SUERF Colloquia and Colloquia Publications 1969-2003 in Figures and Locations
Colloquium 18: The Competitiveness of Financial Institutions and Centres in Europe
Dublin, May 1994
President of SUERF and Chairman of the Colloquium: Christian de Boissieu Colloquium Book
Editors:Donald E. Fair and Robert Raymond
Authors: Jean-Paul Abraham, Michel Aglietta, Harald Benink, Sigbjørn Berg, Niklaus Blattner, Philip Bourke, Philip Davis, Christian de Boissieu, Michel Dietsch, Lars Engwall, Gerhard Fink, Peter Haiss, Gerd Häusler, Hilary Ingham, Neil Kennedy, Mervyn Lewis, David Llewellyn, Rainer Masera, Pietro Modiano, Per Mokkelbost, Laura Mollame, Andrew Newton, Richard O’Brien, Maurice O’Connell, Thomas O’Connell, Francisco Pérez, Reinhard Petschnigg, Stefan Pintjens, Javier Quesada, David Raikes, Lucio Rondelli, George Sheldon, Jacques Sijben, Patrick Simonnet, Mart Sưrg, Wataru Takahashi, Hiroo Taguchi, Steve Thompson, Virna Valenti.
Publishers:Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1994, xii, 507 pp.
– Setting the stage: Is competitiveness the lifeblood of banking or is it a dangerous obsession?
“... Competitiveness is the lifeblood of any industry and banking is no exception. Very few industries have been subjected to such rapid changes in the past decade with the impact of technology, the globalisation of financial services and the development of financial derivatives which were unheard of a short time ago. In stressing the importance of competitiveness, however, let us not lose sight entirely of the wider obligations of banks to the communities which they serve. Banks enjoy a privileged status in a sense, because of their impact on economic life. As a central banker, I must be very conscious of the regulatory aspects of banking and of the obligations on the authorities to keep pace with new developments ...” (Maurice O’Connell, Governor of the Central Bank of Ireland, Dublin, in his opening address, p. 6)
“We are undergoing rapid technological change in financial industries, affecting the competitive environment. And as they compete vigorously,
banks must be, like Caesar’s wife, above suspicion. From the record of the past few years, I would suggest that Caesar had better start checking up on his wife, as she seems to have been a little bit ready for experimentation, diversification and seeking joint venture partnerships. Even Caesar had to compete and never knew when friend would become a foe ...” (Richard O’Brien, Chief Economist, American Express Bank, London, p. 497) – A solid injection of theory on the junction between financial economics
and industrial organization...
“... The recent research on the operation of credit markets and the associated revitalization of credit in macroeconomics is based on the new economics of asymmetric information and incomplete markets. This view, concentrating on the independent influence both of the amount and availability of credit and the credit-rationing mechanism on economic activity is called the ‘credit view’ ... Recently in economic literature the lemons principle and the associated asymmetric information has been applied to the operation of financial markets, especially to explain the phenomenon of credit rationing and the importance of the quality of the financial structure of economic agents for macroeconomic performance. The asymmetric information approach provides an important transmission mechanism for how disturbances on credit markets affect aggregate economic activity ... The new microeconomic view has also been applied to the operation of the credit market, emphasizing the issues of adverse selection and moral hazard resulting in quantity adjustments on this market ... Based on the Stiglitz-Weiss’ analysis the rise of bad-loans in the banking system and its attendant increase in outstanding debt of firms and households, coinciding in time with a cyclical downturn, has increased financial fragility ... The primary danger for financial stability is that a downturn of the business cycle will interrupt the cash flows of households and firms, giving rise to an inability to service the accumulated debt. Such a process can lead to a crisis in the financial system with negative spill-over effects to the real economy. The robustness of the financial system can be maintained by stable government policies and an institutional environment that encourages sufficient diversification of risks, reducing the risk for future economic and financial crises.” (Jacques Sijben, Professor of Money and Banking, Tilburg University, pp. 354, 365, 369, 375, 376)
“... The traditional approach which treats the financial system as an epiphenomenon and the intermediary-rentieras destined for euthanasia, does not entail the need for a theory of financial innovation. By contrast, (the functional approach of the financial system) requires an explicit theory of the dynamics of the financial system, a theory of financial innovation. Process
and product innovations in the financial system have four main characteristics: they reduce agency and information costs, second they complete the markets; third, they reallocate and reduce risk; and fourth they reduce transaction and settlement costs ... It is not proper to speak simply of disintermediation in the American financial system, i.e. a process in which borrowers obtain financing directlyfrom lenders through the markets. Even when one acknowledges in full the importance and implications of securitization, it would appear more correct to describe the complex process of innovation as being characterized by a diversification of the forms of intermediation. A growing role is being played by non-bank intermediaries (institutional investors) and investment banks (in fact securities houses and thus non-banks) that operate in close relationship (competitive complementarity) with the financial markets ... The regulatory neutrality that underlies the Single Market can allow banks in Europe to maintain a significant role in financial intermediation. However, this requires the capacity to achieve economies of scale and scope in the production of financial services through appropriate operational and organizational strategies. Mere growth and unfocused diversification (the financial conglomerate) are unpromising paths to produce such results. Institutional despecialization goes hand in hand with operational specialization: what are required, then, are multispecialist intermediaries with focused growth ...”
(Rainer Masera, Director General, Istituto Mobiliare Italiano, pp. 11, 12, 14-15)
– Evidence on markets and strategies: same causes, various banking strategies, often analogous effects...
– Real estate: “... The recent property boom – indeed, the 1980s in general – looks increasingly like one of those once-in-a-lifetime periods when the ‘boom that will never end’ mentality takes hold, and people temporarily suspend customary prudent standards. Bankers are presumably as prone to such ‘bubbles’ as are others. How else are we to explain why banks and financiers, many of which had experienced more than a century of property and share booms – and busts – suddenly started to behave as if property and share prices could never fall?” (Mervyn K. Lewis, Professor of Money and Banking, University of Nottingham, p. 61)
– Entry arrangements in the United Kingdom: “... Financial deregulation in the UK has created an unusual opportunity to study entry by firms previously restricted to a core business ... The general availability of
resources, as proxied by firm size, appear to encourage wholly-owned ventures and discourage collaborative ones, lending support to the argument that control costs make joint ventures problematic in many areas. Collaboration appears to be used as a means of easing the resource constraint. Conversely, it appears that risk and high initial outlays encourage collaboration – presumably to facilitate risk spreading. The result also suggests – for financial service firms at least – that the remaining regulatory requirements exert a strong influence on the choice of entry arrangements ...” (HilaryIngham and Steve Thompson, respectively, Senior Lecturer, School of Management, Manchester University and Professor, School of Management and Finance, University of Nottingham, pp. 196, 197)
– Les surcapacités bancaires en France: “... Dans la période récente, la création de nouveaux guichets a été déterminée par des motifs d’accessibilité et des motifs stratégiques plutơt que par des motifs d’efficacité, l’augmentation des capacités en guichets ne s’étant pas accompagnée d’une réelle augmentation de l’activité par guichet, mais plutơt d’une réduction ... La dispersion des cỏts bancaires s’explique davantage par des différences d’efficience entre banques que par des différences des caractéristiques des marchés sur lesquels les banques opèrent. Enfin la part des crédits inefficients parce que trop risqués a augmenté au cours des dernières années, expliquant le déplacement de la frontière rendement – risque du portefeuille des crédits bancaires vers la droite ... L’élimination des surcapacités constitue l’issue principale permettant d’ajuster les capacités bancaires au niveau de l’activité ...” (Michel Dietsch, Professeur, Centre d’Etudes des Politiques Financières, Université de Strasbourg III, p. 92)
– Efficiency in Swiss Banking: “Size appears to be both a curse and a blessing. Large banks are more efficient but suffer from diseconomies of scale. Scope on the other hand, seems to offer no cost advantage:
scope economies do not appear to exist and a diversified product mix is associated with higher inefficiencies ... Efficiency and factor productivity have increased in Swiss banking, a sign of effective competition ... Stiffer competition should place added pressure on banks to economize, causing a growing number of inefficient banks to fail ...” (George Sheldon, Deputy Director, Labour and Industrial Economics Research Unit, Basle University, pp. 129, 130)
– Idem in Spanish Banking: “... 1. In reaction to the intensely competitive environment, (Spanish) banks have clearly improved global efficiency at the firm level ... 2. Size is a strategic instrument to increase efficiency to be only systematically useful, in what refers to the size of the branch ... 3. The strategic benefits of specialization are difficult to establish. Partial evidence shows that those activities most traditionally related to banks – the creation of means of payment and loan production – enhance efficiency and profitability ... 4. The employment of factors has been seriously conditioned by external regulation ... In this respect the margin for differentiated strategies appears to be very narrow ...
Under these circumstances, we tend to think that – in what refers to size and specialization – the less externally identifiable components of the strategies are the most relevant ones. Such components depend upon the intangible assets of the firm related to experience and organizational culture, questions about which microeconomics has very little to say.” (Francisco Pérezand Javier Quesada, Professors, IVIE and Valencia University, pp. 146-147)
– Idem in Italian Banking: “... The reaction of the Italian banking system was in a certain sense the best reply to the changing of regulatory and structural conditions. The rapid expansion of loans allowed to reach two essential objectives more rapidly: the re-balancing of assets, which were excessively concentrated in public debt securities due to credit ceilings previously in effect, and the diversification of the customer base, which had been limited by constraints on geographic expansion ...
It appears the market re-adjustment process is on the verge of being completed. From an asset perspective, the objectives of banks are changing: once banks have achieved an optimal balance between securities and loans and a degree of customer diversification which is deemed efficient, their attention shifts to profit objectives ... Banks are accordingly being asked to modify their operations in order to satisfy the new needs arising from the market. In introducing the universal bank model and sanctioning the end of the separation between banks and non financial firms Italy’s acknowledgement of the second EU banking directive provides the banks with the possibility to operate in a broad array of financial services ... This competitive strategy will in turn have important repercussions on industrial structure. Indeed the possibility of consolidating or even increasing market share will undoubtedly be easier for the very large banks capable of fully
exploiting the economies of scale and scope which are connected to a diversified supply. As a result, the dichotomy between small and large institutions should grow stronger ...” (Pietro Modiano, Laura E.Mollame and Virna Valenti, respectively Chief Economist, and Economists, Credito Italiano, Milan, pp. 221, 222)
– Idem in Austrian Banking: “... It seems that Austrian banks seem to develop into ‘big banks in a small country’, i.e. go for home market ownership as a necessary prerequisite for profitability improvement and conquering surrounding foreign markets. The large banks are trying to exploit these differences (in information and high cost of information) by market segmentation and at the same time to reduce risk by diversification ...” (Gerhard Fink, Professor Vienna University; Peter Haiss, Secretariat Bank Austria Lecturer, Graz University; and Reinhard Petschnigg, Economist and Austrian National Bank Lecturer, Vienna University, pp. 168-169)
– ’Bridge, Poker and Swedish Banking: “...This paper has pointed out the importance of two concepts: liquidity and organizational stress ... The higher the liquidity of an industry’s core product, the higher the risks of introducing rapid institutional changes. Organizational stress is a consequence of uncertainty in a particular field, i.e. the higher the uncertainty, the higher the stress caused by the actions of an organization’s competitors. This stress is also likely to be stronger in a field with a limited number of actors ... On a more practical level (this) demonstrates the need to be careful in redesigning systems.
Although the big leaps may appear more spectacular, signalling an ability to act, it seems that a step-by-step procedure, a kind of muddling through, would be a more appropriate way to proceed.” (Lars Engwall, Professor of Business Administration, Uppsala University, p. 237) – Not so in Estonia: “... Our measures for overcoming the banking crisis
have been well chosen. Firstly, we do not have so much free money as in Finland and Sweden where the renovation of the banks has been carried out with the financial assistance of the state. Secondly, all our banks had taken too great risks and if the state had helped some of them, the others would have followed the former more risky policy ...
Thirdly, the banks should fight against risks and crime by themselves and not only hope that police would defend them...” (Mart Sưrg, Professor of Money and Banking, Tartu University, p. 182)
– Competition among Financial Centres in Europe; a beauty contest
● London: “... The evidence ... suggests that London has maintained its position as one of the world’s leading international financial centres, despite the increase in competition in recent years ... The arrival of the European Single Market does not appear so far to have had a dramatic impact on competition between financial centres. However, it seems fair to assume that in the longer-term its impact will still be important.
It is likely to increase competition between both intermediaries and financial centres in Europe: in doing so, it will increase the competitiveness of European financial centres, in relation not only to each other but also to the rest of the world ...” (David G. Raikesand Andrew Newton, respectively, with European Division, and Financial Markets and Institutions Division, Bank of England, p. 333)
● Finanzplatz Deutschland: “Innovations and structural change within
‘Finanzplatz Deutschland’ are therefore leading to a gradualist approach borne by the strongest market participants ... Now that the Federal Government has explicitly proclaimed the promotion of
‘Finanzplatz Deutschland’ as a political objective, the Bundesbank may, and indeed must, support that objective. This is a new task ... and one to which classically trained central bankers in Germany have not been accustomed. If, however, the two aims should clash with one another, the safeguarding of the currency clearly has priority for the Bundesbank over promoting Germany as a financial centre ...” (Gerd Häusler, Member of the Board, Deutsche Bundesbank, Frankfurt, pp. 254-255)
● Preserving Switzerland’s charm: “... Preserving Switzerland’s attractiveness in the international market segment and its role as an international financial sector in principle requires more caution with respect to international reactions than the preservation of competitiveness in domestic markets. Regulatory competition (partly
‘competition in laxity, partly ‘competition in stringency’) is possible and should be encouraged ... (On the other hand) for bankers in Switzerland the goal is to increase the efficiency and quality of the services provided in order to be able to benefit from a well engineered regulatory environment in difficult times...” (Niklaus Blattner, Economic Adviser, Swiss Bankers Association and Associate Professor of Economics and Director LIU, Basle University, pp. 344, 348-349)
● Ireland (of course): “...The small size of the economy implied that Dublin was never going to rank among the major financial centres in the world. Nevertheless, like a number of other small financial centres, the International Financial Services Centre has developed a number of niche specialties – banking, corporate treasury, insurance and mutual funds – on the basis of a good infrastructure, available skilled labour, low costs, favourable tax incentives and an independent supervisory regime...” (Thomas O’Connell and Neil Kennedy, Advisors, Economic Affairs and Financial Sector Department respectively, Central Bank of Ireland, Dublin, p. 283)
– Some evidence and conclusions on financial fragility and breakdowns
“... What can safely be concluded from recent experience in the case-study countries (UK and Scandinavia) is that big shocks to banking systems (such as sharp changes in regulation) almost inevitably produce unstable reactions.
However, it cannot be concluded that the aftermaths of such shocks (the transitional effect of the system moving between two different steady-state market environments) indicate the characteristics of the new de-regulated environment itself once the adjustment has been made, and the lessons learned. It is hazardous to make generalisations about the characteristics of a new steady-state environment from the experience of moving to it from a different regime. Nevertheless, the de-regulated banking environment may have made banking potentially more fragile. The erosion of economic rents induced by previous regulation is likely to have made banking a more vulnerable industry than in the past. Secondly, it is possible that the capacity created during the period of regulation was excessive and not sustainable in a more competitive and de-regulated environment...” (Harald A. Beninkand David T. Llewellyn, respectively Assistant Professor of Finance, Limburg University, and Professor of Money and Banking, Loughborough University, pp. 461-462)
“... The impression is that the Nordic governments have considered the financial strength and future stability of their banking industries to be at least as important as the efficient operation of banking production. Deregulation was a forceful push for increased efficiency but banking policies after deregulation have to a substantial degree worked to contain the competitive pressures released. This has been apparent in the governments’ attitude to large bank mergers, foreign entry, and national ownership of large banks. The efforts to remove excess banking capacity may also be seen as a way to improve on the stability of the banking industry...” (Sigbjørn Atle Berg, Head of Financial Research, Norges Bank, Oslo, p. 491)
“... Our ability to deal cost effectively with the problems of bank stability is not high. Lender of last resort and deposit insurance facilities appear to be inadequately focused and mispriced and the lack of an international lender of last resort is highlighted. In particular, the exposures of small countries, headquartering large banks with significant foreign currency deposits, require attention ... Consideration should be given to the concept of two-tiered deposit insurance with the first tranche provided by private markets and the remainder provided by a consortium of central banks ...” (Philip Bourke, Professor, Graduate School of Business, Department of Banking and Finance University College, Dublin, pp. 415-416)
“... Although the five crises – i.e. the Penn Central bankruptcy (1970), the crisis in the Floating-Rate Notes (FRN, 1986), the failure of the Junk Bond Market (1989) the Swedish Finance Company and Commercial Paper crisis, (1990), the collapse of the Ecu Bond Market (1992) – differ in important respects – there are sufficient parallels tentatively to justify their being described as a common syndrome. In particular, the collapses tended to occur in markets for instruments that were themselves financial innovations (whether in terms of instrument or currency), whose properties in periods of stress had not yet been evaluated. Institutional investors rather than retail clients tended to be the main investors in the markets ... The crisis tended to follow a bull market in the instrument, which entailed heavy issuance in the primary market, declines in yields and yield spreads relative to other securities, rising trade volumes and narrowing secondary market bid-ask spreads (as ‘liquidity trading’ increased) ... These patterns indicate a collective self-deluding failure on the part of market participants to attach more than a low probability to a crisis of the type that emerged. A ‘shock’ to such confidence ... led in each case to a major re-evaluation of the securities’
value. The consequence was heightened uncertainty (both for investors and market makers), an increase in selling, withdrawal of market makers and widening of spreads. In each case they culminated in a collapse of liquidity and of market prices that made primary issuance virtually impossible... and which persisted for some time except for the Penn Central crisis, where the authorities intervened ... Finally, the instability shown poses a general issue whether it is appropriate to rely heavily on securities markets to provide finance – is it a cause for concern if owing to this, banks, which should in principle have a comparative advantage in overcoming asymmetric information between borrower and lender as well as being able to maintain credit lines during market crises, are forced to withdraw from lending to some sectors?” (E. Philip Davis, with Bank of England, but seconded to the European Monetary Institute, Frankfurt, pp. 393-394, 395, 400)