amanda-hartley-appellant-brief-agnes-scott-college

IN THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF GEORGIA _ AMANDA HARTLEY, ) ) Petitioner/Appellant, ) Supreme Court Case No ) S13G1152 v ) ) On Writ of Certiorari to the AGNES SCOTT COLLEGE, INC., et al., ) Georgia Court of Appeals ) Case No A12A1989 Respondents/Appellee ) BRIEF OF PETITIONER/APPELLANT Lloyd N Bell Georgia Bar #048800 BELL LAW FIRM 1201 Peachtree Street, N.E Suite 1900 Atlanta, Georgia 30361 Telephone: (404) 249-6768 TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CITATIONS iv PRELIMINARY STATEMENT QUESTION PRESENTED STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION STATEMENT OF THE CASE I The Underlying Facts II The Motion to Dismiss and the Appellate Decision ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY A The Plurality Opinion of the Court of Appeals Impermissibly Expands the Definition of a “State officer or employee” Beyond Its Clear Legislative Intent i The statutory text of O.C.G.A § 50-21-22 (7), by its plain terms, conclusively refutes the plurality’s interpretation 10 ii The legislative intent, purpose, and history further refute the plurality’s interpretation of O.C.G.A § 50-21-22 (7) 12 B In Construing the Campus Policemen Act with the GTCA, the Plurality Opinion Fails to Take the Entirety of the Campus Policemen Act into Consideration 14 i The statutory text of the Campus Policemen Act, by its plain terms, conclusively refutes the plurality’s interpretation 15 ii ii The existing condition of the law when the GTCA was enacted further refutes the plurality’s Construction of the Campus Policemen Act with the GTCA 16 iii The plurality opinion ignores legal precedence finding that not every law enforcement officer is a “State officer or employee” entitled to the protection of sovereign immunity 19 C Conclusion 20 iii TABLE OF CITATIONS CASES PAGE(S) Agnes Scott College et al v Hartley, 321 Ga App 74, 741 S.E 2d 199 (2013) 5-8, 13-15, 19 Alford v Pub Serv Comm’n, 262 Ga 386, 418 S.E.2d 13 (1992) Currid v DeKalb State Court Prob Dep’t, 285 Ga 184, 674 S.E.2d 894 (2009) 10, 14 Ga Dep't of Cmty Health v Data Inquiry, LLC, 313 Ga App 683, 722 S.E.2d 403 (2012) Ga Forestry Comm v Canady, 280 Ga 825, 634 S.E.2d 105 (2006) 12 Harris v State, 286 Ga 245, 686 S.E.2d 777 (2009) 10 Higdon v City of Senoia, 273 Ga 83, 538 S.E.2d 39 (2000) 10 Howard v Miller, 222 Ga App 868, 476 S.E.2d 636 (1996) 14 Nichols v Prather, 286 Ga App 889, 650 S.E.2d 380 (2007) 19 Sikes v State, 268 Ga 19, 485 S.E.2d 206 (1997) 20 Smith v Germania of Am., 249 Ga App 587, 549 S.E.2d 423 (2001) 13 Spalding County Bd of Elections v McCord, 287 Ga 835, 700 S.E.2d 558 (2010) 10 iv Summerlin v Ga Pines Cmty Serv Bd., 286 Ga 593, 690 S.E.2d 401 (2010) 16-17, 20 The Corporation of Mercer University v Barrett & Farahany, LLP, 271 Ga App 501, 610 S.E.2d 138 (2005) 17-18 OTHER CITATIONS BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1822 (9th ed 2009) 11 Charles N Kelley, Jr., TORTS Georgia Tort Claims Act: Provide a Limited Waiver of Sovereign Immunity, GA ST U L REV 349 (1992) 12, 17 v PRELIMINARY STATEMENT On April 28, 2009, a young Agnes Scott College (“ASC”) student named Hayley Maxwell claimed she was brutally sexually assaulted in her dorm room by Amanda Hartley, a graduate student at the University of Tennessee A campus police officer working exclusively for the Department of Public Safety at ASC transported Maxwell to DeKalb Medical Center for a physical examination, which revealed no evidence of trauma or bruising Undeterred, the campus police officer went to the Magistrate seeking warrants for Hartley’s arrest, but failed to inform the Magistrate about the negative physical exam The campus police officer obtained warrants against Hartley for "felony sexual battery" and other related crimes The consequences to Ms Hartley were predictable and horrific: she was arrested at her apartment in Tennessee and incarcerated for over three weeks, during which time she was placed in prolonged isolation, beaten by other inmates, and subjected to body cavity searches by female guards while male guards watched and made comments Even more devastating than her lengthy incarceration were the consequences when Hartley returned to the University of Tennessee: she lost her lab job, where she had been doing research for two years for her Master’s degree, which she hoped would lead to medical school, and missed and thus failed her final exams As a result, Hartley was expelled from the University of Tennessee and lost her scholarship funds and grant monies When all of the charges were revealed as complete and utter fabrications by a deranged Agnes Scott student, the prosecutor declined to even present the case to the grand jury and the charges were eventually expunged But the damage had been done Hartley filed suit against ASC and its employees, (hereinafter referred to as “ASC”, collectively) the campus police officers, for malicious arrest, among other claims Defendants moved to dismiss the case, claiming the employees of the private college were entitled to official immunity under the Georgia Tort Claims Act (“GTCA”) The trial court denied the motion, correctly holding that private employees at a private school acting within the course and scope of their private duties are not “State officers or employees” within the meaning of the GTCA ASC requested an interlocutory appeal of this decision which the Court of Appeals granted A bare majority in the Court of Appeals voted to overturn the trial court’s decision.1 While conceding the campus police officers were employed by a private entity and not the State, the plurality opinion erroneously held that a campus policeman is a “State officer or employee” because he necessarily acts on behalf of the State in an official capacity when he exercises his “law enforcement Four judges voted to reverse, with one of the four concurring in judgment only Three judges dissented from the opinion powers.” The plurality’s error stems from its strained conclusion that the General Assembly intended to include law enforcement officers employed by private colleges and universities within the definition of “State officers and employees” who are granted immunity under the GTCA To reach such a conclusion, the plurality ignored a salient portion of the Campus Policemen Act, which specifically provides that a campus policeman has these law enforcement powers only “when authorized by the governing body or authority” of the educational facility which employs him In other words, a campus policeman can only exercise his law enforcement powers under the direction of his employer, the private college or university The legislative language goes no further—but the plurality did In their view, exercising law enforcement powers equates to acting on behalf of the State in an official capacity, even if the exercise of law enforcement powers comes at the direction of, and on the campus of, a private employer This dangerous misconstruction overlooks a significant part of the Campus Policeman Act and ignores virtually every interpretively significant aspect of the GTCA—its text, context, history, and purpose In doing so, the plurality impermissibly expands the GTCA beyond the purpose for which it was written This Court should reject the plurality’s misconstruction and apply the Campus Policeman Act and GTCA as written QUESTION PRESENTED Did the Court of Appeals err in ruling that the campus police officers in this case qualify as State officers or employees within the meaning of O.C.G.A § 5021-22(7)? STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION The decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the trial court was entered on March 29, 2013 Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari was filed on April 17, 2013, and was granted on September 9, 2013 STATEMENT OF THE CASE This appeal arises from a motion to dismiss Accepting all of Amanda Hartley’s factual allegations as true, the facts are as follows: I The Underlying Facts On April 28, 2009, a young college student named Hayley Maxwell claimed she had been brutally assaulted2 in her dorm room on the campus of Agnes Scott College by Petitioner Amanda Hartley, (hereinafter “Hartley”) a graduate student working on her Master’s degree at the University of Tennessee (R-21, 34) Gaetano Antinozzi, a campus police officer and "Chief Investigator" working Among her many and varied allegations of abuse, Maxwell claimed Hartley had forced a “4 Hour” energy drink bottle into Maxwell’s anus and vagina, along with a toothbrush holder and cleaning brush (Supplemental Record, T-145) At his deposition, Gaetano Antinozzi conceded that he would expect there to be some physical evidence of trauma if the allegations were true, but agreed there was no such physical evidence (Supplemental Record T-164-166) exclusively for the Department of Public Safety at ASC, transported Maxwell to DeKalb Medical Center (“DMC”) for a physical examination (Supplemental Record T-124-125) Despite Maxwell’s claims, the examination revealed no evidence of trauma or bruising (Supplemental Record T-164-166) Moreover, a “reasonable investigation” would have established that Hartley was not at ASC at the time of the alleged assault and that, in fact, she had never been to Maxwell’s dorm at ASC Agnes Scott College et al v Hartley, 321 Ga App 74, 74, 741 S.E 2d 199 (2013) Antinozzi nevertheless went to the magistrate court in downtown Decatur two days later to take out warrants against Hartley for “felony sexual battery.” among other crimes (Supplemental Record T-129, 214-215) Antinozzi himself, and not the alleged victim, signed affidavits swearing that Hartley had, in fact, assaulted Maxwell (Supplemental Record T-214) When he presented the allegations to the magistrate judge, Antinozzi failed to disclose that Maxwell had recently undergone a complete physical examination at DMC and that the examination had revealed no physical evidence corroborating her fantastic story (Supplemental Record T-203) Based solely on Antinozzi's affidavits, the magistrate judge issued warrants to have Hartley arrested (Supplemental Record T-216-217) in investigating the alleged assault Id at 80 In a vigorous dissent, three judges applied fundamental rules of statutory construction to the GTCA and held that “[t]he plain language of the GTCA excludes employees of private entities like ASC from the definition of State employee or officer.” Id at 83 The dissent also found that “[n]othing in the Campus Policemen Act indicates that a campus policeman is considered to be a State employee” even if such employees are given authority to perform law enforcement functions Id at 84 In stark contrast to the majority’s finding of “no allegations,” the dissent found the Complaint to contain allegations “that the campus policemen were acting within the scope and course of their employment” when they investigated the alleged assault and then initiated proceedings to arrest Amanda Hartley Id at 85 ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY A The Plurality Opinion of the Court of Appeals Impermissibly Expands the Definition of a “State officer or employee” Beyond Its Clear Legislative Intent The plurality opinion of the Court of Appeals erroneously contravenes the constitutional4 and statutory scheme set forth by the General Assembly which “The Georgia Constitution provides that sovereign immunity extends to the State and all of its departments and agencies, and that the State's sovereign immunity can only be waived by a constitutional provision or an Act of the General Assembly that specifically provides for such waiver and the extent thereof Ga Const of 1983, Art I, Sec II, Par IX (e).” Ga Dep't of Cmty Health v Data Inquiry, LLC, explicitly excludes employees of private corporations and entities from the protection of sovereign immunity As a result of its error, the plurality opinion impermissibly expands the definition of a “State officer or employee” beyond its clear legislative intent “In construing a statute, the cardinal rule is to glean the intent of the legislature.” Alford v Pub Serv Comm’n, 262 Ga 386, 387, 418 S.E.2d 13 (1992) But this does not mean that a court may simply posit some legislative goal that was never intended and then make assumptions to promote that goal Rather, the legislature’s intent is to be discovered by first looking to the enacted text and then to the time-honored principles of statutory construction By failing to take this more disciplined approach, the plurality strayed widely from the text, context, history, and purpose of the Georgia Tort Claims Act The Petitioner’s interpretation, on the other hand, remains faithful to the enacted statutory language and the other objective indicia of legislative intent This Court should reverse the decision below and should hold that campus police officers not qualify as “State officers and employees” within the meaning of O.C.G.A § 50-21-22 (7) 313 Ga App 683, 685, 722 S.E.2d 403 (2012) (internal citations and punctuations omitted) i The statutory text of O.C.G.A § 50-21-22 (7), by its plain terms, conclusively refutes the plurality’s interpretation The General Assembly has instructed that “[i]n all interpretations of statutes, the courts shall look diligently for the intention of the General Assembly, keeping in view at all times the old law, the evil, and the remedy.” O.C.G.A § 1-3-1(a) Statutory terms are to be given their most natural meaning, taking into account the legislative context in which they are used Spalding County Bd of Elections v McCord, 287 Ga 835, 700 S.E.2d 558 (2010) “All statutes are presumed to be enacted with full knowledge of existing law and their meaning and effect is to be determined with reference to the constitution as well as other statutes and decisions of the courts.” Higdon v City of Senoia, 273 Ga 83, 86, 538 S.E.2d 39 (2000); accord Harris v State, 286 Ga 245, 247, 686 S.E.2d 777 (2009) “[D]efined words shall have the meanings specified, unless the context in which the word or term is used clearly requires that a different meaning be used.” O.C.G.A § 1-3-2 When construing statutes, this Court has held that we apply the fundamental rules of statutory construction that require us to construe the statute according to its terms, to give words their plain and ordinary meaning, and to avoid a construction that makes some language mere surplusage At the same time, we must seek to effectuate the intent of the legislature Currid v DeKalb State Court Prob Dep’t, 285 Ga 184, 187, 674 S.E.2d 894 (2009) (citation and punctuation omitted) 10 O.C.G.A § 50-21-22 (7) defines a “State officer or employee” in pertinent part as an officer or employee of the state, elected or appointed officials, law enforcement officers, and persons acting on behalf or in service of the state in any official capacity, whether with or without compensation Except as otherwise provided for in this paragraph, the term shall not include a corporation whether for profit or not for profit, or any private firm, business proprietorship, company, trust, partnership, association, or other such private entity (emphasis added) Here, the plain language of the GTCA demonstrates that a campus policeman who is an employee of a corporation or private entity like ASC does not fall within the parameters of a “State officer or employee.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines “employee” as “[a] person who works in the service of another person (the employer) under an express or implied contract of hire, under which the employer has the right to control the details of work performance.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1822 (9th ed 2009) Where the phrase “of the state” modifies “an officer or employee,” the plain language of the GTCA definition signifies that the legislature intended for the State of Georgia to have “the right to control the details of work performance” of the “State officer or employee” entitled to the protection of sovereign immunity Yet the State has no such right of control over the employees of private entities like the campus policemen Such right of control over the campus policemen belongs solely to their employer, ASC 11 ii The legislative intent, purpose, and history further refute the plurality’s interpretation of O.C.G.A § 50-21-22 (7) When it enacted the GTCA in 1992, the General Assembly provided for a limited abrogation of state sovereign immunity Charles N Kelley, Jr., TORTS Georgia Tort Claims Act: Provide a Limited Waiver of Sovereign Immunity, GA ST U L REV 349 (1992) The General Assembly explicitly stated in the GTCA that its legislative intent was to strike a balance between the inherently unfair and inequitable results which occur in the strict application of the traditional doctrine of sovereign immunity and the need to limit the exposure of the state treasury to tort liability Ga Forestry Comm v Canady, 280 Ga 825, 826, 634 S.E.2d 105 (2006) (citing O.C.G.A § 50-21-21 (a)) (internal punctuation omitted) The General Assembly recognized that “private entrepreneurs voluntarily choose the ambit of their activity and can thereby exert some control over their exposure to liability, [but] state government does not have the same flexibility.” O.C.G.A § 50-21-21(a) The express legislative intent to limit the exposure of the state treasury plainly establishes that the General Assembly did not intend for “private entrepreneurs” like ASC and its employees to be entitled to the benefit of sovereign immunity Indeed, it is telling that the plurality does not argue this case involved exposure of the State treasury to tort liability, because it cannot This case does not involve exposure of the State treasury to tort liability The campus 12 police officers are thus not immune from suit and not fall within the definition of a “State officer and employee” under the GTCA Yet in so forcing the definition of “State officer and employee” to include campus police officers, the plurality discounts the General Assembly’s express intent Further, the repercussions of the Court of Appeals’ decision are far-reaching and of grave importance In its expansion of the definition of employees who are entitled to sovereign immunity, the plurality has created a class of individuals entitled to immunity who are not subject to the supervision or control of the State of Georgia, or any of its agencies or departments, but who may now subject the State treasury to liability for Section 1983 claims.5 See Howard v Miller, 222 Ga Another far-reaching, and likely unintended consequence of the plurality’s inclusion of campus policemen as “state officers” is the potential for private entities like ASC to be held liable for Section 1983 claims In Smith v Germania of Am., plaintiffs brought a 42 U.S.C § 1983 claim against the owner and manager of an apartment complex for constitutional violations which occurred when police officers employed by the complex assaulted and arrested the plaintiffs without provocation 249 Ga App 587, 549 S.E.2d 423 (2001) The defendant employers filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that they are not “state actors” liable for Section 1983 claims Finding that “private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the prohibited action, are acting under color of law for purposes of the statute,” the Court of Appeals denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss Id at 590 The Smith Court further found that if the plaintiffs could prove “that the Germania defendants willingly participated in the officers’ actions because the officers acted under policies adopted by their employer,” then the plaintiffs “will have satisfied the requirement of state action” for purposes of a Section 1983 claim Id Indeed, by creating such a potential for liability under Section 1983 for private actors like ASC, the plurality in the case below has accomplished what it most fears the dissent would do: “create [] an incentive for private colleges and 13 App 868, 872, 476 S.E.2d 636 (1996) (acknowledging that 42 U.S.C § 1983 “gives a claim against a state officer individually for certain unconstitutional acts”) This goes against the very intent of the legislature in passing the GTCA See O.C.G.A § 50-21-21(a) By expanding the definition of a “State officer or employee” to include individuals employed by private entities, the plurality opinion fails to “effectuate the intent of the legislature,” which is to strike a balance between the inequitable results which occur in the strict application of sovereign immunity and the need to limit the exposure of the state treasury to tort liability See Currid, 285 Ga at 187 B In Construing the Campus Policemen Act with the GTCA, the Plurality Opinion Fails to Take the Entirety of the Campus Policemen Act into Consideration Under the Campus Policemen Act, a campus policeman is defined as an employee of an educational facility whose duties include the enforcement of the laws of this state; the preservation of the public order; the protection of life and property; the prevention, detection, or investigation of crime; or any combination thereof O.C.G.A § 20-8-1(2) Under the provision entitled “law enforcement powers,” a campus policeman employed by such educational facility who is certified [as a peace officer] and when authorized by the governing body or authority of such educational facility shall have the same law universities to disband their private police forces ” See Agnes Scott College, 321 Ga App at 80 14 enforcement powers, including the power of arrest, as a law enforcement officer of the local government with police jurisdiction over such campus O.C.G.A § 20-8-2 (emphasis added) i The statutory text of the Campus Policemen Act, by its plain terms, conclusively refutes the plurality’s interpretation The plurality seizes upon the fact that the Campus Policemen Act vests duly certified and authorized campus policemen with law enforcement powers as proof positive of “the General Assembly’s intent to include law enforcement officers employed by private colleges and universities within the definition of ‘State officers and employees’ who are granted immunity under the GTCA.” Agnes Scott College et al v Hartley, 321 Ga App 74, 77, 741 S.E 2d 199 (2013) In a conclusory fashion, the plurality equates the exercise of authorized law enforcement powers with “acting on behalf of or in service of the [S]tate in an [] official capacity.” Id The plurality concedes, however, that the jurisdiction of a campus policeman is restricted to the “campus”6 of an educational facility which has hired him, and Defined, in relevant part, as the grounds and buildings owned or occupied by a college or university [and] shall also include any public or private property within 500 yards of the property of an educational facility and one-quarter mile of any public street or public sidewalk connecting different buildings of the same educational facility when the property or buildings of the educational 15 not the State of Georgia Id Moreover, the pertinent language of the Act according law enforcement powers upon campus policemen specifically states that such employees only have the same law enforcement powers as local law enforcement officers “when authorized by the governing body or authority” of the educational facility which employs the campus policeman See O.C.G.A § 20-8-2 The plurality overlooked this salient portion of the Act in its opinion By its plain language, the Campus Policemen Act demonstrates the legislature’s intent that campus policemen remain under the supervision and authority of the educational facility which employs them, and not the State Consequently, campus policemen necessarily cannot be acting on behalf of or in service of the State in an official capacity ii The existing condition of the law when the GTCA was enacted further refutes the plurality’s construction of the Campus Policemen Act with the GTCA As this Court recently held, [t]he General Assembly is presumed to enact all statutes with full knowledge of the existing condition of the law and with reference to it The meaning and effect of a statute are to be determined in connection, not only with the common law and the Constitution, but also with reference to other statutes and decisions of the courts facility are located within any county in this state having a population of 400,000 or more O.C.G.A § 20-8-1(1) 16 Summerlin v Ga Pines Cmty Serv Bd., 286 Ga 593, 594, 690 S.E.2d 401 (2010) (citations and punctuation omitted) When the General Assembly enacted the GTCA in 1992, it was well aware of the common law definition of the term "employee," as well as definitions set forth by the Campus Policemen Act.7 But despite a number of revisions before the GTCA passed the House and the Senate, the legislature did not expressly delineate campus policemen anywhere in the Act as individuals entitled to sovereign immunity See Charles N Kelley, Jr., TORTS Georgia Tort Claims Act: Provide a Limited Waiver of Sovereign Immunity, GA ST U L REV 349, 351-352 (1992) Further, the phrase “[e]xcept as otherwise provided for in this paragraph” preceding the language excluding employees of private entities lends credence to the argument that such employees are not entitled to sovereign immunity If the legislature had indeed deemed it necessary to “provide for” the campus policemen employed by a corporation or private entity to be deemed State officers or employees, then they could have done so unequivocally in the language of the GTCA It did not The plurality opinion cites to the legislature’s prompt action in amending the Campus Policemen Act after the decision in Mercer University v Barrett & The Campus Policemen Act was passed in 1977 17 Farahany, LLP, 271 Ga App 501, 610 S.E.2d 138 (2005),8 as grounds for its assertion that the Respondents, “as campus law enforcement officers, are acting on behalf of the State when they investigate crimes and uphold the laws of this State.” See Agnes Scott College, 321 Ga App at 79 However, at the same time it amended the Act “to provide for disclosure of campus policemen’s records”, the General Assembly did not strike or amend the language providing that duly certified campus policemen are only vested with law enforcement powers “when authorized by the governing body or authority” of the educational facility which employs them (2006 Ga ALS 616) The legislature’s failure to so indicates that it amended the Campus Policemen Act in 2006 with a limited purpose in mind and nothing more In Barrett & Farahany, LLP, the Court of Appeals held that the mere fact that campus police officers are given authority to perform certain law enforcement functions under the Campus Policemen Act does not make them public officers or employees 271 Ga App at 502 In that case, a law firm sought records maintained by the Mercer University Police Department (“MUPD”) on the basis that they were “public records” subject to disclosure by the Georgia Open Records Act Id at 502 In support of their contention, the law firm argued that despite Mercer University’s status as a private institution and private employer, the Mercer campus police officers were public officials because they had been delegated public powers in the Campus Policemen Act Id at 502-503 Construing the Campus Policemen Act with the Open Records Act, the court found that “there is nothing in the plain and unambiguous language of the Open Records Act that supports such an outcome” and flatly rejected the law firm’s argument Id at 503 So too here There is nothing in the plain and unambiguous language of the GTCA that supports such an outcome that the plurality has reached in its misguided opinion 18 iii The plurality opinion ignores legal precedence finding that not every law enforcement officer is a “State officer or employee” entitled to the protection of sovereign immunity By equating the campus policemen’s exercise of authorized law enforcement powers with “acting on behalf of or in service of the [S]tate in an [] official capacity,” the plurality opinion ignores legal precedence finding that not every law enforcement officer exercising authorized law enforcement powers is entitled to the protection of sovereign immunity See Agnes Scott College, 321 Ga App at 77 In Nichols v Prather, a county sheriff and his employees claimed they were entitled to the protection of the GTCA because the sheriff’s department is a state agency or department 286 Ga App 889, 650 S.E.2d 380 (2007) The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that under the plain language of the Georgia Constitution9 and the GTCA,10 the local law enforcement officers were not state officers or employees Id at 892 The plurality incorrectly held that the Nichols case was inapplicable on the grounds that there “is no similar Constitutional or statutory basis for the exclusion of campus law enforcement officers from the GTCA’s provision of immunity.” See Agnes Scott College, 321 Ga App at 79 However, the plurality’s opinion ignores the very basis for the Nichols holding—that only in applying the rules of In particular, the Nichols court found that the Georgia Constitution effectively limited the jurisdiction of sheriffs to the county in which they were elected Id 10 The Nichols court found the GTCA’s definition of “State” to specifically exclude counties and “other units of local government.” Id 19 statutory construction did the Nichols court find that local law enforcement officers like a county sheriff and his employees were not entitled to the protections afforded by the GTCA Similarly here, an application of the rules of statutory construction to the GTCA and the Campus Policemen Act demonstrates that law enforcement officers like campus policemen are not entitled to the protection of sovereign immunity afforded by the GTCA In dismissing legal precedence illustrating that not every law enforcement officer exercising authorized law enforcement powers is entitled to the protection of sovereign immunity, the plurality opinion fails to apply the “cardinal rule” in the construction of legislative enactments Such rule requires that the meaning and effect of a statute are “to be determined in connection, not only with the common law and the Constitution, but also with reference to other statutes and decisions of the courts.” Summerlin, 286 Ga at 594 (emphasis added) CONCLUSION By ignoring the express statutory definitions in the GTCA and a significant portion of the Campus Policemen Act, the Court of Appeals’ construction disregards the well-established rule that “courts should construe a statute to give ‘sensible and intelligent effect’ to all of its provisions and should refrain, whenever possible, from construing the statute in a way that renders any part of it meaningless.” Sikes v State, 268 Ga 19, 21, 485 S.E.2d 206 (1997) If the 20 plurality was correct that a campus police officer exercising his law enforcement powers is a “State officer and employee,” then the very provision in the Campus Policemen Act granting a campus policeman his “law enforcement powers,” O.C.G.A § 20-8-2, would be rendered pointless And if the plurality was correct that a campus police officer qualifies as a “State officer and employee” under the GTCA, then the very provision in the GTCA expressing its intent and purpose to limit the “exposure of the state treasury to tort liability” would be rendered meaningless That is neither sensible nor intelligent For all of the foregoing reasons, Amanda Hartley respectfully requests that this Court HOLD that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the campus police officers in this case qualified as “State officers or employees” within the meaning of O.C.G.A § 50-21-22 (7) and REVERSE the plurality opinion of the Court of Appeals This the 29th day of September, 2013 Respectfully submitted, /s/ Lloyd N Bell _ LLOYD N BELL Georgia Bar No 048800 Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant BELL LAW FIRM 1201 Peachtree Street, NE, Suite 1900 Atlanta, GA 30361 (404) 249-6768 (tel) (404) 249-6764 (fax) 21 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this day served all counsel of record in the foregoing matter with Brief of Petitioner/Appellant using the SCED system which will automatically send an email notification of such filing to the attorneys of records and a true and correct copy via U.S Mail with sufficient postage to assure delivery to: David Ladner, Esq Brian Trulock, Esq Bendin, Sumrall & Ladner, LLC One Midtown Plaza, Suite 800 1360 Peachtree Street NE Atlanta, GA 30309 This the 29th day of September, 2013 /s/ Lloyd N Bell _ LLOYD N BELL Georgia Bar No 048800 Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant BELL LAW FIRM 1201 Peachtree Street, NE, Suite 1900 Atlanta, GA 30361 (404) 249-6768 (tel) (404 249-6764 (fax) 22