Luận văn thạc sĩ public asset management, a study of asset management companies and policy suggestions for vietnam

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Luận văn thạc sĩ public asset management, a study of asset management companies and policy suggestions for vietnam

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MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS, HO CHI MINH CITY FULBRIGHT ECONOMICS TEACHING PROGRAM PHAN THỊ MINH KHOA PUBLIC ASSET MANAGEMENT: A STUDY OF ASSET MANAGEMENT COMPANIES AND POLICY SUGGESTIONS FOR VIETNAM MASTER IN PUBLIC POLICY THESIS HO CHI MINH CITY - 2013 123doc MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS, HO CHI MINH CITY FULBRIGHT ECONOMICS TEACHING PROGRAM PHAN THỊ MINH KHOA PUBLIC ASSET MANAGEMENT: A STUDY OF ASSET MANAGEMENT COMPANIES AND POLICY SUGGESTIONS FOR VIETNAM MAJOR: PUBLIC POLICY CODE: 60340402 MASTER IN PUBLIC POLICY THESIS SUPERVISOR Dr JONATHAN R PINCUS HO CHI MINH CITY - 2013 123doc I CERTIFICATION I certify that the thesis is all done by my efforts To the best of my knowledge, all resources used have been acknowledged in the thesis The thesis does not reflect the views of Ho Chi Minh City Economics University or Fulbright Economics Teaching Program Author PHAN THI MINH KHOA 123doc II ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to express my appreciation to my supervisor, Dr Jonathan R Pincus for helping me with this thesis I would like to thank Mr Truong Minh Hoa for his help on the layout of this thesis And finally, I would like to thank all my professors and classmates for their contribution to the experience and knowledge that I have gained during the two year studying at Fulbright Economic Teaching Program Phan Thi Minh Khoa Ho Chi Minh City – June, 2013 123doc III ABSTRACT The Vietnamese banking sector is facing difficulties with high levels of non-performing loans (NPLs) caused by rapid credit growth, weak risk management, connected lending, crossownership, high amount of loans to state owned enterprises (SOEs), and loose supervision from the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) High NPLs cause banks to hesitate to grant new loans to borrowers At the same time, good borrowers are repaying their debts, reducing credit growth and economic growth in 2012 In order to resolve these problems, some observers have suggested establishing an Assets Management Company in Vietnam According to past experience, AMCs are frequently used in financial restructuring Some studies have shown that using AMCs as a rapid disposition tool would achieve better results than corporate restructuring tools (Klingebiel, 2011) However, another study from the World Bank has shown that countries using AMCs as both an asset disposition and a corporate restructuring tool have a better chance to succeed (Rose, 2005) Given the economic and legal conditions in Vietnam, establishing the AMC in Vietnam as both an asset disposition and corporate restructuring tool may not yield positive outcomes Following an example of the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Authority (IBRA), the AMC should be structured as a banking restructuring agency However, in order for the AMC to achieve its objectives, it requires corporation between SBV and other government agencies as well as some adjustment in the current laws and regulations 123doc C.33.44.55.54.78.65.5.43.22.2.4 22.Tai lieu Luan 66.55.77.99 van Luan an.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.33.44.55.54.78.655.43.22.2.4.55.22 Do an.Tai lieu Luan van Luan an Do an.Tai lieu Luan van Luan an Do an IV ABBREVIATIONS Abbreviation Name AMC Assets Management Company BI Bank of Indonesia EBCI European Bank Coordination Initiative FI Financial Institutions FS Financial statement JSBs Joint stock commercial banks IBRA Indonesian Bank Restructuring Authority MOF Ministry of Finance NPLs Non-performing loans SBV State Bank of Vietnam SOE State-owned Enterprise SOCBs State-owned commercial banks VAMC Vietnamese Assets Management Company 123doc Stt.010.Mssv.BKD002ac.email.ninhd 77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77t@edu.gmail.com.vn.bkc19134.hmu.edu.vn.Stt.010.Mssv.BKD002ac.email.ninhddtt@edu.gmail.com.vn.bkc19134.hmu.edu.vn C.33.44.55.54.78.65.5.43.22.2.4 22.Tai lieu Luan 66.55.77.99 van Luan an.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.33.44.55.54.78.655.43.22.2.4.55.22 Do an.Tai lieu Luan van Luan an Do an.Tai lieu Luan van Luan an Do an V LIST OF BANKS No Abbreviation Name Listing ABBank An Binh Commercial Joint Stock Bank Listed ACB Asia Commercial Bank Listed Agribank Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development OTC BAC North Asia Commercial Joint-Stock Bank OTC BIDV Bank of Investment and Development of Vietnam JSC Listed Bao Viet BAOVIET Bank Unlisted Dong A DongA Joint Stock Commercial Bank Unlisted Exim Vietnam Export Import Bank GPBank Global Petro Bank 10 Habubank Hanoi Building Commercial Joint Stock Bank 11 HDBank HDBank Unlisted 12 Kien Long Kien Long Bank Unlisted 13 Lien Viet Lien Viet Post Bank Unlisted 14 Maritime Vietnam Maritime Commercial Joint Stock Bank Unlisted 15 MB Military Commercial Joint Stock Bank 16 MDB Mekong Development Bank Unlisted 17 MHB Mekong Housing bank Unlisted 18 Nam A NAM A Commercial Joint Stock Bank Unlisted 19 Navibank Nam Viet Commercial Joint Stock Bank 20 OceanBank Ocean Commercial Joint Stock Bank Unlisted 21 OCB Orient Commercial Joint Stock Bank Unlisted 22 PG Bank Petrolimex Group Commercial Joint Stock Bank Unlisted 23 Sacombank Saigon Thuong Tin Commercial Joint Stock Bank Listed 123doc Stt.010.Mssv.BKD002ac.email.ninhd 77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77t@edu.gmail.com.vn.bkc19134.hmu.edu.vn.Stt.010.Mssv.BKD002ac.email.ninhddtt@edu.gmail.com.vn.bkc19134.hmu.edu.vn Listed Unlisted Listed Listed C.33.44.55.54.78.65.5.43.22.2.4 22.Tai lieu Luan 66.55.77.99 van Luan an.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.33.44.55.54.78.655.43.22.2.4.55.22 Do an.Tai lieu Luan van Luan an Do an.Tai lieu Luan van Luan an Do an VI Abbreviation Name Listing 24 SaigonBank Saigon Bank for Industry and Trade Unlisted 25 SCB Saigon Commercial Bank Unlisted 26 SeABank Southeast Asia Commercial Joint Stock Bank Unlisted 27 SHB Saigon Hanoi Commercial Joint Stock Bank Listed 28 Southern Southern Commercial Joint Stock Bank Bank Unlisted 29 Techcombank Vietnam Technological and Commercial Joint-stock Bank Unlisted 30 Tien Phong Tien Phong Commercial Joint Stock Bank Unlisted 31 Trust Bank Great Trust Joint Stock Commercial Bank Unlisted 32 VIB Vietnam International Commercial Joint Stock Bank Unlisted 33 VietA Vietnam Asia Commercial Joint Stock Bank Unlisted 34 Viet Capital Viet Capital Commercial Joint Stock Bank Unlisted 35 VietBank Vietnam Thuong Tin Commercial Joint Stock Bank Unlisted 36 VCB 37 VietinBank 38 VPBank 39 Western Bank Joint Stock Commercial Bank for Foreign Trade of Vietnam Vietnam Joint Stock Commercial Bank for Industry and Trade Listed Listed Vietnam Prosperity Joint-Stock Commercial Bank Unlisted Western Commercial Joint Stock Bank Unlisted 123doc Stt.010.Mssv.BKD002ac.email.ninhd 77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77t@edu.gmail.com.vn.bkc19134.hmu.edu.vn.Stt.010.Mssv.BKD002ac.email.ninhddtt@edu.gmail.com.vn.bkc19134.hmu.edu.vn C.33.44.55.54.78.65.5.43.22.2.4 22.Tai lieu Luan 66.55.77.99 van Luan an.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.33.44.55.54.78.655.43.22.2.4.55.22 Do an.Tai lieu Luan van Luan an Do an.Tai lieu Luan van Luan an Do an VII CHAPTER TABLE OF CONTENTS CERTIFICATION I ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS II ABSTRACT III ABBREVIATIONS IV LIST OF BANKS .V LIST OF TABLES AND GRAPHS IX CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 1.1 The Vietnamese economy and the Vietnamese banking system 1.2 Research objectives 1.3 Research questions 1.4 Research methods, scope and sources of information 1.5 Thesis structure CHAPTER LITERATURE REVIEW 2.1 Two types of banking crises 2.2 Solutions for banking crises 2.3 What are NPLs? CHAPTER ASSET MANAGEMENT COMPANIES 11 3.1 Asset management companies 11 3.2 Some important objectives of AMCs 11 3.3 Prerequisites 12 3.4 Some important aspect for a successful AMC 14 3.5 The AMC in Indonesia 16 3.6 For a successful AMC 24 123doc Stt.010.Mssv.BKD002ac.email.ninhd 77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77t@edu.gmail.com.vn.bkc19134.hmu.edu.vn.Stt.010.Mssv.BKD002ac.email.ninhddtt@edu.gmail.com.vn.bkc19134.hmu.edu.vn C.33.44.55.54.78.65.5.43.22.2.4 22.Tai lieu Luan 66.55.77.99 van Luan an.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.33.44.55.54.78.655.43.22.2.4.55.22 Do an.Tai lieu Luan van Luan an Do an.Tai lieu Luan van Luan an Do an VIII CHAPTER BANKING PROBLEMS IN VIETNAM AND THE PROPOSAL TO USE AMCS AS A RESOLUTION TOOL 25 4.1 Brief history of the Vietnamese banking since 1988 25 4.2 Factors that contribute to high ratio of NPLs 28 4.3 Non-performing loans within the banking system – problem and difficulties 33 4.4 NPLs analysis 35 4.5 Using AMC as a resolution tool 37 CHAPTER POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 43 5.1 Policies recommendations 43 5.2 Conclusion 46 REFERENCES 47 APPENDIX I - USING AMC AS A RESOLUTION TOOL 51 APPENDIX II - EXPERIENCES OF AMCS IN OTHER COUNTRIES 55 APPENDIX III - BANK AND NPLS ANALYSIS 58 123doc Stt.010.Mssv.BKD002ac.email.ninhd 77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77t@edu.gmail.com.vn.bkc19134.hmu.edu.vn.Stt.010.Mssv.BKD002ac.email.ninhddtt@edu.gmail.com.vn.bkc19134.hmu.edu.vn C.33.44.55.54.78.65.5.43.22.2.4 22.Tai lieu Luan 66.55.77.99 van Luan an.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.33.44.55.54.78.655.43.22.2.4.55.22 Do an.Tai lieu Luan van Luan an Do an.Tai lieu Luan van Luan an Do an 49 21 Trần Thủy (2013), “Nợ xấu tăng đột biến”, Vietnamnet, accessed on March 03, 2013 at: http://vietnamnet.vn/vn/kinh-te/110046/no-xau-se-tang-dot-bien.html 22 Việt Trần (2012), “Sở hữu chéo thâu tóm ngân hàng”, An Ninh Thủ Đơ, accessed on April 25, 2013 at: http://www.anninhthudo.vn/Tien-Vang/So-huu-cheo-va-thau-tomngan-hang/466223.antd 23 Đỗ Thiên Anh Tuấn (2012), “Nợ xấu tham gia tòa án”, Thời báo Kinh Tế Sài Gòn, (Số 51-2012) 24 Nguyễn Xuân Thành (2003), Việt Nam: Con đường đến tự hóa lãi suất, Case Study, Fulbright Economic Teaching Program 25 Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development, Kien Long Bank, Saigon Comercial Bank et al (2012), Báo cáo Tài Quý 3/2012 English 26 Arnold, W (2003), “Indonesian Bank Agency Fading Out”, The New York Times 27 Claessens, Stijin (1999), “Systemic Bank and Corporate Restructuring: Experiences and Lessons”, Paper for the Symposium: Insolvency Reform: Building Effective Systems, The World Bank, September 14-15, 1999, Washington, D.C 28 Claessens, S.; S Djankov and L C Xu (2000), “East Asian Corporations, Before and During the Recent Financial Crisis”, World Bank Research Observer, (No 15(1)), February 1, pp 23–46 29 Doing Business (2013), “Doing Business Data”, Doing Business, accessed on April 15, 2013 at: http://www.doingbusiness.org/ 30 East Asia Analytical Unit (EAAU, 2000), Indonesia Facing the Challenge 31 Enoch, C.; Baldwin, B.; Frecaut, O., and Kovanen, A (2001), “Indonesia: Anatomy of a Banking Crisis Two Years of Living Dangerously 1997 – 1999”, IMF Working Paper, (WP/01/SZ) 32 European Banking Coordination “Vienna” Initiative (2012), Working Group on NPLs in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe 123doc Stt.010.Mssv.BKD002ac.email.ninhd 77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77t@edu.gmail.com.vn.bkc19134.hmu.edu.vn.Stt.010.Mssv.BKD002ac.email.ninhddtt@edu.gmail.com.vn.bkc19134.hmu.edu.vn C.33.44.55.54.78.65.5.43.22.2.4 22.Tai lieu Luan 66.55.77.99 van Luan an.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.33.44.55.54.78.655.43.22.2.4.55.22 Do an.Tai lieu Luan van Luan an Do an.Tai lieu Luan van Luan an Do an 50 33 Gelpern, Anna (2004), “Systemic Bank and Corporate Distress From Asia to Argentina: What Have We Learned?”, International Finance, (7:1), pp 151-168 34 IMF (2004), Indonesia: Selected Issues, IMF Country Report, (No 04/189) 35 IMF (2006), “Financial Soundness Indicators - Compilation Guide”, IMF, accessed on December 10, 2012 at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fsi/guide/2006/index.htm 36 Klingebiel, Daniela (2000), “The Use of Asset Management Companies in the Resolution of Banking Crises Cross-Country Experiences”, The World Bank, accessed on September 10, 2012 at: http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/154927/financeforum2002/pdf/klingebiel _amc.pdf 37 Rose (2005), “A practical guide to an effective national AMC”, The World Bank, accessed on November 3, 2012 at: http://www- wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2005/04/08/000012 009_20050408154020/Rendered/PDF/32006.pdf 38 State bank of Vietnam (2013), “History of State Bank of Vietnam”, State Bank of Vietnam, accessed on June 17, 2013 at: http://www.sbv.gov.vn/portal/faces/en/enm/enpages_home/about/history 39 Stiglitz, Joseph E and Weiss, A (1981), “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information”, American Economic Review, (Vol 71) 40 Trading Economics (2013), “Trading Economics Data”, Trading Economics, accessed on June 02, 2013 at: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/vietnam 41 Vu Thi Mai Tram (2012), Risks to Vietnam’s Banking Sector and Policy Recommendations, Master in Public Policy Thesis, Fulbright Economic Teaching Program 42 Woo, D (2000), “Two Approaches to Resolving Nonperforming Assets During Financial Crises”, IMF Working Paper, (WP/00/33) 43 The World Bank (2002), Vietnam- June 2002, Banking sector review, The World Bank 44 The World Bank (2013), “The World Bank Data”, The World Bank, accessed on June 02, 2013 at: http://databank.worldbank.org/data 123doc Stt.010.Mssv.BKD002ac.email.ninhd 77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77t@edu.gmail.com.vn.bkc19134.hmu.edu.vn.Stt.010.Mssv.BKD002ac.email.ninhddtt@edu.gmail.com.vn.bkc19134.hmu.edu.vn C.33.44.55.54.78.65.5.43.22.2.4 22.Tai lieu Luan 66.55.77.99 van Luan an.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.33.44.55.54.78.655.43.22.2.4.55.22 Do an.Tai lieu Luan van Luan an Do an.Tai lieu Luan van Luan an Do an 51 APPENDIX I - USING AMC AS A RESOLUTION TOOL I Advantages of using an AMC As stated above, one of the objectives of asset management policy is to maximize the returns to these distressed assets in order to minimize the fiscal cost of restructuring Therefore, in some cases, it is necessary to separate good assets from bad assets of distressed financial institutions There are several advantages of using AMCs as a “bad bank” Labor specialization When distressed assets are removed completely from banks‟ balance sheets, banks can focus all of their people and resources on managing their regular assets and on running their normal business operations Because the skill sets needed to perform loan recovery are very different from regular banking operations, with this separation, AMCs can focus solely on these skill sets to maximize loan recovery Therefore, each institution can utilize their specialized experiences most efficiently Support of bank valuation With distressed assets removed from banks‟ balance sheets, the true value of banks can be determined more correctly and transparently If banks have their private AMCs, they can use these private AMCs to transfer distressed assets out of banks‟ balance sheets into AMCs‟ at book value or above market value Therefore, banks can increase their capital adequacy ratio and hide their losses at AMCs‟ balance sheets Credit discipline improvement AMC can help increase credit discipline by breaking the link between banks and corporations If NPLs are left for banks to resolve, they tend to use one popular tool of partially writing off the loans and rescheduling payments This option, appropriate in some cases, may cause moral hazard for banks, especially when banks have relationships with these borrowers (connected lending) AMCs, as an outsider to that relationship, can be more objective when it comes to collecting loans or seizing underlying collateral Economies of scale 123doc Stt.010.Mssv.BKD002ac.email.ninhd 77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77t@edu.gmail.com.vn.bkc19134.hmu.edu.vn.Stt.010.Mssv.BKD002ac.email.ninhddtt@edu.gmail.com.vn.bkc19134.hmu.edu.vn C.33.44.55.54.78.65.5.43.22.2.4 22.Tai lieu Luan 66.55.77.99 van Luan an.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.33.44.55.54.78.655.43.22.2.4.55.22 Do an.Tai lieu Luan van Luan an Do an.Tai lieu Luan van Luan an Do an 52 In some countries, people with the knowledge and experience of asset management are scarce Therefore, if one AMC is established, that AMC can gather these experienced personnel working for it instead of having these people scatter all over the banking industry In addition, by gathering loans from banks, AMC can also create bigger asset portfolios to attract bigger investors AMCs can also divide them into tranches according to their characteristics and apply different tools of recovery for different types of tranches Centralized AMCs can also establish securitization market as one tool of asset resolution Increase negotiating power When dealing with debtors, AMCs can have more power of negotiation for holding multiple loans than banks with single claims This is an especially important power when dealing with a big corporation that is liable for several NPLs in several different banks or when dealing with a big asset pledged as underlying collateral for several NPL claims Maximization of recoveries AMCs can help maximize recoveries by comparing costs and benefit by identifying loans that have a low probability of recovery and put them aside Banks‟ loan officers, who were responsible for making those loans in the first place, may reluctant to admit these loses and continue to pursue these recoveries; even when the returns on those NPLs, if any, may not be able to cover for the recovery cost In countries where the legal and judicial systems are not adequate, AMCs sometimes can be given special powers in order to recover loans and seize and sell collateral faster than traditional processes II Disadvantages of using an AMC Along with the advantages of having an AMC, there come along many disadvantages as well Lack of specific loan knowledge Centralized AMCs generally have a more distant relationship with corporations than banks Therefore, sometimes, banks have certain inside information that AMCs cannot have In the process of restructuring, banks may have to make new loans to corporations That cannot be done by AMCs which are not banks and should not perform the functions of a bank This may reduce the recovery rate 123doc Stt.010.Mssv.BKD002ac.email.ninhd 77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77t@edu.gmail.com.vn.bkc19134.hmu.edu.vn.Stt.010.Mssv.BKD002ac.email.ninhddtt@edu.gmail.com.vn.bkc19134.hmu.edu.vn C.33.44.55.54.78.65.5.43.22.2.4 22.Tai lieu Luan 66.55.77.99 van Luan an.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.33.44.55.54.78.655.43.22.2.4.55.22 Do an.Tai lieu Luan van Luan an Do an.Tai lieu Luan van Luan an Do an 53 In addition, if bank personnel are in charge of collecting NPLs, they can gain more experience from that process and improve their skills and knowledge to prevent future losses Collateral valuation problems In some countries, such as emerging economies, loan collateral is primarily real estate or real estate related These countries usually not have reliable official data on asset prices both on commercial and residential properties In addition, NPLs tend to increase after an economic downturn, sometimes after the bursting of a real estate bubble when the real estate market becomes very inactive At that time, there are not many real estate transactions to use as a benchmark Therefore, valuation of collateral becomes very difficult and not transparent There will be a price gap between banks and investors‟ points of view Banks tend to be overly optimistic about loan recovery Sometimes banks want to sell assets at prices prevailing before the crisis, counting losses from face value without regard to \market conditions and the effect of the crisis on these assets Therefore, banks seldom want to sell these assets at market value At the same time, buyers tend to be pessimistic about economic conditions, especially just after a crisis That, in turn, will increase the gap between buyers and sellers‟ prices (EIBC, 2012) Harming credit discipline Establishing an AMC can both improve and damage credit discipline Borrowers, in general, not have any business relationship with an AMC; thus, they may refuse to repay the loans If distressed assets are left within banks, borrowers may have more incentive to repay them since they have an ongoing relationship with the banks and probably want to borrow in the future Political meddling Centralized, government owned AMCs are still government agencies; therefore, there will to be some interference from government officers, politicians and interest groups Hence, if the AMC‟s policies and structures are not designed carefully to avoid political interference, AMC may become a tool to distribute wealth from the whole population (taxpayers) to some specific group of rich and powerful people Absence of competition 123doc Stt.010.Mssv.BKD002ac.email.ninhd 77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77t@edu.gmail.com.vn.bkc19134.hmu.edu.vn.Stt.010.Mssv.BKD002ac.email.ninhddtt@edu.gmail.com.vn.bkc19134.hmu.edu.vn C.33.44.55.54.78.65.5.43.22.2.4 22.Tai lieu Luan 66.55.77.99 van Luan an.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.33.44.55.54.78.655.43.22.2.4.55.22 Do an.Tai lieu Luan van Luan an Do an.Tai lieu Luan van Luan an Do an 54 Government owned AMCs, as newly established government agencies, may not have enough experience when dealing with NPLs In addition, because there is no real competition in this market, the AMC may have excessive bargaining power In some cases, it may be more effective to create bank-owned AMCs than central controlled AMCs Obstacles to effective NPLs resolutions Legal frameworks in some countries, such as developing countries, are not efficient enough to facilitate NPL resolutions They tend to lack an effective insolvency system, including the process of settling outside of court Furthermore, judgesin those countries tend to lack experience in dealing with liquidation process and framework All of these factors make the foreclosure process very complicated, time consuming and costly Therefore, in order to speed up NPL resolution, the regulatory framework for foreclosure should be predictable, transparent, and reliable (EIBC, 2012) Delaying the process of restructuring Sometimes AMCs tend to be warehouses for distressed assets, not pursuing loan recovery aggressively when some connected corporations or shareholders are involved AMCa can become passive, not use enough force to implement operational restructuring, and just reschedule loans In some countries such as Mexico and other transition economies, centralized AMCs were one of the elements that delayed corporate restructuring schemes (Claessens, 1999) 123doc Stt.010.Mssv.BKD002ac.email.ninhd 77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77t@edu.gmail.com.vn.bkc19134.hmu.edu.vn.Stt.010.Mssv.BKD002ac.email.ninhddtt@edu.gmail.com.vn.bkc19134.hmu.edu.vn C.33.44.55.54.78.65.5.43.22.2.4 22.Tai lieu Luan 66.55.77.99 van Luan an.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.33.44.55.54.78.655.43.22.2.4.55.22 Do an.Tai lieu Luan van Luan an Do an.Tai lieu Luan van Luan an Do an 55 APPENDIX II - EXPERIENCES OF AMCS IN OTHER COUNTRIES Table Initial conditions of the seven countries Private Success in Enforcement sectors narrow of creditor claims, objectives rights a percent of GDPb Peak Bond market level of capitalization NPLs, , percent of percent GDPc of total assets Amount of transferred assets, percent of total assets Ghana No 1.0 NA 60.0 50.8 Mexico No 6.0 71 1.1 18.9 17.0 No 7.7 79 16.6 23.1 21.7 Spain Yes 18.0 88 43.2 5.7 1.4 USA Yes 18.0 103 50.5 4.1 8.0 Sweden Yes 24.0 145 58.5 10.8 7.4 Finland Partial 8.0 87 39.7 18.7 5.2 The Philippines Source: cited in Klingebiel (2001), pg 20 Note: a This index show how much the legal framework can protect creditors with secured loans This ranges from to 24, with is the lowest score and 24 is the highest score b Private sectors claims shows the level of loans to private sector as a percent of GDP, with the higher number means that the economy is led by private sector and lower number means that the economy is led by public sector c This index show the depth of bond market, with higher number means that the bond market is developed From the table above, it can concludes that countries with success or partial success in their objectives are the ones that have relatively high level of creditor protection under legal framework, have a market where private sector is the lead player, and have a sufficient capital 123doc Stt.010.Mssv.BKD002ac.email.ninhd 77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77t@edu.gmail.com.vn.bkc19134.hmu.edu.vn.Stt.010.Mssv.BKD002ac.email.ninhddtt@edu.gmail.com.vn.bkc19134.hmu.edu.vn C.33.44.55.54.78.65.5.43.22.2.4 22.Tai lieu Luan 66.55.77.99 van Luan an.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.33.44.55.54.78.655.43.22.2.4.55.22 Do an.Tai lieu Luan van Luan an Do an.Tai lieu Luan van Luan an Do an 56 market Moreover, out of seven cases, successful AMCs were the ones that have small amount of assets transferred to them Table Characteristic of AMC established Real estate Success in assets, Political narrow percent of motivated objectives transferred assets Agency is Super Appropriate independent powers funding assets Ghana No Negligible Yes No Yes No Mexico No N/A Yes No No No No Negligible Yes No Yes No The Philippines Yes, after Spain Yes 8.2 No Yes No initial problems USA Yes 49 No Yes Yes Yes Sweden Yes 80 No Yes No Yes Finland Partial 34 No Yes No Yes Source: cited in Klingebiel (2001), pg 20 This table shows that successful AMCs were independent agencies, were funded sufficiently, and received non-political connected assets from financial institutions In summary, from the seven cases above, there are some similarities in characteristics for those failed AMCs and for the successful ones For the failed AMCs, they all have those points in common:  They all lacked of independent and were set up as subsidiaries of other government agencies (central banks or department of finance) 123doc Stt.010.Mssv.BKD002ac.email.ninhd 77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77t@edu.gmail.com.vn.bkc19134.hmu.edu.vn.Stt.010.Mssv.BKD002ac.email.ninhddtt@edu.gmail.com.vn.bkc19134.hmu.edu.vn C.33.44.55.54.78.65.5.43.22.2.4 22.Tai lieu Luan 66.55.77.99 van Luan an.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.33.44.55.54.78.655.43.22.2.4.55.22 Do an.Tai lieu Luan van Luan an Do an.Tai lieu Luan van Luan an Do an 57  Because of their independence, they all had weak governance, had to face a lot of political pressure from other agencies, politicians as well as interest groups, and lack of transparency  The assets transferred to them were mostly political, connected, or SOE related loans Some of the loans were also fraudulent  The legal frameworks in those countries were weak and unsupported to liquidating process from banks Some countries still required debtors‟ approvals before banks or AMC can liquidate collaterals of non-performing assets (Ghana) Other country forbids banks from foreclosing on those assets (Mexico) In case of The Philippines and Ghana, the government gave them special powers; however, this could not help to improve the legal environment in those countries In Ghana, the court tended to be siding with debtors; and in The Philippines, the court system was insufficient and did not improve after the creation of AMC  Another common characteristic for all the failed AMC was that they were not funded sufficiently Some AMCs had to ask for their budget from other agency This would cause budgetary pressure and restrict some activities of AMCs  All of them had large amount of non-performing assets (as percentage of total financial assets) transferred to them (Mexico: 17%, The Philippines: 21.7%, and Ghana: 51 %) For the successful AMCs, they also had some commonalities  All the successful AMCs had a small amount of NPL (as percentage of total financial assets) transferred to them (Spain: 1%, USA: 8%, Finland: 5.2%, and Sweden: 7.4%)  All of them had sufficient funding to cover for their purchase and everyday expenses  They all had skilled staff and good governance  Most assets transferred to AMCs were real estate or real estate related assets, which was easy to liquidate and free out political pressure They all had developed capital market and private sector led economies 123doc Stt.010.Mssv.BKD002ac.email.ninhd 77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77t@edu.gmail.com.vn.bkc19134.hmu.edu.vn.Stt.010.Mssv.BKD002ac.email.ninhddtt@edu.gmail.com.vn.bkc19134.hmu.edu.vn C.33.44.55.54.78.65.5.43.22.2.4 22.Tai lieu Luan 66.55.77.99 van Luan an.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.33.44.55.54.78.655.43.22.2.4.55.22 Do an.Tai lieu Luan van Luan an Do an.Tai lieu Luan van Luan an Do an 58 APPENDIX III - BANK AND NPLS ANALYSIS Table Reported loans from banks’ balance sheets Reported loans (2012) Current loans Total ACB Bao Viet BIDV EXIM HDBank Lien Viet * MB Nam A Ocean Bank 1,395,718 95,663 5,083 273,615 71,911 19,416 15,490 69,512 5,920 24,028 Special mentioned loans 96,400 4,567 1,264 31,383 2,023 1,234 948 3,029 173 1,289 Sub-standard loans 14,814 747 188 5,857 50 355 138 299 16 65 Doubtful loans Loss NPLs (%) Reported loans (2012) Current loans Special mentioned loans 9,888 673 38 825 145 117 68 433 66 165 14,488 1,150 175 2,479 793 26 244 640 87 694 2.56% 2.50% 5.94% 2.92% 1.32% 2.35% 2.66% 1.86% 2.71% 3.52% PG Bank Sacombank SHB Techcombank VCB Viet Cap VIB Vietin VPBank 10,968 93,933 47,177 64,415 201,799 7,520 29,245 327,054 32,970 1,656 429 4,614 2,006 33,573 115 3,756 1,412 2,931 Sub-standard loans 864 312 1,031 108 3,126 18 388 995 258 Doubtful loans 109 764 1,774 849 1,214 32 273 1,789 554 Loss 191 797 2,209 884 1,451 98 273 2,106 192 8.44% 1.95% 8.83% 2.70% 2.40% 1.90% 2.75% 1.47% 2.72% NPLs (%) Source: FS for 2011, 2012 of the above banks and CafeF.com 123doc Stt.010.Mssv.BKD002ac.email.ninhd 77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77t@edu.gmail.com.vn.bkc19134.hmu.edu.vn.Stt.010.Mssv.BKD002ac.email.ninhddtt@edu.gmail.com.vn.bkc19134.hmu.edu.vn C.33.44.55.54.78.65.5.43.22.2.4 22.Tai lieu Luan 66.55.77.99 van Luan an.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.33.44.55.54.78.655.43.22.2.4.55.22 Do an.Tai lieu Luan van Luan an Do an.Tai lieu Luan van Luan an Do an 59 Reported loans (2011) Current loans Total ACB Bao Viet BIDV EXIM HDBank MB Nam A 1,210,565 101,564 6011.1218 233,766 72,422 12726.5 54,766 5912.61 17,641 Special mentioned loans 86,755 327 394.986 32,415 1,038 829.437 2,405 155.3 1,147 Sub-standard loans 11,038 275 115.7169 5,244 414 154.444 306 19.33 154 Doubtful loans 3,875 346 167.3558 420 353 95.845 111 105.4 44 Loss 9,257 297 394.9863 2,458 436 41.605 521 52.4 202 NPLs (%) 1.83% 0.89% 9.57% 2.96% 1.61% 2.11% 1.61% 2.84% 2.08% PG Bank Sacombank SHB Techcombank VCB Viet Cap VIB Vietin VPBank 11,554 79840.392 27,417 57,104 174351 4,078 39,894 285213 26,305 309 235.868 1,094 4,553 30808.9 184 2,496 6017.02 2,346 66 101.981 219 927 1257.46 24 414 1071.42 275 Reported loans (2011) Current loans Special mentioned loans Sub-standard loans Doubtful loans Loss NPLs (%) 40 193.335 154 624 653.072 27 252 220.213 68 143 167.911 278 242 2347.43 67 506 912.537 190 2.06% 0.58% 2.23% 2.83% 2.03% 2.70% 2.69% 0.75% 1.82% Source: Data from banks’ FS 2011 and 2012 Note: * Ocean Bank Use data for quarter 3/2012 In billions of VND Some banks did not provide their loans classification: ABBank, Maritime, OCB, SeABank, VIB, Southern Bank Loan classification from Bao Viet was got from CafeF.com The bank does not provide Note to Financial Statement 123doc Stt.010.Mssv.BKD002ac.email.ninhd 77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77t@edu.gmail.com.vn.bkc19134.hmu.edu.vn.Stt.010.Mssv.BKD002ac.email.ninhddtt@edu.gmail.com.vn.bkc19134.hmu.edu.vn C.33.44.55.54.78.65.5.43.22.2.4 22.Tai lieu Luan 66.55.77.99 van Luan an.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.33.44.55.54.78.655.43.22.2.4.55.22 Do an.Tai lieu Luan van Luan an Do an.Tai lieu Luan van Luan an Do an 60 Other banks have not published their FS in 2012: Agribank, Dong A, GPBank, Kien Long, MDB, MHB, Navibank, Saigon Bank, SCB, SeABank, Tien Phong, Trust Bank, VietA, Vietbank Table Some of the selected financial data from the 18 banks, with amount of NPLs are adjusted according to Note to financial statement Total ACB Bao Viet BIDV EXIM HDBank Lien Viet MB Nam A Ocean Bank Adjusted NPLs 83,455 11,021 500 15,653 3,246 1,712 1,533 4,188 1,323 2,451 NPLs (%) 4.84% 10.72% 7.30% 4.94% 4.21% 7.66% 8.53% 5.46% 17.84% 5.01% Total loans to customer 676,115 102,815 6,748 339,924 74,922 21,148 22,992 74,479 6,848 26,240 Loans to other FI 81,025 1,673 433 27,616 21,173 3,000 - 24,759 922 1,448 Cash & Gold at other FI 141,497 20,328 3,848 27,013 36,342 4,376 15,399 18,346 1,950 13,893 59,730 9,431 - 11,646 9,460 - 15,514 4,628 1,840 7,211 Debt securities from FI and economic entities Other asset 59,327 12,150 307 15,632 5,391 10,632 8,738 - 1,989 4,489 Receivables 33,072 8,231 12 10,056 2,600 8,908 - - 1,349 1,914 Interest, fees receivables 16,247 4,095 273 4,990 2,650 1,277 - - 571 2,390 (13,695) (2,091) (139) (6,788) (606) (318) (403) (2,393) (81) (877) Provision, except other asset Total Provision (14,132) (2,272) (139) (6,844) (606) (325) (403) (2,539) (81) (923) Total Assets 1,219,807 176,308 13,283 484,785 170,156 52,783 66,413 175,610 16,008 64,462 92,370 12,624 3,153 26,703 15,812 5,394 7,391 13,530 3,277 4,485 Equity & reserve 123doc Stt.010.Mssv.BKD002ac.email.ninhd 77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77t@edu.gmail.com.vn.bkc19134.hmu.edu.vn.Stt.010.Mssv.BKD002ac.email.ninhddtt@edu.gmail.com.vn.bkc19134.hmu.edu.vn C.33.44.55.54.78.65.5.43.22.2.4 22.Tai lieu Luan 66.55.77.99 van Luan an.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.33.44.55.54.78.655.43.22.2.4.55.22 Do an.Tai lieu Luan van Luan an Do an.Tai lieu Luan van Luan an Do an 61 Adjusted NPLs PG Bank Sacombank 1,272 3,215 12,333 SHB Techcombank 7,951 VCB Viet Cap 6,144 1,217 VIB Vietin VPBank 983 4,890 3,823 2.81% 1.47% 8.74% 33,887 333,356 36,903 NPLs (%) 7.91% 3.12% 11.36% 5.93% 2.39% 7.81% Total loans to customer 13,787 96,334 56,940 68,261 241,163 7,782 1,619 4,648 8,890 10,196 5,321 3,247 968 36,433 9,498 771 2,965 20,997 21,160 60,509 3,972 6,420 21,458 17,317 561 8,937 6,844 39,656 16,105 2,351 - 26,575 14,223 550 8,255 10,147 21,359 5,810 1,753 7,274 19,535 12,937 Receivables 237 4,691 1,494 15,174 1,566 1,135 6,039 9,455 10,131 Interest, fees receivables 211 2,493 4,461 5,895 3,437 584 1,116 7,944 2,455 (383) (2,121) (1,312) (1,546) (5,677) (106) (605) (3,979) (465) (2,834) (1,377) (1,589) (5,677) (106) (707) (3,989) (557) 152,119 116,538 179,934 414,475 20,670 65,023 503,530 102,576 13,290 41,705 3,265 Loans to other FI Cash & Gold at other FI Debt securities from FI and economic entities Other asset Provision, except other asset Total Provision Total Assets Equity & reserve (383) 19,251 3,194 13,699 9,506 Source: Data from banks’ FS 2012 123doc Stt.010.Mssv.BKD002ac.email.ninhd 77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77t@edu.gmail.com.vn.bkc19134.hmu.edu.vn.Stt.010.Mssv.BKD002ac.email.ninhddtt@edu.gmail.com.vn.bkc19134.hmu.edu.vn 8,436 33,840 6,637 C.33.44.55.54.78.65.5.43.22.2.4 22.Tai lieu Luan 66.55.77.99 van Luan an.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.33.44.55.54.78.655.43.22.2.4.55.22 Do an.Tai lieu Luan van Luan an Do an.Tai lieu Luan van Luan an Do an 62 Table NPL scenarios analysis Total ACB Bao Viet BIDV EXIM HDBank Lien Viet MB Nam A Case - Adjusted NPLs - NPL (Adjusted) - (NPL - Provision) / Equity 83,455 11,021 500 15,653 3,246 1,712 1,533 4,188 1,323 0.37 0.71 0.11 0.33 0.17 0.26 0.15 0.13 0.38 Case - percent of debt securities and loans to other FI are NPLs - NPL - (NPL - Provision) / Equity 100,297 11,576 521 17,616 4,778 1,862 2,308 5,658 1,461 0.31 0.75 0.12 0.41 0.26 0.29 0.26 0.24 0.42 Case - addition percent of debt securities and loans to other FI are NPLs + percent of Cash & Gold are not returnable - NPL - (NPL - Provision) / Equity 103,267 11,779 560 17,887 5,141 1,906 2,462 5,841 1,480 0.32 0.77 0.13 0.42 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.25 0.43 Case - addition 10 percent of debt securities and loans to other FI are NPLs + percent of Cash & Gold are not returnable - NPL - (NPL - Provision) / Equity 120,109 12,334 581 19,850 6,673 2,056 3,238 7,311 1,619 0.40 0.81 0.14 0.49 0.38 0.32 0.38 0.36 0.47 Case - NPL ratio in each bank is 15 percent (include debt securities) - NPL - (NPL - Provision) / Equity 260,118 16,835 1,027 49,246 12,996 3,354 5,023 12,203 1,388 1.02 1.17 0.28 1.59 0.78 0.56 0.62 0.73 0.40 123doc Stt.010.Mssv.BKD002ac.email.ninhd 77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77t@edu.gmail.com.vn.bkc19134.hmu.edu.vn.Stt.010.Mssv.BKD002ac.email.ninhddtt@edu.gmail.com.vn.bkc19134.hmu.edu.vn C.33.44.55.54.78.65.5.43.22.2.4 22.Tai lieu Luan 66.55.77.99 van Luan an.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.33.44.55.54.78.655.43.22.2.4.55.22 Do an.Tai lieu Luan van Luan an Do an.Tai lieu Luan van Luan an Do an Stt.010.Mssv.BKD002ac.email.ninhd 77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.77.99.44.45.67.22.55.77.C.37.99.44.45.67.22.55.77t@edu.gmail.com.vn.bkc19134.hmu.edu.vn.Stt.010.Mssv.BKD002ac.email.ninhddtt@edu.gmail.com.vn.bkc19134.hmu.edu.vn

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