The question of interest is whether different types of institutional investors influence corporate governance and firm performance in a less developed market like Vietnam, where issuing
Motivation
Corporate governance encompasses the mechanisms that guide managerial decisions in scenarios where ownership and control are distinct Key monitoring mechanisms include the board of directors, institutional shareholders, and the corporate control market The significance of corporate governance is highlighted by the substantial growth in empirical research across various fields, including accounting, economics, finance, management, and corporate strategy Research typically investigates the influence of different corporate governance structures on organizational performance, as seen in studies by Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny.
Ownership structure plays a crucial role in corporate governance, significantly impacting key corporate decisions (Zattoni, 2011) The relationship between corporate governance, ownership structure, and firm performance has garnered substantial research interest (Kumar & Zattoni, 2015; Lemmon & Lins, 2003; Utama et al., 2017; Zheka, 2005) Studies indicate that the quality of corporate governance and firm performance is influenced by various ownership structures, with major shareholders, particularly institutional investors from financial sectors, playing a pivotal role (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) Research has explored the determinants of institutional ownership and its effects on firm valuation and performance (Dahlquist & Robersson, 2001; Ferreira & Matos, 2008; Gompers & Metrick, 2001) Findings from studies on firms in Spain, Australia, and China support the notion that institutional ownership positively correlates with firm value (Ruiz-Mallorquí & Santana-Martín, 2011; Muniandy et al., 2016; Guo & Platikanov, 2019) Additionally, research indicates that foreign ownership can enhance firm performance, particularly when concentrated, as foreign investors tend to increase their monitoring roles (Nam & Thao, 2013; Phung & Le, 2013) Emerging markets, such as Vietnam, present a unique context for examining the influence of different types of institutional investors on corporate governance and firm performance, especially with the recent mandate for listed companies to issue corporate governance reports (Borisova et al., 2012).
Institutional investors play a crucial role in the stock market, particularly in developing countries where markets are still evolving With their extensive experience and strong ties to large financial institutions, these investors possess significant advantages in scale, financial resources, and expertise This allows them to excel in accessing and analyzing market information, often leading to superior performance compared to individual investors In smaller markets, such as Vietnam, the influence of institutional investors is notably pronounced, making their impact on emerging stock markets much greater than in developed economies.
Objectives of the thesis
This study analyzes the connection between institutional investors, corporate governance, and firm performance within Vietnam's logistics sector over a decade, beginning in 2010 It aims to offer recommendations for companies in this industry and for the government to foster both sectoral and national economic growth The research is structured around three key objectives.
First, systematize the theories of institutional investors, corporate governance, and firm performance as well as the relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance
Second, identify and test the relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance of listed logistics companies in Vietnam in the period 2010-2019 through regression models
Third, make suggestions or recommendations for listed logistics companies and government in Vietnam in the period 2010-2019
To answer the research objective, the author poses detailed research questions for this issue as follows:
First, how do Vietnamese institutional investors tend to invest in businesses with their characteristics, structure, and corporate governance?
Second, how do different types of institutional ownership affect firm performance?
Contribution of the thesis
This study enhances the understanding of institutional preferences regarding business structures and their impact on firm value in Vietnam's emerging market It highlights how institutional investors select listed logistics firms based on corporate governance and business characteristics, providing valuable insights for this sector Additionally, it addresses the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in Vietnamese logistics The findings have practical implications for managers of listed logistics companies, enabling them to identify optimal institutional ownership levels to boost performance, while also equipping investors with essential knowledge on corporate governance for informed decision-making Furthermore, the study suggests that stock market entities and government regulators can play a pivotal role in enhancing market conditions.
Research scope
This research focuses on logistics enterprises from 2010 to 2019, a period prior to the significant disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic The pandemic has had a profound impact on logistics operations and ownership structures, which could introduce confounding factors and inaccuracies in the analysis Therefore, to ensure accurate and reliable results, the study strictly examines the specified timeframe of 2010 to 2019.
The research thesis employs both qualitative and quantitative methods The author utilizes qualitative methods to analyze data regarding the ownership structure, business profile, and performance, aiming to evaluate and elucidate the research topic effectively.
To enhance the understanding of the topic, the author employs quantitative methods, including Tobit, Pooled OLS, and 3SLS research models, utilizing a panel data sample derived from published financial statements and credible sources This approach allows for a comprehensive measurement and evaluation of the influence of financial indicators on profit margins.
Thesis structure
Besides the Introduction, Conclusion, and Reference, this thesis consists of the four following chapters:
Chapter 1: Literature review and hypothesis development
Chapter 3: Empirical Results and Discussion
Chapter 4: Managerial Implications and Conclusion
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS
The theoretical basis of corporate governance
Corporate governance is defined in various ways within both practical and academic contexts, with significant events like the collapses of WorldCom, Enron, and Arthur Andersen highlighting its importance (Bebchuk & Hamdani, 2009; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Erkens et al., 2012) Scholars have noted that cultural differences, legal frameworks, and historical contexts across countries complicate the establishment of a universally accepted definition of corporate governance (Ararat et al., 2016; Black, 2001; Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013).
A comprehensive understanding of corporate governance mechanisms is illustrated by Ross et al (2005) and Gillan (2006):
Figure 1.1.1a Corporate governance and enterprise asset balance model according to Ross et al (2005)
Figure 1.1.1b Corporate governance and the extended balance sheet model according to Gillan (2006)
Corporate governance is a multifaceted concept that encompasses the methods by which financiers secure returns on their investments, as noted by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) This definition, however, overlooks the crucial relationship between stakeholders and company management The Cadbury Commission (1992) further elaborates on governance as the system through which companies are directed and controlled The Australian standard (2003) expands this definition to include the processes of direction, control, and accountability within organizations Additionally, Sheikh and Chatterjee (1995) highlight that corporate governance involves a system where board members are entrusted with the responsibilities of managing the company's affairs.
Corporate governance is defined by the OECD (2004) as the framework that establishes relationships among a company's management, board, shareholders, and other stakeholders It sets the company's objectives and outlines the methods to achieve and monitor performance Effective corporate governance incentivizes the board and management to pursue goals that align with the company's interests, while also facilitating oversight by shareholders, stakeholders, and regulators.
Business governance is the process of directing and controlling activities to improve company prosperity and accountability, ultimately aiming to achieve organizational objectives and enhance stakeholder value (Mensah & Adams, 2014) Key governance mechanisms include board composition, board committees, CEO duality or separation, frequency of board meetings, and the concentration of shareholders.
Corporate governance, as defined by Dr Duong Duc Lam (2021), is the systematic process of managing and coordinating various activities within an organization to achieve established goals and enhance effectiveness The governance structure delineates the roles and responsibilities of key stakeholders, including shareholders, the board of directors, management, the supervisory board, and other relevant parties involved in the enterprise.
Corporate governance is crucial for the survival and effective operation of businesses Companies that fail to recognize the importance of governance in their activities risk operational failure To achieve business goals—minimizing costs while maximizing product quality, service excellence, and profits—corporate governance must be prioritized at all management levels and integrated as a key management tool Effective governance enables companies to clearly define their objectives, navigate environmental challenges, leverage opportunities, and optimize their strengths to achieve substantial returns.
Corporate governance plays a crucial role in enhancing the quality of financial reporting, as highlighted by Cohen et al (2002) A key component of this governance is the board of directors, which serves as an essential internal mechanism for overseeing the integrity and reliability of financial reports.
Effective corporate governance establishes a framework that delineates the rights and responsibilities of all stakeholders, including managers, creditors, and board members By clearly defining these roles, companies can facilitate informed decision-making that aligns with the common interests of all parties involved Inefficient operations and a lack of accountability can lead to significant errors, which reflect poorly on the board of directors if they fail to enforce proper governance mechanisms Properly implemented corporate governance equips companies with the necessary insights to make decisions regarding personnel management, including dismissals, evaluations, and promotions, ultimately fostering a more responsible and effective organizational structure.
Effective corporate governance is crucial for companies to mitigate risks associated with scandals, fraud, and criminal liability, acting as a form of self-regulation By aligning individual responsibilities with company activities, members are held accountable for mistakes and violations, ensuring compliance with both internal policies and legal standards Strong corporate governance enhances a company's reputation in the market, attracting investors through transparent operations and information disclosure Furthermore, it boosts company value by improving operational efficiency, asset allocation, and labor policies Conversely, inadequate corporate governance can destabilize financial markets and deter foreign investment, leading to increased financial instability.
The theoretical basis of corporate performance
Corporate performance is a complex economic concept that measures the benefits derived from a company's production and business activities It fundamentally involves evaluating the outputs achieved in relation to the inputs or resources utilized to attain those outcomes.
1995) Higher corporate performance is indicative of more efficient utilization of resources to achieve business goals
Maximizing corporate performance is essential for enhancing labor productivity and resource utilization High performance is crucial for companies to ensure their long-term survival, boost competitiveness, foster innovation, and achieve maximum profitability, which is the primary objective for most businesses.
A comprehensive perspective suggests that corporate performance is determined by how effectively resources are utilized to meet specific goals (Habib, 2016) This approach emphasizes not only the total output levels but also the cost-effectiveness of achieving those outputs.
Corporate performance is an economic metric that reflects resource utilization in achieving specific goals, linking the results obtained to the costs incurred It is characterized by a greater surplus of outputs over inputs, indicating higher performance levels Additionally, performance can be assessed in both absolute and relative terms.
Corporate performance in production and business activities is defined as an economic measure that reflects how effectively resources are utilized to achieve specific goals It illustrates the relationship between the outputs attained and the inputs expended, indicating that a higher surplus of outputs over inputs signifies superior corporate performance This concept allows for assessment in relative terms by comparing outputs to inputs, as well as in absolute terms by evaluating the total magnitude of outputs achieved or resources consumed.
Evaluating a company's performance is essential for understanding its operational and managerial effectiveness Numerous studies have investigated the factors that affect corporate performance across different global markets and industries For example, Zeitun and Tian (2007) analyzed the determinants of firm performance for 167 companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange in Jordan, using data from 1989 to 2003 Similarly, research by Siminica et al has contributed to this body of knowledge.
(2011) investigated 40 companies on the Bucharest Stock Exchange in Romania between 2007 and 2010, while Memon et al (2012) analyzed factors affecting the performance of 141 textile and garment companies in Pakistan from 2004 to 2009
Empirical research in corporate governance often relies on market-based or accounting-based measures to evaluate firm performance Common accounting indicators include Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE), which serve as proxies for operating performance Notably, Klein (1998) employed ROA, whereas Lo (2003) and Brown and Caylor (2005) utilized both ROE and ROA as key indicators of operating performance.
Return on Assets (ROA) measures the earnings generated from invested capital assets, allowing stakeholders to assess a firm's corporate governance effectiveness and management efficiency (Epps & Cereola, 2008) In this study, ROA is calculated as net income before interest expense divided by total assets for the fiscal period Conversely, Return on Equity (ROE) indicates the profit generated from shareholders' investments, calculated as income before interest expense divided by total shareholders' equity Ultimately, a primary goal of operating a corporation is to generate income for the benefit of common stockholders (Epps & Cereola, 2008).
Accounting-based measures can be easily manipulated by managers through adjustments in accounting methods or accruals, making cross-industry comparisons challenging These metrics primarily reflect historical performance, emphasizing past successes while neglecting factors such as risk, investment needs, and the time value of money (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003; Rappaport, 1986).
Tobin's Q is a key market-based indicator of profitability that serves as a proxy for firm performance in various corporate governance research studies Defined as the ratio of a firm's market value of assets to their replacement value, Tobin's Q reflects the financial strength of a company This metric has been utilized in both developed and developing financial markets, highlighting its broad applicability in assessing corporate performance.
Research indicates that higher Q values reflect improved market perceptions of a firm's efficiency, attributed to superior governance mechanisms A high Q value demonstrates a stronger alignment of interests between shareholders and managers, whereas a lower Q value implies increased managerial discretion.
This study utilizes Tobin's Q as a market-based performance metric, calculated by summing short-term debt, long-term debt, and market capitalization, then dividing by the book value of total assets (Cheung et al., 2010).
The analysis indicates a positive correlation between corporate governance variables and both Return on Equity (ROE) and Tobin's Q The study predicts that improvements in the corporate governance index will lead to enhanced ROE and Tobin's Q when the model is regressed.
The theoretical basis of institutional investors
Institutional investors are legal entities, not natural persons, and their structures vary significantly, including profit-maximizing joint-stock companies, limited liability partnerships like private equity firms, and corporations created by special statutes, such as certain sovereign wealth funds They can operate independently or as part of larger corporate groups, often seen in mutual funds that serve as subsidiaries of banks and insurance companies.
The rise in the number and diversity of institutional investors has led to the emergence of new categories and subcategories In this study, we focus on two broad categories of institutional investors, reflecting this evolution While we acknowledge the limitations due to a lack of reliable data and the desire for simplicity, this exclusion does not impact our analysis or conclusions.
Institutional investors encompass a wide range of legal forms and organizational structures, making a singular definition difficult However, they share a common characteristic: they are legal entities rather than individuals, exhibiting varying levels of independence and connections to larger corporate groups or conglomerates.
1.3.2 The relationship between institutional ownership and corporate performance
Shareholder theory emphasizes the voting rights of shareholders in corporate governance, allowing them to influence key decisions like board appointments and corporate policies This theory is crucial for companies as it guides them in defining their responsibilities toward shareholders and optimizing corporate profits The ownership stakes of investors, particularly institutional investors who often possess significant shares, play a vital role in affecting a company's profitability and overall performance.
Ownership structure theory highlights the significance of institutional ownership in corporate governance, as it plays a crucial role in monitoring management The presence of institutional shareholders enhances oversight, leading to more effective supervision and a reduction in agency costs.
In 2008, it was highlighted that companies with significant institutional ownership can effectively oversee management performance Institutional investors possess the necessary strength and expertise to enforce corporate governance principles, ensuring the protection of shareholders' rights and interests.
Giannetti and Simonov (2006) found that both domestic and foreign institutional investors, along with small individual investors focused on security benefits, tend to shy away from investing in Swedish companies exhibiting weak corporate governance Conversely, larger domestic individual investors, who can derive private benefits, show no hesitation in investing in firms with poor governance practices.
Li et al (2006) examined the connection between institutional ownership and corporate governance in China, revealing a notable relationship among institutional ownership, CEO duality, and board composition These elements are identified as critical components of corporate governance within the companies analyzed.
A study conducted in 2013 highlights key elements of corporate governance among 77 listed companies in Vietnam, including board size, the inclusion of female board members, CEO duality, the educational qualifications of board members, their work experience, the presence of independent directors, board compensation, ownership structure, and the influence of blockholders.
In Vietnam, the state maintains significant control over numerous listed companies, which raises questions about corporate governance Research by Guo and Platikanov (2019) suggests that privately-owned firms often outperform state-owned enterprises, as the privileges afforded to internal state shareholders can lead to wealth expropriation from other stakeholders This context underscores the importance of examining institutional investors' preferences for particular corporate governance attributes.
Research in China and Vietnam highlights key elements of corporate governance, including board composition, CEO duality, and ownership structures In Vietnam, the government's control over publicly listed companies and the risk of manager expropriation in state-owned enterprises drive the interest in understanding institutional investors' preferences for particular governance attributes.
Nam and Thao (2013) highlight that concentrated ownership impacts firm performance differently, with state ownership negatively affecting it, while foreign ownership positively contributes to performance Their empirical findings indicate an inverted U-shaped relationship between state ownership and firm performance, contrasted by a U-shaped relationship for foreign ownership This suggests that state ownership can enhance firm performance by leveraging certain advantages (Borisova et al., 2012).
Morck et al (1988) theoretical and empirically research the influence of ownership structure on company performance and found the similar research as Stulz
A study conducted in 1988 revealed that an increase in ownership structure and control authority can enhance a company's value However, when ownership proportions rise excessively, it may lead to a decrease in company value due to the effects of conservative management practices.
Research by Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) supports the hypothesis that institutional investors are driven to monitor company performance Institutional shareholders, benefiting from enhanced voting rights compared to individual shareholders, can effectively intervene to counteract executive authority Monks and Minow (2001) assert that such interventions demonstrate institutional shareholders' commitment to safeguarding their asset value.
A study by Oanh et al (2021) indicates that high levels of institutional ownership in Vietnam may negatively impact firm performance, primarily due to significant state ownership contributing to lower company effectiveness The detrimental effects of institutional ownership can arise when small shareholders lack protection or when there are close ties between institutions and company managers (Djankov, 1999).
Hypothesis development
First, we use Giannetti and Simonov’s (2006) and Gompers and Metrick’s
Research by Giannetti and Simonov (2006) highlights the significant impact of major shareholders on managerial voting decisions, although not all shareholders are motivated to engage actively While security benefits are available to all shareholders, those involved in company management often prioritize personal gains, which influences their preferences for corporate governance quality Their study indicates that in Sweden, both domestic and foreign institutional investors, along with small individual investors who seek only security benefits, tend to shy away from companies with poor corporate governance Conversely, large domestic individual investors, who have the potential to extract private benefits, are less deterred by weak governance structures.
Li et al (2006) found a significant relationship between institutional ownership and corporate governance in China, highlighting the importance of CEO duality and board composition Similarly, Duc and Thuy (2013) identified key corporate governance elements in Vietnam, including board size, the presence of female board members, CEO duality, education and experience levels of board members, the presence of independent directors, board compensation, ownership structures, and blockholders, based on their analysis of 77 listed companies.
In Vietnam, the state maintains significant control over numerous listed companies, which influences corporate governance dynamics Research by Guo and Platikanov (2019) suggests that privately owned firms often outperform state-owned enterprises due to the incentives for internal state shareholders to prioritize their interests, potentially at the expense of other stakeholders This context prompts an exploration of institutional investors' preferences regarding corporate governance characteristics, forming the basis for our first hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 Institutional investors in Vietnam are less likely to hold shares of firms with larger board sizes, CEO duality, and, ultimately, control by the state
Prudence is crucial for institutions globally, especially in Vietnam, as highlighted by Gompers and Metrick (2001), who emphasize the need for institutional investors to navigate the legal environment carefully Firms that exhibit strong liquidity, a solid history, and a reputable market presence are particularly appealing to these investors This study anticipates a positive correlation between institutional ownership and both firm size and age In addition to corporate governance aspects, we propose a second hypothesis regarding the characteristics preferred by institutions.
Hypothesis 2 Institutional investors in Vietnam are more likely to invest in firms with a larger size and older age
Since the implementation of "Doi Moi" in 1986, Vietnam's economy has experienced substantial restructuring Despite these changes, state ownership remains a crucial component of the ownership structure in Vietnamese listed companies The government continues to exercise ultimate control over many partially privatized firms, particularly in key industries that are vital to the nation's economic stability and national security.
In 2012, a significant number of listed companies in Vietnam had state ownership exceeding 90% Given the critical role of major institutional shareholders, it is essential to explore the differing impacts of state-owned versus privately owned institutional investors on firm performance We anticipate that both types of institutions will positively influence firm performance, though the impact of privately owned institutions may surpass that of state-owned ones Thus, we propose the fourth hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3 The positive effect of institutional ownership on firm performance is more significant for privately owned than state-owned institutional ownership
Greyrate The grey institutional ownership
Indrate The independent institutional ownership (rate)
Prirate The privately-owned institutional ownership (rate)
Starate The state-owned institutional ownership (rate) Independent variables
Adnum Number of members in the board of directors (-)
Insnum Number of large institutional shareholders (+)
Firm size (the common logarithm of market capitalization)
AGE The common logarithm of firm age (+)
TobinsQ Market capitalization/book value (+)
STATE State as ultimate control
ROA Return on assets (net income/total assets) (+)
LEV Firm leverage (total debts/total assets) (-)
Firm’s market share compared to the whole industry (Firm’s sales/
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Research process
The research is conducted following the steps:
Step 1: Develop indicators that reflect institutional ownership, company performance and corporate governance factors that affect the performance of Vietnamese logistics companies listed on HOSE and HNX
Step 2: Check the data before analysis
Step 3: Set up the theoretical model
Step 4: Conduct single regression analysis
Step 5: Conduct multivariate regression analysis to determine the impact of independent variables on institutional ownership and company performance of companies used in the study
Step 6: Eliminate potential endogeneity in the model
Step 7: Presenting research results and then making some recommendations to improve company performance of Vietnamese logistics companies listed on HOSE and HNX
Data collection
This study utilizes secondary data, incorporating theoretical foundations, research findings from other authors, and relevant state guidelines and policies Additionally, data from Fiingroup and Vietstock, reputable sources for information on Vietnamese listed logistics companies, are included Observations lacking adequate information for hypothesis testing are excluded from the sample.
In addition, all data were winsorized at the 1% level to control for outliers As a result, 300 observations were adopted as the final sample of this study, equivalent to
Variables construction
This study analyzes annual reports from Vietnamese logistics companies to assess institutional ownership, defined under Article 6, Sub article 9 of the Vietnam Securities Law (2006) as shareholders owning at least five percent of voting stocks The research data reveals the percentage of institutional ownership in Vietnamese public logistics firms, sourced from the list of significant institutional shareholders, as only those who are majority shareholders are required to report their stock ownership to the authorities (Article 29, Sub article).
In this study, we focus on large institutions as institutional investors, utilizing data from the Vietstock organization's report, as outlined in the Vietnam Securities Law of 2006 Institutional ownership is defined as the proportion of shares held by these institutions relative to the total number of outstanding shares in the company.
Following Guo and Platikanov (2019), we manually identify the financial institutions among large institutional shareholders and classify them into the following groups:
- State-owned institutions (Starate) include financial institutions owned by the state or state legal entity
Privately owned institutions, often referred to as "Pirate," are defined as financial entities not owned by the government or any state legal entity In this thesis, the term "privately owned institutions" encompasses a distinct category of institutional investors that is separate from state-owned enterprises While this definition diverges from the traditional view that limits it to businesses not publicly traded, the thesis aligns its classification of these ownership groups with prior research findings.
- Grey or pressure-sensitive financial institutions (Greyrate) comprise banks and insurance companies
- Independent or pressure-insensitive financial institutions (Indrate) consist of securities companies and venture capital firms
According to Article 114, Sub article 1.a of the Vietnam Securities Law 2006, each ordinary share of a listed company is entitled to one vote, indicating that the ownership percentage directly correlates with the voting rights of investors in Vietnamese logistics companies.
Research has highlighted the importance of corporate governance systems, particularly emphasizing the board of directors' pivotal role in improving corporate and economic performance Empirical evidence from a study of U.S firms indicates that smaller boards are associated with enhanced company performance, positively impacting investor behavior and overall company value (Yermack, 1996).
Horváth and Spirollari (2012) demonstrate that the size of a board of directors significantly affects CEO compensation incentives, as effective compensation programs are a key responsibility of the board Companies with excessively large boards often experience diminished effectiveness In Vietnam, the Administrative Council defines the structure of the board of directors, prompting this study to incorporate the number of Administrative Council members (Adnum) to account for institutional investors' preferences concerning board size.
CEO duality, where one individual serves as both the CEO and chairperson of the board, is a significant factor in assessing corporate governance quality Previous studies on CEO duality present mixed results; for instance, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) found that companies with CEO duality may experience decreased business performance Conversely, some researchers argue that separating the roles of CEO and chairman can lead to fragmented strategic decision-making and policy implementation, potentially exacerbating agency problems between senior management and the board of directors Consequently, addressing institutional investors' preferences regarding the separation of these roles is essential for effective governance.
Chairman, this study includes a dummy variable (COB) equal to one if the same person holds the CEO and the Chairman positions and zero otherwise
Bai et al (2004) demonstrate a positive correlation between the presence of large shareholders and a firm's Tobin's Q, suggesting that institutional investors benefit from enhanced protection in companies where major shareholders closely oversee one another The research incorporates the count of large institutional shareholders (Insnum) as a key indicator of internal corporate governance, effectively controlling for the company's ownership structure.
In Vietnam's logistics industry, the state's influence on listed companies remains significant Shleifer and Vishny (1997) highlight that managers in state-owned enterprises may prioritize internal benefits, resulting in operational inefficiencies Property rights theory, as proposed by Alchian and Demsetz (1972), suggests that fully privatized firms outperform government-controlled ones, as private shareholders can focus on maximizing wealth Consequently, the degree of state control over a listed company is a crucial factor for performance-oriented institutional investors This study introduces an indicator variable (STATE), assigned a value of one when the state is the ultimate controlling shareholder and zero otherwise.
Numerous studies have historically evaluated financial performance through various indicators, notably Tobin's Q and Return on Assets (ROA) These indicators can be categorized into two measurement methods: accounting-based (ROA) and market-based (Tobin's Q) According to Daily and Dalton (2003), accounting measures assess a company's current financial performance, while market measures reflect investor perceptions Haniffa and Huduiab (2006) highlight the lack of consensus on the most effective indicators for financial performance, noting that each measure has distinct strengths and weaknesses, preventing any single measure from being deemed the definitive representation of financial performance.
Return on Assets (ROA) is defined as total net income divided by the book value of assets, indicating effective asset utilization and increased shareholder value when high (Biekpe, 2006) Despite its limitations, ROA remains a crucial metric focused on shareholder profits and asset-generated value In contrast, Tobin's Q reflects future shareholder expectations rather than past performance, making it a popular index in various research studies (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991) Calculated by dividing the combined market value of equity and liabilities by the book value of total assets, Tobin's Q assesses whether a company is overvalued or undervalued in the financial market A high Tobin's Q suggests strong investor confidence and effective corporate governance, as supported by Weir, Laing, and McKnight (2002), who highlight the positive relationship between managers and investors.
On the contrary, if the index is low, it reflects that managers tend to make their own decisions, deviating from the wishes of shareholders.
Empirical model
Institutional ownership, as the dependent variable, is censored Petersen
In 2008, it was emphasized that explicit modifications are necessary for this data type Consequently, the preferences of institutional investors regarding the corporate governance characteristics of listed logistics companies in Vietnam were assessed using the Tobit model.
The study examines the influence of various types of institutional investors—such as grey, independent, privately owned, and state-owned institutions—on corporate governance quality, measured through variables like Adnum, COB, and Insnum Additionally, firm size (SIZE) and age (AGE) are analyzed to assess the prudence of institutional investors in selecting stocks that offer lower risk and higher liquidity Control variables include TobinsQ, STATE, return on assets (ROA), firm leverage (LEV), annual sales growth (Sgrowth), and market share (Mkshare), with all estimations accounting for time-fixed effects (𝛴𝜑 t) The analysis employs Tobit estimations to derive insights from the data.
Institutional Ownership it = ò 0 + ò 1 Adnum it + ò 2 COB it + ò 3 Insnum it + ò 4 SIZE it
+ ò 5 AGE it + ò 6 TobinsQ it + ò 7 STATE it + ò 8 ROA it + ò 9 LEV it + ò 10 Sgrowth it + ò 11 Mkshare it + 𝛴𝜑 t + 𝜀 it (1)
2.4.2 Pooled ordinary least square model
To test the effect of institutional ownership on firm performance, we apply the pooled ordinary least squares model with Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable
This study examines internal corporate governance measures, including the number of board members (Adnum), a dummy variable for CEO-Chairman duality (COB), and the number of large institutional investors (Insnum) It highlights the significance of return on assets (ROA) in influencing Tobin’s Q, as noted by Alghifari et al (2013) Additionally, firm characteristics such as firm size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), and sales growth rate (Sgrowth) are analyzed for their consistent relationship with firm performance, following Guo and Platikanov (2019) Market share (Mkshare) is included as a control variable, as discussed by Graves & Waddock (1994), and the study also accounts for the control variable STATE, acknowledging the high percentage of state-owned companies in Vietnam.
In Model (2), we categorize institutional ownership into two groups based on their pressure sensitivity to management and the nature of the investors Group 1 comprises independent (Indrate) and grey (Greyrate) institutional investors, while Group 2 includes privately owned (Prirate) and state-owned (Starate) institutional investors All estimations incorporate time-fixed effects (Σδt), with the pooled OLS estimations detailed accordingly.
Tobin’s Q it = 𝛼 0 + 𝛼 1 GROUP1 it + 𝛼 2 GROUP2 it + 𝛼 3 Adnum it + 𝛼 4 COB it +
𝛼 5 Insnum it + 𝛼 6 ROA it + 𝛼 7 SIZE it + 𝛼 8 LEV it + 𝛼 9 Sgrowth it + 𝛼 10 Mkshare it +
2.4.3 Three-stage least square model
Research indicates a mutually interdependent relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance To address potential endogeneity, the study employed the three-stage least-squares (3SLS) method, which effectively accounts for cross-correlation among the equations.
The analysis explores the simultaneous and endogenous relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance, focusing on the marginal effects of different investor groups To identify parameters, specific excluded variables were utilized, with total institutional ownership included solely in the Tobin’s Q equation Each type of institutional ownership, represented as Insnum1 and Insnum2, is integrated only into their respective equations The primary focus of this study is the Tobin’s Q regression, while additional regressions for Group1 and Group2 are employed to address potential endogeneity concerns.
In models (3), (4), and (5), Group1 and Group2 maintain the same classifications as in Model (2) The parameters were estimated utilizing the three-stage least-squares (3SLS) method, incorporating time-fixed effects (𝛴𝛿 t, 𝛴𝜃 t, and 𝛴𝜇 t) in all estimations.
Tobin’s Q it = 𝛼 0 + 𝛼 1 GROUP1 it + 𝛼 2 GROUP2 it + 𝛼 3 Adnum it + 𝛼 4 COB it +
𝛼 5 Insnum it + 𝛼 6 ROA it + 𝛼 7 SIZE it + 𝛼 8 LEV it + 𝛼 9 Sgrowth it + 𝛼 10 Mkshare it +
GROUP1 it = ò 0 + ò 1 Adnum it + ò 2 COB it + ò 3 Insnum1 it + ò 4 SIZE it + ò 5 AGE it + ò 6 TobinsQ it + ò 7 STATE it + ò 8 ROA it + ò 9 LEV it + ò 10 Sgrowth it + ò 11 Mkshare it + 𝛴𝜃 t +
GROUP2 it = 𝛾 0 + 𝛾 1 Adnum it + 𝛾 2 COB it + 𝛾 3 Insnum2 it + 𝛾 4 SIZE it + 𝛾 5 AGE it
+ 𝛾 6 TobinsQ it + 𝛾 7 STATE it + 𝛾 8 ROA it + 𝛾 9 LEV it + 𝛾 10 Sgrowth it + 𝛾 11 Mkshare it + 𝛴𝜇 t
EMPERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Qualitative analysis
The logistics industry is highly cyclical and closely tied to the economic cycle, with return on assets for listed logistics enterprises fluctuating between 5.2% and 12.2% from 2010 to 2019 The COVID-19 pandemic in 2019 significantly impacted various economic sectors, leading to reduced consumption, social distancing measures, decreased production activities, and shortages of certain goods Despite these challenges, Vietnam's logistics industry managed to sustain an overall profit rate of approximately 5%.
Figure 3.1 1 Average ROA of Vietnamese listed logistic companies from 2010 to
Between 2010 and 2014, businesses significantly invested in their fleets to enhance competitiveness against both domestic and international rivals However, high levels of financial leverage among transportation companies can adversely affect business performance, leading to instability and increased risks during unforeseen economic events The data indicates that financial leverage has stabilized at approximately 38%, while the average annual sales growth for these companies has shown a gradual increase, reflecting an overall improvement in financial health.
Figure 3.1 2 Capital structure and average growth rate over the years
Independent institutional investors exhibit 3.5 times the pressure sensitivity to management compared to grey institutional investors According to NQS (2019), fund management companies and long-term investment funds generally show limited activity, with the notable exceptions of the leading foreign funds, Dragon and VinaCapital, which experience annual growth Additionally, the Vietnam Fund Management Company (VFM) is successfully attracting more capital to exchange-traded funds (ETFs).
Figure 3.1 3 Ownership structure of businesses according to sensitivity to management over the years
In Vietnam, the average institutional ownership ratio in surveyed businesses exceeds 45%, significantly higher than India's approximate 27% (Ajay and Madhumathi, 2015) This indicates that while the frequency of transactions by institutional investors is low, the size of each transaction is substantial, often positioning them as major shareholders Furthermore, it suggests that institutional investors in Vietnam prefer a longer-term holding strategy compared to their counterparts in other markets.
Figure 3.1 4 Ownership structure of businesses according to the nature of investors over the years
Descriptive statistics
Variables Observations Mean Std.Dev Min Max
(Source: Author’s summary in Stata 17)
Table 2 outlines the components of institutional ownership, which encompasses five key variables: total institutional ownership (Insrate), grey institutional ownership (Greyrate), independent institutional ownership (Indrate), state-owned institutional ownership (Starate), and privately owned institutional ownership (Prirate) Notably, privately owned institutions dominate this landscape, representing a significant 96.6% of the total Furthermore, the analysis incorporates corporate governance measures alongside various firm characteristics as part of the second group of variables.
The analysis of firms' profitability reveals that Tobin’s Q exhibits a greater variation than ROA, with standard deviations of 1.089 and 0.089, respectively ROA's minimum value of −0.281 indicates the presence of inefficient businesses with negative after-tax profits, while Tobin’s Q ranges from 0.323 to 4.354, suggesting that all sampled firms have potential profitability based on market expectations Additionally, the Sgrowth variable, with a minimum value of 0.126, confirms that listed companies experience specific annual sales growth Firm size, measured by the SIZE variable, shows a significant standard deviation of 0.605, highlighting differences in market capitalization among firms within the same sector The Mkshare variable further illustrates that firms vary in market share, ranging from 0.000 to 0.062 Lastly, the AGE and LEV variables indicate minimal variation in firm age and financial leverage, with their values showing that the firms in the sample are relatively similar in terms of establishment duration and financial risk.
Corporate governance factors, including board size (Adnum), CEO duality (COB), the number of institutional shareholders (Insum), and state ownership (STATE), reveal that the companies in the sample have board members numbering between 3 and 9, with institutional shareholders comprising as many as seven members.
In Vietnam, state-owned companies account for 38.3% of samples due to over a decade of the equitization program However, the issue of CEO duality is evident, with a standard deviation of 0.270, indicating that 27% of companies have a chairman who also serves as the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), highlighting a significant concern within the corporate governance framework.
Regression results
Table 3: Determinants of institutional ownership - Tobit model
Coefficient estimations, in the 1st row, ***|p| < 0.01, **|p| < 0.05, *|p| < 0.1 T-statistics, in parentheses
(Source: Author’s summary in Stata 17)
The article analyzes the corporate governance attributes and firm characteristics that appeal to institutional investors Findings from the Tobit model, presented in Table 3, highlight the percentages of institutional ownership across various categories, including grey, independent, privately owned, and state-owned firms.
Table 3 indicates that the coefficients of the COB are significantly negative for nearly all types of institutional investors at a 5% significance level, suggesting a preference among institutional investors in Vietnam for listed firms where the roles of CEO and chairman of the board are separate While the coefficients of Adnum show insignificant results in Columns (2) and (3), they are significantly negative in Columns (1) and (4) at the 5% and 10% significance levels, particularly concerning grey and state-owned institutional ownership Additionally, the coefficients on Insnum suggest that institutional investors favor companies with strong internal monitoring, whereas the Adnum coefficients indicate a preference for smaller board sizes This supports Hypothesis 1, which posits that institutional investors in Vietnam are less inclined to invest in firms with larger boards, CEO duality, and state control, reflecting good corporate governance practices These findings align with the research of Guo and Platikanov (2019), although grey and state-owned institutions still show a positive relationship with companies ultimately controlled by the state.
The analysis in Table 3 reveals that institutional investors in Vietnam tend to favor larger and older firms, as evidenced by the positive and statistically significant coefficients for SIZE and AGE in three of the four regression models, aligning with Hypothesis 2 This preference indicates that institutional investors prioritize more mature firms for prudent investment, as supported by Gompers & Metrick (2001), who highlight the importance of safety in their portfolios Interestingly, the exception noted in Column (3) for privately owned institutions suggests they are more inclined to explore new investment opportunities compared to their state-owned counterparts, corroborating the findings of Guo and Platikanov (2019).
Higher Tobin's Q and operating performance (ROA) are positively associated with private institutional investors, while state ownership and market share have a negative relationship with them State-owned institutional investors tend to favor investments in state-owned firms, contrasting with privately owned institutional investors Additionally, state-owned institutions are more inclined to invest in firms with higher leverage (LEV), whereas privately owned institutions prefer firms with lower leverage Both grey and independent ownership types show a negative correlation with firms that have higher leverage Independent institutions are negatively linked to Tobin's Q, LEV, and state ownership, while grey institutions exhibit a positive association with state ownership.
3.3.2 Institutional ownership and firm performance
This study investigates how various categories of institutional ownership—specifically grey, independent, privately owned, and state-owned institutions—impact the performance of Vietnamese listed logistics companies By identifying the preferences of institutional investors, we test Hypotheses 3 and 4 using pooled OLS for single-equation analysis and 3SLS models to address endogeneity concerns.
Table 4: The effect of institutional ownership on firm value - Pooled OLS model
Coefficient estimations, in the 1st row, ***|p| < 0.01, **|p| < 0.05, *|p| < 0.1
(Source: Author’s summary in Stata 17)
The analysis presented in Table 4 utilizes the pooled ordinary least squares method to investigate the relationship between institutional ownership and firm value, with Tobin's Q serving as the dependent variable for measuring firm performance All estimations incorporate time-fixed effects (Σδt) to enhance the accuracy of the results.
The analysis reveals a negative relationship between independent institutions and Tobin’s Q, while grey institutions show a positive correlation, with coefficients of -0.3909 and 3.2446, respectively Additionally, both privately owned and state-owned institutional ownership are positively associated with Tobin’s Q, supporting part of Hypothesis 3, which posits that these institutions enhance firm performance These findings align with Guo and Platikanov (2019), although the data does not suggest that privately owned institutions have a greater impact on firm performance compared to state-owned institutions.
Management pressure plays a crucial role in how institutional investors influence the market performance of publicly listed companies in Vietnam The driving force behind an institutional investor's control is their independence, which remains significant whether the investor is state-owned or privately owned.
Table 4 indicates that CEO duality (COB), company size (SIZE), and return on assets (ROA) have a positive correlation with Tobin’s Q, while a negative relationship is observed between Tobin’s Q and the variables STATE and Adnum Additionally, companies with larger institutional investors and mutual monitoring exhibit a positive relationship with Tobin’s Q.
All estimations reported in Model (2) are statistically significant The R- squared values for Group1 and Group2 in Table 4 are 38.81% and 36.32%, respectively
Guo and Platikanov (2019) highlight the interdependence between institutional ownership and firm value, utilizing Tobin’s Q as a key metric for assessing market performance This measure significantly influences investors' decisions regarding stock investments and the magnitude of their investments Additionally, Tobin’s Q plays a vital role in guiding current investors on whether to adjust their existing positions Conversely, the ownership structure of a company, especially the presence of large institutional shareholders, can impact Tobin’s Q Consequently, the institutional ownership and monitoring functions of major shareholders are crucial in shaping managerial decisions and enhancing firm performance.
A three-equation system can effectively tackle potential simultaneity and endogeneity issues, with Tobin’s Q, Group 1 (grey and independent institutions), and Group 2 (privately owned and state-owned institutions) serving as the dependent variables in each individual equation of the system.
Table 5: Grey and independent institutions and firm value - Tobin’s Q, 3SLS model
Coefficient estimations, in the 1st row, ***|p| < 0.01, **|p| < 0.05, *|p| < 0.1
(Source: Author’s summary in Stata 17)
Results from the 3SLS method, where the dependent variables are Tobin’s Q and Group1 are presented in Table 5 All estimations contain time-fixed effects (𝛴𝛿t and 𝛴𝜃 t )
The first system of multiple equations allows this study to attain separate estimates for the effect of grey and independent institutional ownership on Tobin’s
Q Following Table 5, the estimates reported in Column (1) specify that both grey institutional ownership and independant institutional ownership has a negative and insignificant effect on firm performance, with a coefficient of -0.4386; -0.6443 and a z-statistic of −0.08; -0.49, respectively
Table 6: Privately-owned and state-owned institutions’ ownership and firm value - Tobin’s Q, 3SLS model
Coefficient estimations, in the 1st row, ***|p| < 0.01, **|p| < 0.05, *|p| < 0.1
(Source: Author’s summary in Stata 17)
Table 6 presents the three-stage least-squares method results, where Tobin’s
Q and Group2 are the dependent variables All estimations contain time-fixed effects (𝛴𝛿t and 𝛴𝜇 t )
The analysis of the second system of multiple equations reveals the influence of privately owned and state-owned institutional ownership on Tobin’s Q According to the estimates in Column (1) of Table 6, privately owned institutional ownership has a coefficient of 0.0289 and a z-statistic of 0.01, indicating an insignificant positive effect on firm performance In contrast, state-owned institutional ownership shows a coefficient of -2.7586 and a z-statistic of -0.15, suggesting a negative and insignificant relationship with firm performance.
The findings from Tables 5 and 6 indicate that the type of institutional investors—whether privately owned or state-owned—plays a crucial role in influencing the performance of listed logistics companies in Vietnam, overshadowing the impact of management pressure sensitivity Notably, private institutions contribute positively to firm performance.
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION41 4.1 Conclusion
Recommendation
The logistics industry is cyclical and heavily influenced by economic and political events, as well as developments in related industries Following a prolonged period of challenges due to the pandemic, many sectors are now exhibiting recovery signs In 2024, the logistics sector is expected to experience a volume rebound driven by increased import and export demand, particularly from inventory replenishment in the US and Europe, while supply levels are anticipated to remain stable.
The US economy is expected to experience slow growth without a severe recession or significant job losses, leading to a resurgence in retail inventory replenishment after a 1.5-year reduction A forthcoming decrease in interest rates by the central bank will further support consumer spending and manufacturing, boosting the volume of goods transported at seaports Additionally, ongoing geopolitical tensions, such as the Russia-Ukraine war and conflicts in the Middle East, will enhance sea logistics as longer shipping routes due to conflicts reduce supply, benefiting seaport revenues The Vietnamese Ministry of Transport has approved Circular 39/2023/TT-BGTVT, which introduces a new price schedule for container handling services at all Vietnamese seaports, increasing prices by approximately 10% effective February 15, 2024 This change is anticipated to positively impact the industry, particularly for seaports with high operational capacity and less competition.
The logistics industry in general is a service industry that is linked to many departments and levels of government, such as the Department of Transportation,
To enhance the efficiency and profitability of the logistics industry, collaboration between corporations and government entities, such as the Customs Department and the Department of Industry and Trade, is essential Research indicates that private ownership positively influences firm performance, prompting logistics companies to seek increased private investment The government should focus on improving legal frameworks and policy mechanisms to facilitate the reduction of state capital, thereby enhancing transparency and competition within Vietnam's stock market This includes amending regulations to allow for diverse capital reduction methods, such as auctions and the sale of state assets Additionally, encouraging foreign direct investment (FDI) into the private sector by upgrading labor quality and developing integrated transportation infrastructure is vital for attracting foreign investments Monitoring FDI trends will enable timely policy adjustments to attract high-quality investments into Vietnam.
In Vietnam, the logistics sector is predominantly comprised of small and medium-sized enterprises operating under 1PL and 2PL transportation models, which limits their profit potential To enhance profitability, these firms should consider scaling operations, increasing investments, and focusing on technology development to improve transport efficiency Regularly updating knowledge of logistics laws is essential for effective customer negotiations, while continuous improvement of transport service policies and regulations in the Commercial Law is necessary to support logistics activities Strengthening business capacity and service quality will enable companies to better navigate the market, leading to increased revenue and profitability Additionally, attracting grey investors, such as large banks and investment funds, can positively impact business performance Furthermore, enhancing human resource skills in language and technology is vital for integration, and investing in facilities, warehouse systems, and specialized equipment will bolster competitiveness and operational effectiveness.
While the research offers valuable insights for enhancing financial efficiency, its applicability to businesses in Vietnam is limited by several factors Firstly, the study analyzed a relatively small sample of 30 logistics companies over a decade, with some firms excluded due to insufficient data Additionally, despite the annual financial reports being audited, discrepancies were found upon further investigation, raising concerns about their accuracy and reliability Furthermore, the research relied solely on quantitative analysis, whereas other studies that incorporate both quantitative and qualitative methods tend to yield more comprehensive results.
The essay introduces a new research direction that allows authors to explore the influence of corporate governance on financial performance in relation to institutional investors Future studies should consider using a larger sample size over an extended timeframe to establish broader economic insights, enabling comparisons with neighboring countries Additionally, researchers are encouraged to investigate more corporate governance factors beyond the limited independent variables identified in this study.
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