Ownership structure, board characteristics anf firm performance in vietnam

VIETNAM NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF HO CHI MINH CITY UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY NGUYỄN TIẾN THÔNG OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, BOARD CHARACTERISTICS AND FIRM PERFORMANCE IN VIETNAM PHD THESIS HO CHI MINH CITY, 2019 VIETNAM NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF HO CHI MINH CITY UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY NGUYỄN TIẾN THÔNG OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, BOARD CHARACTERISTICS AND FIRM PERFORMANCE IN VIETNAM Subject: Business Administration Code: 62340501 Independent Examiner 1: Associate Prof.Dr Vương Đức Hoàng Quân Independent Examiner 2: Associate Prof.Dr Đỗ Bá Khang Examiner 1: Associate Prof.Dr Võ Thị Quý Examiner 2: Associate Prof.Dr Nguyễn Minh Hà Examiner 3: Associate Prof.Dr Nguyễn Minh Kiều ADVISORS Dr Nguyễn Thu Hiền Associate Prof.Dr Piman Limpaphayom STATUTORY DECLARATION I declare that I have developed and written the enclosed Dissertation completely by myself, and have not used sources or means without declaration in the text Any thoughts from others or literal quotations are clearly marked The Dissertation was not used in the same or in a similar version to achieve an academic grading or is being published elsewhere Author, Signature Nguyễn Tiến Thông i ABSTRACT Ownership structure, which specifies who are the owners of the firm, is crucial to corporate governance as it explains sources of agency conflicts Roles and impacts of different corporate owners on corporate performance and governance have been studied worldwide, but not as popular for the role of State-Owned Holding Company (SOH) as a model of state capital investment agency This study examines the relationship of ownership of SOH in the listed companies with state capital in Vietnam and the performance of these firms The result shows that companies with SOH ownership, or SOH-linked companies (SLCs), deliver superior returns and enjoy higher valuations than GLCs and non-GLCs as a result of higher profitability, and lower leverage ratio The evidence shows that when SOH holds a dominant ownership, it exercises positive control on firms, which results in better market performance Further analysis shows that SLCs hold more cash and the shareholders appreciate the cash hold by the SLCs, robust to the firms’ characteristics Without evidence that SLCs have special privileges and lower business risks, the better shareholder value of cash in SLCs is revealed to come from better corporate governance This study contributes to the literature of ownership structure and corporate governance and provides an evidence for SOH as a positive ownership and monitoring mechanism in improving corporate governance and firm performance in companies with State-owned capital in Vietnam The study also looks at the impacts of other owners in listed companies, such as family owners and foreign owners, board characteristics, and board independence on firm performance and yields evidence for various impacts of internal governance mechanisms on firm performance ii TÓM TẮT LUẬN ÁN Cấu trúc sở hữu, cho thấy chủ sở hữu cơng ty, đóng vai trị quan trọng quản trị cơng ty giải thích nguồn gốc xung đột đại diện Vai trò tác động loại hình chủ sở hữu doanh nghiệp khác hiệu hoạt động quản trị công ty nghiên cứu giới, nhiên nghiên cứu vai trò State-Owned Holding Company (SOH) mơ hình quan đầu tư vốn nhà nước giới hạn Nghiên cứu xem xét mối quan hệ sở hữu SOH cơng ty niêm yết có vốn nhà nước Việt Nam hiệu hoạt động công ty Kết cho thấy cơng ty có sở hữu SOH, cơng ty liên kết với SOH (SLCs), có hiệu vượt trội định giá cao so với công ty GLCs non- GLCs lợi nhuận cao tỷ lệ đòn bẩy thấp Bằng chứng cho thấy SOH nắm giữ quyền sở hữu chi phối, SOH thực thi kiểm sốt tích cực công ty, điều dẫn đến hiệu thị trường tốt Phân tích sâu cho thấy SLCs nắm giữ nhiều tiền mặt cổ đông đánh giá cao việc nắm giữ tiền mặt SLCs, làm bật đặc điểm cơng ty Khơng có chứng cho thấy SLCs nhận đặc quyền rủi ro kinh doanh thấp hơn, giá trị tiền mặt cho cổ đông tốt SLCs cho đến từ quản trị cơng ty tốt Nghiên cứu đóng góp vào sở lý thuyết cấu trúc sở hữu quản trị công ty cung cấp chứng cho thấy SOH chế sở hữu giám sát tích cực việc cải thiện chất lượng quản trị công ty hiệu hoạt động cơng ty có vốn nhà nước Việt Nam Nghiên cứu xem xét tác động loại hình hữu khác cơng ty niêm yết, sở hữu gia đình sở hữu nước ngồi, đặc điểm hội đồng quản trị độc lập hội đồng quản trị hiệu hoạt động công ty đưa chứng cho tác động khác chế quản trị nội hiệu hoạt động công ty iii ACKNOWLEDMENTS This thesis is a dedicated present to my dear parents to thank for their invisible contributions and also the wishes they have expected on me The Buddha said “in the end, only three things matter: how much you loved, how gentle you lived, and how gratefully you let go things not meant for you” I would like to thank my parents for their love, their mercy and their sacrifices helped me grow up I am grateful to my advisors, Dr Nguyen Thu Hien and Assoc Prof.Dr Piman Limpaphayom for their thoughtful guidance and insightful comments throughout my working Corporate Governance is a new research direction and their knowledge and experience are useful resources for my first step in this field I would like to say thank to other teachers of University of Technology, The School of Industrial Management, my colleagues and my friends with their supports and encouragement during my efforts for this study Last but not least, I would like to express my sincere thanks to Prof.Dr.Nguyễn Trọng Hoài Associate Prof.Dr.Võ Thị Quý Associate Prof.Dr.Nguyễn Minh Hà Associate Prof.Dr Nguyễn Minh Kiều Associate Prof.Dr Vương Đức Hoàng Quân Associate Prof.Dr Đỗ Bá Khang Dr.Dương Như Hùng for their precious comments to help improve my work iv TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF FIGURES viii LIST OF TABLES ix ABBREVIATIONS xi CHAPTER INTRODUCTION .12 1.1 Overview 12 1.2 Research Gap 17 1.3 Research Objectives 19 1.4 Research Scopes .19 1.5 Research Methodology 20 1.6 Research Significance .21 1.7 Research Structure 21 CHAPTER STATE-OWNED HOLDING COMPANY 23 2.1 SOE and SOH 23 2.2 State-Owned Enterprises 24 2.2.1 Concept of SOE .24 2.2.2 SOE in Literature 25 2.2.3 SOEs & Privatizations in other countries 29 2.2.4 SOEs and Equitization in Vietnam 30 2.3 State-Owned Holding Company, a new approach 31 2.3.1 SOH: Managerial Form 33 2.3.2 SOH: A Framework 33 2.3.3 SOH: Around the world 35 2.4 Temasek Holdings, a successful SOH 37 2.5 Khazanah Nasional Berhad, SOH of Malaysia 38 2.6 SCIC, SOH of Vietnam 38 2.7 Conclusion 41 CHAPTER 3.1 LITERATURE REVIEW 43 Literature Review 43 3.1.1 Agency Theory and Agency Problem .43 3.1.2 State Ownership Agency Problem 45 3.1.3 Remedies to Agency Problem 45 3.1.4 Model of SOH blockholder with profitability objective as remedy to State ownership agency problem 46 3.1.5 Other Ownership Structure & Board Characteristics as Remedies to Agency Problem 47 3.1.6 Ownership Structure, Cash Holdings and Firm Value 52 v 3.1.7 Firm Performance 54 3.2 Previous Studies on Ownership Structure, Board Characteristics and Firm Performance .56 3.2.1 Ownership Structure and Board Characteristics Studies around the World 56 3.2.2 3.3 Ownership Structure and Board Characteristics Studies in Literature 57 Research Hypothesis Development 62 3.3.1 Impacts of SOH ownership on Firm Performance 62 3.3.2 Role of Ownership Structure on Firm Performance through impacts of Cash Holdings .67 3.4 Conclusion 68 CHAPTER METHODOLOGY 69 4.1 Data 69 4.2 Research Model 70 4.2.1 Research Model .73 4.2.2 Research Variables for Impacts of Ownership Structure and Board Characteristics on Firm Performance 80 4.2.3 Research Variables for Impacts of Ownership Structure on Firm Performance through Cash Holdings 86 4.3 Methodology 89 4.3.1 Pooled Cross Section (POLS) 89 4.3.2 Fixed Effects (FE) 90 4.3.3 Heteroscedasticity Tests 90 4.3.4 Autocorrelation Tests 90 4.3.5 Random Effects (RE) 91 4.3.6 Feasible Generalized Least Square (FGLS) 91 4.3.7 Panel-Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) 91 4.3.8 Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) Test and Hausman Test .91 4.3.9 Endogeneity of Ownership Structure 92 4.4 Conclusion 93 CHAPTER RESULTS 94 5.1 Description of dataset .94 5.2 Outliers 97 5.3 Correlation Analysis of Variables 98 5.4 Performance Comparisons between SLCs, GLCs and non-SLCs 98 5.5 Regression Results 104 vi 5.5.1 Impacts of Ownership Structure, Board Characteristics on Firm Performance 104 5.5.2 Impacts of Ownership Structure on Firm Performance through Interaction Variables 110 5.5.3 Discussions on SLCs’ Performance 115 5.5.4 Impacts of Ownership Structure on Corporate Cash Holdings .117 5.5.5 Impacts of Ownership Structure, Cash Holdings on Firm Value 120 5.6 Robustness Check 125 5.7 Endogeneity Check .128 5.8 Summary of Chapter .129 CHAPTER DISCUSSIONS 133 6.1 Introduction 133 6.2 Summary of Main Findings from Samples 133 CHAPTER IMPLICATIONS .140 7.1 Implications for Literature based on findings from study’s samples 140 7.2 Implications for Policy Makers based on findings from study’s samples 143 7.3 Conclusions 145 7.4 Limitations and future research 146 LIST OF PUBLICATIONS 149 REFERENCES 150 Annex SLCs and GLCs Benchmarking on Performance Ratios, Privileges and Business Risk .177 Annex Value of Cash Holidings Regressions 182 Appendix .184 vii LIST OF FIGURES Figure 3.1 Agency conflicts and corporate governance Author compiled 46 Figure 3.3 Vietnamese Companies by Categories Statistics Office (31/08/2017) .51 Figure 4.1 Research Model Author 74 Figure 4.2 Direct Relationship Model with Variables Author .75 viii Annex Value of Cash Holidings Regressions Table 5.15 Impacts of Ownership Structure on Value of Cash using Market Value Regressions The dependent variable for the regressions is the market value of the firm in year t, MVt For each independent variable X (E, D, I, NA, MV), Xt is the level from year t-1 to t, divided by the level of net assets in year t; dXt is the change in the level of X from year t−2 to year t, divided by net assets in year t ((Xt – Xt−2)/NAt); dXt+2 is the change in the level of X from year t+2 to year t, divided by net assets in year t ((X t+2 – X t)/NAt) NA is Net Assets E = operating profit, earnings before interest and tax D = dividends payouts I = Interest Expense Excess Cash is Cash at time t minus optimal cash from model 3A SCIC ownership, government ownership, family ownership and foreign ownership, year and Industry are same as previous definitions Sample without financial companies include 220 non-financial firms FGLS 2009-2017 Market Value to Net Asset VARIABLES Excess Cash SCIC Ownership Excess Cash x SCIC Ownership Government Ownership SCIC Ownership 0.0353*** (0.00621) 0.359** Government Ownership 0.0248** (0.0106) dEj,t+2/NAj,t Dj,t/NAj,t dDj,t/NAj,t dDj,t+2/NAj,t Ij,t/NAj,t dIj,t/NAj,t dIj,t+2/NAj,t dNAj,t/NAj,t dNAj,t+2/NAj,t dMVj,t+2/NAj,t Year Industry Constant Observations Number of id -0.00754 (0.0115) 0.165 SCIC Ownership 0.0292*** (0.00905) 0.746*** (0.126) 0.109 (0.126) (0.289) 0.596* (0.351) Government Ownership 0.0412** (0.0162) Family Ownership 0.0298*** (0.0101) Foreign Ownership 0.0193* (0.0106) All 0.00839 (0.0183) 0.476* (0.267) 0.530* (0.320) -0.0581* -0.153** -0.0783 (0.0347) 0.0202 (0.0256) (0.0349) 0.0331 (0.0250) (0.0710) -0.0176 (0.0391) (0.0722) 0.0308 (0.0405) -0.299*** 0.358*** (0.0739) 0.00912 (0.0393) -0.541*** -0.560*** (0.118) 0.0142 (0.0480) (0.121) 0.0408 (0.0569) 0.846*** 0.950*** 0.909*** 0.897*** 0.781*** (0.0859) 0.195*** (0.0844) 0.222*** (0.197) (0.198) 0.136 (0.187) 0.0850 (0.0618) (0.0642) (0.146) (0.134) 0.0545 (0.263) 0.646*** (0.250) -0.337* (0.184) -0.408 (0.584) 2.294*** (0.638) 0.440 (0.424) -0.185 (0.743) -1.022 (0.657) -0.246 (0.651) -0.0491 (0.0356) 0.0585** (0.0259) -0.0488 (0.0401) Yes Yes 0.246*** (0.0318) 735 220 0.0476 (0.263) 0.626** (0.251) -0.348* (0.184) -0.450 (0.574) 2.417*** (0.617) 0.533 (0.409) -0.232 (0.761) -0.658 (0.621) 0.194 (0.627) -0.0375 (0.0349) 0.0439* (0.0243) -0.0453 (0.0384) Yes Yes 0.281*** (0.0324) 735 220 0.0545 (0.263) 0.646*** (0.250) -0.337* (0.184) -0.408 (0.584) 2.294*** (0.638) 0.440 (0.424) -0.185 (0.743) -1.022 (0.657) -0.246 (0.651) -0.0491 (0.0356) 0.0585** (0.0259) -0.0488 (0.0401) Yes Yes 0.190*** (0.0587) 735 220 0.0476 (0.263) 0.626** (0.251) -0.348* (0.184) -0.450 (0.574) 2.417*** (0.617) 0.533 (0.409) -0.232 (0.761) -0.658 (0.621) 0.194 (0.627) -0.0375 (0.0349) 0.0439* (0.0243) -0.0453 (0.0384) Yes Yes 0.233*** (0.0631) 735 220 (0.0758) 0.00316 (0.0377) 0.0417 (0.286) 0.621** (0.269) -0.359* (0.198) -0.553 (0.633) 2.801*** (0.684) 0.476 (0.453) -0.227 (0.826) -0.802 (0.654) 0.269 (0.678) 0.00198 (0.0379) 0.0367 (0.0255) -0.0264 (0.0417) Yes Yes 0.243*** (0.0296) 735 220 All -0.109*** Excess Cash x Family Ownership Foreign Ownership dEj,t/NAj,t Foreign Ownership 9.11e-06 (0.00614) (0.152) 0.371* (0.197) Excess Cash x Government Ownership Family Ownership Excess Cash x Foreign Ownership Ej,t/NAj,t Family Ownership 0.0298*** (0.00687) PCSE 2009-2017 Market Value to Net Asset 0.0174 (0.286) 0.664** (0.271) -0.393* (0.203) -0.408 (0.651) 2.821*** (0.711) 0.604 (0.476) 0.130 (0.821) -1.433** (0.695) -0.203 (0.700) -0.0132 (0.0378) 0.0402 (0.0275) -0.0248 (0.0435) Yes Yes 0.303*** (0.0330) 735 220 0.0402 (0.264) 0.656*** (0.250) -0.359* (0.185) -0.339 (0.584) 2.355*** (0.634) 0.524 (0.423) -0.0122 (0.760) -1.103* (0.641) -0.232 (0.649) -0.0397 (0.0358) 0.0549** (0.0254) -0.0457 (0.0396) Yes Yes 0.294*** (0.0316) 735 220 0.0417 (0.286) 0.621** (0.269) -0.359* (0.198) -0.553 (0.633) 2.801*** (0.684) 0.476 (0.453) -0.227 (0.826) -0.802 (0.654) 0.269 (0.678) 0.00198 (0.0379) 0.0367 (0.0255) -0.0264 (0.0417) Yes Yes 0.188*** (0.0579) 735 220 0.0174 (0.286) 0.664** (0.271) -0.393* (0.203) -0.408 (0.651) 2.821*** (0.711) 0.604 (0.476) 0.130 (0.821) -1.433** (0.695) -0.203 (0.700) -0.0132 (0.0378) 0.0402 (0.0275) -0.0248 (0.0435) Yes Yes 0.253*** (0.0621) 735 220 0.0402 (0.264) 0.656*** (0.250) -0.359* (0.185) -0.339 (0.584) 2.355*** (0.634) 0.524 (0.423) -0.0122 (0.760) -1.103* (0.641) -0.232 (0.649) -0.0397 (0.0358) 0.0549** (0.0254) -0.0457 (0.0396) Yes Yes 0.205*** (0.0579) 735 220 Standard errors in parentheses Asterisks (***, **, and *) denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively 182 Table 5.16 Impacts of Ownership Structure on Value of Cash using Excess Return Regressions The dependent variable for the regressions is excess return the firm in year t relative to the Fama and French (1993) 25 size and book-to-market portfolios ∆X indicates a change in X from year t – to t Independent variables are normalized by the market value of equity (ME) of the firm at the beginning of the year Lagged Cash (Cj,t-1) = Cash at time t-1 Earnings (Ejt) = Earning before Interest and Tax from year t – to t Net Assets (NAjt) is Net Asset at time t Interest (Ijt) = Interest Expense from year t – to t Dividend (Djt)= Dividend Payout from year t – to t Leverage (Ljt) = Debtjt/(Debjt+Mjt) = leverage at time t Detbjt = Short term debt jt + Long term debt jt New Finance (NFjt) = New Finance from year t – to t = Net New Equity Issues + Net New Debt Issues Ownershipjt = Ownership Type including SCIC ownership, Government Ownership, Family ownership and Foreign ownership Year and Industry are same as previous definitions Sample without financial companies include 220 non-financial firms VARIABLES ∆Cash/ME SCIC Ownership x ∆Cash/ME SCIC Ownership Government Ownership x ∆Cash/ME SCIC Ownership 0.392** (0.172) 0.671 (0.748) 0.0602 (0.0906) Government Ownership FGLS 2009-2017 Excess Return Government Family Foreign Ownership Ownership Ownership 0.501*** 0.396** 0.178 (0.172) (0.165) (0.187) -0.0979 (0.177) 0.0272 (0.186) 0.0163 Foreign Ownership x ∆Cash/ME ∆Interest/ME ∆Dividend/ME Lagged Cash/ME Leverage New Finance/ME Lagged Cash/ME x ∆Cash/ME Leverage x ∆Cash/ME Industry Year Constant Observations Number of id (0.828) -0.00668 (0.106) 2.647*** (0.564) -0.0944* (0.0523) 2.893*** (0.663) -0.0803 (0.0609) 0.486*** All 0.283 (0.284) 1.485* (0.819) 0.00970 (0.111) 0.381 (0.236) 0.00888 0.0331 (0.0477) (0.0511) 1.067 1.215 (0.769) -0.0836 (0.0856) 2.592*** (0.810) -0.0835 (0.0866) 2.541*** (0.831) -0.0933 (0.0867) 0.411*** 0.464*** 0.602*** 0.493*** (0.635) -0.0603 (0.0631) 0.475*** 0.406*** 0.413*** 0.414*** (0.801) -0.0932 (0.0834) 0.417*** (0.0458) 0.0115 (0.00772) -0.317*** (0.100) 0.243** (0.123) 0.370*** (0.0500) -0.281*** (0.0358) -0.00578* (0.0453) 0.0192*** (0.00678) -0.427*** (0.103) 0.397*** (0.130) 0.243*** (0.0366) -0.210*** (0.0249) -0.00872*** (0.00265) -0.00843 (0.0468) 0.0128* (0.00772) -0.331*** (0.104) 0.250** (0.123) 0.342*** (0.0483) -0.278*** (0.0351) 0.00600** (0.00302) 0.000984 (0.0467) 0.0144* (0.00764) -0.338*** (0.103) 0.313** (0.126) 0.313*** (0.0463) -0.247*** (0.0338) 0.00644** (0.00301) 0.0102 (0.0698) 0.0180* (0.0103) -0.328** (0.155) 0.178 (0.178) 0.398*** (0.0610) -0.315*** (0.0476) 0.00694** (0.00318) -0.0569 (0.0699) 0.0189* (0.0103) -0.337** (0.156) 0.173 (0.178) 0.390*** (0.0609) -0.319*** (0.0468) -0.00705** (0.00305) 0.0128 (0.0458) 0.0123 (0.00753) -0.332*** (0.0993) 0.298** (0.125) 0.332*** (0.0466) -0.250*** (0.0329) 0.00632** (0.00304) 0.0297 (0.00316) -0.0509 (0.0698) 0.0182* (0.0103) -0.328** (0.157) 0.177 (0.179) 0.394*** (0.0611) -0.310*** (0.0475) 0.00704** (0.00318) -0.0360 (0.0689) 0.0196* (0.0103) -0.340** (0.155) 0.169 (0.178) 0.380*** (0.0604) -0.323*** (0.0488) 0.00711** (0.00315) -0.0293 (0.0683) 0.0198* (0.0102) -0.338** (0.153) 0.184 (0.178) 0.373*** (0.0613) -0.311*** (0.0498) 0.00705** (0.00316) -0.0228 (0.0677) -0.222 (0.0607) -0.382* (0.0677) -0.274 (0.0650) -0.0795 (0.0679) -0.109 (0.0828) -0.531* (0.0824) -0.523 (0.0830) -0.527 (0.0803) -0.273 (0.0810) -0.368 (0.226) Yes Yes 0.0950*** (0.0349) 1,440 220 (0.220) Yes Yes 0.0425 (0.0331) 1,440 220 (0.220) Yes Yes 0.0827** (0.0326) 1,440 220 (0.236) Yes Yes 0.102*** (0.0342) 1,440 220 (0.248) Yes Yes 0.0875** (0.0349) 1,440 220 (0.321) Yes Yes 0.141*** (0.0456) 1,447 220 (0.322) Yes Yes 0.128*** (0.0486) 1,447 220 (0.321) Yes Yes 0.137*** (0.0451) 1,447 220 (0.339) Yes Yes 0.148*** (0.0460) 1,447 220 (0.339) Yes Yes 0.144*** (0.0504) 1,447 220 Foreign Ownership ∆Net Assets/ME SCIC Ownership 0.688*** (0.244) 1.237 (0.0329) 0.493 0.796 (0.568) -0.105* (0.0554) Family Ownership ∆Earnings/ME 0.0892 (0.202) 0.808 (0.748) 0.0891 (0.0837) 0.230 (0.0244) Family Ownership x ∆Cash/ME All PCSE 2009-2017 Excess Return Government Family Foreign Ownership Ownership Ownership 0.688*** 0.670*** 0.366 (0.245) (0.244) (0.273) Standard errors in parentheses Asterisks (***, **, and *) denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 183 Appendix Appendix Correlation Matrix s own g own f own fr own dom b indep d dual size lev growth b size d hose tobin mb s own -0.248 -0.0592 0.296 -0.046 0.0276 0.1 0.136 -0.0972 -0.0129 0.146 0.0776 0.308 0.197 g own f own fr own dom b indep d dual size lev -0.324 -0.272 0.456 -0.136 -0.181 -0.136 0.0425 -0.0468 -0.169 -0.0885 -0.0986 -0.11 0.0618 0.228 0.039 0.169 0.147 0.0484 0.0663 0.0539 0.148 -0.0258 0.0839 -0.119 0.0905 0.0718 0.33 -0.213 0.0558 0.322 0.297 0.281 0.217 -0.134 -0.138 0.0349 0.0119 -0.0186 -0.17 -0.034 0.0491 0.0863 0.112 0.0088 -0.0724 0.0127 0.0675 0.183 0.0275 0.0064 0.0023 0.0054 0.0122 0.0665 0.172 0.0358 0.0699 0.277 0.108 0.38 0.366 0.16 0.145 0.0741 0.033 -0.218 -0.167 -0.111 growth b size d hose tobin mb 0.054 0.0567 0.0833 0.122 0.179 0.0702 0.165 0.12 0.138 0.498 growth b size d hose tobin mb Appendix Hetoroskedasticity & Autocorrelation Tests Test for Model on Tobin’s Q Hetoroskedasticity hettest Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity Ho: Constant variance Variables: fitted values of tobin chi2(1) = 305.39 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 xttest3 Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in fixed effect regression model H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i chi2 (242) = 6.3e+05 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 184 xttest0 Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random tobin[id,t] = Xb + u[id] + e[id,t] Estimated results: | Var sd = sqrt(Var) -+ tobin | 3787146 6153979 e | 2121507 4605982 u | 0740228 2720714 effects Test: Var(u) = chibar2(01) = 861.45 Prob > chibar2 = 0.0000 Autocorrelation xtserial tobin s_own g_own f_own fr_own b_indep d_dual b_size growth lev size d_hose Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data H0: no first-order autocorrelation F( 1, 241) = 626.166 Prob > F = 0.0000 Tests for Model on MB hettest Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity Ho: Constant variance Variables: fitted values of mb chi2(1) = 482.34 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 xttest3 Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in fixed effect regression model H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i chi2 (242) = 2.2e+06 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 xttest0 Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects mb[id,t] = Xb + u[id] + e[id,t] Estimated results: | Var sd = sqrt(Var) -+ mb | 9906036 9952907 e | 1019235 3192546 185 u | 5565972 7460544 Test: Var(u) = chibar2(01) = 5516.15 Prob > chibar2 = 0.0000 Autocorrelation xtserial mb s_own g_own f_own fr_own b_indep d_dual lev size d_hose Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data H0: no first-order autocorrelation F( 1, 241) = 13.314 Prob > F = 0.0003 Tests for Model 2, Tobin’s Q Hetoroskedasticitydsds hettest Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity Ho: Constant variance Variables: fitted values of tobin chi2(1) = 400.89 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 xttest3 Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in fixed effect regression model H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i chi2 (242) = 6.4e+05 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 xttest0 Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects tobin[id,t] = Xb + u[id] + e[id,t] Estimated results: | Var sd = sqrt(Var) -+ tobin | 3787146 6153979 e | 211177 45954 u | 0735492 2711995 Test: Var(u) = chibar2(01) = 847.32 Prob > chibar2 = 0.0000 186 b_size growth Test for Model on MB Hetoroskedasticitydsds hettest Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity Ho: Constant variance Variables: fitted values of mb4 chi2(1) = 578.68 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 xttest3 Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in fixed effect regression model H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i chi2 (242) = 5.8e+05 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 xttest0 Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects mb[id,t] = Xb + u[id] + e[id,t] Estimated results: | Var sd = sqrt(Var) -+ mb | 9906036 9952907 e | 1007506 3174123 u | 5590564 7477007 Test: Var(u) = chibar2(01) = 5555.16 Prob > chibar2 = 0.0000 Tests for Model Hetoroskedasticity hettest Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity Ho: Constant variance Variables: fitted values of cvna chi2(1) = 36.87 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 xttest3 Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 187 in fixed effect regression model H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i chi2 (219) = 2.0e+32 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 xttest0 Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects cv[id,t] = Xb + u[id] + e[id,t] Estimated results: | Var sd = sqrt(Var) -+ cv | 1.490959 1.221048 e | 5953941 7716179 u | 5770664 7596489 Test: Var(u) = chibar2(01) = 1171.38 Prob > chibar2 = 0.0000 Autocorrelation xtserial cvna oplermb oplersize cf in_sig nwc capexnet netlev d_div s_own g_own f_own fr_own Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data H0: no first-order autocorrelation F( 1, 218) = 38.307 Prob > F = 0.0000 Appendix Models with Insitutional Ownership Table A3 Model Regressions with Institutional Ownership Model 1A Regressions’ results of Tobins’Q and Market to Book by FGLS Independent variables of study include S_Own, G_Own, F_Own, I_Own, B_Indep, D_Dual representing for SCIC ownership, government ownership, family ownership, institutional ownership, board independence and duality Control variables includes Growth rate (Growth), Leverage (Lev), Firm Size (Size), Board Size (B_Size), Year (Year) and Stock Exchange listed (D_Hose) Industry are classified by the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) Saples includes 242 firms for the period of 2009-2013 forming 1210 observations VARIABLES s_own g_own f_own i_own b_indep tobin 0.439*** (0.102) 0.0989*** (0.0341) 0.0390 (0.0607) 0.207*** (0.0385) mb 0.455*** (0.109) 0.103*** (0.0360) 0.0413 (0.0642) 0.219*** (0.0412) 0.00239 (0.00868) 0.0899** 0.00164 (0.00913) 0.0988** d_dual growth lev 188 FGLS tobin 0.407*** (0.105) 0.0884** (0.0346) 0.0245 (0.0611) 0.204*** (0.0376) -0.0657* (0.0369) 0.0169 (0.0111) 0.00381 (0.00868) 0.0775** mb 0.421*** (0.114) 0.0919** (0.0363) 0.0249 (0.0645) 0.216*** (0.0403) -0.0681* (0.0387) 0.0193 (0.0118) 0.00320 (0.00914) 0.0851** size b_size d_hose Industry Year Constant Observations Number of id (0.0364) 0.0239*** (0.00655) (0.0387) 0.0245*** (0.00696) 0.0463*** (0.0155) Yes Yes 0.436*** (0.159) 1,210 242 0.0519*** (0.0165) Yes Yes 0.426** (0.169) 1,210 242 Standard errors in parentheses *** p