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STATE EXPROPRIATION, REFORM AND CASH
DIVIDENDS
HUANG
JIA
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE
2011
1
STATE EXPROPRIATION, REFORM AND CASH
DIVIDENDS
HUANG JIA
(M. Business), NUS
A THESIS SUBMITTED
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF BUSINESS
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE
2011
2
Acknowledgement
First and foremost, I would like to show my deepest gratitude to my supervisor,
Dr. Duong Xuan Truong, a respectable, responsible and meticulous scholar, who
provided me with valuable guidance in every stage. Without his helpful
instruction, impressive kindness and infinite patience, I could not have been able
to complete my master thesis. His keen and vigorous academic observation
enlightens me not only for this particular thesis and in the past two years, but
also for my future work and study.
Secondly, I shall extend my thanks to Dr. Qian Meijun, who provided me with the
database and other useful writing skills for an academic thesis. My sincere
appreciation also goes to other professors, who helped me develop fundamental
and essential academic competence by teaching me various courses.
Last but not least, I would like to thank all my colleagues (Lu Ruichang, Wang Tao,
Cheng Si, Lin Zhan, Hu Rong and so on), friends, and especially my parents, for
their long‐term, sturdy encouragement and support.
i
Table of Contents
Acknowledgement ................................................................................................... i
Summary ................................................................................................................ iv
List of Tables ............................................................................................................ v
List of Figures ........................................................................................................... v
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................ 1
2. Literature Review ................................................................................................ 4
2.1. Dividends and Stock Evaluation ............................................................... 4
2.2. Dividend Irrelevance, Dividend Relevance, and Corporate Dividend
Policy ............................................................................................................... 5
2.3. Dividends in Signaling Model ................................................................... 7
2.4. Dividends in Agency Cost Theory ........................................................... 10
2.5. Dividends, Large Shareholders and Governments ................................ 15
2.6. Cash Dividends and China’s Capital Market .......................................... 17
3. Institutional Background and Hypothesis Development .................................. 24
3.1. Origin of Ownership Structure of Chinese Listed Firms......................... 24
3.2. Split‐share Structure Reform ................................................................. 28
4. Sample and Data ............................................................................................... 30
4.1. Sample .................................................................................................... 30
4.2. Variables ................................................................................................. 31
4.3. Summary Statistics ................................................................................. 37
5. Empirical Results ............................................................................................... 40
5.1. Dealing with Possible Concerns ............................................................. 40
5.2. Regression Results ................................................................................. 46
5.2.1 Local‐government‐controlled Type versus Central‐government‐
controlled Type ..................................................................................... 48
5.2.2 Local‐government‐controlled Type versus Non‐government‐
controlled Type ..................................................................................... 55
5.3. Logistic Regressions ............................................................................... 56
ii
5.4. Robustness Tests .................................................................................... 58
6. Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 59
References ............................................................................................................ 61
Tables .................................................................................................................... 67
Figures ................................................................................................................... 75
iii
Summary
China’s capital market has undergone a tremendous change in the past six years,
and thus has become a significant force in emerging capital markets. In spite of
numerous works concerning cash dividends, a fascinating yet unresolved area of
corporate finance, my research on the relationship between the nature of
ultimate controller and cash dividends distribution might contribute to prior
literature from a fresh Chinese perspective. To understand key implications, I use
a panel of 4609 firm‐year observations from 2003 to 2008, and find evidence
that Chinese listed firms ultimately owned by local governments, compared to
other two types of firms, tend to issue more cash dividends on average, which
indicates that controlling shareholders are expropriating minority shareholders.
However, such local‐government‐controlled firms are inclined to pay less cash
dividends after the split‐share structure reform, mitigating the state
expropriation phenomenon and justifying the reform. I also find moderate
evidence that after the reform, firms controlled by local governments reduce
their cash dividends more than other firms do.
iv
List of Tables
Table 1: Definition of Variables………………………………………………………………..……..67
Table 2: Summary Statistics…………………………………………………………………………….68
Table 3: Correlation Analysis…………………………………………………………………………..69
Table 4: Comparison of Several Ratios……………………………………….……………………70
Table 5: OLS Regression Results for Comparing Local‐government‐controlled
Type and Non‐government‐controlled Type……………………………………71
Table 6: OLS Regression Results for Comparing Local‐government‐controlled
Type and Non‐government‐controlled Type………………………………………72
Table 7: Logistic Regression Results for Comparing Local‐government‐controlled
Type and Central‐government‐controlled Type…………………………………73
Table 8: Logistic Regression Results for Comparing Local‐government‐controlled
Type and Non‐government‐controlled Type………………………………………74
List of Figures
Figure 1: Cash Dividends of Chinese Listed Companies………………………………….....75
Figure 2: Consideration Schemes of Listed Companies in SSE…………………………...76
v
1. Introduction
Corporate cash dividends decisions can be strategically important since they can
significantly affect the cost of capital and the firm’s ability to invest in profitable
projects, and are often seen as issues central to the conflict between
shareholders and managers (Jensen, 1986). Yet schools of thoughts concerning
cash dividends, which can be traced back to Modigliani and Miller’s (1958, 1961)
pioneering seminal work of “dividend irrelevance”1, are far from agreement.
Until now, financial economists have proposed various explanations in an
attempt to solve the so‐called “dividend puzzle” (Black (1976)), which states the
contradiction between the fact that companies with more dividends are
rewarded by investors with high evaluation and the agreement among many
economists that dividends are not important. As plausible as those popular
theories might be, they may not be applicable to analyze listed companies in
emerging markets such as China. In fact, the “dividend puzzle” can be more
prevalent in China due to its particular institutional background and unique
historical development. One of the most important features, for example, is that
most shares of many Chinese listed companies are concentrated in a relatively
few hands of block shareholders (Lv and Wang (1999), Yuan (2001), Lee and Xiao
(2006), Lv and Zhou (2005) and so on), and papers about the relationship
1
If we refer to the first one to explain the dividends involving the market value of the share, however, we
should give credit to J.B. Williams. In his 1938 book “The Theory of Investment Value”, he first proposed
that the value of the asset should be equal to the present value of all future dividends discounted at the
required rate of return.
1
between controlling shareholders and cash dividends of their companies are
more than few (Cleassens, Djankov and Lang (2000), Shleifer and Vishny’s (1997),
Johnson et al (2000), Faccio et al. (2001) and so on).
However, studies on the effect of different types of ownership on corporate cash
dividends policies, a different yet closely related perspective, are still relatively
scant (Huang et al., 2010). My paper contributes to this area by examining the
roles of different governments in corporate cash dividends decisions in the
context of China’s capital market since it provides an excellent institutional
setting. First and foremost, China owns a unique split‐share structure system,
which I will detail later, where controlling shareholders, most of whom are
associated with governments (Chen et al., 2009), hold non‐negotiable shares, the
shares that are irrelevant to the fluctuation of China’s capital market. Secondly,
local economic performance is an important element in the evaluation of China’s
local bureaucrats, and hence speeding up local economic growth has become a
key task of local governments under the decentralized political system and the
state policy of “concentrating on economic development” (Expert Group, 1995).
Thus, there is a strong motive for China’s local governments to favor themselves
by extracting resources such as cash dividends out of firms, and whether the
ultimate controller of a listed company in China is a government agency or a
government itself, especially a local one, might greatly impact cash dividends
2
payout ratio of Chinese listed firms. Correspondingly, my study will lay much
emphasis on the companies with a government‐controlled‐type ultimate
controller, especially when a local government is the actual controller. Moreover,
this paper also takes the split‐share structure reform, the milestone event in the
development of China’s capital market, into account, considers its influence on
the dividend payout ratio of Chinese listed companies.
To be specific, my paper expects to find that listed firms which have local
governments as their ultimate controllers will distribute relatively more cash
dividends and expects to find that listed firms with local governments as their
ultimate controller will cut cash dividends afterwards. Similarly, the possibility of
issuing cash dividends is also expected to be higher before the reform and lower
after the reform.
After securing a panel of 4,609 firm‐year observations from year 2003 to year
2008, I subdivide it into three groups by different nature of ultimate controllers:
local‐government‐controlled type, central‐government‐controlled type, and non‐
government‐controlled type. Since my focus is on the first type, I create two
comparison groups during the regression process to better study the association.
I first compare the local‐government‐controlled type with the central‐
government‐controlled type, and then compare the local‐government‐controlled
type with the non‐government‐controlled type.
3
As expected, I find that, with two above comparison groups, Chinese listed firms
controlled by local governments will issue more cash dividends compared to
companies with other types of ultimate controllers, and local‐government‐
controlled companies will issue less cash dividends after the split‐share structure
reform. The results remain consistent when I run a regression with all sample
firms with similar methods, which I will not report in this paper since the results
are similar. Besides, I do sensitivity tests to ensure that my empirical results are
robust.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews
prior literature about dividends, including the most relevant ones. Section 3
presents the special institutional background in China and develops my
hypotheses. Section 4 displays the sample, data and summary statistics. Section
5 addresses some possible concerns and then reports the empirical results and
Section 6 concludes.
4
2. Literature Review
2.1. Dividends and Stock Evaluation
Dividends first attract attention from financial scholars by estimating stock prices
based on discounted dividends or earnings. Walter (1956) combines dividends
and earnings to calculate the share price while Gordon (1959, 1962) both
theoretically proposes and empirically tests his famous constant‐growth
dividend discount model, or “Gordon Growth Model”. Solomon’s (1963) model
supports their theories by including their features and extending their models.
The above mentioned models, however, all assume that investors have a
thorough knowledge of the stream of future dividends and the appropriate
discount rate.
2.2. Dividend Irrelevance, Dividend Relevance, and Corporate
Dividend Policy
After connecting dividends with the value of the stock, researchers begin to
consider the rationale for companies to distribute dividends. Surprisingly, the
first essential conclusion is that dividend policy is unimportant. Main arguments
drawn from the Modigliani and Miller’s, hereafter referred to as MM,
propositions (1958, 1961) are that the value of a firm is dependent on its current
and future free cash flows generated by investment and operating decisions and
5
that the level of dividends will not affect firm value. Dividend policy, as well as
capital structure, is nothing more than “financial” decisions, or technical ways of
dividing up ex‐post operating cash flows among investors.
Other representative studies in line with MM theorems deny the existence of a
relationship between dividends and firm value or its proxy, stock price. Using a
limited coverage of industries and time periods, Friend and Puckett (1964)
suggest that there is little basis for the customary view that, generally in the
stock market a dollar of dividends will have an impact on price of a dollar of
retained earnings. Black and Scholes (1974) test the relation between dividend
yields and stock returns by forming well‐diversified portfolios and ranking them
on the basis of their systematic risk, and then divided yields within each risk class.
They find that they cannot tell the particular effects dividend yields have on
stock returns and thus explain the result as an implication that a change in
dividend policy will not influence a corporation’s stock price. Miller and Scholes
(1982) re‐examine whether shareholders with higher dividend yields receive
higher risk‐adjusted returns by using short‐run measures of dividends, and show
that such measures are inappropriate. To investigate the connection between
dividend policy and investment decision, Fama (1974) carries out an empirical
research and shows that there is a somewhat complete degree of independence
between dividend schemes and investment decisions of firms even in the
imperfect real world.
6
The natural extension of MM’s story is that the dividend policy will not influence
a firm’s value, and thus a firm will not deal with the dividend policy with
discretion. Lintner (1956) refutes such a view by initiating a field investigation to
collect the real data of dividend policy of a sample of 600 firms and selecting 28
for detailed description considering several factors2. He finds that most firms
follow some patterns and thus advances a model stating that changes in
dividend payments are dependent on target payout ratio, current year's profits
after taxes, current year's dividends and last year’s dividends. Briefly, contrary to
what MM claim, firms choose deliberate dividend policies rather than act
randomly. Lintner’s model has fared well relative to its competitive models
testing aggregate data by Brittain (1966) and models testing data for individual
firms by Fama and Babiak (1968).
Inspired by Lintner’s work, many scholars criticize MM’s non‐tax, frictionless
world and seek to relax their assumptions. One powerful and relatively new
attack might come from DeAngelo et al.’s (2006). They claim that when MM’s
assumptions are relaxed to allow retention of free cash flows (FCF), payout
policy matters in exactly the same way as investment policy does and dividend
irrelevance hence fails because a firm can reduce its value by paying out less
2
These factors include gross plant and equipment expenditure, company size, frequency of change in rates,
relative average earnings on invested capital, average price‐earnings ratios, balance sheet and fund flow
liquidity, stability of earnings, capitalization, stock dividends, extras and splits, and the size and relative
importance of stock ownership by management.
7
than the full present value of FCF. They also question MM’s equivalence
principle3, which builds up popular free cash flow valuation models by noticing
that the rule “is not a universal property, but holds only for optimal payout
policies”.
2.3. Dividends in Signaling Model
In 1980s, studies on dividends enter a new period and become more systematic,
marked by several emerging schools of thought striving to uncover the answer to
the “dividend puzzle”, among which signaling model is one of the most
influential. The central idea of this theory is that top executives have inside
information, to which outsiders have no access, about the firm’s present
fundamentals and even future prospect, and that they can predict the future
earnings of the firm more accurately than others do. Consequently, only
lucrative firms will use dividends as a signaling mechanism to send good
information to public investors, which is a costly strategy for bad firms to mimic,
and market participants thereupon change their expectations of firm’s future
prospects.
3
The discounted value of cash flows from investment must equal the discounted value of
dividends.
8
Theoretical works involving this theory are as follows. Under certain
assumptions4, Bhattacharya (1979) shows that dividends function as a signal of
expected cash flows by structuring a model so that finite‐lived investors turn
over continuing projects to succeeding generations of investors and deriving a
comparative static result that relates the equilibrium level of dividend payments
to the length of investors' planning horizons. In another paper of Bhattacharya
(1979), he develops a model of non‐dissipative signaling of insiders' information
about future cash flows, based on expectation revision in the market, in a setting
in which there is no tax cost to directly communicate ex‐post cash flows.
Similarly, Miller and Rock (1985) allow the firm's managers to know more than
outside investors about the true state of the firm's current earnings and
theoretically prove that an informationally consistent signaling equilibrium exists
under asymmetric information. In a different context, Ross (1977) develops a
financial‐signaling model of leverage on the basis of a "lower‐truncated" cost
structure of significant bankruptcy penalties for managers and claims that paying
cash dividends, as well as increasing the leverage, will increase the market's
perception of firm’s value5.
Numerous empirical papers concerning this theory, most of which analyze the
dividend announcement effect, yield favorable results. By examining quarterly
4
Outside investors have imperfect information about firms' profitability and that cash dividends are taxed
at a higher rate than capital gains.
5
A difficulty with such a structure is that unless enforceable penalties of similar magnitude relative to the
benefits of non‐bankruptcy exist for shareholders, there is an incentive for shareholders to make side
payments to managers to induce false signaling by employing higher levels of debt.
9
dividend and earnings announcements made public on different dates within any
given quarter, Aharony and Swary (1980) distinguish earnings announcements
that precede or follow dividend announcements from those that accompany the
news, and their findings strongly assert that changes in quarterly cash dividends
provide useful information beyond that provided by corresponding quarterly
earnings numbers. Additionally, the results also lend support to the semi‐strong
form of the efficient capital market hypothesis by showing that the stock market
adjusts in an efficient manner to new information on quarterly dividends on
average. Bernheim and Wantz (1995) implement a tax‐based test and reveal a
positive relation between dividend tax rates and the share price response per
dollar (or “bang‐for‐the‐buck” effect). This finding, as well as additional evidence
on the relation between “bang‐for‐the‐buck” effect and other variables related
to the marginal cost of paying dividends, provides further support for dividend
signaling theory. Amihud and Murgia (1997) investigate German capital market,
where dividends are taxed lower for most investor classes, demonstrating that
the stock price reaction to the dividend announcement in Germany is similar to
that in tax‐advantaged U.S. capital market, and conclude that other reasons than
taxation make dividends informative.
Although many papers vote for the presence of dividend signaling effect, there is
still opposition to this theory. For example, Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997)
counter the theory based on their limited findings in favor of it. They find that
10
firms that increase dividends at present have experienced significant earnings
increases for the past year and this year, but show no subsequent unexpected
earnings growth. They also ascertain that the size of dividend increases do not
predict future earnings. Interestingly, sample firms that cut dividends in year 0
have experienced a reduction in earnings for the current year and last year, but
continue to show significant increases in earnings for the next year.
2.4. Dividends in Agency Cost Theory
There are many competing theories for signaling theory, among which agency
cost theory, or free cash flow theory, might be one of the strongest, and it is
mostly relevant to agency cost type Ⅰ, which concerns conflicts of interests
between managers and outside shareholders. To the contrary, Agency cost type
Ⅱ is about conflicts of interests between controlling shareholders and minority
shareholders plus managers.
The pivotal idea of dividends in agency cost theory is that agency cost type Ⅰ
affects the dividend policy since investors pressure irresponsible managers to
accelerate cash payouts. If investors allow internal cash to be built up unchecked,
they actually offer managers both the opportunity and the temptation to
misappropriate corporate resources (DeAngelo et al. (2009)).
11
This body of literature goes back to Easterbrook (1984), who first raises the
suspicion and argues that the signaling effect of dividend increases is ambiguous
unless the market could understand the difference between future growth and
lack of investment opportunities. He also maintains that dividends play a role in
controlling equity agency problems. When the firm increases its dividend
payments, it is forced to go to the capital markets to raise additional funds,
which in turn leads to an investigation of management by potential investors,
and hence agency problems are reduced. Jensen (1986) improves the idea by
realizing that cash dividends are used by shareholders as a control mechanism so
that they could prevent managers, who have the incentive and ability to splurge
free cash flow (either investing in big yet low‐return projects or their own luxury
lives) within the organization, from doing so. Zwiebel (1996) develops a model
concerning a trade‐off consideration of managers between the ambitions to
build their empires and the need to ensure their freedom from monitor and
control, and proves that a policy of coordinated capital structure follows
naturally. In other words, managers voluntarily incur obligation and pay
dividends in order to avert challenges for control.
Empirical works pertaining to this theory are more than a few. Rozeff (1982)
presents an optimal dividend payout model in which dividend increases lower
agency costs but raises transaction costs of external financing. With a sample of
about 1,000 U.S firms, he finds that higher dividend payouts are related to
12
insiders’ ownership fraction, past and expected future revenue growth of the
firm, the firm’s beta coefficient, and the number of common stockholders. By
adding a squared measure of insider ownership, Schooley and Barney (1994)
modify Rozeff’s cost minimization model and claim that the association between
dividend and insider ownership may be non‐monotonic. Their results provide
further support for Rozzeff’s model and document a U‐Shaped relation between
dividend yields and CEO ownership. Jensen et al. (1992) analyze the
determinants of cross sectional differences in insider holdings, debt and dividend
policies of firms, and their empirical results suggest that firms with higher insider
ownership choose lower levels of both debt and dividends and that the effects of
profitability, growth, investment spending on debt and dividend policy support a
modified "pecking order" hypothesis. Lang and Litzenberger (1989) empirically
test both signaling model and agency cost theory and approve of the former
because they find that average returns associated with announcements of large
dividend changes are significantly larger for firms with Tobin’s Q less than unity
than those of other firms.
There are also several papers conducting comparisons across different countries.
Using a sample of U.S., U.K. and Irish firms characterized by an Anglo‐Saxon
tradition and a matching sample of other EU companies from Civil Law legal
systems in the paper, Farinha (2005) finds that while for firms from Anglo‐Saxon
tradition the relation between dividends and insider ownership follows a
13
negative‐positive‐negative pattern, in Civil Law countries the relation is positive‐
negative‐positive. These results give clues to the role of dividend policy as a
disciplining mechanism in countries with different legal systems and distinct
agency problems. LLSV (2000) further divide the agency model into two types:
the outcome model and the substitute model. The former claims that dividend
policy is an outcome of an effective system, in which investors are well‐
protected and can use legal weapons to enforce firms to disgorge money rather
than use earnings to benefit insiders6. Thus, the implication of this theory is that
if investor protection is better, more dividends should be extracted from the
firms. The latter point, which states that dividends are a substitute for legal
protection, renders almost the opposite conclusion. In this setup, the underlying
assumption is that firms need to revisit the capital market for external funds
frequently, and will, consequently, need to establish a reputation of moderate
expropriation of minority shareholders7.This view implies that, ceteris paribus,
dividend payout ratios should be higher in countries with weak legal protection
for shareholders than those in countries with stronger investor protection.
Although the comparison between these two models is not the emphasis of my
research, I do find results partially in favor of the outcome model since listed
firms controlled by governments do not issue cash dividends as much as a whole,
6
LLSV (2000): They can achieve that by voting for directors who offer better dividend policies, by selling
shares to potential hostile raiders who then gain control over non‐dividend paying companies, or by suing
companies that spend too lavishly on activities that benefit only the insiders. Moreover, good investor
protection makes asset diversion legally riskier and more expensive for the insiders, thereby raising the
relative attraction of dividends for them. Other things equal, the greater rights majority shareholders have,
the more cash they extract from the company.
7
This reputation concern, however, is not so strong in a country where investors are well‐protected.
14
considering the indisputable fact that China is a civil law country with fairly weak,
if any, investor protection.
2.5. Dividends, Large Shareholders and Governments
Among numerous research areas in dividends, relation between cash dividends
and large shareholders might be one of the most peculiar and intriguing, and it is
mostly relevant to agency cost type Ⅱ. The central idea is that agency cost type
Ⅱ affects the dividend policy since controlling shareholders are powerful
enough to obtain private interests directly or indirectly at the expense of other
stakeholders (Shleifer and Vishny’s (1997)).
In many Asian countries, publicly listed companies usually have large controlling
shareholders (Cleassens, Djankov and Lang (2000)), which is quite opposite to
the Berle and Means’ (1932) image of the “widely held corporation” in which
free‐rider problem of monitoring a management team prevails. Shleifer and
Vishny (1986) suggest that management should be monitored by large
shareholders, who have both the incentive and the capability to do so, and that
agency conflicts are hence alleviated to some extent. However, the presence of
controlling shareholders might be detrimental to other stakeholders as well. In
Shleifer and Vishny’s (1997) argument, when large shareholders gain nearly full
control, it is probable that they could not resist the temptation of generating
15
private benefits to which they have unique access. The concept of this
expropriation is formalized in Johnson et al.’s (2000) paper as “tunneling”, which
they use to define controlling shareholders’ behavior of siphoning assets or
profits out of firms and thus putting minority shareholders at a disadvantage.
Empirical works connecting block shareholders with dividends are summarized
as follows. Holderness and Sheehan (2000) find that dividend payout ratios and
dividend yields are lower in firms controlled by few majority shareholders than
those of diffusely owned firms with similar size. Barclay et al. (2009) notice that
block shareholders are more than twice as likely to be found in firms that pay no
dividends as they are to be found in firms that pay dividends, that two‐thirds of
firms that pay dividends have no corporate block shareholders, and that block
shareholders’ tax status has virtually no effect on a firm’s dividend policy. Gugler
et al. (2003) examine the relationship between dividends and ownership
structure of the firm, and find that state‐controlled firms engage in smoothing
cash dividends while family‐controlled firms choose significantly lower target
payout levels. Consistently, state‐owned firms are most reluctant to cut
dividends when cuts are warranted while family‐controlled firms are least
reluctant to do so. Moreover, they find that larger holdings of the second largest
shareholder increase the dividend payout ratio.
16
As interesting as the relationship between cash dividends and controlling
shareholders is, my study is more closely related to the association between
cash dividends and one peculiar kind of controlling shareholders, local
governments, especially local ones, who significantly influence decision‐making
of Chinese listed firms. More directly, government can influence the incentives
of corporate insiders and thus the firms' cash dividends decisions (Durnev and
Fauver, 2008). There is actually one strand of research paying attention to
government institutional factors as a key institutional factor (e.g. Fisman, 2001;
La Porta et al., 2002). Recognizing the importance of government, Stulz (2005)
theoretically models the interaction between firm insiders and bureaucrats and
puts forward the “twin agency” concept. In his “twin agency” framework, there
are two sets of agency relationships, one between managers and the
government (the state agency problem) and the other between managers and
shareholders (the insider agency problem).
2.6. Cash Dividends and China’s Capital Market
Since this paper is based on China’s capital market, it is natural to see prior
closely related literature in this area. Many scholars (see Lv and Wang (1999),
Yuan (2001), Lee and Xiao (2006), Lv and Zhou (2005) etc.) have already pointed
out that the governance and the ownership structure of Chinese listed
companies differ broadly from those of their U.S. or European counterparts.
17
Their papers also advocate that existing theories of dividend policy might not
completely apply to dividend decisions of Chinese listed firms (see Lv and Wang
(1999), Lee and Xiao (2006) etc.). Previous researches on China’s capital market
document that the existence of the largest shareholder (see Yuan (2001), Lee
and Xiao (2006), Lv and Zhou (2005) etc.), or the ultimate controller (see Chen et
al. (2009) etc.) can greatly influence the dividend decision of a listed company.
They share the same opinion that dividend policy in China is not a means to
control the agency cost but the outcome of the agency problem, and that
controlling shareholders are using cash dividends as a channel to transfer
resources from listed companies.
There are relatively fewer empirical papers concerning the impact that different
ownership has on cash dividends in the context of Chinese stock market, some of
which put emphasis on revealing the relationship between state ownership and
dividend payout ratio. Lv and Wang (1999) summarize important factors of
dividend policies of Chinese listed companies as size, profitability, liquidity,
leverage, and state ownership and so on. They find that the lower state
ownership is, the greater potential for growth a Chinese listed company has,
resulting in higher stock dividends and lower cash dividends. Using 3,994
observations from year 1995 to year 2001, Wei et al. (2003) show that there is a
significantly positive correlation between the state ownership and cash
dividends (both level and propensity) and a significantly negative correlation
18
between public ownership and stock dividends. Particularly, they notice that the
relation between dividend policy and ownership structure is nonlinear, and that
the managers of Chinese listed companies are likely to cater for the preference
of different shareholders. They also find evidence on the effect of firm’s size,
debt, growth, profitability, and the listing time on cash dividends policy. Limiting
their study to a sample of 2397 observations in the 1996‐1999 period, Lee and
Xiao (2006) find that state‐owned firms in China have high propensity to
distribute cash dividend whereas controlling shareholders have low propensity
to subscribe rights offering. Block shareholders usually increase cash dividend
payments soon after rights offerings, which they consider as the potential
evidence in favor of the theory that cash dividends might aggregate the agency
problem because they are used by the controlling shareholders in Chinese list
companies as a vehicle for tunneling minority shareholders. They provide further
support by demonstrating that the market reacts negatively to cash dividend
announcements made by firms with intermediate or high shareholding
concentration. Recently, Chen et al. (2009) select a sample of a total of 8285
observations from 1990 to 2004 and use six dummy variables to proxy for
possible tunneling phenomenon. The empirical analysis supports the tunneling
theory by showing that Chinese listed companies with more differential pricing in
the IPO, a recent IPO or rights issue, or more concentrated ownership tend to
pay more cash dividends. They also show that companies that are ultimately
owned by the government tend to pay more cash dividends and that a dividend
19
increase is not necessarily associated with a higher contemporaneous stock
return. Interestingly, dividend increases accompanied by large IPO price
discounts, a recent‐year rights issue, an ROE qualified for rights issue, or great
dividend variation are associated with more negative stock returns than other
types of dividend increases. These results further support the conjecture that
dividends are possibly used by controlling shareholders to engage in tunneling
resources out of listed companies in China.
As there are a few relevant papers, a helpful glimpse of the overall situation of
cash dividends in China’s capital market is provided in Figure 1, in which cash
dividends for Chinese listed firms over nearly 20 years are demonstrated by
different kinds of ultimate controller. The first two years of dividend history of
China’s capital market are uninstructive and ignored because no more than 10
companies were listed in 1990 and 1991. Furthermore, the market was actually
in chaos before the foundation of Chinese Securities Regulatory Committee8
(CSRC) in 1992.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
8
It can be seen as the Chinese counterpart of SEC.
20
In terms of quantity, the average level of cash dividends is not very high in China
since it is below 0.1 RMB9 per share for most of the time, which supports LLSV’s
(2000) “outcome model” stating that countries with low investor protection will
issue less cash dividends. And the overall trend worth mentioning is that in terms
of cash dividends, both central‐government‐controlled type and local‐
government‐controlled type surpass non‐government‐controlled type in most
instances. In other words, firms with no government backgrounds, compared to
other firms, will always distribute less cash dividends. My brief explanation is
that, due to lack of funding resources from government, these private firms
would rather keep retained earnings within the companies themselves for better
investment opportunities than give them out to shareholders as cash dividends.
Particularly, I divide the whole process into three stages and analyze cash
dividends corresponding to the development of China’s capital market:
1. Preliminary Stage (1992‐1994):
After the initial chaos and disorder in 1990 and 1991, relevant authorities,
Securities Committee of the State Council and Chinese Securities Regulatory
Committee, were both founded in 1992 and hence development of China’s
capital market got on to the right track, which was further promoted by
subsequent and successive regulations and policies10 during this stage. The end
9
The currency unit of China is the Renminbi (RMB).
Main regulations include: “Notice of the State Council on Strengthen Macro‐management on Capital
Market”, “Interim Administrative Regulations on Stock Issuing and Trading” and “Interim Measures on
Forbidding the Securities Fraud”
10
21
of this era is marked by the implementation of Company Law of the People’s
Republic of China in July, 1994. It is clear that in this period, all three curves go
upward until the second half in 1994, indicating that cash dividends of all
companies increase during this stage as the fundamentals of companies become
well as a result of the ordering and standardization of China’s capital market.
2. Growth and Adjustment Stage (1994‐1999):
After 1994, China’s capital market began to grow rapidly with self‐correction
simultaneously, with important events emerging all the time. “Treasury Bond
Crisis” in March 27th, 1995, as called “China’s Bahrain Event” by the media,
shocked the country and even the world, which brought the first financial future
in China, the “treasury bond future”, to an end. It is clear from the graph that the
cash dividends undergo a plunge until 1996, possibly because of the aftereffect
from “Treasury Bond Crisis”.
After hitting the bottom one after another, three curves of cash dividends come
into the adjustment stage. Soon after the “price‐limit” system was established in
1996, the first influential security scandal in China’s capital market was exposed.
The controlling shareholders of Qiong Minyuan11 manipulated the stock price of
their firm using inflated profits, which, ironically, happened soon after “Notice
on Forbidding the Market Manipulation” was issued in October, 1996. To warn
11
A Chinese listed firm appeared excellent with good financial indicators.
22
public investors against Chinese listed firms with inferior quality, “Special
Treatment” policy came into existence in April, 1998. At this stage, the level of
cash dividends stops the prior falling tendency and demonstrates a relatively
stable phase.
3. Steady Progressing Stage (1999‐2008):
As important as Company Law, Securities Law was enacted in 1999. Two years
later, China became a member of World Trade Organization, and hence the
opening of China’s capital market entered the countdown stage, which is
followed by the establishment of QFII12. Two extremely crucial regulations are
carried out afterward. “Some Opinions of the State Council on Promoting the
Reform, Opening and Steady Growth of Capital Markets” in 2004 set the tone for
the future development of China’s capital market while “Notice of the China
Securities Regulatory Commission on Piloting the Share‐trading Reform of Listed
Companies” in 2005 indicated the initiation of addressing the historical issue of
split‐share structure. Most recently, Growth Enterprise Market (GEM), lying in an
embryo stage for nearly 10 years, was finally established and available to
investors. Therefore, it is safe to say that, during this stage, with the foundation
of a nationwide market and further essential regulations, China’s capital market
moved forward firmly and soundly. Correspondingly, in spite of little ups and
12
QFII refers to Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors.
23
downs, cash dividends of Chinese listed companies are experiencing an stable
upward stage as a whole.
3. Institutional Background and Hypothesis Development
China, a socialist country with planned economy until 1978 and civil law system,
has weak investor protection, and thus China is predestined to have its own
features in the development of capital market and listed companies. In this
section, I will first analyze my research target, Chinese local governments, and
then go further to detail the unique forming process of Chinese listed companies
and their split‐share structure. On the basis of introducing the split‐share
structure reform, I finally develop my hypotheses.
3.1. Origin of Ownership Structure of Chinese Listed Firms
The initial aim for Chinese stock market is to transfer the government’s
responsibility to fund the state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) to financial
intermediaries. This leads to the situation that almost two thirds of Chinese
listed firms, especially the giant ones or the old ones, are carved out of SOEs. In
order to satisfy rigorous restrictions13 of CSRC, parent‐SOEs will usually choose
13
These include stringent quota on IPO, the volume of offering, the asset valuation, and the P/E multiple for
IPO pricing.
24
most profitable parts to be the main body of forthcoming listed companies while
keeping those less prolific parts within them.
Simultaneously, two types of shares of Chinese listed companies are formed:
negotiable shares and non‐negotiable shares. Non‐negotiable shares, which
account for the absolute bigger fraction of total shares until 2005, are sold to
controlling shareholders, usually parent‐SOEs or governments who are behind
them, at a significant discount14 compared to the market price, which public
shareholders have to pay in their purchase of negotiable shares. And these non‐
negotiable shares can only be traded under administrative commands or private
placement, which make them irrelevant to the highs and lows in the stock
market. It is extremely costly for those block shareholders to make their “home‐
made” dividends. Hence, paying cash dividends become the only convenient and
effective way for the controlling shareholders, most of whom are associated with
governments, to compensate for the loss of capital gain in the market and to
recoup revenues for their own equity in the listed firms.
This is, obviously, unfair for public investors from the beginning because when
negotiable shares of state‐owned corporations are eventually available in stock
markets, public investors trade the shares according to the market prices, which
14
For these non‐negotiable shares, actually, not only the purchase cost is lower, the transaction cost and
the holding cost are both lower, which equals a much higher dividend yield.
25
are several times higher than the investment costs of state and legal persons15.
The situation is worse for minority shareholders when controlling shareholders
issue more cash dividends. In other words, the higher the market prices are, the
higher investment costs are for public investors, while the investment costs of
state shareholders are relatively low. Therefore, for the same cash dividends per
share, other things being equal, the difference of investment return from cash
dividends between these two classes of shareholders is fairly wide. Hence,
despite of the level of cash dividends, China’s investors might not be highly
interested in cash dividends since they are treated differently from control
shareholders.
There is also difference between central government and local governments,
two main kinds of controlling shareholders. First and foremost, decentralization
provides local governments with more freedom to act as an independent
economic entity while they simultaneously face huge economic burden such as
infrastructure investment and compulsory education. Ever since the 1980s,
China’s local governments have gained increased control over such resources as
land, financial capital and human capital, including Chinese listed companies in
the process of promoting regional economies by innovating, reforming and
competing with each other (Cao et al., 1999). Therefore, local governments, with
strong incentives to boost regional economies, either implement favorable
15
Chen and Xiong (2001) find that on average, prices of non‐negotiable shares of a firm are only 14%‐22% of
those of negotiable shares of the same firm. Equivalently, for the same level of dividend payout ratio, block
shareholders will have a dividend yield that is 4.55‐7.14 times more than minority shareholders do.
26
policies to support firms, or, more conveniently, centralize resources by
extracting resources out of firms. Secondly, we focus on local governments not
only because they account for the majority of controlling shareholders, which we
will show later, but also because managers in other two kinds of controlling
shareholders are not differently monitored to certain extent 16 . Since the
tunneling behaviors in this paper are carried out by local governments, I consider
this particular type of expropriation behavior as state expropriation.
To sum up, China’s local governments have incentives and abilities to “liquidate
their rights” and tunnel minority shareholders by distributing more cash
dividends. This provides the basis for us to formulate the first two hypotheses:
H1: If a firm is ultimately controlled by a local government, it will on average
distribute more cash dividends than the firm not controlled by a local
government does.
H2: It will be more likely for firms owned by local governments to pay cash
dividends than those without local government backgrounds.
16
Some people may think that firms controlled by central government should be better monitored so that
they will issue more cash dividends since central government is more powerful. The reason why the central‐
government‐controlled enterprises will be no better monitored than the ones in the non‐government‐
controlled firms lies in the fact that every penny earned in a private firm has something to do with the self‐
interest of the ultimate controller, which is different from the state‐owned assets squandered away by
irresponsible managers. In other words, managers in private firms will be monitored no less than their
counterparts in the central‐government‐controlled enterprises since people are selfish and cares more
about their own private assets.
27
3.2. Split‐share Structure Reform
The split of non‐negotiable shares and negotiable shares are formed for various
reasons. In the early days when Chinese stock market was established, the
circulation of state‐owned shares was suspended due to the concern that
newborn Chinese stock market is not mature enough to sustain the shock of full
circulation of shares. There was an attempt called “reduction of state's stake in
listed companies” (beginning from the second half of 1998) before the split‐
share structure reform took place to address the reality that shares of the same
firm did not “share” the same right and the same price. However, this reduction
scheme was brought to a halt in 1999 due to the gap between the effect and the
expectation. Another attempt is “Interim Measures of the State Council on the
Management of Reducing Held State Shares and Raising Social Security Funds”
proposed by the State Council in 2001, which was also suspended in the same
year since the market response was not good.
After several attempts, the split‐share structure reform, a popular policy as it is,
finally rose to the occasion at a historical moment in 2005. CSRC initiated the
split‐share structure reform in April 29th, 2005, which was marked by “Notice on
the Trial Implementation of Measures on Full Circulation Reform for Listed
Companies and Related Questions”. Later in the same year, two other important
28
policy documents17 were issued, indicating that the split‐share structure reform
is fully underway. In spite of some difficulties as expected, the authorities
maintained a firm attitude towards the reform18. Indeed, up until the end of
2008, 1304 Chinese listed firms in both Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen
Stock Exchange, which account for about 98% of the total companies, have
undergone or accomplished the reform. However, an unresolved question is:
how effective is it? Since the split‐share structure reform is targeted to help
minority shareholders out of the disadvantage situation, I naturally hypothesize
that it will be able to depress the state expropriation by reducing cash dividend
payouts. More formally:
H3: After the split‐share structure reform, less cash dividends should be
observed.
H4: The possibility of paying cash dividends by Chinese listed firms owned by
local governments will be lowered after the reform.
17
They refer to “Guiding Opinions of the China Securities Regulatory Commission, State‐owned Assets
Supervision and Administration Commission, Ministry of Finance, People’s Bank of China, and the Ministry
of Commerce on Share‐trading Reform of Listed Companies” in Aug. 23th, 2005 and “the Measures for the
Administration of the Share‐trading Reform of Listed Companies” in Sep. 4th, 2005.
18
To demonstrate the resolution to completely carry out the reform, Chairman of CSRC made the famous
argument: “There is no coming back for an arrow once you pull the bow”.
29
4. Sample and Data
4.1. Sample
I obtain the basic (asset, liability, total shares, cash, net sales and so on), financial
(ROA, ROE), owner concentration (shareholding percentage of top 3, 5, and 10
shareholders) and split‐share structure reform data from CSMAR (China Stock
Market Accounting Research) developed by Shenzhen GTA information
technology company. Ultimate controller data are mainly extracted out of the
annual reports from two website: www.jrj.com.cn and www.stockstar.com.cn19.
The nature of ultimate controller20 is judged by the authors with assistance from
annual reports, authoritative media, and official websites of these public firms. A
listed firm is considered to be owned by the local government if the ultimate
controller is a local government or the local state‐owned assets supervision and
administration commission of the state council. If the ultimate controller is the
state‐owned assets supervision and administration commission of the state
council or it is one of the extremely important firms21 directly controlled by the
central government, it is classified as a firm owned by the central government.
The rest are categorized as the non‐government‐controlled type.
19
“JRJ” (NASDAQ: JRJC) was established in 1999 and funded mainly by IDG and vertex in the early stage. It is
one of the leading Chinese financial information suppliers and one of the largest Chinese financial websites.
“JRJ” acquired “Stockstar” in Aug. 15th, 2006.
20
Every Chinese listed firm will fall in one of the three following categories: local‐government‐controlled
type, central‐government‐controlled type, and non‐government‐controlled type.
21
There is a list on: http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1226/n2425/index.html.
30
The sample is chosen from all Chinese firms listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange
and Shenzhen Stock Exchange in the 2003‐2008 period, and is subjected to the
following screening criteria:
(1) Rule out all financial firms (all firms in the financial industry according to the
CSRC industry classification 22 ) due to the unique features of corporate
governance and daily operation.
(2) B shares 23 are excluded since their accounting policies and corporate
governance practices are quite different from their A share counterparts.
(3) Observations listed less than a year are deleted24 to ensure that dividends
were not affected by a new listing.
(4) Observations that undergo a loss are dropped25.
(5) Observations that have negative cash flow will be excluded26.
After implementing these standards, I obtain a final full sample of 4,609 firm‐
year observations across six years. Then I winsorize the top and bottom 1% of
financial variables of this sample to eliminate the potential influences that
outliers have on the research results.
22
I will describe the whole industry classification of CSRC in the sample distribution.
B share is a special kind of Chinese stock, whose formal name is “Domestically Listed Foreign Investment
Shares”. It carries a par value denominated in RMB, and is subscribed and traded in foreign currencies in
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The main investors are limited to foreign (including Hong Kong,
Macau and Taiwan) natural persons, legal persons and other organizations.
24
In other words, I only keep observations with the gap (between foundation date and the dividend
announcement) larger than 1 year.
25
Logic behind this criterion include: 1. Regulations discourage firms losing money to pay cash dividend; 2.
Chen, Lee, and Li (2003) argue that the firm at loss faces potential suspension of listing. They may use cash
dividends to play a game of completely different nature which is beyond the scope of current study.
26
This is following the setup in LLSV (2000).
23
31
4.2. Variables
The variables used in this regression are detailed in Table 1.
[Insert Table 1 here]
I have two dependent variables, Cash Dividends over Sales27, and Cash Dividends
over Assets28, which are defined in Table 1. As to independent variables, three
main key variables: Lgov, Reform and Lgov*Reform, all of which are dummy
variables, are used in the analysis.
The first measure Lgov determines whether the company is ultimately controlled
by the local government. It equals 1 if the ultimate controller of the listed
company is a local government or the state‐owned assets supervision and
administration commission of a local government. I predict that local‐
government‐controlled firms are more inclined to distribute cash dividends in
order to reap more gains from minority shareholders, or the state expropriation
is graver when the listed firm has a local government as the ultimate controller.
27
LLSV (2000), Faccio Mara, Larry H. P. Lang, and Leslie Young (2001) both use similar dependent variables.
Chen Donghua, Ming Jian, Ming Xu (2009) also use this as the dependent variable.
28
32
The next key proxy is Reform. The original goal for this milestone event is to
protect the minority shareholders, just as what CSRC claims. Since I define this
dummy to be 1 if a dividend‐paying activity is after the reform ending date of a
firm, 0 otherwise, I expect the sign of this coefficient to be negative if the reform
is effective. That is, cash dividends, which are utilized by controlling shareholders
to tunnel minority shareholders, should be less after the reform. In other words,
the phenomenon of state expropriation should be alleviated after the reform.
The third key variable is the interaction term of Lgov and Rdate_dummy. I am
interested in exploring the difference of changes of cash dividends between
different groups of Chinese listed companies. More specifically, I expect to do
some comparison about the dividend changes when I compare local‐
government‐controlled type with other two types respectively after the
momentous event.
Various control variables are also involved in the analysis, conforming to either
prior literature or the current situation of China’s capital market:
Following Fama and French (2001), Faccio et al. (2001), I include Size, which is
defined as the natural logarithm of total assets. A bigger firm will generally have
more financial resources and material resources to sustain a long‐term stable
33
cash dividends policy. Hence, it is reasonable to think that the bigger a Chinese
listed firm is, the more resources it have, and the more cash dividends it will pay.
In line with LLSV (2000), I consider the impact that sales growth, proxied by
Investment Opportunity, has on cash dividends. Particularly, average annual
percentage growth of net sales from 2003‐2008 is calculated for every firm in the
sample, which are then ranked into 10 equal‐size groups in ascending order. It is
expected that if the firm is in the preliminary stage of its development, it is more
than likely that it will be parsimonious while distributing cash dividends due to
the big capital requirement for rapid growth.
According to Faccio et al. (2001), I deem it necessary to include Leverage, which
equals total liabilities divided by total assets, in the analysis. Due to the
imposition of debt covenants and the fact that huge state‐owned banks are
essential creditors in Chinese listed companies, the ability of managers to
splurge free cash flow will be greatly restricted. They will have no better
alternatives but to distribute the money from retained earnings rather than
squander it to build their own empires. So I expect to see a negative relation
between debt‐to‐assets ratio and cash dividends.
34
As DeAngelo et al. (2004) emphasize in their paper29, I take Cash Holdings, which
equals cash over total assets, into account and assume that more cash holdings
of a firm, which means more cash resources at discretion, will lead to more cash
dividends.
Consistent with Fama and French (2001), who find that dividend‐paying firms are
more profitable and larger than those non‐payers, I cannot ignore the
Profitability factor in this paper. I use the indicator of return of asset in the main
body of the paper and use return of equity in the robustness test, and predict
that these financial indicators should be positively related to cash dividend
payouts.
Since my research target is Chinese listed companies, it is more appropriate to
add some variables to deal with uniqueness of China’s capital market. Block
Shareholders play an extremely important role in Chinese listed firms. Seasoned
New Issue and Rights Offering are unique phenomena in China’s capital market30.
For example, if the coefficient of Rights Issuing is positive and significant, I
consider it the evidence of tunneling since the right issuing activities do have a
connection with the forthcoming cash dividends distribution. In other words, the
29
Counter‐intuitively, they find that dividend payers have lower cash/total assets ratio than non‐payers.
30
In their EFMA Basel Meetings Paper, Wei et al. (2004) put top 10 ownership concentration into their
regression framework. In Lee et al. (2006) and Chen et al. (2009) they use dummy variables to proxy for
these particular Chinese elements.
35
controlling shareholders are actually using the receipt from rights issuing to
distribute cash dividends31.
Following similar logic and method, I add several variables presented in Table 1.
Top 3 shareholders’ share‐holding percentage is used in the main analysis and
corresponding top 5 shareholders’ share‐holding percentage and top 10
shareholders’ share‐holding percentage in the sensitivity analysis. Moreover,
Bureaus of Finance fall within a special group of government organizations,
which is anything but finance‐constrained. Thus if the ultimate controller of a
public firm is certain Bureau of Finance, I conjecture that its motive to tunnel the
listed firm by distributing cash dividends will be weaken and that a negative
between Bureaus of Finance and cash dividends proxies should be observed.
Additionally, I think the influence of global financial crisis at the end of year 2008
cannot be ignored. Since it is the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers that pulls the
trigger of the outbreak of this global financial disaster, I define this Year dummy
to be 1 if the dividends‐paying scheme is after the global financial crisis and 0
otherwise. I expect to observe this dummy be negatively related to cash
31
According to Lee and Xiao (2006), in the 1996‐2001 period, non‐negotiable shareholders only subscribe
on average 29% of the shares allocated to them in rights offering whereas negotiable shareholders nearly
subscribe all. Thus it is equivalent to sell non‐negotiable shares to minority shareholders. As the freshly
raised money is consumed by the parent SOE, this “quasi‐ponzi‐game” activity can be regarded as tunneling
against minority shareholders, who are actually put into a very disadvantageous position since they are paid
by their own money.
36
dividends because I suppose that firms cannot recover quickly from the crisis and
hence their profit, in turn their cash dividends, will be reduced.
Finally, I control for differences among all industries defined in the CSRC industry
classification except for the financial industry since it is excluded in the sample
selection.
4.3. Summary Statistics
The descriptive statistics of all involved variables are reported in Table 2, Panel A.
Statistics show consistently that, in terms of both two measures of dividends
from 2003‐2008, majority of Chinese listed companies barely give out any cash
dividends32, which agrees with the curves obtained in Figure 1 and LLSV’s (2000)
outcome model. More specifically, the medians of Cash Dividends over Sales and
Cash Dividends over Assets are close to each other and not very much different
from zero. And the means of dividend payouts do not deviate much from their
corresponding medians, which imply that there is a comparatively small positive
skew in the distribution of the cash dividend payouts since the mean is larger
than the median.
32
This is the same as the results of most papers concerning cash dividends of Chinese listed firms.
37
Key proxies are investigated first. Considering the setting of Lgov, I can deduct
that over half of the sample corporations will be ultimately associated with local
governments, which is unique in China’s capital market. Additionally, I could
discern from the data that more than half of the dividends‐issuing activities take
place after the firms accomplish the reform.
[Insert Table 2 here]
It makes more sense to focus on the non‐dummy variables such as Size, Leverage,
and Cash Holdings in this part, their statistics are also demonstrated in Table 2,
Panel A. It is obvious that data of all three variables have approximate means
and medians, which again prove that the data in this paper are not skewed to a
great extent. Interestingly, the median and the mean of Leverage are both
almost one half, which suggest that nearly half of the total assets of Chinese
listed firms rely relatively heavily on debt. Considering the fact that Chinese bond
market is much less developed than Chinese stock market and that most debt
can be traced back to large state‐owned banks, I can safely conclude that banks
actually have a big say in the corporate governance policies, including dividends
policies, of these Chinese listed firms. It is not surprising to see that the mean
and the median of ROA are in a reasonable range. My sample firms have a mean
(median) of 52.51% (53.24%) for ownership concentration, a figure slightly more
than one half, confirming that the phenomenon of block shareholders prevails in
38
Chinese listed companies, which is also consistent with many other works (See
Cleassens, Djankov and Lang (2000), and Laporta, Lopez‐De‐Silanes and Shleifer
(1999)).
The ownership structure of sample firms across different industries is reported in
Table 2, Panel B. More than half of the sample firms come from the raw
materials industry. It is clear that apart from few industries, such as
communication and multi‐industry, sample companies in most industries are
directly or indirectly controlled by local governments, and that the percentage of
local‐government‐controlled firms are relatively higher for those critical
industries relevant to the national economy and the people's livelihood such as
mineral, energy, transportation and so on. As a whole, I could again arrive at the
conclusion that observations with local government backgrounds account for
nearly half of the sample, which reflects a unique feature of Chinese listed firms
and China’s capital market.
Table 3 presents Pearson correlation coefficients (Panel A) and Spearman
correlation coefficients (Panel B) respectively. As can be seen from these two
panels, almost all corresponding pairs of coefficients in these two panels are
both quantitative and qualitatively similar. To illustrate, only Panel A is analyzed
as follows.
39
[Insert Table 3 here]
It is not surprising to find that Cash Dividends over Sales and Cash Dividends over
Assets are related to each other since both are indicators of the dividend policy
of a firm. What is more interesting is that both two dividend indicators are
positively and significantly related to Lgov, which might be the first clue that a
positive relation exists between an ultimate controller with local government
background and more cash dividends. Reform is negatively and significantly
related to both two cash dividends indexes, which means that after the reform,
cash dividends become less on average. This could be the first piece of evidence
that cash dividends are associated with tunneling in Chinese listed companies
since the reform is targeted, at least claimed by the authorities, to remove the
deformed inequality. It also indicates that the censorable situation is mitigated
after the reform, and that reform is unfavorable to local government. There is
also a positive and significant relation between Size and all three dependent
variables, which suggests that more cash dividends are related to bigger listed
firms. The same relation exists between Lgov and Size, indicating that larger
Chinese listed corporations are usually controlled by local governments.
Leverage is found to be consistently negatively and significantly related to three
dividends measures, implying that if a Chinese listed firm has more debt, it will
issue less cash dividends. It is also interesting that Leverage and Size have a
positive and significant association. My explanation is that it will be easier for
40
larger firms, which are often controlled by governments, to obtain loans from
huge state‐owned banks, leading to a relatively high leverage ratio.
Similarly, Cash Holdings, Profitability and Block Shareholders are all found to be
positively and significantly related to Cash Dividends over Sales and Cash
Dividends over Assets. I consider it reasonable since Chinese listed firms with
block shareholders and with local governments as ultimate controllers usually
have the power (either monopolistic or non‐monopolistic) to make themselves
profitable, and have more cash in hand, a relation that could be perfectly
corroborated by the positive and significant correlation coefficients.
5. Empirical results
5.1. Alternative Explanations
The goal of this paper is to test whether more cash dividends are related to
Chinese listed firms controlled by local governments and whether those firms
will distribute less cash dividends after the reform. However, it can be argued
that even less cash dividends are observed, it may not necessarily be the result
of the reform. This could be that controlling shareholders are losing their power
because part of or even all of the non‐negotiable shares controlled by them
41
become circulated in the capital market after the reform33 may lead to less cash
dividend payouts as well.
I test the average shareholding percentage of the top shareholder both before
the reform and after the reform to see whether there exists a material change
around the reform period, calculate the check‐and‐balance ratios around the
reform, and prove that the power of controlling shareholders are not reduced on
average.
[Insert Table 4 here]
From Panel A, it seems clear that, on average, the change in shareholding
percentage of the top shareholder is around ‐7%, and that its 95% confidence
interval is about 1%, from nearly ‐6.5% to ‐7.5%, which appears to justify the
doubt that the largest shareholder’s influence is less than before since its
shareholding percentage is decreasing on average and the significance is found
in the paired t‐test.
In Panel B, I define the check‐and‐balance ratio as the ratio of sum of
shareholding percentage of top 3 shareholders over the shareholding percentage
of the largest shareholder, and test whether this ratio increases since the largest
33
Actually, circulation schemes of the non‐negotiable shares are related to the unique compensation
method in the reform, which is called “Consideration Scheme”. I will give more details about it in the
following paragraphs when I deal with another concern.
42
shareholder becomes less powerful as the concern states. To the contrary, the
check‐and‐balance ratio decreases, in spite of the small magnitude and
moderate significance, by 0.017, which means that the extent to which the
largest shareholder is constrained by other top shareholders slightly goes down.
This certainly address the above concern because I can safely assume that the
power of the largest shareholder, or of the ultimate controller who behind it, is
not considerably weaken due to the decline in the check‐and‐balance ratio. In
other words, the largest shareholder, or the ultimate controller behind it, is as
strong as before so that its influence on the corporate governance decisions, in
this case the scheme of cash dividends, will not be compromised.
Summary statistics presented in Panel C offer further evidence to support this
point. Check‐and‐balance ratios, in terms of means, remain qualitatively the
same both before and after the reform and there is no distinct change taking
place as a whole.
Another potential concern is that different “Consideration Schemes34” may have
different influences on the distribution of cash dividends of Chinese listed
companies. Before I quote some results from related literature to prove that the
34
In the Chinese split‐share structure reform, the general process for a final consideration is as follows:
Firstly, the shareholders of non‐negotiable shareholders, usually the controlling shareholders, propose a
consideration scheme to compensate the shareholders of negotiable shareholders, usually the minority
shareholders. Then the shareholders of negotiable shareholders have the right to vote for or against the
plan. The process will go on until the majority of shareholders of negotiable shareholders approve the
scheme.
43
concern is unnecessary, I list all four cases of consideration schemes as follows in
order to shed light on this specific production of China’s capital market:
1. Return of Premium: Before the reform, the general level of P/E of listed
companies with non‐negotiable shares exceeds that of listed companies under
the full circulation circumstance, which is more reasonable. The difference
between these two levels should be returned to the shareholders of negotiable
shares, compensating the difference in the initial purchase costs for these two
different shares.
2. Constant Circulation Market Value: First obtain the reasonable stock price of a
public firm in the full circulation case either by referring to estimated value of
similar listed firms both at home and abroad or by using certain evaluation
methods. Since the interests of shareholders of negotiable shares could be hurt
by the non‐negotiable shares, shareholders of non‐negotiable shares should pay
for the price difference in order to keep the circulation market value of the listed
firm constant. In other words, circulation market capitalization of the list
company will not be influenced by the split‐share structure reform.
3. Constant Total Market Value: The only difference between this method and
the second method is that the hypothesis here is that total market capitalization
will not change after the reform.
44
4. Pseudo subscription warrant: Subscription warrant is a kind of security that
allows the owner to have the right, not the obligation, to buy common stocks of
the issuing company with pre‐determined price in a certain period of time, which
offers a new form of payment from shareholders of non‐negotiable shares to
those of negotiable shares. When the shareholders of non‐negotiable shares are
short of cash or the percentage of negotiable shares is very small, they could
issue such warrants to pay the consideration value to the other side.
Although there are various theoretical principles concerning consideration
schemes, empirical papers discussing about the consideration schemes provide
opposite and interesting results. One of the most representative papers might be
Shen et al. (2006). Using a full sample of all listed companies undergoing the
reform from 2005 to 2006, they find a striking result that the consideration levels
present remarkable “clustering” properties. Specifically, nearly all firms choose
bonus shares as their consideration scheme and the average level is 3 bonus
shares per 10 shares, among which three kinds of schemes including 2 bonus
shares per 10 shares, 3 bonus shares per 10 shares and 4 bonus shares per 10
shares account for as high as 87.16%35. From scatter points in Figure 2 (quoted
from the original paper of Shen et al. (2006)), it is clear that majority of listed
firms, except for a few outliers, are clustered in the interval from 2 to 4.
35
One explanation is that consideration schemes are more related to the market shares of different
investment banks in the Chinese sponsor market, which is beyond the scope of this article and will not be
detailed here.
45
[Insert Figure 2 here]
Consequently, since nearly all firms choose similar consideration schemes and
will be influenced at the same level, it can be argued that differences in
“Consideration Schemes” are not affecting the findings of this paper.
5.2. Regression Results
In this section, I first examine determinants of dividend payments of Chinese
listed companies using the sub‐sample of local‐government‐controlled type and
central‐government‐controlled type, and then investigate the cash dividends of
Chinese listed firms with another sub‐sample of local‐government‐controlled
type and non‐government‐controlled type. Finally, I explore the possibility of
distributing cash dividends both before the reform and after the reform with
these two sub‐samples.
The following regression models are used to test my hypotheses:
Cash Dividends over Sales = α0 + β1Key Proxies + β2Size + β3Investment Opportunity +
β4Leverage + β5Cash + β6Profitability + β7Block Shareholders + β8Stock Dividends + β9Bureau
of Finance + β10Seasoned New Issue + β11 Right Issuing + β12Year + β13Industry dummies + ɛ
46
(1)
Cash Dividends over Assets = α0 + β1Key Proxies + β2Size + β3Investment Opportunity +
β4Leverage + β5Cash + β6Profitability + β7Block Shareholders + β8Stock Dividends + β9Bureau
of Finance + β10Seasoned New Issue + β11 Right Issuing + β12Year + β13Industry dummies + ɛ
(2)
Probability of Paying Cash Dividends = α0 + β1Key Proxies + β2Size + β3Investment
Opportunity + β4Leverage + β5Cash + β6Profitability + β7Block Shareholders + β8Stock
Dividends + β9Bureau of Finance + β10Seasoned New Issue + β11 Right Issuing + β12Year +
β13Industry dummies + ɛ (3)
Definitions of these variables in above equations are detailed in Section 4 and
Table 1. In order to better compare local‐government‐controlled type with other
two types, I divide the sample into two sub‐samples: local‐government‐
controlled type versus central‐government‐controlled type, and local‐
government‐controlled type versus non‐government‐controlled type.
I use pooled cross‐sectional time‐series data, employ a series of ordinary least
squares (OLS) regressions analyses and calculate Newey‐West adjusted t‐
statistics for which the error structure is assumed to be heteroskedastic and
possibly autocorrelated to some lags36. The regression results are presented in
36
Peterson (2008) claims that only clustered standard errors are unbiased as they account for the residual
dependence created by the firm effect. Meanwhile, he admits that not all present finance paper use
47
Table 5 and 6. In both tables, the regression equations are significant in terms of
F value and no obvious multi‐collinearity is found due to the tests of VIF.
5.2.1 Local‐government‐controlled Type versus Central‐
government‐controlled Type
Table 5 reports the results of regressions of the first sub‐sample, which contains
3,244 firm‐year observations and compares the local‐government‐controlled
type with the non‐local‐government controlled type. Three different models are
used with two different dependent variables. Results are presented when I use
Cash Dividends over Sales as the dependent variable in Panel A while Cash
Dividends over Assets is employed in Panel B.
The regressions are highly significant in terms of F value and explain more than
30 (46) percent of the variation in Cash Dividends over Sales (Assets). Most of the
variables have t‐statistics well above 2.0 and enter the regressions with
hypothesized signs.
Let us consider the key proxies first. Lgov dummy enters all three regression
models with a positive and significant coefficient at no more than 5 percent level
clustered standard errors. Additionally, some papers closely related to my topic do not use clustered
standard errors: Huang, Shen, and Sun (2009), Chen et al.(2009), Wei et al. (2003) et al. Hence, I choose OLS
regressions analyses and use Newey‐West adjusted t‐statistics for adjustment
48
in regressions using both two measures of cash dividends. Using Cash Dividends
over Sales as the dependent variable in all three models, for example, a Chinese
listed firm ultimately controlled by a local government will pay out nearly 0.01
RMB more per RMB of sales, compared to those companies ultimately controlled
by central government. The result is statistically and economically significant
considering the evidence that Chinese listed firms are “parsimonious” when they
issue cash dividends. Consistent with my first state expropriation hypothesis, my
result has revealed that relatively finance‐constrained and opportunistic local
governments, compared to the central government, resort to tunneling activities
and are liquidating their interests in Chinese listed companies by issuing more
cash dividends.
Then focus on the next model where I take the split‐share structure reform into
account. When Cash Dividends over Assets serves as the dependent variable, for
example, it is clear that public firms controlled by these two different kinds of
governments will cut their dividend payouts by 0.0017 RMB per RMB of assets
on average after the split‐share structure reform. The corresponding figure falls
more sharply (almost ‐0.005 RMB per RMB of sales) when Cash Dividends over
Sales is the dependent variable. The negative and significant sign implies that the
split‐share structure reform, which is claimed by the CSRC to be beneficial to the
minority shareholders, do have obvious effect. The extent to which the
controlling shareholders could tunnel the minority shareholders by paying more
49
cash dividends is mitigated because less cash dividends are observed after the
milestone event.
To further explore the relationship, I examine the relative magnitude of this
dividend‐cut behavior between these two types of government‐controlled firms
in the last model by including the interaction term between the Lgov dummy and
the Reform dummy into the regression. Take Panel A for example, where Cash
Dividends over Asset is the dependent variable, the coefficient of Reform is still
negative yet insignificant, indicating that central‐government‐controlled firms
reduce their dividends distribution by 0.0032 RMB per RMB of sales after the
reform; while the sum of the coefficient of Reform and the coefficient of
Reform*Lgov suggests that the cut in local‐government‐controlled listed firms’
dividends is 0.0052 RMB per RMB of sales after the reform. Consequently, the
negative yet insignificant coefficient of Reform*Lgov reflects the idea that if
firms are controlled by local governments and have completed their reform, they
on average cut their cash dividends by 0.0020 RMB more per RMB of sales than
firms with the central government as the ultimate controller do. Back to my
second hypothesis, the state expropriation is slightly alleviated by the split‐share
reform. My best explanation behind this is that after the reform, more non‐
negotiable shares become circulated in the stock market, and thus controlling
shareholders’ shares will be diluted. Since public investors are aware of the
unfavorable cash dividends and the state expropriation, the stock price is likely
50
to plunge if a Chinese listed firm’s cash dividends are still high after the reform
and the probability that the firm will be taken over by outsiders increases. To
avoid losing control of the company, controlling shareholders, especially those
local governments, would tend to decrease state expropriation by cutting cash
dividends to a relatively bigger extent. Although I cannot put too much weight on
this result due to the insignificance of Reform*Lgov in the last model, it does
shed some light on the future possible research avenues due to the consistent
signs of these coefficients across models with two different dependent variables
and across different sub‐samples.
[Insert Table 5 here]
Besides these key proxies, various other variables controlling for other potential
dividends determinants are also estimated. Nearly all coefficients are consistent
across these 3 different models in Panel A and Panel B, and most of them fall
within my prediction. To illustrate, I will only describe Panel A since results
obtained in Panel B are similar.
Larger companies are found to issue more dividends, as indicated by the positive
and significant coefficient of Size. This can be traced back to prior works in which
larger firms, usually with less growth opportunities, tend to have more resources
to be distributed as cash dividends.
51
Firms with greater growth opportunities, proxied by Investment Opportunity,
give out less cash dividends, which agree with my prediction and previous
literature review. Since firms with faster growth speed require large capital
investment, it is a natural choice for them to keep retained earnings in the
company to fuel future growth. Although I am rather confident due to the fact
that the sign of the coefficient remain unchanged across different models with
different dependent variable, caution is still necessary since the coefficient on
this dummy is not significant.
As expected, a significant and negative correlation between debt‐to‐asset ratio
and cash dividends is found. In other words, highly‐leveraged firms distribute
less dividends compared to other firms because banks, who are the main
creditors for Chinese listed companies, usually place many constrains on the
debtors by signing complicated and detailed ex‐ante borrowing covenants to
restrict the use for the borrowing money so that flexibility for cash dividends is
very limited.
Profitability might be the most easily understandable variable among all the
control variables. Coefficients are positive across three different models both
statistically and economically significant. Meaning, if a Chinese listed firm could
52
generate more profit, it will be able to possess more resources from which
dividends could be extracted.
With regard to the control variables with Chinese characteristics, Block
Shareholders is one the most worth noticing, which is found to be positively and
significantly correlated to cash dividends proxies, indicating that if the majority
of all shares of a Chinese listed company is controlled by a few large
shareholders, it will tend to issue more cash dividends. This unsurprising result
justifies previous explanations and is in accordance with my hypothesis claiming
that controlling shareholders are actually using cash dividends to expropriate
minority shareholders.
The negative and significant coefficients of Stock Dividends reveal that if a
Chinese public company issue more cash dividends, it will distribute relatively
less stock dividends, and vice versa. In other words, it tell the story that, in the
view of minority shareholders, stock dividends and cash dividends are
substitutes for each other.
As to Seasoned New Issue and Rights Issuing, I can conclude that there is only a
few evidence regarding cash dividends being utilized by controlling shareholders
to tunnel minority shareholders since neither coefficient of these two control
variables is found to be significant. My explanation to this is that my sample
53
period is from 2003 to 2008, during which these two pre‐financing activities are
not as frequent as they used to be.
It is consistent to my prediction that Bureau of Finance is negatively and
significantly related to cash dividends. Because it is highly impossible that a
bureau of finance will be short of financial income, its incentive to expropriate
minority shareholders through cash dividends will not be as strong as other kinds
of controlling shareholders.
I also find that financial crisis reduced the cash dividends because of its
disastrous influence on daily operation and financial performance of listed firms
in the emerging countries such as China. Since I have excluded firms in financial
sector, the overall effect could be stronger.
Regression results of industry controlled variables are no less interesting. Three
industries are found to be positively and significantly correlated with cash
dividends: energy, transportation, and social service, which are the industries
concerning the national economy and the people's livelihood. It is reasonable
that these industries will be inclined to issue more cash dividends because these
industries are often controlled by governments. This evidence actually lends
partial support to the conclusion that local‐government‐controlled listed
companies will have higher payout ratio.
54
5.2.2 Local‐government‐controlled Type versus Non‐government‐
controlled Type
A similar estimating approach is taken in Table 6, except that now I am
comparing local‐government‐controlled type with listed firms with no
government backgrounds, and my analysis focus will be on any distinct
difference compared to the results in Table 5.
All three models are still significant and nearly all of the coefficients enter the
regression models with forecasted signs and significance.
[Insert Table 6 here]
In spite of the changes in the magnitude of the coefficients, I am not aware of
any particular difference in place with the key proxies, and their coefficients in
Table 6 still corroborate previous conclusions. That is, similar relations still exist
between local‐government‐controlled type and non‐government‐controlled type.
One point worth noticing is that the t‐statistic of Reform*Lgov is very near the
10% significance level, which implies that when I compare Chinese listed
companies ultimately owned by local governments with those non‐government‐
controlled listed firms, I am more confident to conclude that, after the split‐
55
share structure reform, the local‐government‐controlled firms will reduce their
cash dividends more than firms not ultimately owned by local governments do.
With respect to different control variables, I find that the majority of their
coefficients are qualitatively the same as those in the last comparison group. For
example, large firms or firms controlled by concentrated block shareholders are
still found to issue more cash dividends. The pre‐financing dummies are still not
significantly related to the cash dividends. Additionally, Cash Holdings is
positively and significantly correlated with both cash dividends proxies since the
missing significance in the previous case is found. All in all, previous analyses
could still apply when I compare local‐government‐controlled firms with non‐
government‐controlled firms.
5.3. Logistic Regressions
To further support previous results, I use logistic regressions to examine the
possibility of distributing cash dividends both before and after the reform. Table
7 and Table 8 present results of these regression results. From the coefficients in
these tables, before the reform, Chinese listed companies with local
governments as ultimate controllers are more likely to distribute cash dividends
in comparison with either central‐government‐controlled type or non‐
government‐controlled type, which proves my hypotheses and supports previous
56
findings. Moreover, such propensity to pay cash dividends declines after the
reform, which is in favor of my forecast and lend further support to my
hypotheses. In other words, the state expropriation phenomenon, in terms of
the probability to distribute cash dividends, does exist before the split‐share
structure reform, and such state expropriation is alleviated because the
possibility to pay cash dividends is not as high as before.
[Insert Table 7 here]
Coefficients of control variables are mostly consistent with what I obtain in Table
5 and Table 6. Interestingly enough, sign of coefficients on Investment
Opportunity and Stock Dividends, which yield mixed results compared to
previous regression results. Considering that this only examines the possibility of
issuing cash dividends and that most other variables have the same signs and
significance as before, it will not be far‐fetched to claim that prior conclusions
still stand.
[Insert Table 8 here]
57
5.4. Robustness Tests
In this section, I perform several robustness tests to ensure the reliability of my
prior empirical results.
One possibility is that credibility of Profitability might be compromised by the
effect of firm size. To address this issue, ROE is replaced with ROA to be the
surrogate proxy for Profitability. It is found that prior results are essentially
unaffected.
Another concern is that the explanatory power for Block Shareholders could be
undermined if remarkably different share‐holdings of top shareholders exist in
sample observations. I hence use shareholding percentage of top 5 shareholders
and shareholding percentage of top 10 shareholders to rerun the regressions
and check the empirical results afterwards. Again, previous regression findings
are not qualitatively changed.
58
6. Conclusion
The so‐called “Dividend Puzzle” remains a puzzle in the modern research area of
corporate finance. Although numerous papers try to address this problem, it still
calls for more effort. One should be extremely cautious especially when selecting
from dividend theories and models to apply to emerging capital markets.
In spite of limited works about cash dividends in emerging markets, China, as a
special representative, has gained considerably more attention from financial
economists. My research follows this line closely, and attempts to provide more
evidence by using a sample of 4609 firm‐year observations from the year 2003 to
the year 2008.
I first look back upon existing theoretical and empirical works on cash dividends,
and then explore the institutional background and the historical origin of China’s
capital market, Chinese listed companies and the spit‐share structure reform. I
take advantage of prior relevant works and data to reach the consensus that
cash dividends are used by controlling shareholders to tunnel private interests
out of Chinese listed firms, and consequently develop my own hypotheses.
Before the regressions, I also address some concerns on other potential factors,
such as change of controlling shareholders concentration, which might impact
the reform‐dividends mechanism.
59
In the empirical regression part, the sample is further divided into three groups:
the first one is ultimately controlled by local governments, the second one is
ultimately owned by the central government, and the ultimate controller of the
third group has no government associations. Apart from using two dividends
proxies to the normal regression, I also do logistic regressions to shed further
light on previous findings.
In my analyses, I do find evidence supporting the outcome dividend model
proposed by LLSV (2000). Additionally, most of variables involved in the
regressions do not deviate from my prediction. For example, Chinese listed firms
with larger size, more profits, or more concentrated controlling shareholders will
issue more cash dividends. However, that controlling shareholders are using
receipts from pre‐finance activities, such as right issue and seasoned new issue,
to distribute cash dividends is not supported by my results.
My data suggest that controlling for various factors, Chinese listed firms
controlled by local governments will issue more cash dividends compared to
other two groups of Chinese listed firms, and the possibility is also higher for the
local‐government‐controlled Chinese listed firms. This implies that, before the
split‐share structure reform takes place, evidence of state expropriation does
exist because local governments are using cash dividends to liquidate their
60
interests out of the Chinese listed forms at the cost of the interests of minority
shareholders. Moreover, the quantity and the possibility are both reduced after
the reform, indicating that reform do help to alleviate the state expropriation
phenomenon.
In conclusion, we do find evidence that state expropriation does exist in China,
and that split‐share structure helps to alleviate this problem to some extent.
However, to truly protect Chinese public investors and to perfect China’s capital
market, the reform is only a start, and CRSC still shoulders heavy responsibilities.
61
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68
Tables
Table 1. Definition of Variables
Panel A: dependent
variables
Cash Dividends over Sales
Cash Dividends over Assets
the Probability of Paying
Cash Dividends
Panel B: key proxies
Lgov
Reform
Lgov*Reform
Panel C: control variables
Size
Investment Opportunity
Leverage
Cash Holdings
Profitability
Block Shareholders
Stock Dividends
Bureau of Finance
Seasoned New Issue
Rights Issuing
Year
Cash dividends per share divided by net sales per share
Cash dividends per share divided by asset per share
equals 1 if a Chinese listed company pays cash dividends
equals 0 otherwise
equals 1 if the ultimate controller is a local‐government‐type one.
equals 0 otherwise
equals 1 if date dividend scheme date is after when split‐share structure reform ends
equals 0 otherwise
The interaction variable of Rdate_dummy and Lgov
Natural logarithm of total assets
Rank 10‐quantile for average annual percentage growth in net sales over 2003‐2008.
Firms are ranked into 10 equal‐size groups. Ranges from 1 to 10 in ascending order.
Total liabilities divided by total assets
Cash divided by total assets
Net profit divided by total assets
the sum of percentage of shares held by top 3 shareholders
equals 1 when stock dividends are distributed with cash dividends for the same year
equals 0 otherwise
equals 1 when the ultimate controller is certain Bureau of Finance
equals 0 otherwise
equals 1 if there is a seasoned new issue in the current year or the prior year
equals 0 otherwise
equals 1 if there is a rights offering in the current year or the prior year
equals 0 otherwise
equals 1 if the year is 2008
equals 0 if the year is not 2008
69
Table 2. Summary Statistics
Panel A: Firm Characteristics
Cash Dividends over Sales
Cash Dividends over Assets
Lgov
Reform
Lgov*Reform
Size
Investment Opportunity
Leverage
Cash Holdings
ROA
Block Shareholders
Stock Dividends
Seasoned New Issue
Rights Issuing
Year
N
4609
4609
4609
4609
4609
4609
4609
4609
4609
4609
4609
4609
4609
4609
4609
Panel B: Sample Distribution
Industry
Industry Name
A
Agriculture
B
Mineral
C
Raw materials
D
Energy
E
Construction
F
Transportation
G
Communication
H
Wholesale and retail
J
Real estate
K
Social service
L
Broadcasting and culture
M
Multi‐industry
Total
‐
Mean
0.0291
0.0144
0.5242
0.5834
0.2929
21.5615
5.7585
0.4718
0.1597
0.0482
0.5251
0.1673
0.0167
0.0126
0.1530
STD
0.0633
0.0198
0.4995
0.4930
0.4551
1.0364
2.6293
0.1715
0.1069
0.0388
0.1471
0.3733
0.1282
0.1115
0.3600
Central Government
6
29
447
80
29
59
86
37
5
33
8
9
828
Min
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
18.6160
1.0000
0.0737
0.0135
0.0014
0.1063
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
Q1
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
20.8418
4.0000
0.3515
0.0811
0.0201
0.4232
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
Median
0.0107
0.0080
1.0000
1.0000
0.0000
21.4476
6.0000
0.4842
0.1350
0.0389
0.5324
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
Local Government
N
N / Total
55
63.95%
67
68.37%
1396
51.17%
168
61.31%
43
45.74%
176
69.84%
47
19.67%
207
63.89%
75
55.56%
102
63.35%
18
47.37%
62
34.44%
2416
52.42%
Q3
0.0326
0.0209
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
22.1501
8.0000
0.6034
0.2119
0.0648
0.6296
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
Max
1.4795
0.2022
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
27.3463
10.0000
0.8219
0.5211
0.1976
0.9577
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
Non‐government
25
2
885
26
22
17
106
80
55
26
12
109
1365
70
Total
86
98
2728
274
94
252
239
324
135
161
38
180
4609
Table 3. Correlation Analysis
Panel A: Pearson
C D/sales
C D/assets
Lgov
Reform
Size
Leverage
Cash Holdings
Profitability
Block Shareholders
Panel B: Spearman
C D/sales
C D/assets
Lgov
Reform
Size
Leverage
Cash Holdings
Profitability
Block Shareholders
CD/sales
1
0.651
CD/assets
Lgov
Reform
Size
Cash
Profitability
Block
Shareholders
‐0.311
‐0.381
‐0.01
0.07
0.288
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
(0.505).
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
0.061
0.182
‐0.084
‐0.009
‐0.155
Leverage
1
‐0.268
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
(0.549).
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
0.33
0.597
‐0.04
0.113
0.116
‐0.37
0.212
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
(0.006)***
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
1
(0.000)***
0.103
0.073
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
1
‐0.051
‐0.031
‐0.051
(0.001)***
(0.034)**
(0.001)***
1
0.11
0.097
0.125
0.133
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
1
1
1
0.205
0.212
0.114
‐0.264
0.191
‐0.103
0.007
0.153
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
(0.649).
(0.000)***
Cash
Profitability
C D/sales
1
0.94
1
C D/assets
Lgov
Reform
Size
0.103
0.149
‐0.075
‐0.013
‐0.139
Leverage
1
‐0.222
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
(0.388).
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
1
(0.000)***
0.095
0.089
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
1
‐0.048
‐0.038
‐0.051
(0.001)***
(0.01)***
(0.001)***
1
0.16
0.157
0.153
0.127
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
1
‐0.325
‐0.331
‐0.008
0.07
0.307
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
(0.571).
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
Block
Shareholders
1
0.493
0.574
‐0.044
0.106
0.112
‐0.361
0.182
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
(0.003)***
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
1
0.23
0.236
0.118
‐0.278
0.124
‐0.108
‐0.009
0.151
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
(0.551).
(0.000)***
1
71
Table 4. Comparison of Several Ratios
Panel A: Comparing the average shareholding percentage of the top shareholder around the reform
N Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 95% CL Mean t Value Pr > |t|
1145 ‐0.071 0.092 ‐0.373 0.623 ‐0.076 ‐0.066 ‐26.16 |t|
1145 ‐0.017 0.258 ‐1.237 1.236 ‐0.032 ‐0.002 ‐2.28 0.023
Panel C: Summary statistics of two check‐and‐balance ratios around the reform
N Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Before 1145 1.442 0.437 1.002 3.000
After 1145 1.425 0.405 1.004 2.962
72
Table 5. OLS Regression Results for Comparing Local‐government‐controlled Type and Central‐government‐controlled Type.
OLS regression results for 3, 244 firm‐year observations. The dependent variables are two ratios: (1) Cash dividends over Sales; (2) Cash
dividends over Asset. The independent variables are: (1) Local government dummy; (2) Reform dummy; (3) the interaction between
Lgov and Reform; (4) Size; (5) Investment Opportunity; (6) Leverage; (7) Cash; (8) Profitability; (9) Block Shareholders; (10) Stock
Dividends dummy; (11) Bureau of Finance dummy; (12) Seasoned New Issue dummy; (13) Rights Issue dummy; (14) Financial Crisis
dummy. T‐statistics are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Cash Dividends over Sales
Lgov
0.01
0.01
0.01
(2.84)*** (2.84)***
(2.26)**
Reform
0.00
0.00
(‐1.91)*
(‐0.86)
Reform*Lgov
0.00
(‐0.42)
Size
0.01
0.01
0.01
(3.23)*** (3.29)***
(3.30)***
I O
0.00
0.00
0.00
(‐0.79)
(‐0.79).
(‐0.79)
Leverage
‐0.07
‐0.07
‐0.07
(‐5.81)*** (‐5.84)*** (‐5.81)***
C H
0.01
0.01
0.01
(0.73)
(0.76).
(0.76)
Profitability
0.42
0.43
0.43
(3.71)*** (3.81)***
(3.80)***
0.04
0.03
0.03
B S
(3.32)*** (2.81)***
(2.81)***
S D
‐0.01
‐0.01
‐0.01
(‐4.31)*** (‐4.32)*** (‐4.31)***
B F
‐0.01
‐0.01
‐0.01
(‐2.05)** (‐2.20)**
(‐2.21)**
0.00
0.00
0.00
S N I
(0.02)
(‐0.05)
(‐0.04)
R I
0.03
0.03
0.03
(0.88)
(0.84)
(0.84)
F C
‐0.01
‐0.01
‐0.01
(‐4.67)*** (‐4.16)*** (‐4.15)***
Constant
‐0.09
‐0.10
‐0.10
(‐2.54)** (‐2.60)*** (‐2.59)***
Industry
Yes
Yes
Yes
N
3, 244
3, 244
3, 244
0.31
0.31
0.31
Adj‐R2
Cash Dividends over Asset
0.00
0.00
0.00
(2.50)**
(2.50)**
(1.88)*
0.00
0.00
(‐2.85)***
(‐0.24)
0.00
(‐0.73)
0.00
0.00
0.00
(2.65)***
(2.92)*** (2.91)***
0.00
0.00
0.00
(‐0.28)
(‐0.29)
(‐0.27)
‐0.02
‐0.02
‐0.02
(‐7.99)*** (‐7.86)*** (‐7.88)***
0.01
0.01
0.01
(1.59)
(1.62).
(1.62)
0.29
0.30
0.30
(12.77)*** (12.92)*** (12.99)***
0.01
0.01
0.01
(3.52)***
(2.75)*** (2.76)***
‐0.01
‐0.01
‐0.01
(‐5.75)*** (‐5.77)*** (‐5.78)***
0.00
0.00
0.00
(‐2.19)**
(‐2.43)**
(‐2.50)**
0.00
0.00
0.00
(1.13)
(1.06)
(1.08
0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.48)
(0.36)
(0.35)
‐0.01
0.00
0.00
(‐7.11)*** (‐6.17)*** (‐6.17)***
‐0.02
‐0.02
‐0.02
(‐2.45)**
(‐2.60)*** (‐2.63)***
Yes
Yes
Yes
3, 244
3, 244
3, 244
0.47
0.47
0.47
73
Table 6. OLS Regression Results for Comparing Local‐government‐controlled Type and Non‐government‐controlled Type
OLS regression results for 3, 781 firm‐year observations. The dependent variables are two ratios: (1) Cash dividends over Sales; (2) Cash
dividends over Asset. The independent variables are:(1) Local government dummy; (2) Reform dummy; (3) the interaction between Lgov
and Reform; (4) Size; (5) Investment Opportunity; (6) Leverage; (7) Cash; (8) Profitability; (9) Block Shareholders; (10) Stock Dividends
dummy; (11) Bureau of Finance dummy; (12) Seasoned New Issue dummy; (13) Rights Issue dummy; (14) Financial Crisis dummy. T‐
statistics are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Cash Dividends over Sales
Lgov
0.00
0.00
0.01
(1.95)*
(1.89)*
(2.22)**
Reform
‐0.01
0.00
(‐2.52)**
(‐0.93)
Reform*Lgov
‐0.01
(‐1.34)
Size
0.01
0.01
0.01
(3.77)*** (3.83)***
(3.82)***
I O
0.00
0.00
0.00
(‐0.85)
(‐0.81)
(‐0.83)
Leverage
‐0.07
‐0.07
‐0.07
(‐6.02)*** (‐6.04)*** (‐6.07)***
C H
0.02
0.02
0.02
(1.73)*
(1.74)*
(1.79)*
Profitability
0.41
0.42
0.42
(3.84)*** (3.96)***
(3.93)***
0.03
0.03
0.03
B S
(3.20)*** (2.67)***
(2.62)***
S D
‐0.01
‐0.01
‐0.01
(‐3.39)*** (‐3.28)*** (‐3.35)***
B F
‐0.01
‐0.01
‐0.01
(‐2.21)**
(‐2.38)** (‐2.43)***
0.00
0.00
0.00
S N I
(0.56)
(0.49)
(0.49)
R I
0.03
0.03
0.03
(0.91)
(0.85)
(0.84)
F C
‐0.01
‐0.01
‐0.01
(‐4.34)***. (‐3.72)*** (‐3.73)***
Constant
‐0.11
‐0.12
‐0.12
(‐3.17)*** (‐3.20)*** (‐3.20)***
Industry
Yes
Yes
Yes
N
3, 781
3, 781
3, 781
0.31
0.31
0.31
Adj‐R2
Cash Dividends over Asset
0.00
0.00
0.00
(3.46)***
(3.42)*** (2.98)***
0.00
0.00
(‐3.59)***
(‐0.28)
0.00
(‐1.48)
0.00
0.00
0.00
(2.95)***
(3.17)*** (3.26)***
0.00
0.00
0.00
(‐0.39)
(‐0.31)
(‐0.36)
‐0.02
‐0.02
‐0.02
(‐8.48)*** (‐8.41)*** (‐8.34)***
0.01
0.01
0.01
(3.26)***
(3.27)*** (3.29)***
0.27
0.27
0.27
(11.90)*** (12.01)*** (12.06)***
0.01
0.01
0.01
(3.40)***
(2.52)**
(2.42)**
0.00
0.00
0.00
(‐4.37)*** (‐4.29)*** (‐4.31)***
0.00
0.00
0.00
(‐2.16)**
(‐2.44)** (‐2.60)***
0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.84)
(0.80)
(0.79)
0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.46)
(0.29)
(0.27)
0.00
0.00
0.00
(‐5.01)*** (‐3.87)*** (‐3.88)***
‐0.03
‐0.02
‐0.02
(‐3.01)*** (‐3.08)*** (‐3.23)***
Yes
Yes
Yes
3, 781
3, 781
3, 781
0.43
0.43
0.43
74
Table 7. Logistic Regression Results for Comparing Local‐government‐controlled Type and Central‐government‐controlled Type
Logistic regression results for 3, 244 firm‐year observations. The dependent variable is the Probability of Paying Cash Dividends. The
independent variables are: (1) Local government dummy; (2) Reform dummy; (3) the interaction between Lgov and Reform; (4) Size; (5)
Investment Opportunity; (6) Leverage; (7) Cash; (8) Profitability; (9) Block Shareholders; (10) Stock Dividends dummy; (11) Bureau of
Finance dummy; (12) Seasoned New Issue dummy; (13) Rights Issue dummy; (14) Financial Crisis dummy. T‐statistics are shown in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Probability of Paying Cash Dividends
Lgov
0.05
0.05
0.07
(2.03)**
(2.03)**
(2.83)***
Reform
‐0.02
‐0.01
(‐1.35)
(0.34)
Reform*Lgov
‐0.05
(‐1.37)
Size
0.09
0.09
0.09
(8.42)***
(8.37)*** (10.52)***
I O
0.01
0.01
0.01
(3.17)***
(3.16)***
(4.08)***
Leverage
‐0.3
‐0.3
‐0.3
(‐4.44)*** (‐4.35)*** (‐5.44)***
C H
0.32
0.32
0.32
(3.52)***
(3.53)***
(4.13)***
Profitability
2.54
2.57
2.56
(9.21)***
(9.33)*** (10.92)***
B S
0.19
0.17
0.17
(2.23)**
(2.91)***
(2.71)***
S D
0.06
0.06
0.06
(2.78)***
(2.78)***
(2.73)***
B F
‐0.13
‐0.14
‐0.14
(‐2.41)**
(‐2.49)**
(‐2.69)***
S N I
0.07
0.07
0.07
(1.25)
(1.22)
(1.04)
R I
‐0.01
‐0.01
‐0.02
(‐0.10)
(1.22)
(‐0.24)
F C
‐0.1
‐0.09
‐0.09
(‐4.34)*** (‐3.83)*** (‐3.93)***
Constant
‐1.56
‐1.58
‐1.6
(‐7.18)*** (‐7.17)*** (‐9.06)***
Industry
Yes
Yes
Yes
N
3, 244
3, 244
3, 244
0.17
0.17
0.17
Adj‐R2
75
Table 8. Logistic Regression Results for Comparing Local‐government‐controlled Type and Non‐government‐controlled Type
Logistic regression results for 3, 781 firm‐year observations. The dependent variable is the Probability of Paying Cash Dividends. The
independent variables are: (1) Local government dummy; (2) Reform dummy; (3) the interaction between Lgov and Reform; (4) Size; (5)
Investment Opportunity; (6) Leverage; (7) Cash; (8) Profitability; (9) Block Shareholders; (10) Stock Dividends dummy; (11) Bureau of
Finance dummy; (12) Seasoned New Issue dummy; (13) Rights Issue dummy; (14) Financial Crisis dummy. T‐statistics are shown in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Probability of Paying Cash Dividends
0.06
0.06
0.10
(2.67)***
(2.64)***
(3.54)***
Reform
‐0.02
‐0.02
(‐1.28)
(0.91)
Reform*Lgov
‐0.07
(‐2.33)**
Size
0.1
0.10
0.11
(9.72)***
(9.72)***
(9.84)***
I O
0.02
0.02
0.02
(4.22)***
(4.24)***
(4.19)***
Leverage
‐0.34
‐0.34
‐0.34
(‐5.02)*** (‐4.98)*** (‐4.92)***
C H
0.34
0.34
0.35
(3.79)***
(3.79)***
(3.86)***
Profitability
2.58
2.62
2.60
(9.36)***
(9.46)***
(9.40)***
B S
0.17
0.15
0.14
(1.99)**
(2.49)**
(2.08)**
S D
0.11
0.11
0.11
(5.46)***
(5.50)***
(5.44)***
B F
‐0.10
‐0.10
‐0.11
(‐1.64)
(‐1.71)*
(‐1.81)*
S N I
0.12
0.12
0.12
(2.69)***
(2.67)***
(2.67)***
R I
‐0.02
‐0.03
‐0.03
(‐0.31)
(‐0.43)
(‐0.47)
F C
‐0.09
‐0.08
‐0.08
(‐4.40)*** (‐3.83)*** (‐3.85)***
Constant
‐1.94
‐1.95
‐2.00
(‐8.88)*** (‐8.89)*** (‐9.14)***
N
3, 781
3, 781
3, 781
0.19
0.19
0.19
Adj‐R2
Lgov
76
Figures
0.18
0.16
0.14
0.12
0.1
CGOV
0.08
LGOV
0.06
NGOV
0.04
0.02
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
0
Figure 1. Cash Dividends of Chinese Listed Companies, 1992‐2008
The vertical axis denotes average cash dividends per share, and the horizontal axis represents calendar year. CGOV is the central
government controlled type firms, LGOV is the local government controlled type firms, and NGOV is the non‐government controlled
type firms.
77
Figure 2. Consideration Schemes of Listed Companies in SSE
SSE means Shanghai Stock Exchange. The X‐axis represents the number of Chinese listed companies, and the Y‐axis denotes the number
of bonus shares per ten shares in a consideration scheme.
78
[...]... observations from year 1995 to year 2001, Wei et al. (2003) show that there is a significantly positive correlation between the state ownership and cash dividends (both level and propensity) and a significantly negative correlation 18 between public ownership and stock dividends. Particularly, they notice that the relation between dividend policy and ownership structure is nonlinear, and that the managers of Chinese listed companies are likely to cater for the preference ... ratio. Lv and Wang (1999) summarize important factors of dividend policies of Chinese listed companies as size, profitability, liquidity, leverage, and state ownership and so on. They find that the lower state ownership is, the greater potential for growth a Chinese listed company has, resulting in higher stock dividends and lower cash dividends. ... investment opportunities than give them out to shareholders as cash dividends. Particularly, I divide the whole process into three stages and analyze cash dividends corresponding to the development of China’s capital market: 1. Preliminary Stage (1992‐1994): After the initial chaos and disorder in 1990 and 1991, relevant authorities, Securities Committee of the State Council and Chinese Securities ... investment costs of state shareholders are relatively low. Therefore, for the same cash dividends per share, other things being equal, the difference of investment return from cash dividends between these two classes of shareholders is fairly wide. Hence, despite of the level of cash dividends, China’s investors might not be highly interested in cash dividends since ... dividends, including the most relevant ones. Section 3 presents the special institutional background in China and develops my hypotheses. Section 4 displays the sample, data and summary statistics. Section 5 addresses some possible concerns and then reports the empirical results and Section 6 concludes. 4 2. Literature Review 2.1. Dividends and Stock Evaluation Dividends first attract attention from financial scholars by estimating stock prices ... considering the indisputable fact that China is a civil law country with fairly weak, if any, investor protection. 2.5. Dividends, Large Shareholders and Governments Among numerous research areas in dividends, relation between cash dividends and large shareholders might be one of the most peculiar and intriguing, and it is mostly relevant to agency cost type Ⅱ. The central idea is that agency cost type Ⅱ affects ... (2000) “outcome model” stating that countries with low investor protection will issue less cash dividends. And the overall trend worth mentioning is that in terms of cash dividends, both central‐government‐controlled type and local‐ government‐controlled type surpass non‐government‐controlled type in most instances. In other words, firms with no government backgrounds, compared to other firms, will always distribute less cash dividends. My brief ... block shareholders are more than twice as likely to be found in firms that pay no dividends as they are to be found in firms that pay dividends, that two‐thirds of firms that pay dividends have no corporate block shareholders, and that block shareholders’ tax status has virtually no effect on a firm’s dividend policy. Gugler et al. (2003) examine the relationship between dividends and ownership structure of the firm, and find that state controlled ... theoretically models the interaction between firm insiders and bureaucrats and puts forward the “twin agency” concept. In his “twin agency” framework, there are two sets of agency relationships, one between managers and the government (the state agency problem) and the other between managers and shareholders (the insider agency problem). 2.6. Cash Dividends and China’s Capital Market Since this paper ... split‐share structure reform is targeted to help minority shareholders out of the disadvantage situation, I naturally hypothesize that it will be able to depress the state expropriation by reducing cash dividend payouts. More formally: H3: After the split‐share structure reform, less cash dividends should be observed. H4: The possibility of paying cash dividends by Chinese ... I have two dependent variables, Cash Dividends over Sales27, and Cash Dividends over Assets28, which are defined in Table 1. As to independent variables, three main key variables: Lgov, Reform and Lgov *Reform, ... background and more cash dividends. Reform is negatively and significantly related to both two cash dividends indexes, which means that after the reform, cash dividends become less on average. This could be the first piece of evidence ... 2.5. Dividends, Large Shareholders and Governments Among numerous research areas in dividends, relation between cash dividends and large shareholders might be one of the most peculiar and intriguing, and it is