Ngày tải lên :
15/02/2014, 13:20
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6
Insuchcycles,monetaryorfiscalpolicywouldbeloosenedintimetoenhancethechancesofagivenofficial’s
election,orcyclicalpolicywouldotherwisebemanipulatedtosuittheperceivedelectoralneedsofincumbents.
7
SeeBerger,DeHaan, and EIjffinger(2001),Faust and Irons(1999), and Posen(1995).
8
AsIfirstarguedinPosen(1993,1995) and hasbeensubsequentlyborneoutinotherempiricalstudies(though
notnecessarilywiththespecificsourcesofsupportIinitiallyhypothesized).SeeBerger,Eijffinger and DeHaan
(2001),Hayo(1998),Kuttner and Posen(2009), and Miller(1998), and thereferencestherein.
9
Drazen and Masson(1994)giveaparticularlyinsightfulformalmodelofthisphenomenon.
7
‘goal’ ... autonomy and making responsible choices. For society, and arguably
for the young persons themselves, what matters is not a young person’s ‘virtue,’ let alone any
reputation for such. What matters for ... Bank of Poland, and Reserve Bank of New Zealand, among others, in societies where
populism previously directly influenced monetary policymaking, and where threats to change
central bank laws arose,...