calculation of damages in antitrust cases in community competition law

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calculation of damages in antitrust cases in community competition law

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FACULTY OF LAW University of Lund Filippa Honeth Calculation of Damages in Antitrust Cases in Community Competition Law Master thesis 20 points Henrik Norinder Competition law Autumn 2006 Contents SUMMARY 1 1 INTRODUCTION 3 1.1 Method 3 1.2 Disposition 4 1.3 Material 4 2 BACKGROUND 6 2.1 Francovich 6 2.2 Post Francovich 7 2.2.1 Banks 7 2.2.2 Factortame III 7 2.3 Courage v. Crehan 8 2.3.1 The ECJ Judgment 8 2.3.1.1 Facts of the Case 8 2.3.1.2 The Judgment 10 2.3.1.3 The Advocate General 11 2.3.1.4 Analysis 12 2.3.2 The High Court Judgment 13 2.3.3 The Court of Appeal Judgment 14 2.3.3.1 Analysis 15 2.4 Summary 15 3 GREEN PAPER 17 3.1 Introduction 17 3.2 Damages 19 3.2.1 Definition of Damages 19 3.2.2 Quantification of Damages 20 3.2.3 Split Proceedings 21 3.2.4 Calculation of Damages 21 4 CALCULATION OF DAMAGES 22 4.1 Introduction 22 4.1.1 Types of Claim 22 4.1.2 Damage Parties 22 4.1.3 Burden of Proof 23 4.2 Calculation methods 23 4.2.1 Before-and-After method 24 4.2.2 Yardstick method 25 4.2.3 Cost-Based method 25 4.2.4 Market Share method 26 4.2.5 Econometric modelling 27 4.2.6 Theoretic modelling 28 4.2.7 Calculation Based on Accounting 28 4.2.7.1 Earning-based Valuation 29 4.2.7.2 Market-based Valuation 30 4.2.7.3 Asset-based Valuation 30 4.2.8 Calculation in cases of Exclusion 30 4.2.8.1 Losing Prices 31 4.2.8.2 Tying 31 4.2.8.3 Price Discrimination 31 4.3 Calculation Problems 32 4.3.1 Time-Period Aspect 32 4.3.2 Ex Ante or Ex Post Calculation 32 4.3.3 Problems related to Data 33 4.4 National Damage Cases 34 4.4.1 France 34 4.4.2 Italy 35 4.4.3 United Kingdom 36 4.4.4 Germany 36 5 CONCLUSIONS 38 BIBLIOGRAPHY 40 The Commission 40 Literature 40 Articles 40 TABLE OF CASES 41 European Court of Justice 41 English Court of Appeal 41 English High Court 41 Summary The right to damage in antitrust cases within the European Community arises from the case Francovich decided by the ECJ. The case established that the individual’s right to compensation could be based on Community law. The case also established that the national courts are required to apply the right to compensation regardless of the position of the national law. The first case to follow the principle established in Francovich was Banks. The Advocate General argued that the principle founded in Francovich should be applied also in this case. However, the ECJ was of another opinion and did not apply the rules of the Treaty in the case. In the case Factortame III, the principle was further elaborated. The first case where remedies for breach of antitrust rules were raised was Courage v. Crehan. The ECJ held that Article 81(1) and 82 EC creates a direct effect between the individuals as well as rights the national courts must protect. The individual can rely on the breach of Article 81(1) EC in national courts even if he is part of a contract liable to restrictions or distortion of competition. In the English Court of Appeal, the judges followed the line of the ECJ and based its decision on previous decisions made by the ECJ together with general Community principles. The Commission has published a Green Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rues. The aim of the Paper is to find ways to improve the facilitation of damage actions in national courts. In a study commissioned by the Commission obstacles to successful damage actions are identified. The conclusion of the study is that the actions of damages in the Member States are undeveloped and that there is diversity in the approach taken to damage actions in antitrust cases. In the Green Paper three different questions regarding damages are mentioned; firstly the definition of damages, secondly the quantification of damages and thirdly split proceedings. One of the largest problem when calculating damages is to establish the counterfactual scenario; how would the situation been but for the violation of competition. Factors affecting this “but for” scenario, such as demand, range and competition, must be taken into consideration. A number of different calculation methods have been identified to calculate damages. The methods should not be seen separately but complements each other. The more simple methods can be used as cross checks to the more complex methods. The methods identified are the before-and-after method, the yardstick method, the cost-based method, the market share method, econometric modelling and theoretic modelling. When calculating lost profit, accounting, finance and economic methodologies are used to estimate the difference between the profit made 1 and the “but for” profit. Three different methods can be used for this calculation; the earning-based method, the market-based method and the asset-based method. In cases of exclusion, it is natural to calculate the damage by calculating the profit the undertaking would have made without the violation. If the violated part is a rival to the violator, it can be more relevant to calculate the lost profit due to the anti-competitive conduct. This calculation is normally based on the accounting of the undertaking. Some general problems can be related to calculation of damage. The time- period aspect and the information availability are issues that must be recognised. When reviewing national damage cases, some general points can be made. Only a few Member States have rewarded damages in antitrust cases, no Member State is prescribed to use a certain calculation method and all calculation methods used have been simple and with no relation to econometric modelling. None of the methods is superior to the others. The choice of method must be made from the information and data available in the specific case. 2 1 Introduction Competition on an open market is one of the best guarantees for companies to increase productivity. Therefore, competition law enforcement is one of the key elements for economic growth in the European Union. The rules on antitrust law are found in Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty and have the aim to deter anti-competitive practices forbidden by antitrust law and to protect firms and consumers from these practices and any damages caused by them 1 . 1.1 Method The rules on damages actions in antitrust cases are unclear. In the Green Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules 2 , the Commission is focusing on damages actions alone 3 . By facilitating damage claims for breach of antitrust law, it will be easier for consumers and companies who have suffered losses due to infringement of antitrust law to recover damages from the infringement but also to strengthen the enforcement of antitrust law. 4 The purpose of damage actions in antitrust law is to compensate those who have suffered a loss and to ensure full effectiveness of the antirust rules in the Treaty by discouraging anti- competitive behaviour. 5 In the absence of Community rules on the matter, the legal systems of the Member States have to provide detailed rules for damage actions. 6 The first case to establish the obligation for national Courts to provide remedy for damages in antitrust cases was Courage v. Crehan 7 . The Green Paper outlines some of the obstacles that relates to damage actions. One of these obstacles is the calculation of damages. Little information exists on calculation of damages in antitrust cases. Quantification of damages in antitrust cases can be complex given the economic structure of the illegality and the difficulty of reconstructing how the situation would have been without the infringement. Therefore, it is necessary to look at calculation methods used in the US where more information can be found and damage assessments cases outside the field of antitrust. 1 Green Paper COM(2005)672 p. 3 2 COM(2005)672 3 Ibid., p. 4 4 Ibid., p. 3 5 C-453/99 Courage v. Crehan, paragraphs 26-27 6 Ibid., paragraph 29 7 Case C-453/99 3 1.2 Disposition In his thesis, I will first look at damages in antitrust cases from a general point of view and then look deeper at calculation of damages and different methods of calculation. In the second chapter, I am introducing the background on damages in antitrust cases from the view of the Francovich 8 case. It has been argued in literature that the right to damages arises from the principle founded in the Francovich case. I will then continue by looking at how the outcome of Francovich has been used in other cases ruled by the ECJ (European Court of Justice) in competition law cases. In the third chapter, I look more deeply into the first case, the Courage case, that raises the question of damages in cases of breach of antitrust rules. The English Court of Appeal asked for a preliminary ruling from ECJ in four questions regarding compensation in antitrust cases. The case has recently been decided in the English Court of Appeal. In the fourth chapter, I focus on the Commission’s Green Paper on damage actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules 9 . I will first present the general idea of the paper and then go deeper into how the paper handles the question of damages and the definition of damages. In the fifth chapter, I start with an introduction to calculation of damages by introducing different types of claims, the different damage parties and the burden of proof. I then present the different calculation methods and calculation of damages in cases of lost profit. I will also look at some problems related to the calculation methods. I end the chapter with a look at cases of damages decided in national courts. 1.3 Material As for material, I have, as a base, used the book Private enforcement of antitrust law in the EU, UK and USA by Clifford Jones from 1999. Little new literature can be found on the subject, I have therefore used two articles; Awarding damages for breach of competition law in English Courts – Crehan in the Court of Appeal by Renato Nazzini and Mads Andenas and New prospects for private enforcement of EC competition law: Courage v. Crehan and the community rights to damages by Assimakis Komininos for a deeper perspective on the subject. I have also used The Green paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules published by the Commission and the Study on the conditions of claims for damages in case of infringement of EC competition rules, both the Comparative and the Analysis report, by Ashurst to a great extent. Lastly a report published by the Swedish Competition Authority, Metoder för att beräkna privat 8 Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 and C-9/90, Andrea Francovich and Others v. Italian Republic 9 Above note 1 4 konkurrensskada och krav på precision i domstol, has provided information on the methods of calculation, 5 2 Background Few cases on liability arising from infringement of EC competition law have been ruled by the ECJ. In literature, it has therefore been argued that right to damages arises from the case Francovich 10 . 11 The theory of Francovich has been further evolved by the ECJ in a number of cases, the most important cases being Banks and Factortame III. The development of the Francovich principle has lead to the first judgment on damage recovery in antitrust cases, the Courage 12 case. 2.1 Francovich In Francovich, the Italian State had failed to implement a Community directive. The failure to implement the directive had been established in a prior judgment by the ECJ. It is clear from the case that an individuals right to compensation can be directly based on Community law and not only on national law. The outcome of Francovich is applicable to private individuals as well as to undertakings and governments. The purpose of the Community right to damages is to assure effective protection of Community rights and must therefore logically be applied to any category of entity or undertaking which can be held responsible for breach of Community law. 13 Two important points where made in Francovich. First, it confirms a principle of right to damages for breach of Community law. After Francovich it may no longer be of importance whether national law recognizes damage remedies because Francovich has forged a Community law damage remedy of wide scope that the Member States are forced to recognize and enforce. The right to compensation is founded directly on Community law. 14 Secondly, if a Member State does not provide for a fully effective judicial remedy for enforcement of Article 81 and 82 EC, the Member State may have been in breach of Article 10 EC where the Community law is given full protection. In other words, a Member State that does not judicially or legislatively provides for antitrust damage remedies for individuals and undertakings may itself be required to pay damages. 15 The breakthrough in Francovich is therefore that the national courts are required to give effect to 10 Above not 8 11 Komninos, New Prospects for Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law: Courage v. Crehan and the Community Right to Damages, p. 454 12 Above not 7 13 Jones, Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law in the EU, UK and USA, p. 71 14 Ibid., p. 72 15 Ibid., p. 73 6 the right to compensation in private enforcement actions regardless of the position in national law. There is no compelling reason to differ between State and individual liability for damage caused by infringement of Community law because the effectiveness and liability of Community law is not affected by the identity of the perpetrator. 16 2.2 Post Francovich 2.2.1 Banks The first case to apply the judgment of Francovich in a competition law case is Banks 17 . In Banks, a private company claimed that British Coal had abused its dominant position as a supplier of coal for electricity production. The ECJ decided not to apply the rules of the Treaty. The national courts could not entertain actions for damages if there was an absence of a Commission decision on compatibility with those rules. However, Advocate General Von Gerven did argue for the principles in Francovich to be applied in this case. The Advocate General argued for recognition of Community rights to obtain reparation in respect of loss of damages as a result of infringement of the Community rules which had direct effect. 18 In the opinion of the Advocate General, the basis established in Francovich was also applicable in cases of “breach of a right which an individual derives from an obligation imposed by Community law on another individual”. “The full effect of Community law would be impaired if the former individual or undertaking did not have the possibility of obtaining reparation from the party who can be held responsible for the breach of Community law – all the more so, evidently, if a directly effective provision of Community law is infringed.” 19 The Advocate General was of the opinion that a Community right to damages in competition law would make the Treaty’s rules on antitrust law more operational. 20 2.2.2 Factortame III In the joined cases Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame III 21 the ECJ further elaborated the principles of Francovich. The court rejected the opinion that the principles only could be applied to situations where the provisions of Community law breach were not directly effected. The right to 16 Komninos, New Prospects for Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law: Courage v. Crehan and the Community Right to Damages, p. 454 17 Case C-128/92 18 Ibid., Advocate General’s Opinion, paragraph 37 19 Ibid., paragraph 43 20 Ibid., paragraph 44 21 Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 7 [...]... the undertaking is losing because of the violation The definition of profit is simple; income subtracted with cost 114 The estimation of lost profit is used in many cases of damage calculation, not only in antitrust cases Lost profit can be described as “the qualification of the reduction in earnings, the calculation of interest on past losses, and the application of financial discounting to future... rewarding The principle of the individuals right to damages based on Community law has been further developed in Banks and Factortame III This principle was applied in the first case regarding damage rewarding in an antitrust case, Courage 63 Nazzini and Andenas, Awarding Damages for Breach of Competition Law in English Courts – Crehan in the Court of Appeal, p 1197-1198 64 Nazzini and Andenas, Awarding... parties regarding a different agreement is a significant change The earlier established principle of “a strict rule of privity applies to limit the binding effect of findings of fact or law by judicial or administrative authorities to the parties, their privies, or successors in title” 65 is abandoned 66 The primary point in the judgment of the Court of Appeal is the binding capacity of Community law The... Court of Appeal is more in line with the ruling of the European Court of Justice than the judgment made by the High Court The safeguard of the effectiveness of the Community law is not protected by the possibility of damage awarding The protection must be measured in remedies actually awarded in concrete cases If damages where rarely awarded because of the claimant’s difficulties in discharging the... required, including; mitigation of damages obligations, loss of profits in economic or commercial litigation and exemplary damages 25 2.3 Courage v Crehan 2.3.1 The ECJ Judgment The first cases where the ECJ dealt with substantive aspect of private enforcement were in Courage 26 where the question of remedies in cases of breach of antitrust rules was first raised 27 2.3.1.1 Facts of the Case In 1990... standard of proof Collection and presentation of evidence Evidential value of national competition authorities and national court decisions 6 Qualification of damages 7 Passing on defence and indirect purchase claims 8 Amount of damages 9 Time limitations 10 Costs 11 Applicable law While the European system of antitrust litigation is underdeveloped, the system in the US offers strong incentives to bring... recovery of illegal gain caused by the infringement The recovery is not for the loss suffered but for the gain made by the defendant from the infringement This can be of more advantage to the claimant if the gain of the defendant is exceeding the loss of the claimant 83 Another structure of the damage can be in the form of exemplary or punitive damage It is a sort of punishment of the defendant for breaching... than single damages in more serious antitrust infringements It would create a clear incentive for claimants to file a damage claim 86 As for the award of interest, both the interest rate and the point in time are of importance They must both be at a lever where the real values are compensated A number of possible times from when the interest can be awarded exist It can be from the time of the infringement,... time of the injury, the time of a demand for payment, the time of the notice to stop the breach, the time of the filing of a claim or the time of the judgment If the award of interest is set at a higher level than the real value, the interest can be seen as a technique to increase deterrence 87 88 3.2.2 Quantification of Damages Quantification of damages is complex due to the economic nature in competition. .. been gained as well as hypothetical situations the claimant would be in if the infringement would not have occurred To establish this “but for” scenario (the prices, profits, costs, market situations etc.), a number of methods exist 89 The most common claims in antitrust cases are overcharges (increased prices in cases of cartels or excessive prices in cases of dominant position) and lost net profits . FACULTY OF LAW University of Lund Filippa Honeth Calculation of Damages in Antitrust Cases in Community Competition Law Master thesis 20 points Henrik Norinder. Awarding Damages for Breach of Competition Law in English Courts – Crehan in the Court of Appeal, p. 1197-1198 64 Nazzini and Andenas, Awarding Damages for Breach of Competition Law in English. point in the judgment of the Court of Appeal is the binding capacity of Community law. The question is how to weigh the factual findings made in a decision by the Commission in national law

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  • 1 Introduction

    • 1.1 Method

    • 1.2 Disposition

    • 1.3 Material

    • 2 Background

      • 2.1 Francovich

      • 2.2 Post Francovich

        • 2.2.1 Banks

        • 2.2.2 Factortame III

        • 2.3 Courage v. Crehan

          • 2.3.1 The ECJ Judgment

            • 2.3.1.1 Facts of the Case

            • 2.3.1.2 The Judgment

            • 2.3.1.3 The Advocate General

            • 2.3.1.4 Analysis

            • 2.3.2 The High Court Judgment

            • 2.3.3 The Court of Appeal Judgment

              • 2.3.3.1 Analysis

              • 2.4 Summary

              • 3 Green Paper

                • 3.1 Introduction

                • 3.2 Damages

                  • 3.2.1 Definition of Damages

                  • 3.2.2 Quantification of Damages

                  • 3.2.3 Split Proceedings

                  • 3.2.4 Calculation of Damages

                  • 4 Calculation of Damages

                    • 4.1 Introduction

                      • 4.1.1 Types of Claim

                      • 4.1.2 Damage Parties

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