofanalysis.Theargumenthereisthatidentities,unlikecorrelations,donotrequireexplanation.Thatsomethingisitselfispreciselythesortofsituationthatweacceptasabrutefact.Whatelsecoulditbe?Whatreallywouldcountasexplaininganobject'sidentitywithitself?Ofcourseitdoesseemasifweoftenaskforexplanationsofidentities.Doesn'titmakesensetoaskwhy,orhowitis,thatwaterisH2O?Butwheneversuchaquestionmakessense,itispossibletoreinterpretitinoneoftwoways:eitherasajustificatoryquestion,orasaquestionaboutthecoinstantiationofdistinctproperties.So,withrespecttoaskingforanexplanationof(5),wemightbeaskingnotwhywaterisH2O,butratherwhyweshouldthinkthatwaterisH2O.Thisisawayofseekingevidenceforitstruth,notanexplanationofitstruth.Ontheotherhand,wemightbeaskingsomethinglikethis:HowisitthatthissubstancemadeoutofH2Omoleculesappearscontinuouslydivisible?Hereweareaskingforanexplanation,butwhatwewantexplainedishowtwodistinctproperties—inthiscase,beingcomposedofH2OmoleculesandappearingcontinuouslyPage8divisible—couldbeinstantiatedinthesamesubstance.Thisisaquiteproperobjectofexplanation,butnoticethatitinvolvesaconnectionbetweentwodistinctproperties.What,goestheargument,youneverhaveis,strictly,whyisthisthesameasthat?Tothisquestion,ifitwereeverasked,theonlypossibleansweris,"becauseitis,that'swhy."Iftheforegoingisright,andIthinkitis,thenthereasonwedon'tfindagapinESIhasnothingtodowiththeavailabilityofananalysisof"water,"andsonothingtodowithourabilitytoexplainthebridgeidentity(5).Thereisnogapbecausebridgeidentitiesdon'tgenerallyrequireexplanations.ButifthereisnogapinESIKunioYasueResearchInstituteforInformaticsandScienceNotreDameSeishinUniversity2-16-9Ifuku-cho,Okayama700-8516,JapanArthurZajoncDepartmentofPhysicsAmherstCollegeAmherst,MA01002PagexixPREFACEWhatisconsciousness?Howandwhydowehaveconsciousexperience,aninnerlifetexturedandcomprisedofthefeelingsandsensationsthatphilosopherscall''qualia"?Asanewmillenniumbeckons,thesequestionshaveemergedfromalongdarknessthatdominatedpsychologyformuchofthelastcentury.Thisinternationalandinterdisciplinaryintrospectionhasstemmedinpartfromanumberofhigh-profilebooksinthearea,inpartfromadevelopmentofnewexperimentaltechniquesforaddressingtheproblem,andinpartsimplyfromasensethatnowisthetimeforthescienceofthemindtoaddressitscentralandmostdifficultproblem.Themostburningissueisthatofwhetherconsciousexperience—feelings,qualia,our"innerlife"—canbeaccommodatedwithinpresent-dayscience.Manyseeconsciousexperienceasjustanotherphysicalprocessinthebrain.Othersseeconsciousexperienceasoutsidescience,orbelievethatsciencemustexpandtoincludeexperience.ThesephilosophicalbattlelineswereoriginallydrawnbetweenSocrates,whobelievedthatthe"cerebrumcreatedconsciousness,"andDemocritus,whoarguedthatmentalprocesseswerefundamentalconstituentsofreality.Ridingandfacilitatingthelatetwentiethcenturywaveofinterestinthenatureofconsciousexperience,threeinterdisciplinaryandinternationalTucsonconferences(TowardaScienceofConsciousness)havebeenheldin1994,1996 ,and1 998(thefourthisscheduledforApril10–15,2000).Theconferenceshavebeenintegrative,attemptingtoassimilateandsynthesizeavarietyofapproachestowardunderstandingtheconsciousmind.Fivemajorareasaredelineated:philosophy,neuroscience,cognitivescience,math/physics/biology,andexperiental/culturalapproaches.Theideafromthebeginninghasbeentobringproponentsandresearchersineachoftheseareasunderonetent,toavoidtunnelvisioninthistrickyandpotentiallyoverwhelmingmystery.ThefirstTucsonconferencein1994wasrelativelysmallandtentative.Couldaninterdisciplinaryconsciousnessconferencework?Wouldproponentsofthevariedapproachesbeabletocommunicate,orwouldthegatheringdegenerateintoamodernTowerofBabel?"TucsonI"succeededbeyondexpectations,andasecond,expandedTucsonIIwasheldin1996,movingfromtheUniversityofArizonacampustothelargerfacilitiesattheTucsonConventionCenterandMusicHall.Manyofthecentralfiguresinthenewlyformingfieldofconsciousnessstudieswereinvitedandparticipated,andtheissueswerefiercelydebatedamid1000attendees,producingnumerousprintandelectronicreports.FollowingTucsonII,morefocusedconferencesonconsciousnesssprangupacrosstheglobe.Consciousnesshadbecomepartoftheconsciousnessofthescientificworld.Wecomethustothesecondandmoregeneralquestionaboutthedualist'sthoughtexperiments.Aretheconceptsthatheusesadequatetothetasktowhichheputsthem?Isourconceptofphenomenalconsciousnessorourconceptofitspossiblephysicalbasiswellenoughdevelopedtoallowustodrawmetaphysicalconclusionsabouttheirrelation?Asnotedabove,Ithinktheyarenot.Considerfirstanothernonmentalexample.Imagineamid-nineteenth-centuryvitalistwhoarguesasfollows:1.Icanconceiveofcreaturesthatarejustlikeactualcreatures(sayactualcats)inallphysicalrespectsbutthathavenoabilitytoreproduce.2.Thereforetheabilitytoreproducedoesnotlogicallysuperveneonacreature'sphysicalstructure.Withthebenefitoflatetwentiethcenturyscienceweknowthevitalist'sconclusionisdeadwrong;theabilitytoreproduce...

... criticaltheorists deconstruct the actions of the avant-garde not as radical breaks, but as part of the cultural and economic structure of the art world. They point out the function of thesegestures ... precisely expressed in the language of mathematics); and the continu-ous testing and refinement of hypotheses. The underlying assumptions of the scientific approach are that the natural, observed world ... on definitions of art, the nature of the aesthetic experience, the relative place of communication and expression, or criteria of evaluation. However, thereis some agreement on these features:...

... cord. The dendrites and soma (cell body) constitute the ma-jor part of the input surface of the neuron. The axon is the “output line.” The tips of the branches of the axon form synapses upon other ... cross-references to other articles in the Handbook. These may occureither in the body of the article in the form THETITLE OF THE ARTICLE INSMALLCAPS,or at the end of the article, designated ... pairs. The contraction of one member of the pair will then act around a pivot to cause the expansion of the othermember of the pair. Thus, one set of muscles extends the elbowjoint, while another...

... about the nature of reality, forexample concerning the existence of the external world, other minds, and God.Chapter 5 shows the relevance of coherence to philo-1 Coherence in Philosophy and ... activation of all the units in parallel. The updated activation of unit is calculated on the basis of itscurrent activation, the weights on links to other units, and the activation of the units to ... identified. The claim thatmuch of human inference is a matter of coherence in the 24 CHAPTER TWOPrefaceThis book is an essay on how people make sense of eachother and the world they live in....

... upon all of the evil in the world mixed with all the good in the world, the thought of a perfectGod, all-powerful and perfectly benevolent, would neversuggest itself. The reasonable hypothesis ... on there. I have the sensation of pain. The question is not whether their visual sensations and mypain sensation are sensations of the same thing. It is ratherwhether my sensation itself, the ... to the two-ways strategy is imposing, butI will claim it is mistaken. At the root of this objection, and at the roots of the knowledge argument and the modal ar-gument, and ultimately at the...

... cat on the housesill, the chickadee, the prarie-dog, The litter of the grunting sow as they tug at her teats, The brood of the turkeyhen, and she with her halfspread wings,I see in them and myself ... possible!C) For the investigation of nature, the method of empirical science is superiorto any other.D) Nature (the world, the universe, the real) is, at bottom, constituted of matter and energy, ... explanation and interpretation of the world. I) There are no miracles.J) There is no extrasensory perception.K) Understanding nature doesn’t transcend nature itself.L) There is a unity of nature...

... communication. The World Wide Web had just 50 pagesin 1993; by the end of the decade there were 50 million.6 The number of Internet users went from 25 million in 1995 to 400 million by the end of 2000. The ... better understand-ing of your own assumptions and arguments. Moreover, if you thendecide to reject the arguments of others, you will do so with a genuineunderstanding of the complexity and historical ... the first to con-centrate exclusively on the political economy of the global environment,striving to integrate the debates within the “real world of global policy and the “academic world of...