r Second Edition Edited by H UGH LAFoLLETTE Second Edition Edited by Hugh LaFollette East Tennessee State University • BLACKWELL Publishers © 1997,2002 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd except for editorial material and organization © 1997,2002 by Hugh laFollette 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148-5018, USA 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 UF, UK 550 Swanston Street, Carlton South, Melbourne, Victoria 3053, Australia KurfLirstendamm 57, 10707 Berlin, Germany The right of Hugh laFollette to be identified as the Author of the Editorial Material in this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act 1988 All rights reserved No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by the UK Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act 1988, without the prior permission of the publisher First published 1997 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd Second edition published 2002 Reprinted 2002 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data has been applied for ISBN 0-631-22833-0 (hardback); ISBN 0-631-22834-9 (paperback) A catalogue record for this title is available from the British Library Set in on II pt Ehrhardt by Kolam Information Services Pvt Ltd, Pondicherry, India Printed and bound in the United Kingdom by T J International Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall For further information on Blackwell Publishing, visit our website: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com Preface for Instructors Acknowledgments General Introduction Theorizing about Ethics Reading Philosophy Part I IX Xli 12 Life and Death Euthanasia Rule-Utilitarianism and Euthanasia Brad Hooker [W] Against the Right to Die J David Velleman [NR] Justifying Physician-Assisted Deaths Tom L Beauchamp [W] Dying at the Right Time: Reflections on (Un)Assisted Suicide John Hardwig [W] 19 22 32 40 48 60 Abortion A Defense of Abortion Judith Jarvis Thomson On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion Mary Anne Warren [R] An Argument that Abortion is Wrong Don Marquis [W] Virtue Theory and Abortion Rosalind Hursthouse [NR] N: New to second edition R: Revised for Ethics in Practice 63 72 83 94 W: Written for Ethics in Practice Contents Animals All Animals Are Equal Peter Singer 10 The Moral Community Michael Allen Fox II Moral Standing, the Value of Lives, and Speciesism R G Frey 12 The Case for Animal Rights Tom Regan Part II 104 107 117 128 140 The Personal Life Family and Reproductive Technology What Do Grown Children Owe Their Parents? Jane English 14 Emotional Exploitation Sandra Lee Bartky [R] 15 Morality, Parents, and Children James Rachels 16 Artificial Means of Reproduction and Our Understanding ofthe Family Ruth Macklin [N] 17 Is Women's Labor a Commodity? Elizabeth S Anderson [N] 18 "Goodbye, Dolly?": the Ethics of Human Cloning John Harris [N] l49 13 19 20 21 22 23 Sexuality What's Wrong with Rape? Pamela Foa Morality and Human Sexuality Vincent C Punzo Plain Sex Alan H Goldman Why Homosexuality is Abnormal Michael Levin [R] Homosexuality and the Moral Relevance of Experience John Corvino [NW] Virtues Servility and Self-Respect Thomas E Hill, Jr 25 On Improving People by Political Means Lester H Hunt 26 Generosity James D Wallace 27 Humility Judith Andre [NR] 152 156 167 178 187 199 209 212 220 225 233 241 251 24 Part III 28 29 254 261 272 276 Liberty and Equality Paternalism and Risk Freedom of Action John Stuart Mill Against the Legalization of Drugs James Q Wilson 287 290 295 Contents 30 The War on Drugs is Lost William F Buckley Jr., et al [N] 300 31 Permissible Paternalism: Saving Smokers from Themselves Robert E Goodin [R] 307 32 The Liberal Basis of the Right to Bear Arms Todd C Hughes and Lester H Hunt [NR] 313 33 Gun Control Hugh LaFollette [N] Free Speech 325 338 34 Freedom of Thought and Discussion John Stuart Mill 35 Sex, Lies, and Pornography Ann Garry [NR] 340 344 36 MacKinnon's Words Ronald Dworkin [N] 356 37 Sticks and Stones John Arthur [W] 364 38 Speech Codes and Expressive Harm Andrew Altman [NW] Sexual and Racial Discrimination 39 Racisms Kwame Anthony Appiah 376 386 389 40 Sexual Harassment 41 42 400 Anita M Superson Date Rape Lois Pineau Men in Groups: Collective Responsibility for Rape Larry M~y and Robert Strikwerda [R] 410 Affirmative Action 428 43 Affirmative Action Michael Levin 418 431 44 The Rights of Allan Bakke Ronald Dworkin 441 45 Affirmative Action as Equalizing Opportunity: Challenging the Myth of "Preferential Treatment" Luke Charles Harris and Uma Narayan [W] 448 Part IV Justice Punishment 463 46 Punishment and Desert James Rachels [W] 466 47 Repentance and Criminal Punishment Jeffrie G Murphy [R] 48 Making Hard Time Even Harder Lynn Pasquerella [W] 475 481 49 In Defense of the Death Penalty Louis Pojman [N] 50 Against the Death Penalty Jeffrey Reiman [N] 493 503 ® Contents 51 52 53 54 Economic Justice A Theory of Justice John Rawls The Entitlement Theory of Justice Robert Nozick Displacing the Distributive Paradigm Iris Marion Young Economic Competition: Should We Care About the Losers? Jonathan Woif.T[NW] World Hunger and International Justice 55 Free Movement: If People Were Money Robert E Goodin [R] 56 Famine, Affluence, and Morality Peter Singer 57 Famine Relief and the Ideal Moral Code John Arthur [NW] 58 Hunger, Capacity, and Development David A Crocker [R] 59 Eradicating Systemic Poverty: Brief for a Global Resources Dividend Thomas W Pogge [NR] Environment 60 Feeding People versus Saving Nature 61 62 63 64 Index Holmes Rolston III [R] The Land Ethic Aldo Leopold Challenges of Ecofeminism: from "Should" to "Can" Gail Stenstad [NW] Ideals of Human Excellence and Preserving Natural Environments Thomas E Hill Jr [N] Hume and Nature Alan Carter [NW] 511 514 527 540 551 560 563 572 582 591 604 618 621 631 640 654 664 674 This anthology seeks to provide engaginglywritten, carefully-argued philosophical essays, on a wide range of timely issues in practical ethics When I had trouble finding essays that suited my purposes, I commissioned new essays - fourteen in all I also invited thirteen philosophers to revise their "classic" essays The result is a tasty blend of the old and the new, the familiar and the unfamiliar I have organized the book into four large thematic parts and fourteen particular topics (sections) to give you the greatest flexibility to construct the course you want When feasible, I begin or end sections with essays that bridge to the preceding or following section Although I have included essays I think introductory students can read and comprehend, no one would believe me if I claimed all the essays are easy to read We all know many students have trouble reading philosophical essays That is not surprising Many of these essays were written originally for other professional philosophers, not first-year undergraduates Moreover, even when philosophers write expressly for introductory audiences, their ideas, vocabularies, and styles are often foreign to the reader So I have included a brief introduction on READING PHILOSOPHY to advise students on how to read and understand philosophical essays I want this volume to be suitable for a variety of courses The most straightforward way to use the text is to assign essays on six or seven of your favorite practical issues If you want a more topical course, you could emphasize issues in one or more of the major thematic sections You could also focus on one or more of the practical and theoretical issues that span the individual topics (sections) and the four thematic parts of the book If, for instance, you want to focus on gender, you could select most essays from five sections: ABORTION, FAMILIES AND REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY, SEXUALITY, SEXUAL AND RACIAL DISCRIMIN ATION, and AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, and combine these with some specific articles scattered throughout, e.g., Young's "Displacing the Distributive Paradigm" (EcoNOMIC JUSTICE) and Stenstad's "Challenges of Ecofeminism" (THE ENVIRONMENT) Finally, you can also give your course a decided theoretical flavor by using essays that address, in diverse contexts, significant theoretical issues like the act/ omission distinction, the determination of moral status, or the limits of morality, etc At the end of this preface, I include a list of some of those theoretical issues, along with the essays you could use to highlight them (see p x-xi) You can also direct your students to Preface for Instructors THEORIZING ABOUT ETHICS - an introductory essay designed to help them understand why it is necessary to theorize; this essay will give them a snapshot of some of the major theories Perhaps the most distinctive feature of this anthology is the section introductions Some anthologies not include them Those that do, often use these introductions simply to summarize the essays in that section These introductions indicate the main thrust of the essays But that is not their primary purpose Their purpose is (1) to focus students' attention on the theoretical issues at stake and (2) to relate those issues to the discussion of the same or related issues in other sections All too often students (and philosophers) see practical ethics as a hodgepodge oflargely (or wholly) unrelated problems The introductions should go some way toward remedying this tendency They show students that practical questions are not discrete, but are intricately connected with one another Thinking carefully about any problem invariably illuminates (and is illuminated by) others Thus, the overarching aim of the section introductions is to give the book a coherence that many anthologies lack There are consequences of this strategy you might mention to your students I organized the order of the essays within each section to maximize the students' understanding of the practical issue to hand - nothing more However, I wrote the introductions and organized the summaries to maximize the understanding of theoretical issues Often the order of the discussion of essays in the introduction matches the order of essays in that section; occasionally it does not Moreover, I spend more time "summarizing" some essays than others That in no way suggests I think these essays are more cogent, useful, or in any way better than the others Rather, I found it easier to use them as entrees into the theoretical realm Finally, since I not know which sections you will use, you should be aware that the introductions will likely refer to essays the student will not (have) read When that happens, they will not realize one aim of the introductions But they may still be valuable For even if the student does not read the essays to which an introduction refers, she can better appreciate the interconnections between issues It might even have the delicious consequence of encouraging the student to read an essay that you did not assign One last note about the criteria for selecting essays Many practical ethics anthologies include essays on opposing sides of every issue For most topics I think that is a laudable aim that an editor can normally achieve But not always I include essays that discuss the issue as we currently frame and understand it Sometimes that understanding precludes some positions that might have once been part of the debate For instance, early practical ethics anthologies included essays that argued that an individual should always choose to prolong her life, by any medical means whatever On this view, euthanasia of any sort and for any reason was immoral Although that was once a viable position, virtually no one now advocates or even discusses it Even the author of the essay with serious misgivings about a "right to die" would not embrace that position The current euthanasia debate largely concerns when people might choose not to sustain their lives, how they might carry out their wishes, and with whose assistance Those are the questions addressed by these essays on euthanasia Likewise, I not have any essays that argue that women and blacks ought to be relegated to the bedroom or to manual labor Although everyone acknowledges that racism and sexism are still alive and well in the United States, few people openly advocate making blacks and women second-class citizens No one seriously discusses these proposals in academic circles Instead, I include essays that highlight current issues concerning the treatment of minorities and women (sexual harassment, date rape, etc.) Some theoretical issues, and the number of the essays where they are discussed explicitly, are listed below I not list essays (and there are plenty) that tangentially address these issues: act/omission distinction - 3,5,54, 59 autonomy - 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 17,23,24,27,28,29, 30, 31,32 consequentialism - 1, 18 deontology - 2,5, 7, 12, 16,46 Preface for Instructors equality - 6,7,9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 17, 18,34, 35, 36, 37,38,39,40,41,42,43,44,45,50,51,52,53, 54,55 freedom - 1, 2, 3, 4,5,28,29,30,31,32,33,34, 35,36,37, 51, 52, 55 groups, moral significance of - 10, 11, 12, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 62 institutions, moral significance of - 3, 13, 15, 24, 25,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43,45,47,53, 54, 59, 60 limits of morality - 5, 13, 15,24,25,26,27,29,32, 37, 60, 63 moral status - 5,6,7,8,9, 10, 11, 12, 18,35,36, 39,40,41,46,47,56,57,58,59,60,61,62,63,64 Hume and Nature those with whom we sympathize And in order for a social existence to remain valuable, people need to act according to certain rules: the rules of justice These prescribe ways of behaving that are generally beneficial Moreover, they are such that it is considered wrong to break them even in those rare instances where more benefit would flow from their infringement The rules of justice arise by means of convention - hence they are 'artificial' And because of their 'artificiality', the tendency to abide by them is an 'artificial virtue', while the tendency to break them is an 'artificial vice' However, while the rules of justice are conventional, they are not merely conventional For, ideally, they benefit all within a society, and persist because they so Thus we see that, while the rules of justice might be valued because they benefit us and those we sympathize with, reason is essential for discovering the appropriate rules It was necessary to reason carefully about which rules would, in actual fact, have beneficial effects when universally, or at least generally, adhered to Furthermore, while 'moral properties' such as vice and virtue - originate in the human tendency to feel sympathy, reason is essential if they are to be determined accurately For reason is required in order to arrive at the general standpoint from which the virtues and vices may be clearly 'discerned' Nevertheless, as we noted earlier, such 'properties' remain projections - or 'phantasms', as Hume puts it But all this seems to generate a problem If, at the sight of the injury and writhing of a person one closely 'associates' with, the association of ideas leads to one feeling pain (a forceful idea becoming an impression), then the motivation to remove the source of that pain is quite understandable But why should an assessment of character based upon a general standpoint or the appraisal of behaviour according to a general rule (a rule of justice) motivate anyone? Neither appears, at first sight, to be intimately connected with a personally motivating pain or pleasure It is not clear that Hume provides a compelling answer However, it is not impossible to supply one on his behalf Consider the following: Imagine Amy and her friends coming across a man beating with a heavy stick a severely over-Iadened boy in order to force him to continue climbing with his heavy load, and without rest, to the top of a long and steep incline Amy immediately 'sees' how vicious is the man's behaviour, as does Bob and Cathy Dan, however, sees nothing wrong in the man mercilessly beating the boy But when Amy, Bob and Cathy later remark on how vicious was the man's behaviour, Dan comes to think that he was mistaken in not seeing the viciousness He thinks he should have seen it, but was suffering from 'moral blindness' due to his partiality - a moral blindness resulting from the fact that the 'vicious' man is a close and dear friend And in now thinking that he 'should' have seen the viciousness that he now presumes was there to be seen, Dan is now motivated to avoid mimicking such 'vicious' behaviour and to prevent his friend from acting in that way again Why? Because, while the 'vice' Amy projects is a different token to that projected by Bob or Cathy, all three, in 'seeing' the same type, presume that they are all seeing the same token And it is to that seemingly objective 'property' of the stick-wielding man's behaviour that each presumes he or she is referring In other words, the supposed referents of certain varieties of moral discourse are not individual projections, but seemingly objective properties Moreover, it is precisely such a 'property' that Dan now believes he should have perceived And it is further presumed that it is the 'vice' which was responsible for the boy's having to endure such torment Amy, Bob and Cathy feel a strong antipathy towards the boy's pain because of their associating his pain with their own And by means of the association of ideas, that strong antipathy is transferred onto the seemingly objective property of viciousness, which is taken to have caused the boy's suffering As pain is to be avoided, then the apparent cause of that pain is equally to be avoided As pain is repellent, then the apparent cause of that pain is equally repellent In short, vice is the sort of thing to avoid and to disapprove of emphatically And as Dan now thinks that vice was there to be seen, then he thinks that he should have seen it, that in some way he was defective in failing to see it, and that in future he will see it and will Environment disapprove of and be repelled by such 'vicious' behaviour Moreover, ifhe doesn't see it, he will be viewed as abnormal and subject to censure Indeed, he will be viewed as repellent Now, one advantage of construing moral 'properties' - the supposed referents of moral discourse - as seemingly objective properties which we presume all are equally capable of perceiving directly, rather than construing them simply as individual feelings, is that we can engage in arguments about such supposed referents We cannot engage in similar arguments about opinions which merely result from personal tastes If Amy likes something and Bob dislikes it, there is no inconsistency But if Amy says that it is good and Bob says that it is not, then there is a clear disagreement between them Indeed, they are contradicting each other Construing the supposed referents of moral discourse as seemingly objective properties makes intelligible the arguments we frequently have about what is and what is not good - arguments that would be unintelligible if we were merely expressing our personal tastes Additionally, if one believes that one 'perceives' a moral 'property' correctly, then one is more likely to attempt to persuade others to 'see' it the same way than if one simply thinks that the differing assessments are due to differences in personal taste Moreover, if there is reason to think that one might be in error because everyone else agrees that the moral 'property' is other than how one 'perceives' it, then there is reason to try to 'see' it differently - to try to 'see' it correctly And given that moral disagreement is usually regarded as a serious matter, it seems a mistake, therefore, simply to reduce moral 'properties' to personal tastes Earlier we noted that Hume holds that an idea can acquire so much force through association with an especially forceful impression or idea that it, too, can become an impression Given how much social pressure one can feel when one fails to 'see' things the way others 'see' them, given how forceful the idea this pressure gives rise to can thus become, and given that one would like to perceive an objective moral property correctly, then it is quite understandable, from a Humean standpoint, how Dan could come to acquire an impression of his friend's vice - in other words, of how he could come to 'see' it for himself And when he comes to 'see' the vice, it is quite understandable how he might come to view the vice, presumed to be the cause of pain, as 'objectively' repellent, and how he would then be motivated to avoid it In a word, the idea oJ 'vice , comes to be so associated with such forceJul ideas and impressions that it, too, becomes an impression And because this impression is intimately connected to our passions, it is highly motivating HUlnean Normative Ethics What moral principles might be thought to follow from the discussion so far? Behavioural traits which, in general, minimize suffering and maximize well-being would be expected to constitute the virtues, and virtuous behaviour would be expected to include a tendency to abide by social rules which, ideally, serve to minimize the suffering and maximize the wellbeing of all within one's society But there is no reason why we could not go further than Hume was prepared to go And we might go beyond Hume in two ways First, if we are to employ our reason in order to avoid prejudice, then there seems to be no good reason for stopping at the boundaries of our own society when seeking a general standpoint A Humean ethic should therefore be cosmopolitan But we could go further still If we employ reason so as to be impartial, then in order to regard certain individuals as not meriting an equal appraisal or equal treatment, we would need to identify some morally relevant factor which differentiated them from the rest For, ceteris paribus, any property of A which justifies treating or judging A in a certain manner will equally justify treating or judging B in a similar manner if B also possesses that property Hence, unless there is a morally relevant difference which separates humans from nonhuman animals, it seems that it would be inconsistent of us not to count in our moral calculations their welfare alongside that of humans Second, not only we dislike physical pain, we also greatly dislike our goals being frustrated In short, each of us values our own Hume and Nature freedom And there is no reason why the association of ideas cannot underpin a general valuing of freedom paralleling the way in which it underpins a general valuing of welfare For just as we dislike our own freedom being restricted in certain ways, by means of the association of ideas we can come to dislike those sorts of restrictions being placed upon others' freedom Furthermore, in order to reach agreement we can adopt a general standpoint with respect to evaluating restrictions on freedom Hence, behavioural traits which are consistent with safeguarding everyone's freedom can also be expected to be considered virtuous And social rules which serve to safeguard individual freedom can equally be expected to be 'seen' to be extremely valuable Put another way, there is nothing to prevent a Humean from insisting on freedom-safeguarding rights as well as on rules which serve to maximize welfare And unless there is a morally relevant difference which separates humans from nonhuman animals, it seems that we should respect animal rights along with human rights An Application of Humean Moral Philosophy to Environmental Concerns What, then, would follow from applying a Humean approach to environmental problems? We have seen that, although Hume ultimately bases morality on sympathy, reason plays an essential role in identifying an impartial standpoint and in ascertaining the rules of justice And we have observed that unless there is a morally relevant difference which separates humans from nonhuman animals, then it would be inconsistent of us not to count their welfare alongside human welfare in our moral calculations or not to respect their rights alongside human rights However, there is a morally significant difference between humans and nonhuman animals: with some possible exceptions, the latter not 'perceive' moral 'properties' And as nonhuman animals not 'perceive' moral 'properties', then it is wholly inappropriate to view them as moral agents bearing moral responsibility for their actions Consequently, we cannot, with justification, condemn predators for catching their prey But unless nonhuman animals differ with respect to some other morally significant property that would justify their being treated by moral agents differently from how humans are treated, and insofar as they feel pain just as we do, then to disregard animal welfare is no less immoral than disregarding the welfare of humans.17 Moreover, unless nonhuman animals differ with respect to some other morally significant property that would justify their being treated by moral agents differently from how humans are treated, and insofar as they feel frustration, as we do, in being confined or restricted, then to disregard the rights of animals is no less immoral than disregarding human rights IS In a word, the essential role played by reason in Hume's philosophy is sufficient for it to be amenable to cooption by promoters of both animal welfare and animal rights But what of the preservation of species and ecosystems? The stability and integrity of an ecosystem is essential for the well-being of the sentient beings dependent upon it And if their well-being matters morally, so does the stability and integrity of the ecosystems they inhabit Moreover, its stability and integrity requires the preservation of a large number of the species found within it Furthermore, although predators harm the prey they catch, they ordinarily increase the well-being of those who escape their clutches, for predators prevent the numbers of their prey rising to a point where a great many would starve by overshooting the carrying capacity of their environment It should also be noted that evolution ordinarily serves to benefit the members of a species, even though it has been claimed that what is in the interests of a species is not what is in the interests of its members 19 The latter has been advanced because, it has been argued, it is in the interests of the species to evolve, and evolution requires a large turnover of individual lives For given an environment's finite carrying capacity with respect to the species in question, the shorter time individual members of the species live after producing offspring, then the greater the number of 'generations' that can appear within any given period of time, and the faster Environment the process of evolution But it would not seem to be in the interests of individuals to die relatively young However, evolution of the species would ordinarily mean that its future individual members were better adapted to their environment and would therefore flourish within it to a greater extent than less evolved individuals would have done And surely it is in the interests of an individual to flourish Moreover, if members of a species not flourish to a greater extent than previous 'generations' because their predators have also evolved, then less evolved members would have fared far worse Furthermore, if the species had remained unchanged, other species could be expected to have evolved in a manner that made them better adapted to occupying its niche, and thus less evolved members of the species would be far worse off than more evolved ones would have been And it is surely not in an individual's interests to find that other species are now better adapted to surviving within its niche So, it would seem that maintaining the conditions for the evolution of any species is indeed in the interests of individual members of that species: namely, future members of that species 2o Nevertheless, while all the above goes some way towards a moral recognition of most environmentalist concerns, there are some remaining gaps Many environmentalists are concerned with preserving species that have so few remaining members that it seems clear that their role within an ecosystem is inessential for its stability.21 Many environmentalists are also concerned to preserve 'unspoilt' inanimate natural entities (such as mountains or rivers), and not merely because of the habitats which they provide for sentient beings The most likely explanation for these concerns is the great aesthetic value which landscapes, species and ecosystems are 'perceived' to possess And the 'perception' of such a value provides no insurmountable difficulty for a Humean, because aesthetic 'properties', on a Humean account, are projections of a similar kind to moral 'properties' However, it might be objected that all this seems to fail to take into account Routley's Last Person Argument, with which we began Now, Peter Singer suspects - as I - that one of the more promising avenues for justifying concern for species preservation may well be that 'the destruction of a whole species is the destruction of something akin to a great work of art'.22 But he doubts that this avenue would actually lead to the promised land For if Singer found himself, genuinely, to be the last sentient being, he doubts that it would really matter if he were to amuse himself 'by making a bonfire of all the paintings in the Louvre,.23 No one would ever enjoy those paintings again, so why should their destruction matter? But there is some reason to think that this might not be the most appropriate response to the Last Person Argument If one happened to be the last sentient being, then no significant moral problems would seem to result from one's viewing the last member of a non-sentient species as the sort of thing that it would be wrong to destroy needlessly For instance, so viewing the last member of a species would not cause any harm to other sentient beings Yet viewing the rarity of a species as greatly increasing the value of any surviving members of that species would, ordinarily, greatly aid the preservation of species And because a species might play an essential role within an ecosystem, and because ecosystems provide the conditions for our collective survival, then viewing rare species and stable ecosystems as extremely valuable generally serves a highly useful, social purpose Indeed, given the extent of the environmental crises we seem to have induced and whose continuation, never mind extension, is most likely to be to our considerable detriment, such a perspective now appears to serve the most socially useful purpose imaginable Consequently, it seems that it is currently in all our interests to keep viewing rare species and stable ecosystems as extremely valuable But what especially needs to be borne in mind - and this is crucial if we are to make sense of our response to the Last Person Argument - is that when we ask 'Would it be wrong for the last sentient being intentionally to engage in environmental destruction from which little was to be gained?', we are not addressing that question to the last sentient being We are asking ourselves that question And we are Hume and Nature doing so in order to ascertain our values And even if no one were ever to experience the loss of whatever was destroyed, we would only think that the destructive act would be of no moral significance if the seemingly objective property that demanded whatever it is be preserved had lost its hold over us Put another way, we are, in effect, asking now how we should behave if we were the last sentient beings But if we were to reply now that destructive acts performed at some future time would be irrelevant morally, then the relevant projected 'properties' - one's which demand that certain entities be preserved or left unharmed - would now have lost their social utility They would be failing in their present social function Hence, for the relevant projected 'properties' to retain their usefulness, it is necessary for us to think now that environmental destruction by the last sentient being would be wrong It is far from surprising, therefore, that environmentalists should 'see' the viciousness in the last person's intentionally extinguishing a species Further light might be shed on the problem posed by the Last Person Argument by distinguishing between two 'levels' of moral thinking 24 We could distinguish between thinking at the 'everyday level' - when we think in terms of those practical principles which we, by and large, unquestioningly apply in making our everyday moral judgements - and thinking at a 'higher level' - when we think in terms of the ultimate moral principle or principles, which must be consulted directly in unusual circumstances (for example, in the face of moral dilemmas), and which ordinarily justify everyday principles A projectivist could view everyday moral judgements as remaining within the grip of projected moral 'properties' However, were one actually to find oneself in the highly unusual situation occupied by the last person, then the social utility of those 'properties' would be a thing of the past And then it would be necessary to think very carefully from first principles about what is required of one in such a situation - in other words, to think like an 'Archangel', 25 as it were But when we respond to the Last Person Argument now - i.e., while we are not, in actual fact, the last sentient beings - we think it wrong to extinguish a species because of the hold 'everyday' projected moral 'properties' retain over us In other words, the common environmentalist response to the Last Person Argument could be argued to result from allowing 'everyday' moral thinking to affect 'higher level' moral principles And it might be because he spends all his time thinking like an Archangel that Singer fails to see anything wrong with the last person burning Grand Masters Of course, given the plausibility of a Humean metaethic, we may well proceed to entertain doubts about the reality of moral 'properties' especially while we remain within our studies But rather than worry that we tend to continue 'seeing' value as a real property even after we have left our armchair theorizing behind, we should, instead, welcome that fact For our continuing to 'perceive' moral 'properties' is precisely how it is that they have the social usefulness they undoubtedly have And in today's world, amongst the most important values to 'perceive' if human societies are to survive would appear to be environment ones: the value of each sentient being, the value of each species, and the value of each ecosystem Recognizing a plurality of values does, of course, create numerous difficulties, at least at times, for deciding how to act It requires some method for trading off those values But why should anyone presume in advance that morally acceptable environmental decisions must always be simple to make?26 Before closing, there is one objection to a projectivist approach that I must briefly respond to, for it is advanced by one of the leading environmental ethicists: Holmes Rolston, III Rolston complains that the anthropogenic account of intrinsic value is a strained saving of what is really an inadequate paradigm, that of the subjectivity of value conferral For all the kindly language about intrinsic value in nature, the cash value is that, 'Let the flowers live!' really means, 'Leave the flowers for humans to enjoy' , because the flowers are valuable - able to be valued - only by humans even though when properly sensitive humans come along they value these flowers for what they are in themselves 27 Environment But this objection either begs the question in simply presuming that there is more to value than projectivism implies,2s or, worse, if it is an objection worth stating, it is because of an implicit suggestion that any projectivist metaethic reduces the preservation of non-sentient life to the satisfaction of human interests But we have just seen that the latter is not the case, for a projectivist approach is quite capable of accommodating Routley's Last Person Argument Certain projected 'properties' are 'seen' as action guiding If a species is 'seen' to be valuable, then its seeming 'intrinsic value' will appear to demand of us that we not intentionally cause its extinction needlessly, and that apparent demand can, at that instant, be quite divorced from the satisfaction of human interests Moreover, we have also seen that a Humean metaethic is wholly compatible with both animal welfarism and animal rights, neither of which can be reduced to the furthering of human interests In addition, if one is supposed to infer from Rolston's critique that projectivism reduces environmental values merely to some form of 'human value', then even if this is so, it is not necessarily a bad thing For humans, if they are anything really distinctive, are value-driven beings Humans have sacrificed their lives for their values, whether the value in question is freedom, democracy, human rights or whatever Were environmental preservation a more widely held 'human value', like that of human freedom or democracy, I, for one, would not complain By way of conclusion, it is perhaps worth noting that H.] N Horsburgh, while reflecting on the possibility of nuclear annihilation, once remarked that 'only the non-violent can inherit the earth', adding that 'the violent can only deny them a world to inherit ,29 We could similarly argue that only those adhering to an environmental ethic can inherit the earth And if, as many environmentalists have argued, the very survival of our species is in doubt because of the environmental crises we seem to have engendered,3o then it would appear to be the case that the only ethic that can survive is an environmental one Non-environmental ethics would spell 'species suicide', as it were, and would face extinction along with those practlsmg them 3l And the possibility of 'species suicide' does, at the very least, seem to provide some reason for why environmentalists should not abandon their moral views, nor cease 'perceiving' moral and aesthetic 'properties', even if dwelling on a Humean metaethic 32 might appear, at first glance, to undermine them Notes See Richard Routley (later Sylvan), 'Is There A Need for A New, An Environmental, Ethic?', Proceedings of the XVth World Congress of Philosophy, Vol (Sophia: Sophia Press, 1973), pp 20510, especially p 207 For similar arguments attempting to establish that certain non-sentient forms possess intrinsic value, see Robin Attfield, 'The good of trees', Journal of Value Inquiry 15 (1981): 51, Mary Anne Warren, 'The rights of the nonhuman world' in R Elliot and A Gare (eds), Environmental Philosopky (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1983), pp 128-9, and Holmes Rolston III, 'Are Values in Nature Subjective Or Objective?' in Philosophy Gone Wild (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1989), p 114 Tom Regan is the most famous exponent of animal rights For a brief summary of his views, see Tom Regan, 'The case for animal rights' in Peter Singer (ed.), In Defence of Animals (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985) This approach is most associated with Peter Singer For his earlier hedonistic position, see Peter Singer, Animal Liberation: A New Ethic for Our Treatment of Animals (New York: Avon Books, 1977) For his later position, which deploys preference utilitarianism, see Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979) ] Baird Callicott, 'Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair' in his In Defense of the Land Ethics: Essays in Environmental Philosophy (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1989), p.21 Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1949), p 224 Callicott, 'Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair', p 21 For some objections to Callicott's reading of Hume, see Alan Carter, 'Humean Nature', Environmental Values 9/ I (2000): 3-37 Hume and Nature David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed L A Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 22 1978), p 468 Ibid., pp 468-9 to David Hume, 'An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals' in Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals, ed L A Selby-Bigge, revised by P H Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p 294 II 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, p 469 See J L Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory (London: Routledge, 1980), pp 71-2 See Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, p 469 Hence, when Hume claims that, 'according to modern philosophy, [colours] are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind' (ibid.), he should not be taken as meaning that colours cannot be 'seen' in some sense, otherwise he would simply be talking nonsense For irrespective of what actually happens when we see colour, seeing in colour, along with seeing in monochrome, is precisely what gives content to our notion of 'seeing' David Hume, 'Of the Standard of Taste' in Essays Moral, Political and Litera~y (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp 238-9 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, pp 581-2 In other words, the role played by reason in Hume's moral philosophy allows a Humean to employ Singer's welfarist arguments And this means that the role played by reason in Hume's moral philosophy also allows a Humean to employ Regan's arguments for ascribing rights to nonhuman animals See Holmes Rolston III, Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in the Natural World (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988), pp 147-8 20 21 However, given how much evolution may resemble an arms race, whether or not it is in the interests of the members of all species is, perhaps, open to question 'One could argue "that lichens, which were once ubiquitous, might play some arcane but vital role in the long-term ecology of forests" But the same claim could not seriously be made for the furbish lousewort, a small member of the snapdragon family which has probably never been other than a rare constituent of the forests of Maine.' David Ehrenfeld, The Arrogance of Humanism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), p 188 23 24 25 26 Peter Singer, 'Not for Humans Only: the Place of Non humans in Environmental Issues' in K E Goodpaster and K M Sayre (eds), Ethics and the Problems of the 21st Centu~y (London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), p 203 As he amplifies: 'On this view, to exterminate a species is to commit an act of vandalism, like setting about Michelangelo's Pieta with a hammer; while allowing an endangered species to die out without taking steps to save it is like allowing Angkor Wat to fall into ruins and be obliterated by the jungle.' Ibid Ibid., p 204 See R M Hare, Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method and Point (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981) Also see R M Hare, 'Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism' in A Sen and B Williams (eds), Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) See Hare, Moral Thinking For one argument which implies that value pluralism does not have to lead to indeterminacy, see Alan Carter, 'Moral Theory and Global Population', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99/3 (1999): 289-313 Rolston, Environmental Ethics, p 116 28 Rolston observes that the perception of value in nature somehow arises as we learn more about individual species and ecosystems See Holmes Rolston III, 'Is There An Ecological Ethic?' in Philosophy Gone Wild, p 20 Also see Rolston, Environmental Ethics, p 232 But this observation tells us nothing about the ontology of value For a projectivist has no difficulty in accepting that, phenomenologically, value 'appears' to arise and intensify as we study certain things Remarkably, Rolston later writes: 'Humans value natural things for what they are in themselves - for example, enjoying a field of wild flowers, listening to loons call, or experiencing the su blime fury of a storm at sea.' Ibid., p 331 And the storm's 'fury' isn't a projection? 29 H J N Horsburgh, 'Reply to Kai Nielsen', Inquiry 24 (1981): 73 30 See, for example, Alan Carter, A Radical Green Political Theo~y (London: Routledge, 1999) 31 I am, of course, here parodying Garrett Hardin's argument for the ascendancy of his notorious life-boat ethic See Garrett Hardin, 'Living on A Lifeboat' in Jan Narveson (ed.), Moral Issues (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1983) 32 For a fuller account of Hume's metaethic, see Carter, 'Humean Nature' 27 abortion I, 5, 8, 9, 11, 13, 60 75, 78-86, 88-95, 97-105, 108, 112, 116, 142, 193, 202, 203, 239, 356, 590 act/omission distinction xii, xiii, 21,61,561 active euthanasia 21, 25, 26, 28, 30, 39, 40, 43-7, 88 adoption 70,80, 101, 154, 170, 176, 179, 184-6, 188-90, 193, 196, 197,293,376,379,383, 397 affirmative action x-xii, I, II, 13, 150,209,370,389,428-31, 435,436,440,442-5,448-60, 464,513,541,562 aggression 354,412,413,422,423, 431,437, 535, 560 agriculture 146,604,617,623, 624, 627, 633, 634, 650 AIDS 4, 49, 57, 87, 106, 135, 180, 181, 185, 186,247,250,302, 313,318 Altman, Andrew x, ISO, 287, 339, 376,386,619 Alzheimer's disease 131, 133, 135 Anderson, Elizabeth S ix, 11, 39, 151,187,377,379,385 Andre, Judith x, 252, 276, 284 animals and fetuses 61, 77, 78, 85, 86, 89,90,92, equality of 104-8, 110 15 in the moral community 117, 119, 121-6 moral status 128-39 rights 140 value of life 618,619,623, 627, 652, 654-6, 658-60, 663, 664, 668, 669, 672, 673 apartheid 141, 460 Appiah, Kwame Anthony x,389, 428 Aristotle 95, 103, 225, 261, 263-5, 270, 272, 276, 494 arrogance 254,276, 277, 279, 493, 660,673 Arthur, John x, xi, 10,61, 117, 126, 149, ISO, 185,211, 287,339,364,386,428,496, 541,550,561,580,582,590, 600 artificial insemination 178, 179, 184, 185, 189, 190 Attica 215,216 autonomy xiii, 19,20,23,27-30, 33, 37, 45, 57, 58, 118-28, 130-3, 135, 137, 139, 144, 145, lSI, 191, 196, 202, 206, 207,264, 268, 288, 289, 309, 314-23, 330, 365, 366, 372, 382, 393, 401, 543, 546 Baier, Annette 176, 177,253 Bakke, Allan x, 428, 437, 440, 442, 443, 445, 446, 448, 449, 458, 460 Bartky, Sandra ix, ISO, lSI, 156, 404,408,619 Beauchamp, Tom L ix, 20, 21, 40, 58, 59, 81, 460 benevolence 126, 272, 273, 275, 416,580,581,587 Benn, Stanley I 84,93, 114, 115 Bentham, Jeremy 23,30, 110, 116, 167,470,473,474,483,607 Berkeley, George 23, 30, 82, 106, 139, 146, lSI, 165, 166, 197, 253,284,480,652,663 Bible 250 bills of rights 120 Black Nationalism 394 Bosnia 418,424,560 Brandt, Richard 25,30, 31, 116, 177,571,590 Brown v Board of Education 443 Buckley, William F x, 300, 303-5 Butler, Samuel 225 Callahan, Joan 47, 62, 71, 82, 183 capabilities ethic 592, 593, 596, 599, 601 capital punishment I, 8, 58, 88, 473, 495-8, 501-3, 505-7, 509,510 Index capitalism 30, 513, 538, 550, 601, 616 care giving 51, 53, 58, 157-65 Carter, Alan 450,460,559,619, 664,672-4 casual sex 210 Catholic Church 73,81, 178,227, 475 censorship 5, 339, 344, 346, 356, 358, 360, 362, 364-6, 371-5 certainty 7, 340, 341, 486, 487, 633 chain gangs 481,486,487 character 3, 10,95-7, 101, 163, 193,252,253,258,261-4, 269-71,276-8,467,472,473, 475, 476, 478-80, 663, 667 charity 96, 98, 126, 218, 251, 274, 416,466,469,513,531,532, 537, 565, 575, 57~ 588, 590, 598, 615, 617, 622 chastity 222-4,251,413 children ix, I, 58,61,68, 78, 80, 81,89,92,96,99-101, 117, 123-5, 127, 131, 136, 141, 143, 149-52, 154, 155, 167-76, 179-85, 187-97,255, 257,264,265,269,288, 296-8, 307, 324, 332, 423, 424, 512, 546, 552-5, 560-2, 587, 595, 598, 604, 614, 617, 626, 628 children's rights 238, 307 China 177,593,606 Christianity 276, 278, 342, 399 citizenship 319,322,327,365, 389, 459, 520, 544, 548, 570 civil rights movement 382, 488 cloning ix, I, 151, 199-208 cocaine 20, 295-9, 301, 303-5 coercion 29,74,290,319,359, 365,421,422,434,469,471, 473, 549, 580 Cohen v California 373, 375, 381, 384 collective repentance 480 college admissions tests 452, 460 communitarianism 565 community ix, 43, 73, 75-8, 105, 117-26, 128, 133, 167,251, 252, 255, 263, 271, 279, 283, 290, 302, 313, 324, 335, 353, 358, 360-3, 365, 371, 378, 381, 383, 395, 397, 420, 422, 443, 464, 465, 476, 478-80, 541, 542, 565, 570 compassion 47,48, 55, 142, 158, 162,252,276,281-3,629,649 compensation 190,292,414,430, 435-8, 449, 452, 455-7, 498, 499,528,542,551,565,579, 607 competent patients 38 competition xi, 151, 159,281,365, 368,369,416,433,447,513, 551-8, 606, 611, 631, 633 consequentialism xiii, 9-11, 31 conservation 398, 610, 614, 623, 628, 630, 632, 635, 636 consistency 5,6,61, 189,229,248, 439, 566, 567, 570 contraception 72,74, 78, 81, 91-3, 101, 102, 112, 202, 227, 248 contractarianism 140-2, 144,284 corporations 369, 450, 585, 650 crime 8,41,44,65,270,287,288, 297, 298, 301, 303-6, 313, 316,321-4,329-37,410,412, 419,463-5,470-4,476, 478-88,491-6,498,501,504, 506, 508, 510 criminal law 270, 289, 337, 370, 375,387,411,476,478,480, 482, 486, 492 Cruzan, Nancy 21 Daniels, Norman 541,550 Darwin, Charles 590, 607 date rape x, xiii, 387, 407, 410-12, 417,420 death ix, xi, 10, 17, 19-23, 26, 28, 29, 32, 35-45, 47-59, 62, 65, 66, 70, 72, 80, 83, 86-8, 92, 93,99, 100, 102, 127, 141, 144, 303, 306, 308, 311, 317-21,465,476,481,483, 486,493-510, 572, 573, 581, 583, 593, 598, 600, 603, 614, 617,629,633,634,638,642, 652, 661, 663 see also abortion; capital punishment; euthanasia; hunger; killing deficient humans 123-125 desert xi, 406, 412, 466-70, 473,479,482,484,494, 530, 551, 556, 582, 585, 588-90, 650 deterrence theory 463, 471, 486 development assistance 609 Dewey, John 592, 600, 601 discrimination x, xii, 10, 11, 107-9, 141-4,252,345,346, 360, 364, 370-2, 380, 386, 387, 389, 390, 394, 400, 408, 409,428-34,436,438-41, 449-54, 456, 457, 459, 460, 480, 508, 569, 571 see also racial discrimination; sexual discrimination distributive justice 474,511-13, 527-38, 544, 550, 564, 591 divorce 154, 161,236, 320 Dreze, Jean 562, 592-4, 596, 599, 601 drugs x, 20, 26, 29, 47, 55, 56,131, 288, 289, 295, 297-306, 308, 333, 338, 357, 370, 372, 492, 511 dualism 159,477,480,642, 648 Duff, R A 465, 476-8, 480 Dworkin, Ronald x, 34, 35, 38, 39, 206, 208, 289, 324, 326, 337, 339, 345, 346, 351-3, 355-7, 365,375,380,384,428-30, 442, 456, 460, 590 ecofeminism xi, xii, 619, 640, 641, 646, 647, 649, 651, 652 ecology 626, 628, 632, 634, 635, 640, 645, 652, 653, 673 economic justice xi, xii, 10,61, 151,428-30, 511, 512, 544, 560, 561, 612 emigration 537, 538, 567, 568 emotional support 45, 156-8, 162-4 emotionality 76 entitlement theory xi, 527, 529, 535, 547, 595 environmental ethics 127,541, 619, 620, 628, 649, 652, 653, 662-4, 672, 673 equality x, xiv, 9, 11,91, 166, 168, 175, 176,201,203,211,214, 250,257, 259, 277, 285, 314-16, 320-3, 356-8, 360-3, 365, 376-80, 382, 469, 470, 504, 505 and affirmative action 429-33, 441,452,455,457,459, 460 of animals 105,107-14,116, 120, 127, 129, 137, 142 Index equality (contd) and distant peoples 571, 573, 583, 585, 644 and economic justice 512-16, 518-20, 522, 526, 529, 531, 538, 541, 547 see also impartiality ethical theory 9, II, 142,231,253, 460, 526, 580, 646-8, 662 euthanasia ix, xiii, 9, 19-22, 24-33, 35-40, 43-7, 49-51, 53, 56, 58, 59, 88, 93, 105, 174, 177,288,309,561 Ezorsky, Gertrude 453, 460 fairness II, 30, 31, 84, 141,458, 459,487,494,500,514-17, 521, 522, 525, 549, 570, 624 fallibility 7,276,277,279,340,498 false consciousness 163, 392 Faludi, Susan 339,354 families ix, xii, II, 20, 26, 29, 61, 78, 124, 157, 208, 209, 2II, 215, 239, 251, 299, 394, 398 and artificial reproduction 178-83, 185, 190, 196, 197 impact of euthanasia on 51-3, 55-7, 59 moral priority of 167, 170, 173, 175-6 parental obligations 149, 151 farming II6, 145, 609, 624, 635 favoritism 2II, 439, 610 Feinberg, Joel 62, 84-6, 93, 122, 127,289, 324, 368, 375, 430, 513,663 feminism II, 163, 165,212, 218, 219,339,353-5,388,397, 404,408,409,431,619,640, 641,643,646,652,653 fetus 8, 60, 61, 63-5, 68, 70, 72-81, 83-6, 89-93, 97-100, 102, 104, II2, 181, 192,210, 297 filial obligations 149, 154 Fingarette, Herbet 477,480 flag desecration 367 Foa, Pamela x,212 food aid 591, 593, 597-600, 602 food chains 359, 632, 633 food entitlements 591, 594, 596, 598,602 forced labor 535, 536, 539 foreign aid programs 600 forgiveness 162, 480 F rankena, William 113, 116, 571 free market 431 free movement xi, 563-6, 570 free speech x, 5, 8, II, 150, 209, 287, 326, 338, 339, 356, 357, 359,361, 362, 365-7, 373, 374, 376, 380, 383, 384, 386, 387, 407, 409, 428 free will 414 freedom x, xiv, 431, 433, 438, 439, 483, 499, 567 economic 5II, 520, 521, 544, 548-50, 559 and euthanasia 19, 23, 30, 37, 38 and paternalism 287,290, 292, 294,305, 315, 316, 320, 321, 326, 327 reproductive choice 79, 101, 188, 194, 196, 206-8 sexual choice 212,213,221, 229, 238 40 speech 339, 340, 343, 346, 353, 356, 359-61, 363-6, 368, 372, 374-6, 382, 384, 385 Freud, Sigmund 219,235 Frey, R G ix, 105, 106, 128,210 Friedman, Marilyn 166,295, 296, 303, 388 friendship 23,98, 102, 151-5, 159, 218,226,248,283,416,417 frustration 27,45, 142-4, 159, 368, 443, 456, 669 Frye, Marilyn 213,214,216,218 gender xii, II, 24, 84, 136, 150, 160, 163, 165, 166, 242, 247, 250,345, 350-2, 367, 376, 381,383,384,408,409,413, 423,427-9,432,433,435, 436,450-7,459,485, 550, 640-3, 645, 648 gender-based affirmative action 451,456 generosity x, 143, 149, 193,251, 252, 264, 272-5, 468, 567, 575, 6II, 629 generous-minded ness 272, 274, 275 Gert, Bernard 42-4,47 globalism 564 God 23,50,51,71, 113, 119, 121, 125, 224, 278, 282, 284, 369, 391,394,586,587,629,631, 637, 638, 642, 655, 656 good life 62,80, II3, 131, 132, 137, 139,232,314,319,322, 326, 327, 549, 552, 615 Goodin, Robert x, xi, 23, 30, 288, 289,307,312,513,560-3,570 Goodpaster, Kenneth 93,663, 673 Greeks 10, 81, 235, 282, 642 groups x, xiv and affirmative action 428, 436, 442 4,446,448-51,453-6, 458-60 harm of 339,344,347,348,361, 362, 364, 366, 367, 369, 371, 373, 375, 377, 380, 381, 386-8, 397, 541, 549 and rape 418-20,422,423,425 Gulf War 560 gun control x, 289, 322, 323, 325-37,465 G-7nations 624,625 Habermas, Jiirgen 607 habit 264, 265, 280, 288, 296, 300, 301, 305 Hampton, Jean 476, 480 harassment x, xiii, 360, 361, 363, 364, 374, 377, 381, 383, 384, 387,400-9,452,487 Hardin, Garrett 599, 674 Hardwig, John ix, 20, 48, 58, 59 Hare, R M 23,30,116, 176, 177, 283,581,673 harm x, 3, 4, 287-90, 316-18, 326-31, 335, 336, 387 and euthanasia 24, 29, 33, 35, 37,44-6 free speech 338, 339 hate speech 365, 367-72, 375-80, 382 4, 386 to nature 618,619,626,628, 654, 657, 669, 670 pornography 348-52, 354, 356, 357,360 property rights 513,551,552, 556-8, 568, 582, 584, 585, 589, 615 and punishment 489-91, 495, 498, 504, 505 to self 299, 303, 304 sexual 394,395,400-3,405-9 see also drugs; punishment; racial discrimination; rape; sexual discrimination Harris, John ix, 197-9,208 Harsanyi, John 23, 25, 30 Index Haslett, D W 25, 30 hate speech 150, 287, 339, 345, 364-78,380, 381, 383-5, 619 Hayek, Fredrick 531,532 health-care reform 57 health-care system 59 hedonistic utilitarianism 231, 592 Hegel, Georg 158, 162, 166, 390,602 heroin 20, 288, 295-9, 301, 303-5, 310 Hill, Thomas E Jr x, xi, 155, 166, 254 Hobbes, Thomas 27, 30 Holocaust 394, 493 homosexuality x, 13,209,210, 233-50, 375, 586 honesty 6,97, 222, 223, 251, 266, 390,413,415,476 human capital 431,567,569,570 human dignity 113, 151,201,203, 206-8, 485, 486, 491 human life 45, 50, 56, 60, 71, 97, 99-101, 129-31, 133-8, 169, 172,173,188,198,201,220, 234, 243, 262, 283, 292, 365, 501, 582, 596, 634, 645, 651 see also abortion; euthanasia; capital punishment human rights 114, 120, 126, 142, 145, 188,201, 203, 208, 250, 256, 258, 476, 568, 604, 628, 629, 654, 669, 672 human traits 656, 662 Hume, David xi, 277, 283, 587, 588,590,619,662,664-9, 672,673 humility 101, 102,251,252, 276-84, 478, 657, 659-63 hunger xi, 10, 13,21, 25, 61, 149, 150,211,229,251,428-30, 465, 512, 560-2, 590-603, 610,616,618, 622, 623, 625, 627 Hunt, Lester H 261,313-24,326, 330, 337, 379 Huntington's chorea 49, 53 Hursthouse, Rosalind 60-2, 94, 253 immigration 209,389, 567, 568, 570, 571, 623, 629 impartiality 66,168,169,172,173, 175,176,393,573,581 in vitro fertilization 178, 179 incitement to lawlessness 367 income distribution 623 individual liberty 287, 320, 330, 338,431, 512 individual responsibility 252, 306, 464,475 individualism 299, 323, 534, 542, 648 inequality 113-15, 127, 355,430, 454,459,480, 521, 522, 531, 541,542,544,564,602,604, 605, 607-9, 612-14 infanticide 80, 81, 85, 86, 93, 116 infants 78, 80, 81, 85, 86, 89, 105, 112, 114, 124, 125, 133, 190, 197,297,299,598 inherent value 135, 142-5, 651 insanity 217, 230 integrity 73, 80, 81, 166, 189, 196, 200, 222, 223, 248, 251, 342, 624, 626, 635, 664, 669 intentions 41, 179,213,245,250, 279,349,352,404-7,425,635 interest theory 307 international trade 558, 559 intuitions 10, 33, 74, 129, 173, 229, 233, 256, 277, 283, 522, 582,664 involuntary euthanasia 25-9 James, Willliam ix-xi, 42, 47, 59, 126, 162, 166, 167, 177, 250, 271, 272, 295, 384, 385, 453, 460, 466, 486, 496, 545, 550,571,600,601,617,642, 663 just war 88 justice see economic justice; social justice; punishment justice in acquisition 527-9, 538 justice as fairness 494,514-17, 521, 522, 525 justice in transfer 528 juvenile offenders 478,479 Kant, Immanuel 4, 10, 11, 39, 85, 93, 201, 202, 258, 260, 270, 396,466,473,474,482,483, 492,494,505,510,514,526, 622,663 Kevorkian, Jack 45-7 Keynes, Alfred 566, 571, 672 killing 10, 576, 58 abortion 60, 61, 65, 67-9, 71, 72, 78-80, 83, 86-93, 96, 99, 100, 102 animals 106, 111, 116, 130, 134, 138, 139, 143, 145 euthanasia 19-22, 24, 25, 27, 30,40-7, 55 and punishment 465, 483, 493-5, 499, 503, 505, 507, 509 and saving nature 622, 629 kindness 47, 55, 64, 67, 85, 97, 142, 158,276,281, 283, 582 King, Martin Luther 382, 582 Labor Department 432 labor market 431,439,610 LaFollette, Hugh 1, 30, 58, 106, 151,289,324,325,337, 353, 559, 562, 590, 600, 615 land ethic xi, 619, 631, 632, 635, 664 law 8, 563, 566, 570, 571, 577, 585-7,617,634,643,650,663 and abortion 70-2, 74, 81, 82, 98 about economic exchange 520, 525, 541, 543, 548, 557 against discrimination 387,400, 402-11,414 and drug use 294, 296-9, 301, 304 and euthanasia 19, 32, 38,40-2, 45,47 and gun ownership 314,316, 323, 328, 329, 336, 337 influence on virtues 261-70 see also punishment laziness 234, 257 legal rights 60, 119, 120,213,491, 551,610 Leopold, Aldo xi, 618, 631, 664, 672 letting-die 40-5 Levin, Michael x, 210, 233, 240, 244-6,249,250,428,431, 440, 502 libel 367 liberalism 313-15, 317-24, 339, 375,480,494, 550, 570, 603 liberation movements 107 Locke,John 271,324,495,513, 514,607,608,617 Longino, Helen 345, 353 Index love between parents and children 149-55 in families 52-5, 58, 59, 160, 163-8, 170, 172, 173, 175 of natural world 632, 635, 644, 652, 657, 658, 662 and sex 209-12, 224, 225, 228-30, 232, 237, 394, 395, 399 luck 64, 166, 169, 170, 173, 176, 282,284,420,467, 512, 553 lying 6,9, 10, 162, 164,336,415, 464 MacIntyre, Alistair 253, 548, 550 MacKinnon, Catherine 339, 345, 346,350,351,353-5,357-61, 363, 401, 406, 408, 409, 422 Macklin, Ruth ix, 151, 178, 185 Macpherson, C B 542, 549, 550 Malcolm X 373, 375 Marquis, Don ix, 60, 61, 83, 93, 104,210 marriage 71, 101, 131, 157, 159, 165,166,171,177,180,184, 218,219,223-5,227,228, 232, 240, 246, 249, 250, 257, 402,414,431,483,658 Marx, Karl 540, 542, 551 Marxism 366, 480 masturbation 227, 248, 354, 358 maximin rule 523-5 May, Larry 418-26 McNaughton, David 10, 11 meaning of life 172 media stereotyping 542 medical care 20,21,44,172,173, 302,429,446,481,541, 572-4, 583, 597, 604, 610, 622 medicine 21,27,28,39-42,44, 45,47, 54, 57-9, 88, 126, 139, 172, 178, 185, 186, 198,230, 337, 597, 627 merit 41,70,104,113,273-5,346, 428, 429, 434, 439, 445-8, 452-4, 458, 459, 471, 494, 516, 530, 531, 625 metaphors 156, 158, 164 Mill, J S x, 11, 23, 26, 28, 31, 162, 166, 167, 177,287-90, 300,314,326,337,338,340, 363,365,375,388,483,551, 554, 559, 662 Milton, John 263, 270, 295, 303, 672 Moore, G E 23,31, 116,208, 478, 480, 655, 656, 663 moral agency 58, 76-8, 105, 123 moral community ix, 73, 75-8, 81, 85, 105, 117-26, 128, 133, 202, 255 moral education 151, 166, 261, 262, 265, 269, 271, 480 moral patients 105 moral significance xiv, 1, 6, 21, 231, 232, 277, 298, 428, 578, 580-2, 590, 612, 671 moral status xii, xiv, 4, 22, 25, 60, 61, 72, 73, 75, 77, 78, 81, 90, 104-6, 117, 119, 121, 123, 124, 140, 141,202,210,225, 256-8, 260, 282, 380, 386-8, 391,394,428,619 motherhood 62, 100-2, 178, 181-9, 197 Murphy, Jeffrie xi, 250, 464, 465, 475,492,512,526,617 Nagel, Thomas 219,231,282, 284,430,605,617 Narayan, Uma xi, 429, 430, 449, 460 native endowments 467 natural law 81,247,493, 525 natural rights 67, 119, 122 natural selection 233,234,421 nature xi, 104, 108, 111, 117-19, 121, 122, 127, 130, 134, 137, 618,619,621-30,632,636, 640-7, 649, 650, 652, 654-65,671-3 necessity 9,77, 120, 164, 182,215, 234, 282, 439, 479, 577, 578, 631,646, 662, 666 New York City 296,297,440 New York Times 197, 198,250, 363, 364, 427, 440, 480, 492, 591,600 Newsweek 295,420,427,439 Noddings, Nel 151, 161, 166 non-voluntary euthanasia 25-9 Noonan,John 47,71-3,75,81,84, 93 Nozick, Robert xi, 61, 512, 513, 527, 547, 550, 561, 607, 608, 617 Nussbaum, Martha 354, 562, 592, 600, 601, 603 obedience 30, 171, 188, 264 obscenity 344, 353, 356, 363, 367 Okin, Susan 542, 550 opinions 6, 7, 36, 40, 47, 97, 102, 207, 254, 290, 291, 293, 340, 341,343,361,362,366,449, 450, 668 OXFAM 24 O'Neill,Onora 151,416,439,594, 602,605,617 Paine, Thomas 261, 262 parents ix, 3, 4, 7, 13, 36, 40, 80, 81,99, 149, 152, 154, 155, 167-76, 179-83, 185, 188-96, 203, 204, 512, 587 Parfit, Derek 23, 31 Pasquerella, Lynn xi, 465, 481 passive euthanasia 21, 22, 25-7, 47,59 Passmore, John 124, 127 paternalism x, 5, 20, 37, 62, 150, 151,287-9,307-10,312,314, 319,324,438,465,511, 512 patients 22,23,29,32,33,35, 37-43,45-7,51,56,88, 105, 169, 280, 443 patriarchy 397,419,425,642 pedophilia 213 personhood 73, 76-80, 86, 89, 118, 121, 125, 126, 196,213, 216 physicians 21, 38-47, 50, 56, 59, 429, 513 Pineau, Lois x, 387, 407, 410 Plato 476, 480, 494, 622 Pogge, Thomas W xi, 149, 430, 562, 604-6, 617 Pojman, Louis xi, 62, 93, 465, 493, 509, 510 political authority 62 political correctness 363 political norms 548 politics 116, 165, 166, 186, 270, 339, 345, 354, 356, 361, 388, 395,450,475,510,526,549, 550, 563, 570, 571, 610, 613, 631, 640, 652 population growth 78, 579, 580, 623, 625-7 pornography x, I, 6, 8, 150, 209, 339, 344 - 63, 371, 385 poverty xi, 25, 297, 331, 435, 444, 451,470,478,487,572,574, Index 579,591,596,598,601-17, 621-3, 625-7, 629 see also hunger preferences 23, 33, 136, 146, 188, 199, 207, 209, 230, 250, 254, 255,288,289, 308-II, 324, 355, 361, 373, 395, 432, 449, 452,454-7,459,525,536 premarital sexual intercourse 223 prison conditions 484-91 prisoners' rights I 17 promise-breaking 25 property rights 189,416,512,534, 536, 537, 609, 654 prostitution 353, 507 prudence 125, 126, 161,247,251, 264,614 punishment xi, 1,8,58,62,88,91, I I I, 122, 234, 252, 257, 263, 270, 290, 320, 364, 380, 382, 384, 387, 406, 429, 438, 463-6, 470-80, 482-90, 492-8, 500-12, 585 Punzo, Vincent x, 210, 220 quality of life 27, II7, 132-4, 137, 139,261, 3II, 499,562,601 Rachels, James ix, 47, 58, 59, 61, 106, 150, 167, 177, 21I, 252, 464,466,512,561 racial discrimination x, xii, 10, 120, 126, 150, 177,209,287, 386, 387, 394, 428, 429, 434, 438, 45~ 451, 460, 513, 518 rape x, xiii, 10,64, 68-70, 72, 74, 81, 83, 84, 101,203, 209, 212-18,230,289,339,345, 348, 350, 353, 357-60, 363, 371, 387, 388, 402, 407, 408, 410-15,417-27,433,435, 452, 470, 477, 485, 500 Rawls, John xi, 10, 116, 141, 176, 177,370,375,467,474,484, 492,494, 51I-14, 543-6, 550, 591,600,606,607,617 Reagan, Ronald 160, 305, 348, 563 rectification of injustice 528, 529 reflective equilibrium 10,225,519 Regan, Tom ix, 82, 93, 105, 106, 132, 135, 139, 140,550,619, 620, 644, 652, 663, 672 Reiman, Jeffrey xi, 465, 501, 503, 509, 510, 546, 550 religious beliefs 23, 72, 135, 367, 389, 655 repentance xi, 464, 475-80 responsibility x, 223, 238, 375, 455, 520, 557 for actions 68, 74, 75, 206, 296, 297,306,318,418,419,421, 423-7 for and within families 49, 51, 52, 54, 57, 58, 171, 173, 174, 182, 185 and membership in the moral community 118, 121, 125, 127 for the natural world 613,615, 617,636,641,645,669 and punishment 464,465,471, 475,480,484,485,491,494, 497, 508, 509, 51I for distant peoples 560, 562, 577, 591, 600, 603, 604, 606, 608 and virtues 101, 102,252, 262, 276 right to life 8, 60, 61, 64-8, 71-5, 78-81,83-6,90,91,93, II7, 126, 494, 495, 584, 622, 655 rights ix, x, 9, 30, 44, 45,171,179, 451,456,459 and abortion 60, 62, 65, 67, 68, 70, 72, 73, 75-82, 84, 89, 90, 93,97, 98 of animals 105-8, 1I0, 1I2, 1I4, 1I7, 119-28, 134, 138-42, 144-6, 149 and choice 184, 187-91, 193, 195-7, 356, 359, 363 and duty to distant peoples 551, 561, 568, 570, 571, 580, 582-5, 588-90, 592, 595, 596, 604,606,607,609,610,614, 615,617 to equal opportunity 398, 402, 409,432,438,439,441-3, 445,446 of free speech 365, 367, 369, 371, 372, 374, 375, 380, 382, 384, 385 homosexuals 233, 237-40 and nature 620, 628, 629, 644, 648, 652 6, 663, 664, 669, 672,673 and paternalism 289,292, 294, 301,304,307, 31I, 313-16, 320, 324, 326, 327, 331, 337 and punishment 476,482,485, 488-91, 493, 495 property 512-14,516,518,520, 521, 523, 525, 527, 529, 534-7, 543-5, 548, 550 see also animal rights; equality; free speech; human rights; individual liberty; natural rights; property rights; right to life Rio Declaration 621, 630 Roe v Wade 60 role models 433, 443, 456 Rolston, Holmes xi, 620, 621, 644, 671-3 Rousseau, J.-J 514 rule utilitarianism ix Russell, Bertrand 232, 353, 471, 474,602 Ryle, Gilbert 132 Sartre, Jean-Paul 398 scepticism 132, 159 Schelling, Thomas 34-6, 38, 39 self-awareness 76-8, 105, 118, 645 self-defense 44, 80, 88, 122, 316, 321, 322, 324, 327, 334, 337, 368,494, 504 self-development 120, 549, 599 self-esteem 156, 159, 160, 166, 172,277,353,370,371,403, 406, 4II, 479, 550, 641 self-interest 3,4, 6, 476, 570, 587, 645, 646, 666 self-sacrifice 24, 25, 194, 259 Sen, Amartya 30, 197, 562, 592 6, 601,602,617,673 sentience 76, 77, 79, 82, Ill, 112, II4, 644, 645, 649 servility x, 153, 155, 166,251, 254-60, 350, 357 sexist speech 380, 409 sexual attraction 406, 407 sexual contracts 414, 415 sexual discrimination II, 109, 141, 143,260,387,585 sexual harassment x, xiii, 360, 361, 387, 400, 403, 405-9, 452 sexual pleasure 214, 218, 232, 345, 357,413,415,417 sexuality x, xii, 150, 151,209, 217-23,235,350-4,357, 387,412-18,427,542,619 Sidgwick, Henry 23,31, lID, lIS, 176,177,576,581 Index Singer, Peter ix, 30, 89, 93, 105-7, 127, 137, 139, 149, 176, 177, 329, 337, 561, 572, 582-5, 588,590,600,617 slavery 114, 143, 187,202, 242, 370, 379, 435, 436, 442, 475, 477, 507, 521, 525, 585, 635, 643,644 slippery slope arguments 46,47, 63 smoking 20, 209, 245, 289, 298, 303, 308-12, 324, 330, 489 social contract 514, 525 social conventions 262, 263, 265, 270, 362, 587 social institutions 45,459, 512, SIS, 544, 545, 549, 592-4, 606,607, 612, 650 social justice 113,116,518,519, 523, 525, 540, 541, 543-50, 571, 623 social norms 187, 192,266,271 social ontology 545-7 social roles 169, 170 social solidarity 333 socialism 126, 559,601 socialization patterns 421, 423 Socrates 95, 102, 167 soil erosion 641 Solomon, Robert 219,229,232 South Africa 109, 141, 181,394, 634 speciesism ix, 89, 110-12, 114, 116, 127, 128, 133, 136-8, 142, 144,396 speech codes x, 150,287,339,360, 361, 367, 370, 376-8, 380, 382-4 Stenstad, Gail xi, 150,619,640, 647 Sterba, James 250, 618, 620 subliminal suggestion 311 suicide ix, 20, 21, 35, 40, 43-56, 59,159,177,238,295,319, 332, 483, 493 supererogation 395, 576 Superson, Anita x, 387, 400 Supreme Court 47,353, 356, 357, 361, 366, 367, 376, 384, 387, 439,440,442-5,450,488-90, 493,499 taxation 535-7,539,541 Thomson, J J ix, 60, 61, 63, 71, 73, 74, 81, 83, 84, 93, 590 Tiger, Lionel 422-4,427,627,630 Tong, Rosemarie 403, 408, 615 Tooley, Michael 84,93, 116 Tyson, Michael 315,387,419, 420 unhappiness 233, 234, 236-8, 244-6, 590 United Nations 120, 560, 562, 602,617 Universal Declaration on Human Rights 568 Urmson, J O 576, 581 utilitarianism ix, 9-11, 22-6, 30, 31,94,96, 103, 142-4, 167, 177,197,231,245,256, 482-4, 516, 559, 576, 592, 663, 664, 672, 673 value dualisms 643, 648, 650 value-hierarchical thinking 643, 650 Velleman, David ix, 19,20,32,39 violence 77, 166, 194,217,297, 299,317,318,323,324,332, 337, 339, 353-5, 360, 363, 370-2, 377, 388, 410, 419, 422-4, 427, 452, 481, 487, 490, 587,633, 634 virtues x, 11, 62, 95, 96, 101, 103, 144, 149, 158, 162, 209, 251-3, 261, 262, 264, 266, 269, 271, 278, 279, 283, 284, 372,382,394,439,517,582, 648, 657, 663, 666-8 vivisection 111, 128, 134, 139 Voltaire 363 voluntary euthanasia 25-9 voyeurism 226, 355 Waldron, Jeremy 513 Wallace, James D x, 149, 253, 271, 272 Walzer, Michael 543, 550, 570, 571 Warren, Karen 641-3,647,648, 652, 653 Warren, Mary Ann ix, 60, 72, 84, 93, 104,210 Wasserstrom, Richard 120, 126, 430, 460 welfare economics 529 welfare services 541 well-being 22, 23, 28, 30, 53, 73, 78, 120, 122, 163, 172, 183, 237, 271, 272, 275, 279, 291, 511, 516, 521, 523, 562, 587-90, 593, 596-8, 601, 602, 616, 668, 669 Whitehead, Alfred 591,600 Wicker, Tom 215,219 Williams, Bernard 30, 103, 116, 127, 151, 197,250,282,284, 363, 396, 399, 571 Wilson, John Q 288, 295 wishful thinking 311 Wittgenstein, Ludwig 132, 278 Wolff, Jonathan xi, 151, 513, 542, 550,551,561 Wollstonecraft, Mary 107 wolves 638 working class 157, 165, 484 World Bank 207, 572, 604, 616, 617,626 World Health Organization 310, 617 Young, Iris Marion 540,541,549, 550 ... Severe pain can be unremitting, and indeed so overpowering that the person experiencing it can think of nothing else If the rest of my life would consist of nothing but excruciating physical pain,... sense in which we continually choose to go on living, it is not reflected in our ordinary self-understanding That is, we not ordinarily think of ourselves or others as continually rejecting the... may think that finding one's life tiresome is a good reason for dying whereas thinking that others find one tiresome is not But if others honestly think otherwise, why should we stand in their