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Copyright Copyright © 2019 by Jonathan Rodden Cover design by Chin-Yee Lai Cover image copyright © Sergio34/Shutterstock.com Cover copyright © 2019 Hachette Book Group, Inc Hachette Book Group supports the right to free expression and the value of copyright The purpose of copyright is to encourage writers and artists to produce the creative works that enrich our culture The scanning, uploading, and distribution of this book without permission is a theft of the author’s intellectual property If you would like permission to use material from the book (other than for review purposes), please contact permissions@hbgusa.com Thank you for your support of the author’s rights Basic Books Hachette Book Group 1290 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10104 www.basicbooks.com First Edition: June 2019 Published by Basic Books, an imprint of Perseus Books, LLC, a subsidiary of Hachette Book Group, Inc The Basic Books name and logo is a trademark of the Hachette Book Group The Hachette Speakers Bureau provides a wide range of authors for speaking events To find out more, go to www.hachettespeakersbureau.com or call (866) 376-6591 The publisher is not responsible for websites (or their content) that are not owned by the publisher Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Rodden, Jonathan, author Title: Why cities lose: the deep roots of the urban-rural political divide / Jonathan Rodden Description: First edition | New York: Basic Books, 2019 | Includes bibliographical references and index Identifiers: LCCN 2018057050| ISBN 9781541644274 (hardcover: alk paper) | ISBN 9781541644250 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Electoral geography—United States | Cities and towns—Political aspects—United States | Democratic Party (U.S.) | Voting research—United States | Right and left (Political science) —United States | Representative government and representation—United States Classification: LCC JK1976 R65 2019 | DDC 324.0973—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018057050 ISBNs: 978-1-5416-4427-4 (hardcover), 978-1-5416-4425-0 (ebook) E3-20190424-JV-NF-ORI Contents Cover Title Page Copyright Dedication Introduction CHAPTER 1: Geography and the Dilemma of the Left CHAPTER 2: The Long Shadow of the Industrial Revolution CHAPTER 3: From Workers’ Parties to Urban Parties CHAPTER 4: Urban Form and Voting CHAPTER 5: What Is Wrong with the Pennsylvania Democrats? CHAPTER 6: Political Geography and the Representation of Democrats CHAPTER 7: Political Geography and the Battle for the Soul of the Left CHAPTER 8: Proportional Representation and the Road Not Taken CHAPTER 9: The End of the Dilemma? Acknowledgments Discover More About the Author Praise for Why Cities Lose Notes Index To my parents Explore book giveaways, sneak peeks, deals, and more Tap here to learn more Introduction IN MOST DEMOCRACIES, the path to victory is simple: win more votes than your competitors For the Democratic Party in the United States, however, this is often not good enough For example, in the 2012 election, Democratic candidates for the House of Representatives received 1.4 million more votes nationwide than Republican candidates, but the Democrats ended up with only 45 percent of the seats in the House In 1996, the Democrats also won the popular vote—that is, the total votes cast across all of the individual races—without winning control of Congress Democrats must win big in the overall popular vote, as they did in the “blue wave” elections of 2018 and 2006, in order to win a majority of seats in the House The Democrats’ problem with votes and seats is even more pronounced in state legislatures Consider the state of Michigan, where it has become commonplace for the Democrats to win the statewide popular vote without winning a majority of seats in either chamber of the Michigan legislature In 2012, for instance, the Democrats received around 54 percent of the total votes cast in elections for both state legislative chambers in Michigan, but they came away with only 46 percent of the seats in the Michigan House of Representatives, and 42 percent of the seats in the state senate This has been happening over the last decade in the other states of the industrialized Midwest as well, including Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania Most recently, it happened in Virginia in 2017, and once again in Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania in 2018 Remarkably, as of 2019, the Republican Party has controlled the Pennsylvania Senate for almost forty consecutive years, even while losing the statewide popular vote around half of the time The Republicans have controlled the Ohio Senate for thirty-five years, during which time Democrats won half of the state’s US Senate elections and around one-third of the gubernatorial elections The popular vote is also largely irrelevant, of course, in determining the composition of the US Senate Democrats have won more votes than Republicans in elections for eleven of the fifteen Senates since 1990, but they have only held a majority of seats on six occasions.2 Yet underrepresentation of Democrats in the US Senate is no mystery It happens because, as a legacy of the bargain made at the Constitutional Convention in the eighteenth century, large Democratic states like California and New York have the same Senate representation as small Republican states such as Wyoming and the Dakotas But in Congress and state legislatures, districts are drawn to be as equal as possible in population For example, Democratic California and Republican Wyoming both get two senators, but California sends fifty-three representatives to Congress while Wyoming sends only one And within states, legislative districts are required by law to be very similar in population It is puzzling, then, that Democrats have been able to dominate the national popular vote in presidential and Senate elections since 1990—not to mention party registration and party affiliation as expressed in opinion surveys— while only winning control of Congress for five of the last fifteen sessions And it is puzzling that there are so many “purple” and even “blue” states like Pennsylvania where citizens routinely elect Democratic senators, governors, and attorneys general, but where Democrats have had little chance of winning a majority of the congressional delegation or state legislature For many frustrated Democrats, the explanation is simple: partisan gerrymandering Republicans gained control of many state legislatures in time for the most recent round of redistricting in the early 2010s, then drew odd-shaped boundaries that packed as many Democrats as possible into a handful of districts that they easily won, leaving the remaining districts with Republican majorities Armed with sophisticated geospatial software and a large budget, Republican operatives carefully drew maps that distributed Republicans as efficiently as possible across districts so as to win the maximum number of seats.3 There is much truth to this widely accepted account, but it provides an oversimplified and ultimately misleading answer to a complex question Why Cities Lose demonstrates that the Democrats’ problem with votes and seats goes much deeper, and is far more intricate, than the impact of a handful of political operatives in a room with a computer Without a doubt, gerrymandering makes things worse for the Democrats, but their underlying problem can be summed up with the old real estate maxim: location, location, location In most of Europe, legislators are chosen from large districts with multiple winners, and parties are represented in proportion to their share of the vote In such a system, the geographic location of a party’s support is not of primary importance In the United States, legislators are elected from smaller districts where there is a single winner In such a system—known as “majoritarian” democracy—the geography of a party’s support is extremely important In many US states, Democrats are now concentrated in cities in such a way that even when districts are drawn without regard for partisanship, their seat share will fall well short of their vote share It matters a great deal how the districts are drawn, and by whom, but because of where Democrats live, the very existence of winner-take-all geographic districts has facilitated the systemic underrepresentation of Democrats To understand the roots of this phenomenon, it is important to grasp the deeper problem that gave rise to it: our highly polarized partisan geography To see why the contemporary Democratic Party so often loses with a system of winner-take-all districts, we must first comprehend how Democrats and cities came to be synonymous Why Cities Lose explains the rise of contemporary urban-rural polarization—a trend that is worrisome for the stability and health of American democracy regardless of one’s partisan or ideological perspective—and then reveals how this development has affected political representation The rise of urban-rural polarization over the last century is striking Figure is a plot based on county-level data from one hundred years of US presidential elections, excluding the states of the Deep South The horizontal axis represents the population density of each county: higher numbers indicate that a county is more urban The vertical axis represents the share of the presidential vote received by the Democratic candidate The relatively flat dotted line indicates that in 1916, Woodrow Wilson’s support was no higher in urban counties than in rural counties After the New Deal and World War II, the dashed line indicates that John F Kennedy’s vote share in 1960 was strongly correlated with population density He lost in most rural counties and won solid majorities in most urban counties And the solid line indicates that by 2016, the urban concentration of Hillary Rodham Clinton’s support was astounding She lost by large margins in rural counties and won overwhelming majorities in urban counties Figure 1: County-Level Population Density and Democratic Presidential Voting over the Last Century By the early part of the twenty-first century, the Democrats had become an almost exclusively urban political party From coast to coast, their support is now concentrated in the downtown cores and inner suburbs of cities Democrats have come to dominate not only large cities like Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, but also medium-sized cities like Reading, Pennsylvania They have come to dominate not only knowledge-economy hubs like Seattle and San Francisco that are gaining population, but also poor postindustrial cities like Detroit and Akron that are losing population Because of this geographic divide, American elections have come to be seen as high-stakes sectional battles pitting the interests and identities of cities and inner suburbs against those of exurbs and the rural periphery This urban-rural polarization is a serious problem in its own right, but in many US states, it has also created a geographic distribution of partisans that allows Republicans to win seat shares well in excess of their share of the vote In turn, this asymmetry between votes and New Deal Democrats, 209–210 New Hampshire, vote shares vs seat shares in, 184 New Jersey, 185 New York congressional districts in, 185 Democrats in, 41–42 Democrats’ margin of loss in, 176 districting in, 170, 172 vote shares vs seat shares in, 185 New Zealand electoral reform in, 12, 229, 246–250 electoral system in, 229–230, 231, 238, 240 ideology in, 239 (fig.) labor parties in, 31, 32 left in, 26, 32 urban-rural polarization in, 249 workers’ parties in, 34 See also colonies, former; Commonwealth countries Nixon, Richard, 194 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 83 North Carolina, 173, 175, 184, 186, 187 Northeast, Democrats in, 41–42 Norway, 27, 29, 231 Nova Scotia, 121 Obama, Barack, 83, 131–132, 137, 149–150 See also election (2012) Ohio Republican overrepresentation in, 187 turnout in, 108 (fig.), 109 vote shares vs seat shares in, 184 voting behavior in, 106 (fig.), 107 working-class housing in, 107 Ohio Senate, Republican control of, Oklahoma, 183, 185 Ontario, 118–120, 119 (fig.), 120 (fig.) Orlando, Florida, 114 See also cities, newer Ottawa, 121 overrepresentation, Republican, 181–185, 186–188, 205 parties, American flexibility of labels, 211, 212 (see also issues, bundling) realignment of, 38, 65, 86, 188 regional meanings of, 36–37, 41–42, 46 See also Democrats; Republicans parties, extremist, 234, 250 parties, political alternative left-wing, 218 diversity of in proportional representation, 230–231 economy and, 258–259 factions in, 6–7, 71, 218–224 national agendas of, 197 national policy reputations, 210 in PR, 230, 231 smaller, 230 See also left; platforms; right; individual parties partisan fluidity, 188 partisan gradient, 106, 113, 118 partisanship distribution across congressional districts, 188–189 generational, 59–62 population concentration and, 64–66 social identity and, 91 urbanization and, 62 party leadership, 202 patents/innovation, 79, 81, 82 Pelosi, Nancy, 202 Pennsylvania, 11, 186 in 2018 election, 138–140 changes in, 77 county-level geographic concentration index for presidential votes, 62–63, 63 (fig.) Democratic voting in, 158 (fig.), 162 (fig.) Democrats’ geographic concentration in, 134–137, 159 Democrats’ margin of loss in, 176 district-level ideology in, 204 districts in, 152 (fig.), 178 gerrymandering in, 11, 133–134, 141 manufacturing in, 19–22 population density and Democratic voting in, 43 (fig.) realignment in, 42, 44 redistricting in, 137, 140–141 relation of historical manufacturing and contemporary voting in, 53–54 Republican overrepresentation in, 187 Republican vote share in, 147 (fig.) Trump’s vote share in, 143 (fig.) vote shares vs seat shares in, 184 voting behavior in, 63 (fig.), 106 (fig.), 107, 134 (fig.), 135 See also individual cities; individual counties Pennsylvania Apportionment Commission, 137, 142 Pennsylvania House of Representatives control of, 156 districts for, 23, 136 (see also districts, legislative) Reading Socialists in, 23 underrepresentation of Democrats in, 138–141 voting patterns in, 44–45 See also elections, legislative; Pennsylvania state legislature Pennsylvania legislature, 131–134 See also elections, legislative; Pennsylvania House of Representatives; Pennsylvania Senate Pennsylvania Redistricting Commission, 137, 140 Pennsylvania Senate, 2, 142–143, 157 (fig.) See also elections, legislative; Pennsylvania state legislature Pennsylvania state legislature, 138–143 in 2016 election, 132 Democratic concentration in, 158–159 Socialists in, 16 vote shares vs seat shares in, 157–159 See also elections, legislative; Pennsylvania House of Representatives; Pennsylvania Senate Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 137, 140, 141, 153 Philadelphia, 158 changes in, 77 Democratic concentration in, 149 voting patterns in, 109–111, 110 (fig.) Phoenix, 115 Pittsburgh, 134–135, 150–151, 158 platforms alignment of, 85–86 importance of, 210 incumbents and, 212 labor parties and, 211–218 national, development of, 160 in parliamentary systems, 210–218 in proportional systems, 234–235 See also ideology; issues, bundling; issues, unbundling; progressive positions; progressives; social issues; social values platforms, Democratic economic, 58 at national level, 200–204 socially conservative, 160 at state level, 204–210 plurality systems, in Commonwealth countries, 38 policy bundling issues, 260–261 in majoritarian democracies, 241–244 in proportional democracies, 241–244 spatial arrangement of electoral competition and, 96 unbundling issues, 249, 261, 262–263, 264 See also ideology; social expenditures; social issues political geography, 176 (fig.), 177 (fig.), 179 (fig.), 180 (fig.) industrial revolution’s influence on, 51 introduction to, 176–181 nationalization of, 65 relation with gerrymandering, 187 underrepresentation of left and, 11 urban-rural polarization and, 40–41 politics, nationalized, 188, 194, 197, 202 See also platforms polycentric cities, 115 poor, 104, 107–108, 122 population density correlation with left voting, 94–96 correlation with manufacturing, 47–48 Democratic voting and, 3–4, (fig.), 7–8, 42, 43 (fig.), 44–46, 45 (fig.), 52–53, 57, 58, 89–90 left voting and, 95 (fig.) in newer cities, 113 social issues and, voting patterns and, 63–67 See also cities; exurban areas; suburban areas/suburbanization population loss, 52, 97, 103, 142 population shifts, 58, 86, 97, 268–273 See also suburban areas/suburbanization populism, 261, 265 See also nationalist backlash PR (proportional representation) See proportional representation (PR) Prairie Provinces, 121 primate cities, 116, 129, 169, 172 progressive positions Democrats and, in proportional democracies, 244 Senate and, 205 See also social issues progressives, 72 geographic concentration and, 10, 11, 218 House and, 205–206 See also social issues proportional representation (PR), 12 advocates for, 230 in Australia, 231 in Britain, 31–32 coalitions in, 232 coordination problems and, 230 described, 229–235 differentiation among parties of left and, 232 diversity of parties in, 230–231, 235 effects of, 227–228 in Europe, 17–18, 27–30, 38, 231–232, 234–235 extremists and, 234, 250 ideology and, 230, 232–233, 235, 236, 250 labor unions in, 243 lack of systematic bias in, 235–237 mixed-member proportional (MMP) systems, 229–230, 231, 248–249 in New Zealand, 229–230, 246–250 in Northern Europe, 29, 231–232 opposition to, 245–246 parties in, 230 party platforms in, 234–235 policy and, 241–244 political competition in, 243–244 progressive positions in, 244 responsiveness to urban voters in, 243, 244 social issues and, 228 support for, 244–245 translating votes into seats in, 229 turnout and, 233 unbundling of issues and, 249 in United States, 34 urban parties in, 228, 231 urban-rural polarization and, 233–235 wasted/surplus votes and, 228 winner-take-all districts in, 230 See also democracies, proportional protection, economic, 73 Quebec, 24, 34, 220, 221, 225 race, alignment of platforms and, 85–86 in city centers, 109 decline in segregation, 271 Democrats and, 86 districting and, 173 parties’ positions on, 72 See also African Americans; gerrymandering; progressive positions; segregationists; social issues radicals, 17 railroads in Berks County, 21, 21 (fig.) Clinton’s vote share and, 51 (fig.), 51 (fig.), 54 (fig.), 55 (fig.), 56, 57 (fig.) factory location and, 21–22 Labour support and, 93 (fig.) manufacturing and, 19 voting patterns and, 56, 107 See also transportation corridors Raleigh/Durham/Chapel Hill (North Carolina), 114–115 See also cities, newer; knowledge-economy cities Reading, Pennsylvania, 11, 18 in 2018 election, 138–140 changes in, 77 contemporary unionization in, 60 decline of, 39 Democrats in, 51 economic and political geography of, 104–105 housing in, 48 legislative districts in, 139 (fig.) manufacturing in, 19–22 population of, 52 Reading Railroad strike/Reading Massacre, 15–16, 22 Republican vote share in, 105 size relative to congressional districts, 179 Updike’s description of, 99 voting behavior in, 105 (fig.) See also Berks County, Pennsylvania; Pennsylvania Reading Railroad strike/Reading Massacre, 15–16, 22 Reading Socialists, 16, 18, 22–24, 34, 40 Reagan, Ronald, 89, 194 realignment of South, 38, 65, 188 redistricting, 11, 148–156, 186, 189 (fig.) approaches to, 267–268 incumbents and, 140–141, 145 in Pennsylvania, 137, 140–141 Redistricting Majority Project (REDMAP), 188 reform, 265–268 Republican advantage and, 186 Republican control of, 162 simulations, 145–148, 150, 152–153, 272 suburban sprawl and, 272 See also districts; gerrymandering Redistricting Majority Project (REDMAP), 188 reform, electoral See electoral reform regional inequality, 259 regional sectionalism, 273–274 religion Evangelical Christianity, 85, 86 politicization of, 86 population density and, 86 See also social issues renters, voter turnout of, 107–108 representation spatial arrangement of electoral competition and, 96 urbanization and, 62 See also overrepresentation, Republican; underrepresentation Republican voting correlation with contemporary mining employment, 56 geographic concentration and, 63 (fig.) in knowledge-economy cities, 111–112 See also vote share, Republican Republicans, 72 appeal to median congressional district, 199 causes of, 72 concentration, nature of, 167 geographic concentration of, 62–66 ideology and, 203 impact of Trump on, 256 industrial areas and, 40–41 loss of support, 256–257 national policy agenda of, 194 policies of, pre-Trump, 262 representational advantage of, 181–185, 186–188, 205 representing cities, 258 reputation, 256 residential preferences, 269–270 social issues/values and, 9, 85–90 transformation of, 72, 254 vote share in Pennsylvania, 142 See also conservative positions; parties, political reputation management, Democratic at national level, 200–204 at state level, 204–210 residential moves, 268–273 resources, interregional flow of, 259 See also sectionalism right in Australia, 213, 224 in Canada, 222, 224 in European cities, 228 factions in, 224, 261–262 in majoritarian democracies, 235, 237 (fig.), 237–240, 243 meaning of, 72 urban representation in, 232 use of term, See also ideology; individual parties Roe v Wade, 86, 88 Rogers, Will, 37 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano (FDR), 37, 40, 44, 45–46 See also New Deal rural areas Democratic pockets in, 146 overrepresentation of, 205 population loss in, 97 representation of, 12 voting patterns in, 135 See also population density rural backlash to third industrial revolution, 254 Ryan, Paul, 203, 262 Salt Lake City, 174–175 Sanders, Bernie, 262 Santamaria, B A., 219 Saskatchewan, 121 Schwank, Judy, 142, 159 science, Democrats and, See also social issues; technology seat shares, Republican, 5, 183 See also overrepresentation, Republican seat shares vs vote shares See overrepresentation, Republican; underrepresentation of Democrats; vote shares vs seat shares seats, transforming votes into, 175–182 See also overrepresentation, Republican; underrepresentation of Democrats; vote shares vs seat shares sectionalism, 259, 273–274 secularism, 84 See also social issues segregation by income/class, 101–104 racial, 271 segregationists, alignment with Democrats, 8, 37, 46 See also Democrats, Southern selection effect, 269–270 Senate, United States composition of, popular vote and, Democrats in, 206–210 difference from House, 208–210 progressive reform and, 205 Republicans in, 205, 206–210 voting in, 208 (fig.), 209 (fig.) sexuality, See also progressive positions; progressives; social issues slavery, 73 Smith, Al, 42, 44 social expenditures, 241–243, 242 (fig.) social issues, 8, 15, 84–90 Democrats and, 85–90 evolution of preferences, 87 (fig.) General Social Survey (GSS), 87 (fig.), 87–88, 200 parties and, 10, 72 population density and, PR and, 228 Republicans and, 85–90 shifting divide on, 89 (fig.) urban parties and, 231 urban-rural differences in, 200 See also issues, bundling; issues, unbundling; progressive positions; progressives; race; segregationists; social values social values, 9, 75, 88 See also progressive positions; progressives; social issues socialist parties, 16 in Canada, 32 in Europe, 25–26 geographic dilemmas for, 23–24 lack of in United States, 34–37 origins of, 22 Reading Socialists, 16, 18, 22–24, 34, 40 Socialist Party of America, 16 See also left South alignment with Democrats, 37 Democrats in, 174, 188, 189–190, 191, 192 dispersed population of African Americans in, 192 efficiency gap in, 191 (fig.), 192 geographic concentration and partisanship in, 65 gerrymandering in, 186 legislative representation in, 174–175 move of industry to, 47 realignment of, 38, 65, 86, 188 relationship between population density and Democratic voting in, 46 segregationists, 8, 37, 46, 86 transformation of Democrats in, 192 Voting Rights Act in, 175 South Carolina, 166, 173 Soviet Union, 23 state governments, sectional conflicts and, 273–274 state legislatures See elections, legislative; individual legislatures strikes, 16, 35, 50 Sturla, Mike, 140 suburban areas/suburbanization, 99–100, 117–118 in Australia, 123 backlash against Trumpism in, 257 in Britain, 101 changes in, 12 development of, 97, 102–104 growth of, 269–273 history of, 100–101 realignment of, 255 reduced urban-rural polarization and, 268 Republicans’ loss of support and, 256 transition from Democratic to Republican in, 100 voting patterns in, 106–107 See also population density supermajoritarian rule, 205 Sweden, 17, 29, 30, 231, 232, 236, 254 Tammany Hall, 41 tariffs, 73 taxes, 82, 259, 276, 277 technology, 9, 77 See also knowledge economy; knowledge-economy cities Tennessee, 166, 176, 183 Texas, vote shares vs seat shares in, 185 third parties, 34–37, 245, 261, 262 See also multi-party systems Tories See Conservatives (Britain) Toronto, 119–120 trade, 73, 254 See also manufacturing Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), 83 transportation, 104 See also highways; railroads transportation corridors, 56, 102–103, 115–116, 117 See also railroads treatment effect, 269–270, 273 Trudeau, Justin, 245 Trump, Donald, 9, 50, 73, 83, 135, 254 backlash against, 257 impact on Republican Party, 256 vote share, 105, 132, 137, 138, 144 vote share in Berks County, 52 vote share in city centers, 108–109 vote share in Pennsylvania, 142 See also election (2016); elections, presidential; Republicans; voting patterns turnout, 107–109, 108 (fig.), 112–113, 203–204, 233 two-party systems in Britain, 25 rigidity of, 10 transforming votes into seats in, 175–181 (see also vote shares vs seat shares) in United States, 18 underrepresentation of Democrats, 62, 67, 130 in Congress, 1–2 geography and, industrialization/city formation and, 151 New Deal and, 132–133 in Pennsylvania House of Representatives, 138–141 size of districts and, 136 in state legislatures, 1–2 visibility of, 7–9 See also vote shares vs seat shares underrepresentation of labor parties, 130 underrepresentation of urban parties, 5–6, underrepresentation of workers’ parties, 29 union organizers, professional, 60 unionization rate, 60 unions, 47, 50, 60, 61, 102, 241, 243, 276 See also labor unrest/mobilization United Kingdom See Britain; Commonwealth countries; England; Wales United States decentralization in, 255, 274, 275 federalism in, 255, 274 lack of workers’/socialist parties in, 34–37 left voting in, 94–95 resemblance to parliamentary democracy, 197 See also colonies, former universities, in Commonwealth countries, 94 Updike, John, 39, 48, 85, 99, 103, 269 See also Angstrom, Earl (fictional character); Angstrom, Harry (fictional character) urban areas See cities urban clustering, 166 See also Democratic concentration; geographic concentration urban concentration, See also Democratic concentration; geographic concentration urban parties, 17, 28–30, 130, 228 See also Democrats; labor parties; left; workers’ parties; individual parties urban voters in Europe, 258 responsiveness to, 243, 244 urbanization, 62, 242–243 See also cities; industrial revolution/industrialization urban-rural polarization, 5, 200, 233 in Commonwealth countries, 91–96 consequences in United States, 10 costs of, 12 economic geography and, 8–9 electoral reforms and, 265–266 in Europe, 27 growth of, 3–5, 41, 71, 159, 190 historical, 72–73 managing, 273–277 nationalization of politics and, 188 in New Zealand, 249 origins of, 10–11, 40 political geography and, 40–41 reducing, 254–255, 260–264 in wealthy democracies, within states, 274 Utah, 174–175, 183 values, social See social issues; social values Vancouver, 121 victory, path to, Virginia, 173, 184, 187 vote choice, “Michigan Model” of, 59 vote share, Democrat, 271 See also Clinton, Hillary Rodham; Democratic voting vote share, Republican, 105, 106–107 See also Republican voting; Trump, Donald vote shares vs seat shares, 1, 5, 133, 175–181, 182 (fig.), 184 (fig.) Democrats and, 166 in Pennsylvania state legislature, 157 (fig.), 157–159 of Republicans, 144 in Virginia, 184 See also overrepresentation, Republican; underrepresentation of Democrats voter, median, 198–199 voter fraud, 260 voter suppression, 259–260 votes, surplus, 190, 228 votes, transforming into seats, 175–182, 229 See also vote shares vs seat shares votes, wasted, 190, 215, 216 (fig.), 217, 219, 220, 228 voting, ranked-choice/preferential, 220, 224, 246 voting, split-ticket, 91 voting patterns contemporary manufacturing and, 50 historical manufacturing and, 47–57 population density and, 44–46, 63–67, 95 (fig.) regional, 41 See also Clinton, Hillary Rodham; Democratic voting; Republican voting; Trump, Donald voting rights, 25, 26, 29 Voting Rights Act (VRA), 140, 173–174, 175, 192, 205 Wales, 92 See also Britain Washington State, vote shares vs seat shares in, 185 wave elections, 1, 175, 212, 226 See also election (2016); election (2018) welfare states, 30, 243 See also social expenditures Wilson, Woodrow, 4, 210 winner’s bonus, 178, 184, 188 winner-take-all system, effects of, 10 in PR, 230 replacement of, 12 (see also proportional representation (PR)) structural bias against the representation of urban political parties in, 130 transforming votes into seats in, 175–181 (see also vote shares vs seat shares) underrepresentation of urban left and, workers’ parties and, 17, 22 See also democracies, majoritarian Winnipeg, 121 Wisconsin, 184, 187 Wolf, Tom, 138 women’s movement See social issues workers as Democrats, 39–41 franchise of, 25, 29 in New Deal era, 50 See also labor unions; labor unrest/mobilization workers’ parties appeal of, 23–24 in Canada, 32–34 in Europe, 24–27 geographic dilemmas of, 17–18, 23–24, 38 origins of, 15–17 PR and, 28 underrepresentation of, 29 winner-take-all districts and, 17, 22 See also labor parties; left; urban parties World Economic Forum, 84 young people, voter turnout of, 107–108 Zipf’s Law, 116–117 ... parties of the left, including the Democrats, but it has also made them into unhappy families One side of the family pushes the cosmopolitan agenda of the global cities and their suburbs, and the other... Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Rodden, Jonathan, author Title: Why cities lose: the deep roots of the urban- rural political divide / Jonathan Rodden Description: First edition | New York: Basic... Geography and the Dilemma of the Left THE STORY OF why cities lose in democracies with winner-take-all districts does not begin with the advent of sophisticated gerrymandering or the outbreak of contemporary

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