The treaty of saigon in 1874 disrupting the sino vietnamese tributary relationship

THE TREATY OF SAIGON.IN 1874: DISRUPTING THE SINO - VIETNAMESE TRIBUTARY RELATIONSHIP Ku Boon Dar Introduction The signing of the Saigon Treaty in March 15, 1874 had not appeased France This was due to the non-adherence by both the Vietnamese and Chinese governments to the terms of the treaty One of these was the rights of France on Coclin China (Bien Hoa, Gia Dinh dan Dinh Tuong at South Vietnam) This resuted in the French desperate move to consolidate its power in Vietnam, which then further opened up the gates to political instability in Vietnam This conflict also made way towards the colonization of Vietnam by France and further benefited Frame through the signing of the subsequent treaties At the same time, China was forccd to undertake a variety of approaches to save Vietnam from further coloiization by France In order to address the conflict in Vietnam, China’s officials sougit to find a comprehensive resolution Hence, this paper will review the propjsals recommended by the China’s officials To what extent the Chinese government had successfully carried out its efforts to prevent the French coloiization of Vietnam? From the outset, the Chinese efforts were made difficult by tie differences in opinions among the Chinese officials The Chinese officials propped a set of different solutions ranging from the voice strategy, treaty negoiations, and even military approaches to solve the conflict in Vietnam Sino-Vietnamese Tributary Relations Tributary relations between China and Vietnam were still continuing although France had conquered much of the Vietnam’s land through the Treaty of Saigon of 1874 The tributary mission led by Tran Nguyen Khanh Thuan and his assistants Ngu’en Thuc and Hoan Nguyen was the last tributary mission from Vietnam to * Ph.P (Malaya), School o f Distance Education, University Sains Malaysia, paper presented at the 4th International Vietnamese Studies Conference (ICVNS2012), Vietnam National Coivention Centre, Hanoi, 26-28 November 2012 This paper was made possible with support from TPLN, University Sains Malaysia, Penang, Malaysia 65 VI$T NAM HQC - KY Y tU Hy them [the French] They [the French] have been determined to capture Vietnam They [the French] will not let its escape so easily again.”4 Therefore, to strengthen the existing close tributary relationship the traditional coronation ceremony of the king of Vietnam was given top priority by China Emperor Ham Nghi (1884-1885) who inherited the throne from Tu Due wished to send a mission to China to get recognition from the Chinese emperor as the new emperor of Vietnam Emperor Ham Nghi looked forward that with the recognition granted by the Chinese Emperor it would reduce the pace of French colonization of Vietnam.5 Meantime, in China, the coronation ceremony was an event to look forward by China as its status as the protector of Vietnam had been the subject of the polemic Henri Cordier, Histoire Des Relations de la Chine Avec les Puissances Occidentals, Vol in E.V.G K iem an, British Diplomacy in China, 1880 to 1885, Cambridge: The University Press, 1939, p 88 Zeng Jize & Yu Yueheng (annotated), Zeng Jize Yiji (The Collected Tributaries o f Zeng Jize), Changsha: Yuelu Shushe, 1983, p 191 , : iÉ rU ^ Ỵto ] Hosea Ballou Morse, The International Relations o f the Chinese Empire, London: Longmans Green, 1910, p 348 See “Letter Zeng Jize to M De Freycinet”, May 1882 & “ Letter M de Freycinet to Zeng Jize, 31 May 1882”, FO 421/1 See also Zeng Jize, Zeng Jize Yiji, p 200 Guo Tingyi dan Wang Yujun, (ed.) Zhongfa Yuenan Jiaoshe Dang, Vol II, p 1282 74 THE TREATY OF SAIGON IN 1874 b:tween China and France China hoped the arrival of the messenger of Vietnam vould strengthen the facts and evidence that Vietnam was under the Chinese pttronage Therefore, China hoped that the decision whether to make peace or d:clare war with France would not be an issue or polemics This was because as the potector of Vietnam, China had the final say to determine the rights and sivereignty of Vietnam.1 Thus, before the Vietnam tributary envoys were sent to China, China took the oronation ceremony seriously Some even suggested that China appointed two oficers among the highest ranks in the army as the messengers and arranged for slips to the coast of Vietnam to run the coronation ceremony of Emperor Ham Nghi ( 884-1885).2 Although the two countries worked hard to complete the mission and t< deliver ceremony tributes and a royal coronation, they failed to reach a ctmpromise This approach failed to be implemented as result of some internal fetors that occurred in Vietnam In addition, China also suggested that Vietnam and China should expand the siope of their cooperation with other Western powers besides France Liu Fongzhang, for example had promised the British that they would received a sum o compensation if the British were willing to begin their trade with Vietnam Gnsul Hughes suggested to the Governor that, “ would not only endeavour to o>tain good term for British in Annam [Vietnam] but also exert his [Li Hongzhang] iifluence in our [British] favour in Corea [Korea].”3 Thus, Zhang Peilun and Chen Baozhen recommended to China to cooperate wth Germany According to them, after the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian Var (1870-1871), France was wary of Germany’s actions, especially in Europe and tb defeat of France also caused the French hesitation in deploying their army to the Eist Therefore, China should take this opportunity to cooperate with Germany as ths was the right moment to block the French ambitions in Vietnam.4 Meanwhile, Zeng Jize also suggested that the access to the Red River should b; opened for trade to all the Western powers According to his calculation, this 1Ibid ‘Chen Qitai, Henan Censor to Emperor Guangxu via Tang Yanggeng”, 29 September, 1883, Qing Guangxu Zhao Zhongfa Jiaoshe Shilicit) Vol 7, p 15 ‘Letter Consul Hughes to Grosvenor”, (In closure N o.37), 30 May 1883, FO 421/1 “Chen Baozhen & Zhang Peilun to Emperor Guangxu”, June 1883, Qing Guangxu Zhao Zhongfa Jiaoshe Shiliao, Vol 2, pp 18-21 [Bianqing yiji yizao ciingchcn mouzhe ( ( j i t s ELISlĩ■P-aẽỉtcÌỉêÍểĨ)) o ] 75 VIÇT NAM HQC - KŸ U HI THÀO QC TÉ LAN THỴTTIT step should be taken so that France could no longer use the excuse of “No trade in the Red River” to conquer Vietnam Zeng Jize realized that only by allowing other Western powers such as Britain, Germany and the United States to enter Vietnam, it would be able to at least slow down the monopoly of the French in Vietnam This was because the Western powers were competing with each other for control of the raw materials in the East since the onset of the Industrial Revolution.1 However, the Chinese offer was not well received by the Western powers In July 1880, Germany, for example informed Quai d’Orsay (the French Prime Minister’s Office) that its interests in Vietnam were purely economic Thus, Germany welcomed the efforts of France to strengthen its political position in Vietnam Germany felt that such a move could indirectly strengthen the security and its interests in Vietnam, which would then secure German interests in Vietnam-2 After China experienced one failure after another (through the diplomatic approach and political channels) China resorted to military approaches to deal with the rising power o f France Military Approaches In terms o f military approaches, China had deployed military forces to assist Vietnam But the assistance given was carried out secretly China adopted the dissimulation approach when facing French China had ordered its army to march into Vietnam but with the reason to help Vietnam to eliminate the robbers in the border o f the two countries This was to divert the French attention China in turn had put the armed forces led by Xu Yanxu (i& Ji M ) from the Guangxi battalion i n Bac Ninh (Vietnam) with the strength of six thousand soldiers Meanwhile th«e battalion led by Tang Tong from Yunnan with the strength o f eight thousand tro3p>s were stationed at Son Tay The Chinese military strength in Vietnam continued to increase from time to time until it reached thirty thousand people on the eve of thie Sino-French War When the Chinese troops entered Vietnam, they did not immediately decla'e a war with France China adopted the strategy of not confronting France openly Tie;n China through ju n jichu (^ # l£ tC o u n c il of State) reminded the armed force: iin order not to “move on its own.” Junji chu said that, “Since the arrival of the ame-d Zeng Jize, Zeng Jize Yiji, p 199 “Letter Freycinet to de Saint-Vallier”, July 1880, DDF 1811-1914, Vol Ill (No 197, ¡in Pei-Chih Hsieh, “ Prelude to Tragedy in Vietnam: the French Annexation o f Tonkin, anc th e Conflict with China, 1881-1885”, p 76 THE TREATY OF SAIGON IN 1874 fortes from Yunnan and Guangdong aimed to eliminate the robbers in Vietnam, the; [the soldiers of China] were not allowed to go above these limits.” The Chinese opinion deeply divided on whether to declare a war with France or o resort to a round table negotiation in resolving the presence o f the French miltary in Vietnam However, the attitude of her “extremely cautious” decision had embedded China’s auspices to Vietnam as Vietnam was once again forced to sign the Treaty of Hue of 1883, which verified the terms agreed upon under the Saigon Agjeement of 1874 Finally in 1887, Vietnam was free from the Chinese rule when Chiia lost the Sino-French War Conclusion During the period between the Taiping Rebellion and 1881, China-Vietnam relaions had also involved France, thus resulted in complex three-way relaionships On one hand, France increased its aggressiveness to conquer Vietnam and tried to deny tributary relations between China-Vietnam via the Saigon Agieement o f 1874 The issues o f China-Vietnam relations were not resolved beciuse the French did not accept the terms of the agreement On the other hand, the diplomatic relationships between China and Vietnam were preserved whereby Vienam continued to send tributary missions to China and China continued to pro/ide military assistance to Vietnam Thus, political and military approaches imitated by China were seen as a step to consolidate its patronage over Vietnam Kovever, the disputes between China and France reached a deadlock until China fmdly launched the Sino-French War to preserve the sovereignty o f Vietnam ‘Junji Chu (Council o f State) to Liu Zhangyou”, 14 A ugust 1882, Qingdezong Shilu (veritable Record o f the Emperor Guangxu), Vo 149, p [ ° ... ^ ) ) ] Indeed, the barons were of the opinion that China should maintain its tributary system in its relations with Vietnam Through the means of maintaining tributary relationships China would... f The Sino- French War), Vol 1, pp 273-274 70 THE TREATY OF SAIGON IN 1874 In addition, the Chinese government also ordered Tang Jingsong 1841-1903), the official secretary at the Department of. .. are linking Vietnam with China By maintaining Vietnam, China actually sustains the provinces in it [China].”2 He said that regardless of the negotiations taking place in Shanghai or Paris; China