(Luận văn) corporate governance and ownership on voluntary information disclosure, case study for listed firms in ho chi minh stock exchange

ERASMUS UNVERSITY ROTTERDAM HO CHI MINH CITY INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL STUDIES VIETNAM THE NETHERLANDS t to UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS ng hi ep VIETNAM – NETHERLANDS w PROGRAMME FOR M.A IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS n lo ad ju y th yi pl ua al CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND OWNERSHIP ON n VOLUNTARY INFORMATION DISCLOSURE: CASE n va ll fu STUDY FOR LISTED FIRMS IN m oi HO CHI MINH STOCK EXCHANGE at nh z z om l.c gm PHAN HOA THAO NGUYEN k jm ht vb By an Lu MASTER OF ARTS IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS n va ey t re th HO CHI MINH CTITY, October 2017 INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL STUDIES HO CHI MINH CITY THE HAGUE VIETNAM THE NETHERLANDS t to UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS ng hi ep w VIETNAM – NETHERLANDS n lo PROGRAMME FOR M.A IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS ad ju y th yi pl ua al n CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND OWNERSHIP ON va n VOLUNTARY INFORMATION DISCLOSURE: CASE ll fu oi m STUDY FOR LIESTED FIRMS IN nh at HO CHI MINH STOCK EXCHANGE z z A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of vb k jm ht MASTER OF ARTS IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS om PHAN HOA THAO NGUYEN l.c gm By an Lu n ey t re VU VIET QUANG va Academic Supervisor: th HO CHI MINH CTITY, October 2017 t to ng hi DECLARATION ep I certify that this thesis entitled “Impact of corporate governance and ownership on w Voluntary Information Disclosure of firms on Ho Chi Minh stock exchange (HOSE)”, n lo which is submitted by me for completing the degree of Master of Art in Development ad y th Economics to Vietnam – Netherlands Programme (VNP) ju I certify this thesis has not been submitted for any degree and all materials and yi pl assistance in this dissertation have been acknowledged in the text n ua al n va ll fu oi m at nh z z k jm ht vb om l.c gm an Lu n va ey t re th Phan Hoa Thao Nguyen | Page i t to ng hi ACKNOWLEGDEMENT ep w This thesis would not be completed without any assistance and instruction from n lo many people Sincerely, I would like to give my acknowledgement to my supervisor, ad y th friends, family because of their support and motivation for me during the time of yi Economics ju performing this research for completing Degree of Master of Art in Development and pl ua al First of all, I would like to express my endless gratitude and thank to my n supervisor, Dr Vu Viet Quang Thank to his instructions and motivation, I had many va n useful advices for my thesis His great generosity and enthusiasm encouraged me to fu ll develop my thesis topic more persuadable and attractive Despite of being busy, he m oi spent a lot of time explaining econometric model and data settling method to me His at nh useful comments supported me improving thesis more qualified and effective z Moreover, I am grateful to Dr Truong Dang Thuy for his assistance in constructing z ht vb research design jm Next, I would like to express my thank to all friends at VNP Spending a long k time together from the first day to the completion of the course, I learned a lot from gm you about knowledge, spirit, assiduousness in studying Beside that, I also want to l.c thank VNP officers for their support in my learning and studying at here om Finally, I would like to express thankfulness to my parents, my brother and his an Lu wife for their supporting in my life My special thank comes to most important person ey t re about to be born, and assists unconditionally for me to pursue my dreams n va in my life, my husband, who has walked by my side, takes care of our baby that is th Phan Hoa Thao Nguyen | Page ii t to ng hi ABBREVIATIONS ep Chief executive officer w CEO: n lo ad GMM: Ho Chi Minh stock exchange ju Ordinary Least Square yi OLS: y th HOSE: Generalized Moment Method pl Stock exchange market SOE: State-owned enterprises UK: United Kingdom USA: United State of America n ua al SEM: n va ll fu oi m at nh z z k jm ht vb om l.c gm an Lu n va ey t re th Phan Hoa Thao Nguyen | Page iii t to ng hi TABLE OF CONTENTS ep w Declaration i n lo ad Acknowledgement ii y th Abbreviations iii ju yi Table of contents iv pl ua al List of table v n List of figures vi va n List of appendix vi ll fu oi m Abstract vii at nh Chapter 1: Introduction z Chapter 2: Literature view and hypothesis development z ht vb Chapter 3: Sample data and research methodology 16 k jm Chapter 4: Empirical results 25 l.c gm Chapter 5: Conclusion 47 References 50 om Appendix 57 an Lu n va ey t re th Phan Hoa Thao Nguyen | Page iv t to ng hi LIST OF TABLE ep Table 1: Definition and measurement of independent variables Table 2: Descriptive statistic Table 3: The regression result by OLS regression method in SOEs in 2010 Table 4: The regression result by OLS regression method in SOEs in 2013 Table 5: The regression result by OLS regression method in SOEs in 2015 Table 6: The regression result by OLS regression method in family-owned companies in 2010 Table 7: The regression result by OLS regression method in family-owned companies in 2013 Table 8: The regression result by OLS regression method in family-owned companies in 2015 Table 9: The regression result by OLS regression method in block shareholders firms in 2010 Table 10: The regression result by OLS regression method in block shareholders firms in 2013 Table 11: The regression result by OLS regression method in block shareholders firms in 2015 Table 12: The regression result by Pooled OLS method in SOEs, family-owned companies, and block shareholders firms from 2010 to 2015 Table 13: The regression result by Fixed effect and Random effect method in SOEs, family-owned companies, and block shareholders firms from 2010 to 2015 Table 14: The regression result by generalized moment method (GMM) in SOEs, family-owned companies, and block shareholders firms from 2010 to 2015 w n lo ad ju y th yi pl n ua al n va ll fu oi m at nh z z k jm ht vb om l.c gm an Lu n va ey t re th Phan Hoa Thao Nguyen | Page v t to ng hi LIST OF FIGURES ep Figure 2.1: Conceptual framework w Figure 3.1: Allocation of voluntary disclosure items in 2010 n lo Figure 3.2: Allocation of voluntary disclosure items in 2013 ad Figure 3.3: Allocation of voluntary disclosure items in 2015 ju y th yi pl al n ua LIST OF APPENDIX n va Appendix A: List of voluntary disclosure items ll fu oi m at nh z z k jm ht vb om l.c gm an Lu n va ey t re th Phan Hoa Thao Nguyen | Page vi t to ng hi ABSTRACT ep w Using final sample data of 237 publicly traded firms on HOSE for the study n lo period from 2010 to 2015, the paper investigates the relationship between corporate ad y th governance and ownership to voluntary information disclosure in Vietnam ju Furthermore, to check significant impact of corporate governance, ownership structure yi on voluntary information disclosure in Vietnam, the GMM regression is employed to pl ua al deal with endogeneity problems and the results provide empirical evidences of the n strong relationship between board size, family ownership, block share holders n va ownership and voluntary information disclosure Interestingly, the study finds that the ll fu negative relationship between board independence and voluntary disclosure is oi m weakened in the presence of block shareholders, and the positive association of board at nh size and disclosure level is strengthened for firms with family ownership z z ht vb Keywords: voluntary disclosure, corporate governance, board leader structure, k firms jm board independence, board size, SOEs, family-owned companies, block shareholder om l.c gm an Lu n va ey t re th Phan Hoa Thao Nguyen | Page vii t to ng hi CHAPTER ep INTRODUCTION w 1.1 Problem statement n lo Nowadays, the stock exchange market (SEM) becomes a channel mobilizing capital ad y th effectively for firms to invest into interested project, produce and provide goods or ju services The Vietnamese SEM passes through unstable period It may state that the yi SEM takes an important role in actuating national economy First, due to having SEM, pl ua al investing of idle capital becomes easier, accumulating capital is more abundant n Second, SEM provides businesses a chance in order to use capital source more n va effectively Third, SEM is a tool in order to evaluate business and forecast the future ll fu Final, SEM provides a good forecast about business cycle in the future The oi m Vietnamese SEM spent unstable periods as stock price fluctuates continuously Evenly, nh that fluctuation is not sometimes reasonable and not to be complied in accordance with at any rules Therefore, many investors lack of exact information about market There are z z some reality problems existing on SEM for a long time are the swaying price, violating vb impose strong methods to disclose market k jm ht disclosing information, and planting spy transaction… It is the time for government to l.c gm The state owned enterprises dominated in Vietnam in the early 1980s The Vietnam economy has passed two periods of French War and American War influencing on om economic property form of enterprises from 1946 – 1975 After Southern liberation in an Lu 1975, there is a united combination between two of South and North region, Vietnam had gone to building period for economy and society Following this unifying, the va n Vietnam economy had operated according to same custom, model of central planning Phan Hoa Thao Nguyen | Page th state ownership takes an important role as owning production means, agricultural co- ey Nguyen, 2005) This development has created the central planning economy which t re which had been adopted in North region was transferred to South region (Turner and n lo ad ju y th yi pl ua al n Table 14: The regression result by generalized moment method (GMM) in SOEs, family-owned companies, and block shareholders firms from 2010 to 2015 This table shows result of relationship of corporate governance measured by board leader structure, board independence and board size and voluntary information disclosure Model 1, 2, and show the relationship of board leader structure and voluntary information disclosure in SOEs, family-owned companies, and block shareholders firms Next, model 4, 5, and reveal the association of board independence and voluntary information disclosure in SOEs, family-owned companies, and block shareholders firms Finally, model 7, 8, and indicate the influence of board size on voluntary information disclosure in SOEs, family-owned companies, and block shareholders firms ***, **, and * mark for the 1-, 5-, and 10-level of significant n va 7.093 1.351 1.45 t 0.39 Model Coeff t -20.169 1.44 nh Boardin~ce -.856 2.004 -1.870 t -0.67 0.57 -.036 038 11.783** -.137*** 110 0.5 332 1.29 -22.078 8.554*** 2.74 3.631* 1.66 -7.159 -0.55 -18.160 14.191** 2.5 8.463 -.123 -1.53 -.251 067 1.55 1.23 1.25 1.12 0.49 -.229 1.63 -.041 7.809*** -17.454** -2.2 -33.099** 6.161*** 2.71 9.300*** -0.4 -.138* -.016 1.21 075*** 2.97 va Bib Bss Bsf Bsb 5.78 2.85 8.551*** 3.21 2.49 2.73 1.75 35.629*** 7.677** 3.36 2.6 2.96 -.127*** 2.00 -.043 0.65 7.642** 2.09 -25.819 13.196*** -.178 n 009 0.42 044* re 1.72 009 y te ac th g e cd si Phan Hoa Thao Nguyen | Page 44 1.35 2.99 1.58 an Bif 13.376*** 5.994** Lu Blb Bis Model t om -.016 -1.918 3.95 l.c 048 12.224** 1.95 2.57 3.96 -.068*** -.204** -18.646** 3.02 gm Externalaudit 1.22 k -26.938 7.989*** jm Leverage 1.63 2.43 2.31 0.64 2.452 1.73 0.29 0.35 ht 6.543 1.16 0.34 1.04 0.38 -.134 0.13 3.496* -.034 vb 2.29 Blockholder 11.652*** Model Coeff z 026** Firmsize Model Coeff t 1.29 z -.002 0.05 Familyown Blf Model Coeff -0.73 Stateown Bls Model Coeff t at Boardsize Profit Model Coeff t oi Model Coeff m ll Boardleader Model Coeff t fu Variable 0.83 jg hg t to ng Beside to principal variables, the ownership variables have also been sought out hi ep having statistical significance to voluntary disclosure In the regression model to board leader structure variable, family-owned variable have been suggested having positive w n and significant association to voluntary disclosure This statistic seemed to indicate that lo ad firms with high number of family members in board may disclose more about y th themselves to public Similarly, firms with a strategy of high disclosure have tendency ju in order to assign a large number of family members in board, and vice versa On the yi pl other hand, in the regression model to independence of board, blockholder variable ua al have been sought out the negative and significant association to voluntary disclosure in n significance level 1% This may reflect the fact that a group of block shareholders in va n companies usually not want to disseminate internal data and strategies to market or ll fu investors m oi Beside to principal variables of model, the control variables take important nh roles in regression result The firmsize variable is positive and significant with 1% and at z 5% level in relationship to voluntary disclosure variable This may be a popular z ht vb situation of Vietnam companies when the large companies would like to open jm themselves to outside investors and stock market for mobilizing investment capital k Moreover, table 14 also reveals statistical significance between leverage and disclosure gm in SOEs, family-owned companies, and block shareholders firms Another control l.c variable researched is auditor which reveals that a firm is audited by a external auditor, om concretely one of the Big The result indicates that the audit variable has statistical an Lu significance level 1% and 5% This may reflect the fact that a firm is audited by one of va the Big usually disclose more information than the others Big contributes to assist n companies for disseminating more themselves to public On the other hand, the profit Phan Hoa Thao Nguyen | Page 45 th disclose better than firms with small profit The most noticeable feature in this table is ey sample reveals popular characteristics of Vietnam firms, a firm with high profit may t re variable has also found having significance to voluntary disclosure The result of t to ng interaction terms board independence and block shareholders variables, board size and hi ep family ownership The positive sign of Bib coefficient reveals that the negative association between number of independent directors and disclosure level is weaker for w n firms with block shareholder Similarly, the positive and significant coefficient of lo ad boardsize and familyown variable indicate that the positive association of board size ju y th and disclosure level is stronger for firms with family ownership yi pl n ua al n va ll fu oi m at nh z z k jm ht vb om l.c gm an Lu n va ey t re th Phan Hoa Thao Nguyen | Page 46 t to ng CHAPTER hi ep CONCLUSION w n lo The extent of information disclosure which is disseminated by business ad managers is likely to be influenced by characteristics of corporate governance and y th ownership of that company By using data collected from 237 listed firms on HOSE ju yi from 2010 to 2015, the paper considers the gap in research about impacts of corporate pl governance on voluntary disclosure at three Vietnamese popular organization types al n ua SOEs, family-owned company, and block share holders firms in comparison with n va current researches Based on the list of 32 voluntary disclosure items, the findings from ll fu this paper reveal the evidences to confirm that characteristics of corporate governance oi m containing board leader structure, independence of board, and size of board influence on voluntary disclosure of information in companies in Vietnam Furthermore, the nh at paper also considers the impact of ownership on voluntary information disclosure z z Findings from this study provide the empirical evidences to confirm influences vb ht of corporate governance and ownership on voluntary disclosure Specifically, with k jm cross-sectional data, the paper’s result shows that in SOEs and block shareholders gm companies, CEO duality and higher proportion of independent directors are associated l.c with higher voluntary disclosure in 2010 and 2013 By contrast, data in 2015 reveals om that a higher number of independent directors may express a lower voluntary an Lu disclosure In family-owned companies, the result suggests that board leader structure and board size is directly proportional with voluntary disclosure Furthermore, with va panel data, in the state-owned enterprises and block shareholders firms, the GMM n Phan Hoa Thao Nguyen | Page 47 th family-owned companies usually have high transparent index Contrary to family- ey members in board are, the higher the voluntary disclosure is The paper also shows that t re regression result reveals that a large size of board indicates that the larger number of t to ng owned companies, the block share holders firms disclose less information A hi ep noticeable feature is the interaction association in GMM result The paper finds the negative association of number of independent directors and voluntary information w n disclosure is weaker for firm with block share holders Similarly, the positive lo ad association of board size and voluntary information disclosure is stronger for firms y th with family-owned companies The result of paper reveals the practical situation and ju conditions of voluntary disclosure are influenced by internal and external factors of the yi pl businesses The external conditions contain Vietnam regulations and laws, especially ua al management and legally biding system of government Moreover, the internal n conditions includes internal control system, board of management, control board and va n independent audit In scope of this paper, factors influencing to information disclosure fu ll of the businesses have just considered in internal aspects of companies m oi Nevertheless, the paper fails in providing evidence to support the association nh between characteristics of corporate governance and voluntary disclosure of listed at z firms on HOSE First, with the cross-sectional data, the paper could not find the z ht vb statistical significant result of the board size variable and voluntary information jm disclosure variable Similarly, with the panel data, the paper also could not find the k relationship of board size and voluntary information disclosure However, the result of gm cross-sectional data and panel data are relative consistency in board leader structure l.c and board independence variable Likewise, with the result of GMM, the research om result also does not find the association of board leader structure and independence of an Lu board to voluntary disclosure from 2010 to 2015 Moreover, the paper could not find va the significant association of state-owed enterprises and voluntary information n disclosure Beside that, only the interaction variables bib and bsf have significant result th Phan Hoa Thao Nguyen | Page 48 ey significant association with the voluntary information disclosure t re with the voluntary information disclosure The other variables could not provide the t to ng Based on these findings, some policy implications are suggested for the hi ep companies and government Firstly, it is necessary for the owners, shareholders, managers, and administrators to reconsider structure of organization, role of members, w n characteristics of board in order to select a best sample form for management board lo ad Secondly, in developing and integrating period, the SEM in general and listed firms in y th particular need more capital for investment and extended production of company from ju foreign investors Thus, in order to attract the investment capital, Vietnamese yi pl corporations need to raise disclosure for responding the interesting from outside ua al potential investors in mobilizing capital effectively Thirdly, Vietnamese enterprises n should update the new trends about strategy of managing and disclosing information va n from countries in the region and the world for enhancing competence and firm value fu ll Finally, government should promulgate the instructions and circulars for supervising m oi process of corporate information disclosure nh Although this study has considered a number of corporate factors that are at z supposed to significantly impact in the firm’s voluntary disclosure, other related z ht vb variables remain untested Also the empirical results should be taken of care as they jm could be distorted by outliers, probably More importantly, because of availability of k disclosure and family ownership data, the study assumes that disclosure information gm and number of family members should remain unchanged in short-term or one year om l.c an Lu n va ey t re th Phan Hoa Thao Nguyen | Page 49 t to ng REFERENCES hi ep Ahmed,K., Nicholls,D (1994) The Effect of Non-financial Company w n Characteristicson Mandatory Disclosure Compliance in Developing Countries: lo ad The Case of Bangladesh.The International Journal of Accounting 29 (1) : 62– y th 77 ju Ahmed, S & Siddiqui, J (2011) Audit committee interactions with external yi pl auditors: Evidence from an emerging economy, Working paper, University of ua al Manchester, United Kingdom n Anderson, R.C and Reeb, D.M (2003), ‘‘Founding-family ownership and firm va n performance: evidence from the S&P 500’’, The Journal of Finance, Vol ll fu LVIII No 3, pp 1301-28 oi m Akerlof, G., 1970 The market for ‘lemons’: quality uncertainty and the market at nh mechanism Quarterly Journal of Economics 90, 629–650 Al-Bassam, W M., Ntim, C G., Opong, K K., & Downs, Y (2015) Corporate z z boards and ownership structure as antecedents of corporate governance vb 0007650315610611 k jm ht disclosure in Saudi Arabian publicly listed corporations Business & Society, l.c gm Allegrini, M., & Greco, G (2013) Corporate boards, audit committees and voluntary disclosure: Evidence from Italian listed companies Journal of om Management & Governance, 17(1), 187-216 an Lu Arcay, M R B., & Vazquez, M F M (2005) Corporate characteristics, governance rules and the extent of voluntary disclosure in Spain Advances in n va Accounting, 21, 299-331 th Phan Hoa Thao Nguyen | Page 50 ey disclosure in Croatia World Academy of Science, Engineering and t re Barac, Z A., Granic, M., & Vuko, T (2014) The determinants of Voluntary t to ng Technology, International Journal of Social, Behavioral, Educational, hi ep Economic, Business and Industrial Engineering, 8(4), 1057-1063 Barako, D G., Hancock, P., & Izan, H Y (2006) Factors influencing voluntary w n corporate disclosure by Kenyan companies Corporate Governance: An lo ad International Review, 14(2), 107-125 y th Bartholomeusz, S., & Tanewski, G A (2006) The relationship between family ju firms and corporate governance Journal of small business management, 44(2), yi pl 245-267 and private ua al Berle, A., & Means, G (1932) The modern corporate n property McMillian, New York, NY va n Binh, T Q (2012) Voluntary disclosure information in the annual reports of non fu ll financial listed companies: the case of Vietnam Journal of Applied m oi Economics and Business Research, 2(2), 69-90 review, 323-349 at nh Botosan, C A (1997) Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital.Accounting z z Byrd, J., Hickman, K., 1992 Do outside directors monitor managers? Evidence vb jm ht from Tender Offer Bids Journal of Financial Economics 32, 195—221 Cerbioni, F., & Parbonetti, A (2007) Exploring the effects of corporate k l.c gm governance on intellectual capital disclosure: An analysis of European biotechnology companies European Accounting Review, 16(4), 791-826 om Chakroun, R., & Matoussi, H (2012) Determinants of the extent of voluntary Management Information Systems, 11(3), 335 an Lu disclosure in the annual reports of the Tunisian firms Accounting and va n Chau, G.K and Gray, S.J (2002), ‘‘Ownership structure and corporate voluntary th Phan Hoa Thao Nguyen | Page 51 ey Accounting, Vol 37 No 2, pp 247-65 t re disclosure in Hong Kong and Singapore’’, The International Journal of t to ng Cheng, E C., & Courtenay, S M (2006) Board composition, regulatory regime hi ep and voluntary disclosure The international journal of accounting,41(3), 262- 289 w n Claessens, S., & Fan, J P (2002) Corporate governance in Asia: A lo ad survey.International Review of finance, 3(2), 71-103 y th Core, J E., Holthausen, R W., & Larcker, D F (1999) Corporate governance, ju chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance Journal of yi pl financial economics, 51(3), 371-406 ua al Dhaliwal, D S., Li, O Z., Tsang, A., & Yang, Y G (2011) Voluntary n nonfinancial disclosure and the cost of equity capital: The initiation of va n corporate social responsibility reporting The accounting review, 86(1), 59- fu ll 100 m oi Eng, L L., & Mak, Y T (2003) Corporate governance and voluntary at nh disclosure Journal of accounting and public policy, 22(4), 325-345 Ferguson, M J., Lam, K C., & Lee, G M (2002) Voluntary disclosure by z z state‐owned enterprises listed on the stock exchange of Hong Kong Journal of vb jm ht International Financial Management & Accounting, 13(2), 125-152 k Firer, C., & Meth, G (1986) Information disclosure in annual reports in South l.c gm Africa Omega, 14(5), 373-382 Graham, J R 2000 How big are the tax benefits of debt? Journal of Finance om 55:1901-1941 voluntary corporate disclosures Journal of Accounting and public n va Policy,23(5), 351-379 an Lu Gul, F A., & Leung, S (2004) Board leadership, outside directors’ expertise and th Phan Hoa Thao Nguyen | Page 52 ey disclosure in Malaysian corporations Abacus, 38(3), 317-349 t re Haniffa, R M., & Cooke, T E (2002) Culture, corporate governance and t to ng Harford, J., Mansi, S A., & Maxwell, W F (2012) Corporate governance and firm hi ep cash holdings in the US In Corporate Governance (pp 107-138) Springer Berlin Heidelberg w n Healy, P M., & Palepu, K G (2001) Information asymmetry, corporate lo ad disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure y th literature Journal of accounting and economics, 31(1), 405-440 ju Heninger, W G 2001 The association between auditor litigation and abnormal yi pl accruals The Accounting Review 76 (1):111-126 ua al Ho, S S., & Wong, K S (2001) A study of the relationship between corporate n governance structures and the extent of voluntary disclosure.Journal of va n International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 10(2), 139-156 fu ll Hossain, M., L M Tan, and M Adams (1994) Voluntary disclosure in an m oi emerging capital market: Some empirical evidence from companies listed on 334-351 at nh the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange International Journal of Accounting, 29, z z Huafang, X., & Jianguo, Y (2007) Ownership structure, board composition and vb jm ht corporate voluntary disclosure: Evidence from listed companies in China.Managerial Auditing Journal, 22(6), 604-619 k l.c gm Jensen, M C., & Meckling, W H (1976) Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure Journal of financial economics, 3(4), om 305-360 an Lu Kelton, A S., & Yang, Y W (2008) The impact of corporate governance on Internet financial reporting Journal of accounting and Public Policy, 27(1), n va 62-87 Phan Hoa Thao Nguyen | Page 53 th economy Journal of business ethics, 114(2), 207-223 ey corporate social responsibility disclosures: Evidence from an emerging t re Khan, A., Muttakin, M B., & Siddiqui, J (2013) Corporate governance and t to ng Klapper, L F., & Love, I (2004) Corporate governance, investor protection, and hi ep performance in emerging markets Journal of corporate Finance, 10(5), 703- 728 w n Lakhal, F (2005) Voluntary earnings disclosures and corporate governance: lo ad Evidence from France Review of Accounting and Finance, 4(3), 64-85 y th Laksmana, I (2008) Corporate board governance and voluntary disclosure of ju executive compensation practices Contemporary Accounting Research, 25(4), yi pl 1147-1182 ua al Laswad, F., Fisher, R., & Oyelere, P (2005) Determinants of voluntary Internet n financial reporting by local government authorities Journal of Accounting and va n Public Policy, 24(2), 101-121 fu ll Li, J., Pike, R., & Haniffa, R (2008) Intellectual capital disclosure and corporate m oi governance structure in UK firms Accounting and Business Research, 38(2), at nh 137-159 z Lim, S., Matolcsy, Z., & Chow, D (2007) The association between board z composition and different types of voluntary disclosure European Accounting jm ht vb Review, 16(3), 555-583 Luo, S., Courtenay, S M., & Hossain, M (2006) The effect of voluntary k l.c gm disclosure, ownership structure and proprietary cost on the return–future earnings relation Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 14(5), 501-521 om Mak, Y T., & Li, Y (2001) Determinants of corporate ownership and board 256 an Lu structure: evidence from Singapore Journal of Corporate Finance, 7(3), 235- va n Maury, B (2006) Family ownership and firm performance: Empirical evidence th Phan Hoa Thao Nguyen | Page 54 ey 321-341 t re from Western European corporations Journal of Corporate Finance, 12(2), t to ng Mak, Y T., & Li, Y (2001) Determinants of corporate ownership and board hi ep structure: evidence from Singapore Journal of Corporate Finance, 7(3), 235- 256 w n Meek, G K., Roberts, C B., & Gray, S J (1995) Factors influencing voluntary lo ad annual report disclosures by US, UK and continental European multinational y th corporations Journal of international business studies, 26(3), 555-572 ju Painter, M (2003) The politics of economics restructuring in Vietnam: the case of yi pl state-owned enterprises “reform” Contemporary South East Asia, Volume 25, ua al number n Raffournier, B (1995) The determinants of voluntary financial disclosure by Swiss va n listed companies European accounting review, 4(2), 261-280 ll fu Ronnås, P., & Sjưberg, Ư (1991) Economic reform in Vietnam: dismantling the m oi centrally planned economy Journal of Communist Studies, 7(1), 7-19 at nh Said, R., Hj Zainuddin, Y., & Haron, H (2009) The relationship between corporate social responsibility disclosure and corporate governance characteristics in z z Malaysian public listed companies Social Responsibility Journal, 5(2), 212- jm ht vb 226 Samaha, K., Dahawy, K., Hussainey, K., & Stapleton, P (2012) The extent of k l.c gm corporate governance disclosure and its determinants in a developing market: The case of Egypt Advances in Accounting, 28(1), 168-178 an Lu Finance LII Ž2.,737–783 om Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1997 A survey of corporate governance Journal of Ta, Q B (2012) Voluntary Disclosure Information in the Annual Reports of Non va n Financial Listed Companies: The Case of Vietnam Journal of Applied Phan Hoa Thao Nguyen | Page 55 th dual class firms Journal of Management & Governance, 18(2), 373-417 ey Tinaikar, S (2014) Voluntary disclosure and ownership structure: An analysis of t re Economics and Business Research JAEBR, 2(2): 69-90 (2012) t to ng Tsamenyi, M., Enninful-Adu, E., & Onumah, J (2007) Disclosure and corporate hi ep governance in developing countries: Evidence from Ghana Managerial Auditing Journal, 22(3), 319-334 w n Sarah, T., Nguyen, P A., (2005) Young Entrepreneurs, Social Capital and Doi Moi lo ad in Hanoi, Vietnam Urban Studies Vol 42, No 10, 1693–1710 y th Villalonga, B., & Amit, R (2006) How family ownership, control and ju management affect firm value? Journal of financial Economics, 80(2), 385- yi pl 417 ua al Wan-Hussin, W N (2009) The impact of family-firm structure and board n composition on corporate transparency: Evidence based on segment va n disclosures in Malaysia The International Journal of Accounting, 44(4), 313- ll fu 333 m oi Xie, B., Davidson, W N., & DaDalt, P J (2003) Earnings management and z of corporate finance, 9(3), 295-316 at nh corporate governance: the role of the board and the audit committee Journal z Yermack, D (1996) Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of vb k jm ht directors Journal of financial economics, 40(2), 185-211 om l.c gm an Lu n va ey t re th Phan Hoa Thao Nguyen | Page 56 t to ng hi APPENDIX A: LIST OF VOLUNTARY INFORMATION DISCLOSURE ITEMS ep STT w n lo ad ju y th yi Description General and strategic information Annual report in English General background of the economy Company’s mission statement Brief history of the company Organizational structure pl Description of the goods or services of the company 10 Description of marketing networks for finished goods/services Company’s current business strategy Market share analysis Discussion about major regional economic developments Financial data Review of current financial results and discussion of major factors underlying performance Statement concerning wealth created e.g value added statement Return on assets Return on shareholders’ funds Liquidity ratios Gearing ratio Forward-looking information New product/service development Planned capital expenditure Planned research and development expenditure Planned advertising and publicity expenditure Earnings per share forecast Sales revenue forecast Profit forecast Social and Board Disclosure Number of employees for the last two or more years Information about employee workplace safety Statement of corporate social responsibility n ua al n va ll fu at nh z z k jm ht vb 12 13 14 15 16 oi m 11 om an Lu n va ey t re th Phan Hoa Thao Nguyen | Page 57 l.c 24 25 26 gm 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 t to ng hi ep w 27 28 29 30 31 n lo ad 32 Statement of environmental policy Names of directors Age of directors Academic and professional qualification of directors Business experience of directors Directors’ shareholding in the company and other related interests (e.g stock options) ju y th yi pl n ua al n va ll fu oi m at nh z z k jm ht vb om l.c gm an Lu n va ey t re th Phan Hoa Thao Nguyen | Page 58