WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK Rebalancing Growth phần 2 pot

CHAPTER 1 GLOBAL PROSPECTS AND POLICIES International Monetary Fund | April 2010 5 depreciation of the U.S. dollar and appreciation of fl oating currencies of some other advanced and emerging economies––but compared with pre- crisis levels, changes have generally been limited (Figures 1.5 and 1.6).  ere are exceptions.  e economies in the Middle East saw some signifi cant appreciation, those in emerging Europe some sig- nifi cant depreciation, and the Japanese yen appre- ciated signifi cantly.  ese changes were generally in line with the medium-term fundamentals for these economies. However, currencies of a number of emerging Asian economies remain undervalued, substantially in the case of the renminbi, and the U.S. dollar and euro remain on the strong side relative to medium-term fundamentals.  e concomitant narrowing of global current account imbalances has a signifi cant temporary component. Among the major economies, the cur- rent account surplus of China fell from about 9½ percent of GDP in 2008 to 5¾ percent of GDP in 2009, refl ecting the slump in global manufacturing and trade but also a steep rise in public spending. Over the same period, the defi cit of the United States fell from about 5 percent of GDP to about 3 percent, as household savings rose and investment slumped. Both economies benefi ted from lower oil prices, which in turn reduced the large surpluses of Middle Eastern economies. However, IMF staff esti- mates suggest that current account imbalances will rise noticeably as global trade continues to recover, fi nancing improves, and commodity prices stabilize at higher levels (Figure 1.6). Policy Support Has Been Essential in Fostering Recovery Extraordinary policy intervention since the crisis has all but eliminated the risk of a second Great Depression, laying the foundation for recovery.  e interventions were essential to prevent a downward debt-defl ation spiral, in which increasingly severe diffi culties would have fed back and forth between the fi nancial system and the rest of the economy. • Fiscal policy provided major support in response to the deep downturn, especially in advanced economies. At the same time, the slump in activity and, to a much lesser extent, stimulus measures 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800 0 100 200 300 400 Figure 1.3. Developments in Mature Credit Markets Financial conditions in advanced economies have improved noticeably, as evidenced by declining interbank, credit default swap (CDS), and corporate spreads and recoveries in equity markets. The tightening of bank lending conditions is coming to an end, suggesting a nascent turn in the credit cycle. The decline in bank credit has been large relative to most recessions. Bank CDS Spreads (ten-year; median; in basis points) Sources: Bank of Japan; Bloomberg Financial Markets; European Central Bank; Federal Reserve Board of Governors; Merrill Lynch; and IMF sta calculations. Three-month London interbank oered rate minus three-month government bill rate. Ten-year government bonds. Percent of respondents describing lending standards as tightening “considerably” or “somewhat” minus those indicating standards as easing “considerably” or “somewhat” over the previous three months. Survey of changes to credit standards for loans or lines of credit to enterprises for the euro area; average of surveys on changes in credit standards for commercial/industrial and commercial real estate lending for the United States; diusion index of “accommodative” minus “severe,” Tankan survey of lending attitude of nancial institutions for Japan. Euro area consists of France, Germany, and Italy. 1 United States Euro area 2003 04 Apr. 10 06 Corporate Spreads (basis points; averages of Europe and United States) AAA BB Apr. 10 2000 02 04 06 2 3 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100 Bank Lending Conditions 02 10: Q1 062000 04 United States (left scale) Euro area (left scale) Japan (inverted; right scale) 3 05 07 -100 0 100 200 300 400 500 Interbank Spreads (basis points) 2000 02 04 06 U.S. dollar Yen Apr. 10 1 Euro Government Bond Yields Japan United States 2002 04 06 Apr. 10 2 4 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 DJ Euro Stoxx Wilshire 5000 Equity Markets (March 2000 = 100; national currency) Topix 2000 02 04 06 Apr. 10 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 08 08 08 08 08 Germany 08 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 94 96 98 100 102 104 106 108 110 112 114 United States Credit from Trough for Highly Synchronized Recessions (Index; quarters on x-axis) -4-202468 94 96 98 100 102 104 106 108 110 112 114 Euro Area 1975:Q1 1982:Q3 1991:Q1 2009:Q2 1975:Q1 1982:Q3 1993:Q1 2009:Q2 4 WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: REBALANCING GROWTH 6 International Monetary Fund | April 2010 pushed fiscal deficits in advanced economies up to about 9 percent of GDP (Figure 1.7). Debt- to-GDP ratios in these economies are expected to exceed 100 percent of GDP in 2014 based on current policies, some 35 percentage points of GDP higher than before the crisis. The expected increases are mostly a result of declines in output and reduced tax payments as a result of lower asset prices and diminished financial sector activity; dis- cretionary fiscal stimulus and direct support to the financial sector stemming from the crisis account for less than one-fifth of the debt increases. • Monetary policy has been highly expansion- ary and has been supported by unconventional liquidity provision. Policy rates were brought down to record lows, close to zero in many advanced economies (Figure 1.8). Other excep- tional measures include public commitments to keep interest rates low for an extended time, out- right purchases of long-term government bonds to reduce longer-term yields, and support for dysfunctional markets (including for asset-backed securities). As a result, central bank balance sheets in some of the largest economies expanded rapidly until recently. Many central banks in emerging economies also introduced special liquidity or credit facilities, including to alleviate the acute global shortage of dollar funding. • Government guarantees and capital injections for financial institutions have provided indispensable backing to the system. Multispeed Recovery to Continue during 2010–11 Two factors underlying the stronger-than-expected start to the global recovery will continue to sustain growth during much of 2010, while the eff ect of fi scal stimulus gradually diminishes.  e fi rst is the better-than-expected state of fi nancial markets, where public support is already being phased out. In particular, there are signs that credit is close to stabilizing, and the recovery of household wealth should provide continued support to consumption.  e second is the inventory cycle: the large fall in global inventories, which resulted from the plunge in production during 2008:Q4–2009:Q1, is now slow- 0 40 80 120 160 200 240 280 Sources: Bloomberg Financial Markets; Capital Data; IMF, International Financial Statistics; and IMF sta calculations. JPMorgan EMBI Global Index spread. JPMorgan CEMBI Broad Index spread. Total of equity, syndicated loans, and international bond issues. Annualized percent change of three-month moving average over previous three-month moving average. 1 Figure 1.4. Emerging Market Conditions Financial conditions have improved markedly in many emerging markets. Equity markets have staged a strong rebound, interest rate spreads have come down, and new issues are up. Private credit growth, however, continues to contract or move sideways in Latin America and emerging Europe. 0 400 800 1200 1600 New Issues by Region (billions of U.S. dollars) United States BB Interest Rate Spreads (basis points) 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 Equity Markets (2001 = 100; national currency) Latin America Asia Eastern Europe AAA 04 05 06 09: Q4 Apr. 10 200203 04 05 200203 04 05 06 Apr. 10 06 Sovereign 1 2 07 07 07 3 Europe Asia Africa Western Hemisphere Middle East Corporate 2 3 4 08 08 08 09 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Private Credit Growth China Latin America Eastern Europe 2002 03 04 05 06 07 Jan. 10 08 4 Asia excluding China 0 40 80 120 160 200 240 280 Equities Bonds Syndicated loans Emerging Market Issuance (billions of U.S. dollars) 03200206 09: Q4 07 08 2005 09 CHAPTER 1 GLOBAL PROSPECTS AND POLICIES International Monetary Fund | April 2010 7 ing or reversing.  e fear of a new depression had triggered rapid destocking, with production quickly scaled back in anticipation of a major decline in con- sumption. With this decline averted, fi rms are now running down inventories at a much reduced pace or are rebuilding them. Under plausible scenarios, this process may continue through much of 2010.  e next question is whether the stronger rebound in the inventory cycle is a harbinger of healthy recovery. For the major advanced econo- mies, this is not expected to be true (Figure 1.9). In the United States, where destocking has been pronounced, inventory investment may add about 1 percentage point to GDP growth during 2010. In the euro area and Japan, the contribution from inventories is likely to be more limited, because the previous drawdown was less drastic than in the United States. Moreover, there are few other indica- tions that private spending in these three economies will lead a strong recovery, given that credit will remain hard to come by for many agents, invest- ment will be held back by low capacity utilization, and unemployment will weigh on consumption (see Chapter 3). In the meantime, public defi cits will have to be scaled back.  is is likely to dampen growth by cutting into incomes and thereby further reducing spending by liquidity-constrained consum- ers. It might also prompt households to scale back their expectations for future disposable income (including expected long-term returns on their assets) and to increase their precautionary saving.  e extent to which this will diminish growth is hard to gauge; much will depend on the credibility and quality of fi scal adjustment. For emerging economies the picture is more positive. Inventory investment is likely to make a signifi cant contribution to growth in the short term, on account of prospects for improved demand in both advanced and emerging economies. With global trade rebounding, stocks must be rebuilt after the drawdown of 2008–09, just as in the advanced economies. Furthermore, countries such as Brazil, China, India, and Indonesia are already sustaining a strong rebound, even in the face of weak recovery in the advanced economies, quickly reattracting capital fl ows.  is is because most emerging and developing economies did not suff er long-lasting shocks to their 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 -8 -4 0 4 8 12 16 20 24 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; and IMF sta calculations. Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Islamic Republic of Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates, and Republic of Yemen. Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Asia excluding China. Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Turkey. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. 1 2 Real Eective Exchange Rate 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 Nominal Eective Exchange Rate China Euro area Real Eective Exchange Rate Figure 1.5. External Developments (Index, 2000 = 100; three-month moving average unless noted otherwise) Although currencies have gyrated during the crisis, they have not moved much relative to precrisis levels, except in emerging Europe and the Middle East. Also, the Japanese yen appreciated signicantly. Many emerging economies began to build up reserves, after nancial stress started to ease in mid-2009. Emerging Europe 4 Middle East and North Africa 1 3 4 5 Nominal Eective Exchange Rate Current Account Positions (percent of GDP) Latin America Latin America 5 Africa 2 Mar. 10 2000 02 04 06 Mar. 10 2000 02 04 06 Mar. 10 2000 02 04 06 Mar. 10 2000 02 04 06 2000 02 04 06 Asia 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 International Reserves Feb. 10 2000 02 04 0608 Emerging Europe 4 Major Currencies Emerging and Developing Economies Japan United States China Euro area Japan United States Asia 3 08 08 08 08 0809 Sub-Saharan Africa Emerging Europe 4 Africa 2 Asia 3 Latin America 5 Middle East and North Africa 1 Middle East and North Africa 1 Asia Middle East and North Africa 1 Emerging Europe 4 Latin America WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: REBALANCING GROWTH 8 International Monetary Fund | April 2010 fi nancial systems or large increases in unemployment rates, and many have been able to deploy sizable fi s- cal and monetary stimulus.  is refl ects a widespread strengthening of policy frameworks and institutions in response to earlier crises as well as accelerating potential growth, driven by market-oriented reforms. Historically, sound domestic policies and strong underlying potential have provided a number of emerg- ing and developing economies with some insulation against recessions in advanced economies (Figure 1.10). For example, Asian economies pulled through the deep recession of the early 1980s relatively well, helped by policy frameworks that improved their resilience to external shocks.  e same was true for a broader range of emerging and developing economies following the 2001 recession in advanced economies. A positive feature for the present recovery is that most emerging economies did not have externally funded booms— exceptions being various emerging European and some CIS economies.  us, the prospects for emerging and developing economies may be less dependent on those for advanced economies during the current recovery than in the wake of some past global recessions. Overall, the world looks poised for further recovery at varying speeds across and within various regions (Figure 1.11; Table 1.1). Global growth is projected at about 4¼ percent in 2010 and 2011. For both advanced and emerging economies, the new fore- cast for 2010 has an upward revision to output of about 1 percentage point relative to the October 2009 WEO, but it is broadly similar to the January 2010 WEO Update; for 2011, the forecast is broadly unchanged relative to the two previous issues of the WEO. Advanced economies are now expected to expand by 2¼ percent in 2010, following a more than 3 percent decline in output in 2009, and by 2½ percent in 2011. Growth in emerging and developing economies is expected to be over 6¼ percent during 2010–11, following a modest 2½ percent in 2009.  e recovery under way in the major advanced economies will be relatively sluggish, both com- pared with recoveries following the major (but less deep) recessions of the mid-1970s, early 1980s, and early 1990s and compared with the recover- ies forecast for many emerging economies. Several euro area economies that were hit particularly hard or have run out of macroeconomic policy room are 1980 88 96 04 12 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 US ROW Figure 1.6. Global Imbalances Current account surpluses and decits narrowed as global trade declined and commodity prices fell. However, as the global economy recovers, imbalances are projected to grow again, but to remain lower than before the crisis. This is consistent with a drop in expected income growth in economies that ran excessive current account decits before the crisis. Source: IMF sta estimates. CHN+EMA: China, Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan Province of China, and Thailand; DEU+JPN: Germany and Japan; OCADC: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, and United Kingdom; OIL: Oil exporters; ROW: rest of the world; US: United States. Measured as standard deviation of country-specic current accounts in G20 economies. Based on a 10-year rolling regression of global current account imbalance on world GDP growth and oil prices. Average growth rates for individual countries, aggregated using purchasing-power- parity weights; the aggregates shift over time in favor of faster-growing economies, giving the line an upward trend. 1 Global Imbalances (percent of world GDP) CHN+EMA OIL 1 OCADC DEU+JPN Discrepancy 15 3 Actual current account imbalances 14 Predicted current account imbalances Actual and Projected Global Imbalances 2 2 3 Trend, 1970–2008 World Trade Volume (goods and services) 4 4 South Africa Australia Brazil Indonesia Canada Korea India Mexico Russia Turkey United Kingdom France Italy Japan Germany Saudi Arabia Euro area China United States Argentina -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 Real Eective Exchange Rate Movement (percent change; for each local currency) September 2007–March 2010 March 2009–March 2010 1970 85 2000 15 -16 -12 -8 -4 0 4 8 12 16 1996 98 2000 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 CHAPTER 1 GLOBAL PROSPECTS AND POLICIES International Monetary Fund | April 2010 9 likely to lag behind their major peers. By contrast, Australia and the newly industrialized Asian econo- mies are off to a strong start and will likely stay in the lead.  e pace of recovery will also diverge signifi cantly among emerging and developing economies: the Asian economies, which suff ered less during the downturn, are leading the recovery–– in terms of both smaller output gaps and higher growth rates––and are forecast to continue to do so. In sub-Saharan Africa, most economies are expected to stay close to their potential output growth rates. Recovery in the economies of emerging Europe and the CIS will continue to lag behind, with some exceptions. In general, economies that are in the lead of recovery are likely to remain there. Conversely, those that experienced larger drops in output during the crisis will not necessarily experience stronger recoveries (Figure 1.9). 2 As Chapter 2 discusses in more depth, output developments are determined by many factors, a number of which have lasting consequences.  ese include the extent of damage to fi nancial sectors, household balance sheets, and cross-border funding and the room available for policy maneuvers to com- bat recession. 3 Contrary to some perceptions, the type of exchange rate regime does not appear to have had a major impact on growth in this crisis (Box 1.1). In ation Pressures Are Generally Subdued but Diverge  e still-low levels of capacity utilization and well-anchored infl ation expectations are expected to keep infl ation low (Figure 1.12).  e limited decline in infl ation in many advanced economies is puzzling given the exceptionally large falls in out- put. Core infl ation in the euro area has lately fallen under 1 percent, down from under 2 percent at the 2  e “Zarnowitz rule”–– whereby deep recessions are followed by rapid recoveries––will generally not apply. For details on this rule, see Zarnowitz (1992). 3 However, looking behind these regional groupings at country specifi cs, much is still not understood about what drove economic activity during this recession. For further discussion, see Berkmen and others (2009); Claessens and others (2010); and Blanchard, Faruqee, and Das (2010). On the lasting impact of fi nancial shocks, see Cardarelli, Elekdag, and Lall (2009) and Chapter 3 of the April 2009 World Economic Outlook. -12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 -1 0 1 2 3 -50 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 Figure 1.7. General Government Fiscal Balances and Public Debt (Percent of GDP unless noted otherwise) Sources: Country authorities; Datastream; European Commission (2009); Fiscal Monitor Database; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; and IMF sta estimates. Based on real GDP growth projected for 2008–14. Emerging and developing economies Advanced economies 1980 15200090 World 10 Fiscal Balance 1950 15200060 80 10 Public Debt Fiscal balances have deteriorated, mainly because of falling revenue resulting from decreased real and nancial activity. Fiscal stimulus has played a major role in stabilizing output but has contributed little to increases in public debt, which are especially large in advanced economies. Most advanced economies need to lower their decits substantially to stabilize their debt-to-GDP ratios; some are experiencing growing nancial market pressure to do so soon. However, all countries need to make signicant progress over the coming decade: spending on aging populations will only make matters worse. Falling debt Actual primary structural balance, 2009 (percent of potential GDP) 1 Debt-stabilizing primary balance Increasing debt Actual and Debt-Stabilizing Primary Balances Italy Ireland Spain European Bond Yields vis-à-vis German Bond Yield (ten year; basis points) 2008 Greece Ireland Apr. 10 United Kingdom 09 Portugal Spain 2010 20 30 40 50 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 Pension expenditures Health care expenditures Aging-Related Spending in G20 Advanced Economies 70 90 G7 Decomposition of Government Debt Increase, 2007–14 (total debt increase: 35.5 percent of GDP) Financial support (3.0) Fiscal stimulus (3.5) Automatic stabilizers (10.0) Higher interest payments (4.0) Revenue loss from lower asset prices and nancial prots (9.0) Other (6.0) Japan Germany United States 1 Advanced economies World Emerging and developing economies WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: REBALANCING GROWTH 10 International Monetary Fund | April 2010 peak in 2008; in the United States it has been run- ning about 1½ percent, down from somewhat over 2 percent; and in the United Kingdom it appears to have moved sideways (excluding the likely impact of one-time eff ects). In Japan, price dynamics turned appreciably from very low core infl ation to nega- tive infl ation, which slightly exceeded 1 percent in February 2010. In general, the correlation between the drop in core infl ation from its 2008 peaks and the increase in unemployment rates is weaker than during the 2001 recession (Figure 1.13). Beyond the fact that the fi nancial crisis aff ected economies’ potential output to diff ering degrees, various factors may explain this: • Inflation expectations have generally remained well anchored, testifying to the credibility of accommodative monetary and fiscal policies as well as public support for financial repair. • Nominal downward rigidities become more binding at very low inflation rates, slowing or inhibiting further falls. • Labor hoarding—a reluctance to lay off existing employees even during the slowdown—may have raised unit labor costs. • In the face of weak revenues and tight financial conditions, firms may resist lowering prices and margins in an effort to rebuild working capital. Moreover, the strong cyclical position of key emerging economies—before and after the crisis— has limited the decline in infl ation pressure at the global level. In particular, recovering demand (espe- cially in Asia) provided a strong boost to commodity prices, which explains why excess capacity in com- modity production and excess inventories for many commodities markets are both lower than usual for this stage of the global cycle (Figure 1.2; Appen- dix 1.1). In many emerging economies, infl ation has been quite variable from year to year and has been higher than in the advanced economies.  is pattern persists. In various Latin American, Middle Eastern, and CIS economies, infl ation slowed but remained relatively high throughout the cycle, and in India it rose strongly. Infl ation fell appreciably in Russia and moderately in Brazil; prices in China actually declined for a while but are now rising. Looking ahead, in most advanced economies head- line infl ation rates should broadly converge to present -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 Figure 1.8. Measures of Monetary Policy and Liquidity in Selected Advanced Economies (Interest rates in percent unless noted otherwise) Policy rates were cut to near zero in major advanced economies and were brought down signicantly in many emerging economies. Markets expect a prolonged period of very low rates for the advanced economies and some signicant rate hikes in various emerging economies, which are seen to be closer to full capacity and subject to higher ination risks. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Euro area Nominal Short-Term Interest Rates Japan United States Sources: Bloomberg Financial Markets; Eurostat; Haver Analytics; and IMF sta calculations. Three-month treasury bill. Relative to core ination. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. Expectations are based on the federal funds rate for the United States, the sterling overnight interbank average rate for the United Kingdom, and the euro interbank oered forward rates for Europe; updated April 12, 2010. Average ask/bid spread of the Turkish Lira Reference Interest Rate (TRLIBOR) as of April 12, 2010. Based on futures of 28-day interbank rates. 1 Policy Rate Expectations (percent; months on x-axis) 2000 02 04 06 Apr. 10 Real Short-Term Interest Rates 2 Feb. 10 2000 0602 04 2 3 4 1 5 United Kingdom United States Europe t United States Euro area Japan 5 08 08 t + 3 t + 6 t + 9 t + 12 0 4 8 12 16 20 Nominal Policy Rates (percent) Asia 2003 04 05 06 Mar. 10 07 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 Real Policy Rates (percent) 2003 04 05 06 Feb. 10 07 2 08 08 Latin America 3 Eastern Europe 4 6 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Interest Rate Expectations (percent) Mexico India Brazil Turkey 6 Latin America 3 Asia Eastern Europe 4 tt + 3 t + 6 t + 9 t + 12 7 7 CHAPTER 1 GLOBAL PROSPECTS AND POLICIES International Monetary Fund | April 2010 11 levels of core infl ation as high unemployment discour- ages high wage settlements and energy prices remain sta- ble or increase only modestly (Table 1.1)––March 2010 futures markets foresee only modest oil price increases, from $78.25 in 2010 to $82.50 in 2011, although prices have lately been somewhat higher. Risks for defl a- tion remain pertinent in light of the weak outlook for GDP growth and persistent wide gaps between actual and potential output (Figure 1.13). For emerging and developing economies, sustained increases in infl ation are not projected during the recovery, although infl ation is likely to remain quite variable wherever consumer prices are more sensitive to commodity prices. 4 Otherwise, signifi cant upside infl ation risks are confi ned to economies with a history of unstable price levels and to those that are growing strongly but have little excess productive capacity–– including a number of emerging Asian economies and others for which markets are pricing in appreciable policy rate hikes during 2010 (Figure 1.8). Important Risks Remain amid Sharply Diminished Room for Policy Maneuvers  e outlook for activity remains unusually uncertain. Risks are generally to the downside, and although a variety of risks have receded, downside risks related to the growth of public debt in advanced economies have become sharply more evident.  e main concern is that room for policy maneuvers in many advanced economies has either been largely exhausted or has become much more limited, leaving these fragile recoveries exposed to new shocks. In addition, bank exposure to real estate continues to pose downside risks, mainly in the United States and parts of Europe. One upside risk that has diminished is that the potential for positive fi nancial surprises is now lower, given the extent of the fi nancial recovery that has already taken place. Even so, reduction in uncertainty may continue to foster a stronger-than- expected improvement in fi nancial market sentiment and prompt a larger-than-expected rebound in capi- tal fl ows, trade, and private demand. One downside risk that has diminished is that the systemic risks 4 See Chapter 3 of the October 2008 World Economic Outlook. 100 105 110 115 120 125 130 135 140 Source: IMF sta calculations. Based on deviations from an estimated (cointegration) relationship between global industrial production and retail sales. Unemployment Rate Industrial Production and Estimated Retail Sales (index) Retail sales (real, estimated) -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 Estimated Change in Global Inventories (index) Figure 1.9. Prospects for Near-Term Activity Based on the historical relationship between global industrial production and retail sales, the global slowdown during 2008:Q4–2009:Q1 was signicantly driven by inventory drawdowns. This process has now reversed and will help support growth during 2010. However, high unemployment in the advanced economies will limit demand, as will impaired nancial systems. Output recovery will be sluggish by past standards. More generally, countries that suered large slowdowns or contractions in activity during the crisis will not necessarily rebound quickly, because they are dealing with long-lasting shocks. 2000 02 04 Nov. 09 Industrial production 06 08 Recession and Recovery 5 6 7 8 9 Advanced Economies 2000 05 10 15 5 6 7 8 9 Emerging and Developing Economies 2000 05 10 15 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 -4 0 4 8 12 16 20 Recession 2009:Q2 GDP (percent of 2008:Q1 GDP) Recovery 2011:Q4 GDP (percent of 2009:Q2 GDP) Advanced Economies -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 Recovery 2011:Q4 GDP (percent of 2009:Q1 GDP) Emerging Economies -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 98 100 102 104 106 108 110 112 114 United States 1975:Q1 1982:Q3 1991:Q1 2009:Q2 Output since Trough for Highly Synchronized Recessions (Index; quarters on x-axis) -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 98 100 102 104 106 108 110 112 114 Euro Area 1975:Q1 1982:Q3 1993:Q1 2009:Q2 2000 02 04 Nov. 09 06 08 1 Recession 2009:Q1 GDP (percent of 2008:Q3 GDP) 1 WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: REBALANCING GROWTH 12 International Monetary Fund | April 2010 originating in the fi nancial sector have fallen further as the recovery has become more robust.  e IMF staff ’s quantitative indicators broadly confi rm these qualitative insights (Figure 1.14). 5 Specifi cally, risks as measured by falling dispersion in analysts’ forecasts for real GDP growth have diminished but remain to the downside. Options prices on the S&P 500 indicate some upside risks from fi nancial surprises, although these are now smaller than in October 2009. Concerns about upside surprises on infl ation that may require earlier-than-expected monetary policy action have remained unchanged, judging by analysts’ expecta- tions. Term spread data point to broadly balanced risks to growth, as yield curves have steepened mod- estly since October 2009. Options prices for futures on petroleum and other commodities suggest small downside risks to growth from another commodity price spike in the near term––risks for sharp price increases are higher in the medium term, as spare capacity and inventory buff ers diminish. Sovereign risk premiums for some of the more fi scally vulnerable economies have again seen a steep increase, amid signifi cant volatility (Figure 1.7). In the near term, the main risk is that, if unchecked, market concerns about sovereign liquidity and solvency in Greece could turn into a full-blown and contagious sovereign debt crisis, as explained in the April 2010 GFSR. A widespread public debt scare across major advanced economies appears unlikely, because together these economies have broad tax and investor bases. However, even here, risk assessments by investors are likely to increasingly diff erentiate among economies, showing greater sensitivity to deteriorating budgetary outlooks. Risks related to sovereign debt could depress output for a variety of reasons.  ey could prompt premature withdrawal of fi scal stimulus that under- mines recovery or limit the scope of new stimulus in response to new adverse shocks. As activity weak- ens, households and investors could lose confi dence in governments’ ability to design and implement sound consolidation plans and in response could sharply reduce their spending because of con- 5 For a detailed discussion of the methodology used to con- struct the fan chart, see Elekdag and Kannan (2009). 1985 90 95 2000 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1970 75 80 0 2 4 6 8 10 1975 80 85 90 -5 0 5 10 Source: World Economic Outlook database. Figure 1.10. Emerging Economies: GDP Growth by Recession Episode (Percent change from one year earlier) During recessions in advanced economies, output in emerging economies has varied, slowing down sharply during the early 1980s but holding up well during the 1990s and in 2001. Furthermore, developments have varied across countries. Following the recession of the early 1980s, output growth moved onto a higher trajectory in emerging Asia but dropped in Latin America. Following the 2001 recession, output growth remained strong in all emerging economies. 1975 80 85 90 0 2 4 6 8 10 1996 98 2000 02 04 06 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Growth around 1991–93 Growth around 2001 1975 80 85 90 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Growth around 1974–75 Growth around 1980–83 Emerging economies Advanced economies 2003 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 Growth around 2008–09 Emerging Asia: Growth around 1980–83 Latin America: Growth around 1980–83 CHAPTER 1 GLOBAL PROSPECTS AND POLICIES International Monetary Fund | April 2010 13 cerns that taxes will increase or that prospects for growth, wages, and investment returns will dimin- ish. Abrupt changes in exchange rates that distort production present further concerns.  e simulation in Figure 1.15 helps illustrate the potential role of confi dence, limited room for policy maneuver, and relevant interactions. It shows the baseline projections (red line) and adds one shock: a confi dence-induced drop in aggregate demand in advanced economies. 6  e resulting downside scenario (blue line) assumes that fi scal policy cannot off set this shock and that monetary policy is constrained at present levels. Households would experience con- tinued weak labor market conditions and housing prices would drop further, following the expiration of key policy support measures. Firms would postpone hiring and investment and bank lending conditions would tighten with mounting loan delinquencies. Given weak recovery prospects in advanced econo- mies, including for the growth of imports, emerging economies as a group would experience diffi culties in sustaining exports and growth––monetary policy would be unable to off set the eff ects on output of the sequence of negative shocks, given its gradual impact.  e result would be a delay in the recovery of several years, with unemployment declining at a slower pace and with persistent defl ation in Japan. Policies Need to Sustain and Strengthen Recovery Policymakers are faced with major challenges. In many advanced and a number of emerging econo- mies, they need to rebalance demand away from the public and toward the private sector, while consoli- dating public fi nances and repairing the fi nancial sector. In a number of emerging and developing economies, policymakers need to increasingly tap domestic sources for growth, as demand from other economies will likely remain weaker than before the crisis.  ese rebalancing acts are proceeding but not without problems. Many advanced economies con- tinue to struggle to repair and reform their fi nancial 6  e simulations are based on a six-region version of the IMF’s Global Projection Model. See Garcia-Saltos and others (forthcoming). -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 -9 -6 -3 0 3 6 -8 -4 0 4 8 12 16 -8 -4 0 4 8 12 16 NIEs 5 Sources: Haver Analytics; and World Economic Outlook database. Comprises China, India, Russia, South Africa, Turkey, and economies listed in footnotes 4, 6, and 7. Includes only economies that report quarterly data. Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, euro area, Hong Kong SAR, Israel, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan Province of China, United Kingdom, and United States. Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand. Newly industrialized Asian economies (NIEs) comprise Hong Kong SAR, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan Province of China. Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. Annual percent change from one year earlier. 1 2 3 4 China Latin America 7 Emerging Europe 6 Figure 1.11. Global Outlook (Real GDP; quarterly percent change from one year earlier, unless noted otherwise) Emerging economies Euro area Japan Advanced economies 2,3 United States Global growth is forecast to recover in all regions but remain below precrisis levels over the medium term. Accordingly, relative to precrisis trends, some activity has been permanently lost. Losses are particularly large in emerging Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), where recovery in many countries will be slow and medium-term growth rates appreciably lower than before the crisis. Recovery is also expected to be sluggish in a number of advanced economies, although less so in the United States than in the euro area and Japan. Brazil India ASEAN-4 4 5 2000 02 06 10 World 04 08 2000 02 06 1004 08 2000 02 06 1004 08 2000 02 06 1004 08 2000 02 04 06 08 10 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 -12 -8 -4 0 4 8 12 16 Russia Sub-Saharan Africa CIS Middle East and North Africa 2000 02 06 1004 08 1,2 2 8 8 8 6 7 8 WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: REBALANCING GROWTH 14 International Monetary Fund | April 2010 Although emerging market economies were not at the epicenter of the global fi nancial crisis, the experience of the past couple years may nevertheless hold important lessons for them. One such lesson concerns the choice of exchange rate regime—an obvious question being whether the regime can help explain how emerging market economies fared during this crisis, particularly in terms of output losses and growth resilience. 1  eory suggests that exchange rate fl exibility, by easing adjustment, should be associated with smaller output losses in the face of external shocks.  is is also a popular perception of the current crisis—that economies with more fl exible exchange rate regimes weathered the crisis better. What we fi nd, however, is that economies with pegged regimes fared neither better nor worse than those with fl oats. Tentative work suggests that good performers, whether operating in the context of pegs or fl oats, allowed their real exchange rates to move in a direction that reduced initial misalignments. A fi rst look at the raw data on growth performance during the crisis yields the surprising result that both in absolute terms and in relation to previous perfor- mance, economies with fl oats—broadly construed to include the range from free fl oating to crawl-like arrangements—averaged larger output declines than pegs (fi rst fi gure). 2 At the beginning of the crisis,  e author of this box is Charalambos Tsangarides. 1 A recent IMF study found that intermediate (neither rigidly fi xed nor freely fl oating) exchange rate regimes are associated with the highest average growth performance by capturing some of the benefi ts of pegs (low nominal and real exchange rate volatility, trade integration) while avoiding the main drawbacks (exchange rate overvaluation).  e study also found, however, that economies with pegged and inter- mediate regimes are more likely to experience currency and fi nancial crises, although not growth crises (see Ghosh, Ostry, and Tsangarides, 2010). Another IMF study uses revised pro- jections for GDP growth in 2009 (comparing forecasts prior to and after the intensifi cation of the crisis in September 2008) and fi nds that exchange rate fl exibility helped buff er the impact of the crisis (see Berkmen and others, 2009). 2  e sample consists of 50 emerging market economies. Based on the IMF’s de facto exchange rate classifi cation at the end of each period of the analysis, the following are cat- egorized as pegs: hard pegs (with no separate legal tender or a currency board), conventional pegged arrangements, pegs within horizontal bands, and crawling pegs. Others are cat- average growth was more than half a percentage point higher for economies with pegged exchange rate regimes compared with those with fl oating regimes. As the crisis intensifi ed, average growth declines for economies with pegs were smaller than for those with fl oats (8.6 and 1.6 percentage point declines for pegs in the periods 2007–09 and 2008–09, respectively, compared with 9.0 and 2.5 percentage point declines for fl oats).  is same discrepancy holds for output declines as measured in relation to the economy’s pre- vious growth performance (fi rst fi gure, righthand bar). What accounts for this? In part, perceptions that economies with pegs fared worse may simply be egorized as fl oats. Of the four growth episodes, the fi rst three calculate real GDP growth rates between 2007–08, 2007–09, and 2008–09, and the fourth compares growth in 2008–09 with growth in 2003–07. It is also possible that the choice of exchange rate regime may have aff ected growth performance prior to the crisis as well.  is is why we examine both the absolute and the relative growth performance. Box 1.1. Lessons from the Crisis: On the Choice of Exchange Rate Regime 2007–08 2007–09 2008–09 2008–09 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 Average Growth for Various Periods of the Crisis (Percent) Source: IMF sta calculations. Pegs Floats versus 2003–07 [...]... 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 -5 -10 -15 20 06 08 10 12 14 15 180 170 160 150 140 130 120 110 100 90 80 70 130 120 110 100 20 06 08 10 12 14 15 90 Aligned3 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 -5 -10 -15 20 06 08 10 12 14 15 180 170 160 150 140 130 120 110 100 90 80 70 130 120 110 100 20 06 08 10 12 14 15 90 Excessive External Deficits4 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 -5 -10 -15 20 06 08 10 12 14 15 180 170 160 150 140 130 120 110... -5 -5 -5 0 -10 20 07 09 11 13 15: Q4 20 07 09 6 -10 -10 15: 20 07 09 11 13 15: Q4 Q4 Headline Inflation (year over year; percentage points) 6 6 11 13 4 4 4 2 2 2 0 0 0 -2 -2 -2 -4 20 07 09 11 13 15: Q4 20 07 09 11 6 -4 15: 20 07 09 11 Q4 Policy Rate (percentage points) 6 13 13 15: Q4 -4 6 4 4 4 2 2 2 0 20 07 09 11 13 15: Q4 20 07 09 12 0 15: 20 07 09 11 Q4 Unemployment Rate (percentage points) 12 11 13 13 15:... 13 15: Q4 0 7 10 10 6 8 8 5 6 6 4 4 4 3 2 2007 09 11 13 15: Q4 20 07 09 100 2 15: 20 07 09 11 Q4 Indicator of Bank-Lending Tightening 100 11 13 13 15: Q4 2 100 80 80 80 60 60 60 40 40 40 20 20 20 0 0 0 -20 20 07 09 11 13 15: Q4 20 07 Source: Global Projection Model simulations 20 International Monetary Fund | April 20 10 09 11 13 -20 15: Q4 20 07 09 11 13 -20 15: Q4 20 07 09 11 13 15: Q4 -5 CHAPTER 1 may be... of advanced economies Rate Differences from Peaks 20 08 peak 10 5 0 Inflation -5 -10 -15 Inflation 20 00–01 peak 1 Emerging Economies2 2 Advanced Economies y = 1 .21 x–5.41 1 R2= 0.08 y = 0.01x–1.94 0 R2= 0.00 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 y = –0.52x–0.71 y = –0.05x–6.51 -6 R2= 0 .25 R2= 0.00 -7 -8 -9 -2 0 2 4 6 8 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 Unemployment rate Unemployment rate -20 -25 -30 8 -35 Deflation Vulnerability Indicator: Key... economies Emerging economies World World 2 2 0 -2 6 4 Advanced economies Advanced economies 20 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 0 20 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 Feb 10 -2 Feb 10 Country Indicators 5 Advanced Economies: Headline Inflation 4 United States1 3 2 1 Advanced Economies: Core Inflation 5 4 United States1 3 2 Euro area 1 Euro area 0 -1 0 Japan Japan -1 -2 -3 -2 20 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 Feb 10 20 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 4 Advanced... through 20 11, although employment growth is expected to turn positive in many economies during 20 10 Accordingly, a major concern is the potential for temporary joblessness to turn into long-term unemployment and to lower potential output growth Appropriately stimulative macroeconomic policies are the first line International Monetary Fund | April 20 10 23 WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: REBALANCING GROWTH of... both the economic downturn and the exit from the pegged regime, then it would be unfair to attribute the poor growth performance to Growth during 20 08–09 relative to 20 03–07 and Exchange Rate Regime Classification Current Regime Classification (1) Regime (1= fixed) Partner Growth 20 08–09 Terms of Trade 20 08–09 0.00535 (0.0151) 2. 3 520 0*** (0. 425 0) 0.00065** (0.0003) Short-Term Debt to GDP, 20 06 Reserves... risks to growth from high prices have also diminished Prospects for World GDP Growth1 (percent change) 8 6 4 2 0 Baseline forecast 50 percent confidence interval 70 percent confidence interval 90 percent confidence interval 20 07 08 -2 09 -4 11 10 Balance of Risks Associated with Selected Risk Factors 2 1 .2 1.0 Balance of risks according to October 20 09 WEO April 20 10 WEO 0.8 0.6 0.4 0 .2 0.0 -0 .2 -0.4... 0.000 32 (0.0 021 ) 0.0 026 8 (0.0039) 0.00915 (0.0146) 38 0.59 (4) 0.01990 (0.0144) 1.1 120 0 (0. 721 0) 0.00086*** (0.0003) –0.0 026 8*** (0.0009) 0.00059 (0.0007) 0.00004 (0.0013) 0.0 022 7 (0.0066) 0.03790*** (0.0144) 32 0.63 Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level, respectively International Monetary Fund | April 20 10... Monetary Fund | April 20 10 15 WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: REBALANCING GROWTH Box 1.1 (continued) Predicted Average Growth, 20 08–09 versus 20 03–07 Using Regression Analysis Exchange Rate Regime Classifications, 20 01–09 (Percent) (Percent) No separate legal tender Conventional peg Pegged exchange rate within horizontal bands Crawl-like Floating 0 Currency board Stabilized Crawling peg -2 Other managed Free floating . Lall (20 09) and Chapter 3 of the April 20 09 World Economic Outlook. - 12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 -1 0 1 2 3 -50 0 50 100 150 20 0 25 0 300 350 400 450 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 Figure. -2 0 2 4 6 8 98 100 1 02 104 106 108 110 1 12 114 Euro Area 1975:Q1 19 82: Q3 1993:Q1 20 09:Q2 20 00 02 04 Nov. 09 06 08 1 Recession 20 09:Q1 GDP (percent of 20 08:Q3 GDP) 1 WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: REBALANCING. 15: Q4 0 2 4 6 0 2 4 6 0 2 4 6 20 07 09 11 13 15: Q4 20 07 09 11 13 15: Q4 20 07 09 11 13 15: Q4 2 4 6 8 10 12 2 4 6 8 10 12 2 3 4 5 6 7 20 07 09 11 13 15: Q4 20 07 09 11 13 15: Q4 20 07 09 11 13 15: Q4 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100 20 07