The role of international agreements in environmental conservation and its implication to Vietnam.

VIETNAM NATIONAL UNIVERSITY FACULITY OF ECONOMIC YASUKATA FUKAHORI THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION AND ITS IMPLICATION TO VIETNAM Major: Political Economy Code: 62.31.01.01 DOCTORAL PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS Advisor: Associated Professor, Doctor Phi Manh Hong Doctor Phung Xuan Nha HaNoi, 2008 VIETNAM NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, HANOI COLLEGE OF ECONOMIC YASUKATA FUKAHORI THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION AND ITS IMPLICATION TO VIETNAM Major: Political Economy Code: 62.31.01.01 DOCTORAL PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS Advisor: Associated Professor, Doctor Phi Manh Hong Doctor Phung Xuan Nha HaNoi, 2008 CONTENTS Page Introduction ……………………………………………………………………… Chapter I: Economic Theories Related to Environmental Conservation……… 14 1.1 Theories of Common Pool Resources …………………………………… 14 1.2 Theories of Collective Actions and International Agreements …………… 23 1.3 Coase Theorem ………………………………………………………… 25 1.4 Game Theory ……………………………………………………….…… 26 1.5 Other Economic Theories …………………………………………….… 31 1.6 Application of Economic Theories to Environmental Conservation……… 36 1.6.1 Sustainability and Budget Line – Case Study for Forest Conservation…… 36 1.6.2 Game theory scenarios and possible contribution arrangements of 46 international agreements ………………………………………….……… 1.7 Summary of Results ………………………………………………….…… 88 1.8 Recommendations …………………………………………………….… 90 Chapter II: Environmental Conservation in Relation with Trade, ODA and 92 Sustainable Development ………………………………………… …………… 2.1 2.1.1 2.1.2 2.1.3 2.2 2.2.1 2.2.2 2.3 2.3.1 2.3.2 2.3.3 Trade Agreements and Environmental Issues ………………………… … The New Politics of Trade ……………………………………… ……… Trade under Commodity Agreements and Environmental Conservation… WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism and Environmental Conservation Global Environmental Issues ……….…………………………………… Issues and Problems related to Global Environmental Conservation……… World Summit for Environment ……………….………………………… ODA and Environmental Issues ………………………………………… Trade and ODA …………………………………….…………………… ODA and Environmental Issues …………………….…………………… Problem of International Aid …………………………….……………… 92 92 96 100 101 102 103 106 106 107 107 Private Sector …………………………………………………………… Transparency …………………………………………………….……… The Problem of Sovereignty and Economic Forces ……………………… Capacity Building, Education, and International Treaties ………….…… Sustainable Management of Environmental Natural Resources ……….… Definitions of Sustainable Development ………………………………… Economic growth for local welfare and conservation - Sustainable Development 2.4.3 Problems Causing Sustainable Management …………………… ……… 2.5 Environmental Conservation and International Agreement ……………… 2.5.1 International Negotiation on Environmental Conservation ……………… 2.5.2 Fund Raising under the Existing International Agreements ……………… 2.5.3 ITTO and Forest Conservation …………………………………………… 2.5.4 Limit in conservation by an international agreement organization ………… 2.6 Experiences in Other Countries…………………………………………… 2.6.1 Japan ……………………………………………………………………… 2.6.2 South Korea ……………………………………………………………… 2.6.3 China ……………………………………………………………………… Chapter III: Issues Related to Vietnam ………………………………………… 2.3.4 2.3.5 2.3.6 2.3.7 2.4 2.4.1 2.4.2 109 109 110 110 111 111 112 114 116 116 117 118 130 132 132 133 133 137 3.1 3.1.1 The New Trade Debate and Its Implication to Vietnam ………………… Vietnam’s New Membership of WTO …………………………………… 137 3.1.2 3.1.3 3.1.4 3.2 New Politics of Trade and Vietnam ……………………………………… CDM and Vietnam ……………………………………………………… ODA and Environment/Trade Issues for Vietnam………………………… Application of Economic Theory - Implication of ITTO Mechanisms to Vietnam - ………………………………………………………………… Scenario ………………………………………………………………… Scenario 2………………………………………………………………… Analysis of results ………………………………………………………… Summary of Games ……………………………………………………… Experiences in Other Countries for the comparison with Vietnam………… Japan ……………………………………………………………………… South Korea ………………………………………………………….…… China …………………………………………………………………… 138 139 141 142 3.2.1 3.2.2 3.2.3 3.2.4 3.3 3.2.1 3.2.2 3.2.3 137 144 151 156 157 160 160 160 160 3.2.4 Lessons from other countries …………………………………………… Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………… 161 List of reference materials ……………………………………………………… 168 162 LIST OF FIGURES, BOXES AND TABLES Page Chapter I: Economic Theories Related to Environmental Conservation 15 Figure 1.1 Supply=Demand Relation for Normal Private Goods 18 Figure 1.2 Supply=Demand Relation for Public Goods 18 Figure 1.3 Total Cost and Total Revenue Relation (Private goods) 20 Figure 1.4 Marginal Cost and Average Revenue Relation (Private Goods) Figure 1.5 Total Cost and Total Revenue Relation (Public Goods) 21 Figure 1.6 Marginal Cost and Average Revenue Relation (Public Goods) 21 Figure 1.7 Natural Resource Budget Line and Sustainable Level 23 Box 1.1 International Agreement and Game Theory 29 Figure 1.8 Contribution and Depletion Relation 30 Figure 1.9 Export Quota Allocation and Market 34 Figure 1.10 Elasticity of Substitution (High Elasticity) 35 Figure 1.11 Elasticity of Substitution (Low Elasticity) 35 Figure 1.12 Current and Possible Future Budget Lines 37 Figure 1.13 Long-term Tropical Forests Depletion Perspectives 38 Figure 1.14 The case sustainable level is set at 2000 41 Figure 1.15 The case sustainable level is much higher than present level 41 Figure 1.16 Contribution and Sustainable Level of Resource Depletion (Case 1) Contribution and Sustainable Level of Resource Depletion (Case 2) Contribution and Sustainable Level of Resource Depletion (Case 3) Relation between Fund and Global Environmental Value / Scenario (Gv = 2*(Cp + Pp) - 1500) Contribution to the Fund and Game Theory /Scenario (Gv = 2(Cp + Pp) - 1500) 44 Figure 1.17 Figure 1.18 Figure 1.19 Box 1.2 20 44 45 48 49 Box 1.3 Same environmental value for both consumers and producers 53 Box 1.4 No environmental value for producers 54 Box 1.5 Half environmental value for producers 55 Box 1.6 57 Box 1.7 Contribution to the fund and Game Theory /Scenario 1b (Gv = 2(Cp + Pp) - 1500)&(Pv = Gv - Pp + Cp) Same environmental value for both consumers and producers Box 1.8 No environmental value for producers 60 Box 1.9 Half environmental value for producers 61 Figure 1.20 63 Figure 1.21 Contribution and Sustainable Level of Depletion (Case 4: Both consumers and producers share responsibility) Budget Line of the Fund Figure 1.22 Budget Line Shift by Producers' Efforts 66 Figure 1.23 68 Box 1.11 Relation between contribution and Global Environmental Value /Scenario (Gv = Cp + Pp) Relation between contribution and Global Environmental Value /Scenario (Gv = Cp + Pp -1500) Contribution to the fund and Game Theory /Scenario (Gv = Cp + Pp) Same environmental value for both consumers and producers Box 1.12 No environmental value for producers 73 Box 1.13 Half environmental value for producers 74 Box 1.14 75 Box 1.15 Contribution to the fund and Game Theory /Scenario (Gv = Cp + Pp -1500) Same environmental value for both consumers and producers Box 1.16 No environmental value for producers 77 Box 1.17 Half environmental value for producers 78 Box 1.18 80 Box 1.19 Contribution to the fund and Game Theory /Scenario 2b (Gv = Cp + Pp)&(Pv = Gv -Pp + Cp) Same environmental value for both consumers and producers Box 1.20 No environmental value for producers 82 Box 1.21 Half environmental value for producers 83 Figure 1.24 Box 1.10 59 66 69 71 72 76 81 Box 1.22 84 Box 1.23 Contribution to the fund and Game Theory /Scenario 3b (Gv = Cp + Pp -1500)&(Pv = Gv - Pp + Cp) Same environmental value for both consumers and producers Box 1.24 No environmental value for producers 86 Box 1.25 Half environmental value for producers 87 Chapter II: Environmental Conservation and Trade ……………… 92 Table 2.1 Developing Countries' Share in Total Exports of Selected 99 Table 2.2 Total forest area, related land area and population in 1995 120 Table 2.3 Forest cover change for developing countries 123 Table 2.4 Current and projected consumption of forest products (1990-2010) Natural forest and Net Plantations in developing countries 124 Forest cover state and change by ecological zone for tropical countries Chapter III: Issues Related to Vietnam ……………………………… 126 Table 2.5 Table 2.6 85 125 132 Box 3.2 Relation between the Bali Partnership Fund and Vietnam Scenario (GVv = Cp + Vp) Contribution to the Bali Partnership Fund and Game Theory / Scenario 1: Vietam (GVv = Cp + Vp) Same environmental value for both Vietnam and consumers Box 3.3 No environmental value for Vietnam 149 Box 3.4 Half environmental value for Vietnam 150 Box 3.5 152 Box 3.6 Contribution to the Bali Partnership Fund and Game Theory /Scenario 2: Vietnam (GVv = Cp + Vp)&(Vv = GVv -Vp + Cp) Same environmental value for both Vietnam and consumers Box 3.7 No environmental value for Vietnam 154 Box 3.8 No environmental value for Vietnam 155 Figure 3.1 Box 3.1 146 147 148 153 Abbreviations AFTA ASEAN Free Trade Area APEC Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation ARF ASEAN Regional Forum ASEAN Association of East Asian Nations ASEM Asia Europe Meeting BTA Bilateral Trade Agreement CDM Clean Development Mechanism CEPT Common Effective Preferential Tariff COP Conference of the Parties CPR Common Pool Resource CPRGS Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy DDA Doha Development Agenda DSB Dispute Settlement Board FAO Food and Agriculture Organization FCCC Framework Convention on the Climate Change FTA Free Trade Agreement FTAA Free Trade Area of the Americas GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GEF General Environmental Facilities GHG Green House Gas ICO International Coffee Organization IMF International Monetary Fund IPCC Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change ITTA International Tropical Timber Agreement ITTO International Tropical Timber Organization MAI Multilateral Agreement on Investment MDG Millennium Development Goals MEA Multilateral Environment Agreement MMT Methylcyclopentadienyl Manganese Tricarbonyl NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement NGO Non-Governmental Organization ODA Official Development Aid OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper SOE State Owned Enterprise TED Turtle Excluder Device TPA Trade Promotion Authority UN United Nations UNCED United Nations Conference on Environment and Development UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNEP United Nations Environmental Programme USITC United States International Trade Commission WB World Bank WCED World Commission on Environment and Development WSSD World Summit on Sustainable Development WTO WWF Trade Organization World Wildlife Fund Box 3.8: Half environmental value for Vietnam Case 3: GVv = Gvc, Gvm = GVv/2, a>0, e=0 (e may turn >0 when game fails) Vietnam I Contribute ITTO Consuming Countries Not contribute Contribute (52.5) 26.25 III Not contribute (52.5) II 26.25 (52.5) IV -26.25 52.5 78.75 (0) 0 (million $) I: GVv = 26.25(Cp) + 26.25(Vp) = 52.5 Cv = 52.5(GVv) - 26.25(Cp) = 26.25 Vv = 52.5(GVv)/2 - 26.25(Vp) + 26.25(Cp) = 26.25 II: GVv = 52.5(Cp) + 0(Vp) = 52.5 Cv = 52.5(GVv) - 52.5(Cp) = Vv = 52.5(GVv)/2 - 0(Vp) + 52.5(Cp) = 78.75 III: GVv = 52.5(Cp) + 0(Vp) = 52.5 Cv = 52.5(GVv) - 0(Cp) = 52.5 Vv = 52.5(GVv)/2 - 52.5(Vp) + 0(Cp) = -26.25 IV: GVv = 0(Cp) + 0(Vp) = Cv = 0(GVv) - 0(Cp) = Vv = 0(GVv)/2 - 0(Vp) + 0(Cp) = Game result: Success, because Column I Vv > Column IV Vv Column II is possible if Consumers pay the entire amount under political consideration Column III is not possible because Column III Vv < Column IV Vv 155 3.2.3 Analysis of results The payoff relations obtained from the games played above can be highlighted by taking out the amounts for Columns I and IV for producers The following are some reasons why the said amounts should be highlighted (1) Consumers payoff amounts are identical for all the cases within the same scenario because consumers are assumed to recognize the same full positive value in the environmental quality of tropical timbers Therefore, it is not necessary to compare the payoff amounts of consumers On the other hand, payoff amounts vary from case to case for producers because they are assumed to recognize different values in environmental assets of tropical timbers (2) Column I represents the case both consumers and producers agree to contribute the conservation of tropical forests by providing contributions to the Bali Partnership Fund Column IV represents the case the both groups decide not to contribute to the Bali Partnership Fund Consumers' value for Column I is always higher than that of Column IV owing to the said assumption but producers' value for Column I can be higher or lower depending on the types of scenarios and cases Therefore, the games that produce higher value in Column I than Column VI for producers can be identified as the effective games for the Bali Partnership Fund to be successful (3) In this thesis, it is presumed that ITTO can provide the proper platform to overcome the 'prisoners‟ dilemma'; therefore, the Column IV is not the inevitable result Column I (or Column II and III) is assumed to be achieved if the producers and consumers hold proper negotiation under ITTA of 1994 at the meetings of ITTO However, it should be noted that this can only be applied to the cases the value in Column IV is lower than that in other Columns There is no way to induce contribution from producers when their Column IV value is the highest 156 For this purpose, the game results are rearranged as follows: Scenario Case Vv(Column I) Vv(Column IV) Result 26.25 Success -26.25 Failure 0 In-between 52.5 Success 0 In-between 26.25 Success Here, 'Success' means the case in which Vv (Column I) is higher than Vv (Column IV) because then the producers have the positive incentive to contribute to the Bali Partnership Fund Likewise, 'Failure' means the case Vv (Column I) is lower than Vv (Column IV) 'In-between' means the case Vv (Column I) equals Vv (Column IV) and it depends on the negotiation with consumers for producers to decide which Column they should choose Form the above results, the following can be concluded: The fund becomes effective when Vietnam identifies the same environmental value on its domestic forests Even when Vietnam identifies the half of its environmental value, the fund can also become effective if the contribution is given directly to Vietnam When Vietnam does not identify commercial value on environmental aspect of its domestic forests, the fund is most likely to fail Under this case, Vietnam chooses to produce timber products and export 3.2.4 Summary of games There is no doubt that tropical forests are under serious threat of depletion 157 Although the depletion rate is slowing down in recent years, still the current net depletion rate of 0.6% could cause serious destruction of the tropical forests in the long run ITTO is seriously tackling this very important issue for all of mankind by adopting the year 2000 objective in its new ITTA of 1994 If this objective succeeds, the world tropical forest would be all managed sustainably Unfortunately, despite serious efforts being taken by the member governments of ITTO, no concrete scheme to implement the objective through the Bali Partnership Fund has yet been adopted Two of the most influential factors for the delay are the difficulties in identifying the level of sustainable management and the amount of contribution to the Fund It is not hard to imagine that member countries view the level of sustainability differently because it is not necessarily determined scientifically Negotiation for allocation of contribution is always very difficult and time consuming Further, there is a doubt among ITTO member countries on whether trade incentive or restrictive measures could properly reduce the level of tropical forests depletion when only 6% of the tropical logs is traded in the world market International negotiations are often considered under collective action problems Without proper authority that can force its members to obey its decisions, any effective and workable measures seem unlikely to be achieved However, an international agreement is a kind of law that all member countries must abide by and that members can be punished by the organization if they not abide by the decisions taken under the agreement Although a member country has liberty to withdraw from the agreement as an ultimate measure, it would be very difficult to leave the organization if it is supported by the overwhelming majority in the global community ITTO is an international agreement organization and it holds majority of tropical timber producers and consumers in the world Therefore, its decisions could influence the world trade of tropical forests if they are properly introduced ITTO also holds the best information in the world about tropical timbers and provide proper consultation bodies for member countries to negotiate discuss and exchange information related to tropical timbers In this respect, ITTO is considered to be in the best position to handle the 158 issues related to tropical timbers and conservation of tropical forests as well The games illustrated above also indicate there are possibilities that ITTO can succeed in making both its producing and consuming member countries to contribute to the Bali Partnership Fund 3.3 Experiences in Other Countries for the Comparison with Vietnam 3.3.1 Japan The experience of Japan stated in the chapter 2.6.1 became a good model for other Asian countries which took the similar path of export oriented economic growth in later years It is very much advisable for Vietnam to look into the damages in Japan caused by pollution during 1960s The mistake should not be repeated in Vietnam It is easy to damage the local environment by polluting rivers, sea, lands and the air, but it is very difficult and takes long time to recover the clean environment as before Some of the natural creatures may even go extinct which, off course, will never be recovered 3.3.2 South Korea South Korea‟s success as described in the Chapter 2.6.2 in becoming the second member of OECD from Asia in a relatively short period of time illustrates a good example for Vietnam in its effort to be another member of OECD in the future The introduction of anti-pollution measures in advance of the economic growth and the introduction of democratic governmental system are the key for the success, as illustrated in the case of South Korea 3.3.1 China The most important lesson for Vietnam from the experience of China as 159 illustrated in the Chapter 2.6.3 is probably the mistake in setting five year numerical targets The best numerical achievement is gained through the thorough implementation of market principles Market principles always lead the economy to the most profitable point for the society as a whole What government should is to protect free market systems by avoiding official intervention as much as possible Setting numerical targets is a serious mistake in terms of economic development 3.3.4 Lessons from Other Countries As explained in the above paragraphs, lessons learnt from the experiences in other countries can be summarized as follows: - Export-oriented economic growth is a right policy - The US market is most important for Vietnam in expanding its export, which will lead to a rapid growth of the entire Vietnamese economy - The cost of pollution control and environmental conservation could remain relatively cheap if proper measures are introduced in advance of economic development The recovery cost of the lost environmental quality and public health is much high than the economic gains - Good governance and democracy is an important factor in strengthening the economic performance of a country - Setting numerical economic target is nothing but an economic hazard Free market principles will always lead the economy to the most profitable point in society 160 CONCLUSION Economic theories introduced in the Chapter all clearly show that environmental natural resources are not protected under the free market mechanism Therefore, some new rules need to be integrated into the market system so that environmental natural resources can be properly protected As discussed in the Chapter 1, international organizations are considered to be tasked to take the leading role in the conservation of environmental natural resources This is mostly because the environmental natural resources are generally the international resources and that the cooperation of international community is indispensable for the conservation of international environmental natural resources Then, the next question is how international organizations can conserve the resources A number of games introduced in this thesis provide a possible answer to it Games clearly showed that international environmental resources can be conserved above the sustainable level if and when members of international organization cooperate each other through market mechanisms regulated under the rules of the organizations, based on certain conditions set forth in the thesis The outcome of the games, together with the outcome of discussions related economic theories held in this thesis, can be summarized as follows Under a completely free market, environmental natural resources are doomed to be depleted because of the „prisoners‟ dilemma.‟ Proper rules under international organization can successfully conserve the international environmental resources Such rules must be supported by proper dispute settlement mechanisms and monitoring systems Ownership of resources needs to be properly identified under the rules of the 161 organizations in order for Coase Theorem to become effective The level of sustainable development must also be properly defined under the rules of the organization It better needs to be endorsed by scientific researches and undisputable data and evidences The level of penalty must be larger than the benefit from which member countries can gain from chiseling, because otherwise there would be no incentive for those chiseling countries to stop making unfair profits out of trade of the resources As for Vietnam, it would be necessary for Vietnam to pay due attention to the issues related to trade and environment especially because Vietnam has become a member of WTO in January 2007 Vietnam will face pressure from international community on its domestic environmental policies by way of international agreements Even sanctions or penalties would possibly be applied to Vietnam However, if a proper system is established and proper consultations are held, Vietnam may be able to receive fund to achieve sustainable management of domestic natural resources without paying extra contributions to international organizations For this to become possible, Vietnam needs to identify its own value on the environmental products and measure the same for the global community Above summation has been derived from the following process of this thesis structure First, the thesis stated with a number of evidences that environmental conservation has been closely linked in trade debate Second, the thesis introduced a number of economic theories related to economic externalities which proved that environmental international resources 162 are doomed to be over-exploited Third, the thesis also introduced a new idea on sustainable development represented by the equation “C ≦ ΔOS*E + S” which innovatively illustrates the relation of two major concepts on sustainable management This equation helps us to see the relation between two points of sustainability in a single diagram Forth, the thesis explained in detail about the current issues related to trade and environment, including commodity agreements, WTO Doha round negotiations, World Environment Summits, and ODA Fifth, the thesis employed the game theory as the main tool to conduct economic analysis related to trade and environmental conservation through international organizations Sixth, the thesis took up ITTO as a case study to apply game theory to see the effect of balance of power between producers and consumers which would have significant impact on tropical timber trade and forest resource conservation Seventh, the thesis put factors derived from Ostrom‟s cooperative game theories and introduced two factors, i.e., the enforcement with penalty and self-arranged arbitration system Eighth, the thesis explains the related situation of Vietnam and also applied the above stated games to Vietnam By this well planned and organized thesis structure, the above set of conclusions are theoretically established It should be noted, however, that it is indispensable to identify rules and 163 mechanisms to establish a workable dispute settlement and monitoring systems It may not be easy to prove that a workable system can be established through the games of cooperation because it depends on the conditions of the international and domestic market forces In any case, this thesis has clearly shown that the conservation would require the transfer of fund from consumers to producers in order for it to become effectively successful Even though both consumers and producers equally wish for the successful conservation of the international natural resources, consumers are requested to transfer the fund directly to producers because the property rights are clearly attached to producers as indicated under Coarse theorem In real world, this means that a country like Vietnam which is classified as the producers for timbers, biodiversity and other environmental resources, may not necessarily bear much financial burden under the framework of international organizations This has already been being experimentally introduced for the cases of CDM trade under which developing countries provide the environmental amenity to the global community through Kyoto Protocol As for Vietnam, the plight of environmental degradation has not reached a serious stage yet However, proper attention needs to be made during the course of economic development, particularly under the trade liberalization efforts supported by WTO systems As discussed in the Chapter 2, the relation between trade and environment will be focused in the future trade debate in the international context Therefore, Vietnam also needs to be prepared for the role under which Vietnam is expected to follow in order to maintain its domestic environmental resources above the sustainable level Forestry can become an important sector to this effect because of the international concerns and efforts to implement CDM The games in the Chapter indicate that Vietnam has been maintaining its forest resources to a relatively stable condition for the possible sustainable level The trade-offs with the benefit to be obtained from timber trade during the course of future economic development process need to be carefully administrated 164 The Doha Development Agenda (DDA) is still being negotiated among WTO member countries as of June 2007 However, there seems to be a possibility for an agreement to be reached on the agricultural negotiation, the hardest item among the agenda, even during the summer of 2007 If the agreement is reached for agriculture, the entire DDA could be concluded soon after that Since Vietnam is now a member of WTO, Vietnam can express its own views related to DDA negotiations which may change the course of the negotiations The environmental issues are not exception Vietnam can make its own position with regard to environmental issues under WTO and actively participate in the negotiations while DDA negotiations are still being conducted It may be difficult for Vietnam to change the course of DDA negotiations because DDA has been negotiated for nearly years while Vietnam was outside of the system However, it is likely that a new round of negotiations will be launched soon after the conclusion of DDA Then, Vietnam is full-fledged to participate in the negotiations to secure its own positions and profits As stated in this thesis, environmental issues will definitely be closely, or even more closely, related to WTO negotiations Hence, the new round negotiations will be a good chance for Vietnam to form a national policy on the trade and environmental issues A possible outcome which may derive from this thesis onto the Vietnam‟s policy on WTO negotiations is that Vietnam would request that international communities, i.e., other WHO members, recognize the value of environmental assets which Vietnam holds at this moment calculated by Vietnam, and demand them to bear the cost of the maintenance of such values as they will be damaged if Vietnam increase its export to other members The right values of „a‟ and „e‟ and game patterns used in the games of this thesis, which is arbitrary for Vietnam to calculate but may also be negotiated under new round, will have to be first determined by Vietnam before the negotiations Then, based on the values of „a‟ and „e‟ and identified game patterns, Vietnam may be able to identify the amount of contributions which other members of WTO should bear as a form of economic cooperation to Vietnam in order to 165 compensate for the trade benefits which would be foregone by protecting environmental assets in Vietnam It is the author‟s hope and pleasure if the implications stated in this thesis become some reference for Vietnam in forming its position for WTO negotiations 166 LIST OF REFERENCE MATERIALS Asahi News Agency (2002), “World Summit,” Asahi News Digest 2002, Asahi News Agency Press, Tokyo Barbier et al (1994), Tropical Timber Trade, Earthscan, London, Begg, D (1997), Economics, McGraw-Hill Book Company, London Botkin & Keller (1998), Environmental Science, John Willy & Sons,Inc., New York Common Fund (2001), Common Fund Annual Report 2001, Common Fund, Amsterdam Environment Agency of Japan (2002), Quality of Environment in Japan in 2002, Government Press, Japan FAO (2000), World Forest Report 2000, FAO Press Rome FAO (2002), FAO Year Book 2002, FAO Press, Rome Field, B C (1994), Environmental Economics, McGraw-Hill Book Company, London 10 GATT (1947), General Agreement on Trade and Tariff, UN Press, Geneva 11 Goodland, R (1992), 'The case that the World has reached limits', Environmentally Sustainable Economic Development, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, Washington D.C 12 Goodland, R (1997), 'Biophysical and Objective Environmental Sustainability', Sustainability and Global Environmental Policy: New Perspectives, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, Washington D.C 13 Environment Agency of Japan (2003), Quality of Environment in Japan in 2003, Government Press, Japan 14 Hirshliefer & Glazer (1992), Price Theory and Applications, Prentice-Hall, Inc., New Jersey 15 Horel & Geisler (1997), Global Environmental Change, John Willey & Sons Inc., Singapore: 16 Institute of Economics of Japan (1997), Environmental Problems in Asia, MITI Research Centre, Tokyo 17 ITTO (1994), International Tropical Timber Agreement, 1994, ITTO Yokohama 18 ITTO (1996a), Guidelines for the Establishment and Sustainable Management 167 of Planted Tropical Forests, ITTO, Yokohama 19 ITTO (1996b), Guidelines on the Conservation of Biological Diversity in Tropical Production Forests, ITTO, Yokohama 20 ITTO (2003), ITTO Annual Report in 2003, ITTO, Yokohama 21 IUCN (1994), First Global Forum on Environmental Funds, IUCN Press, Washington D.C 22 23 Iwasawa, Yuji (1997), “WTO dispute settlement,” WTO, Sanseido, Tokyo 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 Jackson, A.& J (1997), Environmental Science, Longman, Singapore Korea Environment Institute (2006), Execution of Special Measures to Improve Metropolitan Atmospheric Environment, Seoul Lipsey & Courant (1996), Macroeconomics, Harper-Collings, London Matsushita et Al (2000), WTO and GATT case book, Yuhikaku, Osaka Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (1993), Commodity Agreements, MOFA, Japan JIIR (2003), Directory of International Organization (2003 Edition), JIIR Press, Tokyo Kono, S (1998), 'Population', Imidas, Shueisha, Tokyo Nafziger, N W (1997), Economics of Developing Countries, Prentice-Hall, Inc New Jersey Nebel & Wright (1998), Environmental Science, Prentice-Hall, Inc., New Jersey Neher, P A (1990), Natural Resource Economics ­ Conservation and Exploitation, Prentice-Hall, Inc., New Jersey Olson, M (1965), 'The Logic of Collective Action', Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Harverd University Press, Cambrige MA, Ostrom, E (1990), 'Governing the Commons' The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Ota, H (1997), 'International Politics and Economics on FCCC', Revue Diplomatique November 1997, Jiho Inc., Tokyo Rich, B (1994), Mortgaging the Earth: The World Bank, Environmental Impoverishment, and the Crisis of Development, Beacon Press, Boston Sakai, K (1997), Environmental Problem, Sanwa Institute, Tokyo Seitz, W D., et al (1994), Economics of Resources, Agriculture and Food, McGraw-Hill Book Company, London 39 Sachs, W (1999), Planet Dialectics: Development, St Martin‟s Press, New York 40 Schott, J (2001), WTO, after Seattle, Institute of International Economy, Washington D.C 41 Stiling, P (1996), Ecology, Prentice-Hall Inc., NJ 42 Suzuki, Y (2001), Application of Game Theory, Yuhikaku, Tokyo 168 Explorations Environment & 43 Tietenberg, T (1994), Environmental Economics and Policy, Harper-Collins, New York 44 Umahashi (1992), What's Tropical Forest, Gakken Inc Tokyo 45 UN Repport (2002), United Nations Handbook, 2002, New York 46 UNDP (2001), Annual Report 2001, New York 47 UNEP (2002), Global Environmental Outlook 2002, NY 48 United Nations University (1992), Industrial Pollution in Japan, Tokyo 49 Vadnjal, D (1997), TheForegoneVvalues, Chulalongkorn University Press, Bangkok 50 Vogler, J (1995), The Global Commons, John Wiley & Sons Ltd., England 51 Weston, J (1997), Planning & Environmental Impact Assessment in Practice, Longman, England 52 The World Bank (1996), From Plan to Market ­ World Development Report 1996 http://www.climnet.org/sbsta16/CANEuropesinksCDM.pdf 53 Yomiuri (2003), Oct 31, “World Population,” Daily Yomiuri News Paper, (Article on page 23 on Oct 31 issue), Tokyo, Yomiuri Publishing & Co 54 Yomiuri2 (2007), December 7, “Environmentally Developing Countries – China,” Daily Yomiuri News Paper, (Article on page on Dec issue) 169