Notes 749 in cluding its seeds, on its ow n path The hinayána knowledge o f entities is bound by such cling ing because it lacks such realization and thus is not able to relinquish said clinging, including its seeds, on its ow n path The clinging to characteristics that is to be relinquished here is the m ental state o f grasping at conditioned phenom ena as being not dependent on anything else, but being autonom ous This clinging is tw ofold —its instances that are included in the afflictive obscurations consist o f the innate and imputational clinging to a personal identity Its instances that are included in the cognitive obscurations consist o f the coarse stains o f clinging to objects, which arise from the clinging to a phenom enal identity These stains can be divided in terms o f (1) the clinging itself and (2) its objects (1) Clinging is tw ofold—the clinging to characteristics that consists o f (a) clinging to substance and (b) clinging to imputations, (a) The clinging to substance corresponds to the clinging to identity that conceives o f the three spheres with regard to all phenom ena (subjects and objects) It is equivalent to the clinging to a p h enom enal identity and is twofold, (aa) The innate clinging to a phenomenal identity corresponds to mental states o f naturally clinging to subjects and objects as being really existent, without relying on any scriptures, reasonings, and so on (ab) The imputational clinging to a phenomenal identity cor responds to mental states o f clinging to subjects and objects by way o f exam ining and analyzing them on the basis o f seem ingly valid scriptures and reasonings, (b) The clinging to imputations corresponds to the conceptions that are cognitive obscurations and cling to subjects and objects as being mere imputations It is tw ofold—coarse and very subtle, (ba) The first one consists o f the clinging to characteristics and the conceptions that apprehend by conflating terms and referents, w h ich exist up through the seventh bhúmi (bb) The second one consists o f the very subtle clinging to objects as being mere im putations, which exists up through the subsequent attainment o f the tenth bhumi (2) In terms o f its objects, clinging to characteristics is three fold—clinging to (a) the ground, (b) the path, and (c) the fruition, (a) is the twofold clinging to characteristics with regard to the nature o f phen om en a and the bearers o f this nature at the time o f the ground, which is taught by AA III.3ab: The antagonistic factors are discrim inating notions about engaging In the skandhas (such as form) being em ptiness (b) The clinging to characteristics with regard to the path is taught by AA III.3d: And the factors o f enlightenm ent (such as generosity) (c) The clinging to characteristics with regard to the fruition is taught by AA III.4d: Thus, attachment to the victors and so on is subtle Therefore, through the AA explicitly teaching here the clinging to characteristics that binds, the hinayána knowledge o f entities that is bound by it is taught by implication As for the m anner in w h ich the rem edial knowledge o f entities relinquishes these forms o f clinging to characteristics as its factors to be relinquished, it is not that the remedial k n ow ledge o f entities and the entirety o f the clinging to characteristics are explained by way o f matching them as the rem edy and its factors to be relinquished because mental states o f clinging to characteristics are not necessarily associated directly with the remedies that overcom e them Therefore, the w isdom o f noble bod hisattvas o f directly realizing the lack o f characteristics directly relinquishes the obscurations in the m ind streams o f these bodhisattvas For through directly canceling out the seeds o f clinging to characteristics in said m ind streams, it indirectly overcom es the m anifest forms o f this cling ing MPZL (pp -9 ) divides the factors to be relinquished here into the clinging to entities as (real) phenomena, which consist o f the two realities, and the clinging to entities as a person who engages in the practices o f the path Implicitly, in the latter clinging, the discriminating n otions o f clinging to the practices as the remedies for the clinging to a person w ho practices them are included as factors to be relinquished too Though there appear to be different sys tems o f saying that this clinging to a person exists only in šrávakas and pratyekabuddhas, what 750 Groundless Paths appears as the intention o f the AA and its com mentaries is as follows Said clinging does exist in the m ind streams o f ¿ravakas and pratyekabuddhas in general, but it is also associated with the mind streams o f bodhisattvas in the manner o f a factor to be relinquished and, up through the seventh bhumi, som etim es they even have manifest forms o f clinging to characteristics After the seventh bhumi, the relinquishm ent o f the clinging to a person is com pleted, w hile the relin quishm ent o f the clinging to phenom ena is com pleted at the end o f the continuum 499 The Sanskrit prayogamarga and the Tibetan sb yo r lam can mean “path o f training,” “path o f preparation,” or “path o f connecting.” 500 This and the following quotes are found on pp -5 in CZ 501 P 425 502 These tw o term s are explicitly used by LSSP (fol 394a.2) 503 LSSP (fol 4a.6-394 b l) adds the following: “Conceived form —the other-dependent [nature]—is the basis for analyzing said being com plete or incomplete Therefore, it is not that it is not taught here because it is (a) the basis for the superim positions that are the imaginary nature and (b) what bears the nature o f the perfect [nature] This principle is to be applied to [everything] up through the knowledge o f all aspects In brief, if one does not cling to form and so on as being the three natures, one engages in the m other.” PGSD (pp 19 2-9 3) defines the imaginary nature as “the phenom ena that are the mere seem ing appearances which not per form a function.” It is twofold—the imaginary w ithout any characteristics (such as the horns o f a rabbit) and the nominal imaginary (everything that is permanent and is not ultimate reality) The definition o f the other-dependent nature is “dependently originating phenom ena, w hich arise from their specific causes and conditions.” It is tw ofold —the pure other-dependent cor responds to the subsequent attainments in the m ind streams o f noble ones and the impure one, to samsara The definition o f the perfect nature is “the true reality that is the primary object o f the valid cognition o f a reasoning consciousness.” It is tw ofold—the unmistaken perfect nature corresponds to the meditative equipoises in the m ind streams o f noble ones and the unchanging one, to the nature o f phenomena In brief, the three natures are contained in the two realities because the perfect nature is presented as ultimate reality and the other-dependent and imaginary natures, as seeming reality in terms o f being and not being able, respectively, to perform a fun c tion The three natures are presented as being definitely three in terms o f their objects because they are respectively presented in term s o f the objects o f the m inds o f ordinary beings, the sub sequent attainments o f noble ones, and the meditative equipoises o f the latter Their order is as given in Mahdydnasutralamkara XVIII.80ab (“For the sake o f fully know ing, relinquishing, and directly perceiving ”) The three natures bear their names because they respectively are mere conceptual superim positions, are dependent on other causes and conditions, and are perfect as the basic nature o f objects Their scriptural source in the prajnaparamita sutras is the Maitreya Chapter in the sutra in twenty-five thousand lines, which speaks o f imaginary form, conceived form, and the form o f the nature o f phenomena MCG (fol 77a.5-77b.2) explains that imagi nary form means that form and so on are incom plete as the foundation o f qualities, which refers to the perception o f form by ordinary beings That is, no matter how much they focus on forms as being forms by w ay o f clinging to these forms w hile they are appearing in a dualistic manner, the qualities o f the path are not produced The form o f the nature o f phenom ena is the perfect nature empty o f a real other-dependent nature, which refers to the subsequent attainments of noble ones If they focus on this form that is specified by lacking a nature o f its own, they see it as illusionlike and therefore the qualities o f the path are produced in a complete manner SCG (fol 69b.2-5) quotes the Aloka (p 47): “Imaginary form consists o f the im putations in the m an ner o f apprehender and apprehended Since ceived form is false im agination, it is this very cognition that appears like [apprehender and apprehended] As for the form o f the nature o f phenomena, in true reality form itself is perfect as the nature o f em ptiness Feelings and so on Notes 751 are to be described in the sam e way.” Thus, the first one is labeled as the em ptiness o f charac teristics and the last one possesses the collection o f qualities and represents the true nature o f phenom ena Therefore, they are incom plete and com plete, respectively MPZL (p 98) says that, though there appear m any ways o f explaining the m eaning o f “incom plete and com plete” (such as referring to im aginary form and perfect form, or the forms o f children and old people), the prajnaparamita sutra in twenty-five thousand lines generally speaks o f the above-m entioned three kinds o f form As for their meanings, the intention o f the AA is that im aginary form refers to form being perm anent and so on as im puted by the tirthikas, which are not the distinctive features o f form Conceived form and the form o f the nature o f phenom ena are discussed in the AA by way o f the trainings that stop engaging in clinging to the com m o n and u n com m o n characteristics, respectively, o f form and so on 504 N ote that “smaller and larger Brhattikan refers to the number o f prajnaparamita sutras on w hich D3807 and D3808 respectively com m ent, but not to the size o f these texts (in fact, D3807 is twice as lo n g as D3808) 505 D3795, fol 266a 1-2 506 PGSD (pp 191-92) defines the explicitly taught trainings in the knowledge o f entities as “the practices o f familiarizing with either o f the tw o types o f identitylessness.” The defini tion o f the mahayana trainings in the k n ow ledge o f entities is “the yogas o f bodhisattvas that are cultivated by way o f respectively stopping the clinging to real existence with regard to ten objects, such as form ” The first four am ong these ten trainings are called “the natural trainings” because they exist in an on go in g manner from the path o f accum ulation up through the end o f the continuum The rem aining six are “the temporary trainings” because they are o n ly cultivated if their respectively corresponding flaws arise, but need not be cultivated if these flaws not arise The definition o f the implicitly taught hlnayana trainings in the knowledge o f entities is “the hlnayana practices o f familiarizing with entities as being without a personal identity.” They consist o f the four hlnayana paths o f learning 507 CZ, p 305 508 D3807, vol pa, fol 55b.2-4 509 D 3808, fol 202b.2 510 D 3791, fol 172a.3-4 511 LSSP/PSD have rgyu mtshan (“cau se”), but the Aloka has mtshan m a (“characteristics”), both being translations o f Skt n im itta, which has both these meanings However, th e context in all com m entaries clearly suggests that the latter is meant here 512 PGSD (fol 192) defines the equality o f the trainings in the k n ow led ge o f entities as “the yoga o f bodhisattvas o f familiarizing with the trainings (the subject) and the objects o f these trainings as being equality in that they lack real existence.” This equality is fourfold in terms o f training in stop p in g clin gin g to real existence w ith regard to the nature o f form and so on, its distinctive features, the elaborations o f its divisions, and the trainings themselves as the cogn iz ing subjects 513 CZ, p 457 514 D3787, fol 118b.4-6 515 PGSD (p 194) says that, in the context o f the knowledge o f entities, there is a reason for explicitly teaching the mahayana path o f seeing o f directly and new ly realizing personal identitylessness because bodhisattvas must directly realize personal identitylessness in order to take care o f those to be guided who have the ¿ravaka disposition There is also a reason for not explicitly teaching the mahayana path of familiarization of familiarizing with the personal 752 Groundless Paths identitylessness that was realized already because noble bodhisattvas not strive for the frui tions o f the hinayána, such as the relinquishment o f the clinging to a personal identity SZB (pp 31 8-1 9) says that the reason for not teaching the maháyána path o f familiarization here is not because bodhisattvas not familiarize with the already seen types o f realization o f árávakas and pratyekabuddhas Rather, they not familiarize with the limited types o f realization o f árávakas and pratyekabuddhas in the first place, but only with the u n com m on types o f realiza tion o f the maháyána k now ledge o f entities, which is free from the thirty-tw o superim positions and is understood implicitly by virtue o f the know ledge o f the path In general, the realization o f all entities lacking a personal identity is only divided into three (the types o f realization o f noble árávakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas) by virtue o f the m anner o f realizing the k nowledge o f entities being com plete or incomplete, but not by virtue o f the k now ledge o f the path being com plete or incom plete because the know ledge o f the path does not exist at all in árávakas and pratyekabuddhas 516 This and the following two quotes are found o n pp -10 i n CZ 517 Except for a few words here and there, the following three paragraphs, which summarize and further explain the m eaning o f the above three quotes, are not found in LSSP However, each o f these paragraphs in PSD is in quotation marks, so that they cannot be considered as Patrul Rinpoches own explanations either 518 CZ, pp 312-17 519 PGSD (pp 200-203) says that bodhisattvas need to know all p h en om en a through study ing and reflecting because they must practice them in the manner o f their lacking real existence Thus, the definition o f the aspects o f the com plete training in all aspects is “the phenom ena with which bodhisattvas familiarize as lacking real existence.” These aspects consist o f (1) the refer ent aspects and (2) the cognitive aspects (1) The definition o f referent aspects is “the aspects to be familiarized with that are the objects to be realized by the cognitive aspects.” Their instances consist o f all phenom ena and they are divided into the referent aspects o f the three knowledges (2) The definition o f cognitive aspects is “the aspects to be familiarized with that are the aware nesses which apprehend their specific referent aspects.” Their instances consist o f all cognitions and they are divided into (a) the cognitive aspects that are antagonistic factors and (b) those that are remedies, (a) The definition o f the first is “the cognitive aspects that are to be absolutely rejected by persons who strive for liberation.” Their instances correspond to the clinging to a personal identity and the clinging to a phenom enal identity, (b) The definition o f remedial cognitive aspects is “the cognitive aspects that are to be relied on in the m ind streams o f persons who strive for liberation.” Their instances consist o f all paths to liberation and they are divided into the aspects o f the three knowledges As for the manner o f familiarizing with these aspects, to ascertain that all phenom ena lack real existence and then to properly familiarize with this actuality represent the progressive stages o f familiarization in terms o f m entally engaging in the topic o f the essence (emptiness) To practice the clear realizations (the subjects) and emptiness (the object) by w ay o f their being a unity represents the progressive stages o f familiarization in terms o f m entally engaging in the topic o f the clear realizations These two are not mutually exclusive because a single mental state is able to simultaneously practice both the subject (a clear realization) and the object (emptiness) The manner o f familiarizing with the aspects is fourfold The familiarization by way o f the aspect o f the nature, just as it is, refers to familiarizing by way o f generating the phenom ena to be familiarized with from the perspective o f the mental states that familiarize with them (for example, the cultivation o f the four foundations o f m indfulness on the path o f accumulation) The familiarization by way o f the aspect o f approximate concor dance refers to familiarizing with the focal objects and aspects that are approximately concordant with the actual ones to be familiarized with (for example, m entally engaging in the focal objects and aspects o f the path o f preparation on the path o f accumulation) The familiarization by Notes 753 way o f th e aspect o f approximately engaging in characteristics refers to approximately engag ing in the characteristics o f higher factors to be attained (for example, m entally engaging in the general and specific characteristics o f the paths o f noble ones on the path o f accumulation) The familiarization by w ay o f the aspect o f aspiration refers to mentally engaging through the m otivation o f w ishing to attain a special fruition (for exam ple, familiarizing with the knowledge o f all aspects on the path o f accumulation) It may be said that it is not justified to familiarize with the knowledge o f all aspects on the path o f accum ulation because said knowledge does not exist on that path However, there is no flaw because though there is no familiarization with this knowledge in terms o f its nature, just as it is, on said path, this path does possess the familiariza tions with the k n ow led ge o f all aspects by w ay o f the aspects o f approximate concordance and aspiration As for the aspects that are explicitly taught in the brief introductions and the detailed explanations in both the sutras and the AA, they are necessarily cognitive aspects For AA IV speaks o f “aspects” as the specific instances o f w isd om and Haribhadra’s Aloka (D3791, fol 176a.3-4) and Vivrti (D3793, fol 104b.3-4) define them as the rem edies for antagonistic factors Thus, also the detailed explanations must explicate just this In brief, the aspects that are taught here are tw ofold— the three knowledges (the subjects) and the four realities (the objects) The first represent the cognitive aspects that are the primary ones to be taught explicitly, while the second represent the referent aspects that are taught in an implicit manner Thus, the mahayana path o f seeing represents a remedial cognitive aspect because it is the wisdom that, by way o f directly realizing the basic nature o f the four realities, functions as the rem ed y for the antago nistic factors to be relinquished MCG (fols 81b.3-82a.2 and b -9 a l) says that “aspects” refers to cultivating, in the m anner o f prajna and m eans being in union, the 173 w isd om s that are the rem edies for m istaken superim positions onto the phenom ena o f entities, the path, and all aspects However, there is no need for any disputes about cognitive aspects and referent aspects because both are just divisions in terms o f isolates In general, “referent aspects” are the aspects o f the objects and “cognitive aspects,” the modes o f apprehension o f their subjects Therefore, ultimately, they exist in an inseparable manner H owever, in terms o f classifying all aspects in terms o f the three k now ledges from the perspective o f subject and object, the aspects o f the know led ge o f entities and the knowledge o f the path are taught from the point o f view o f being referent aspects and the aspects o f the k n ow ledge o f all aspects, from the point o f view o f being cognitive aspects T hough these 173 aspects o f the three knowledges are all n othing but prajnaparamita, which overcom es the antagonistic factor o f clinging to characteristics and is free from the triad o f arising, abiding, and ceasing, in terms o f the m anner o f cultivating them they are for the sake o f realizing the threefold nonarising (o f the three knowledges) and also apply to all four trainings Therefore, they are cultivated successively in one swoop The reason for this is that they not consist o f just a part o f the vast num ber o f all aspects o f the path, but represent their entirety without any incom pleteness For though they are all o f one taste in being em ptiness, the vast m eans o f the path need to be com plete too (such as the need for generating bodhicitta) To cultivate the com plete training in all aspects on the path o f accum ulation repre sents the rem edy that invalidates the factors to be relinquished through seeing; the culm inating training o f the path o f preparation, a part o f the remedy that relinquishes said factors; and the serial training, their distancing remedy SZB (pp 3 -3 ) says that the explicit statements in the sutras m ostly teach the referent aspects in an explicit m anner and the cognitive aspects as the hidden m eaning The explicit statements in the AA, w hen dividing the aspects in terms o f the three knowledges (as in IV 1), teach the cognitive aspects explicitly and the referent aspects merely implicitly 520 PGSD (pp 201 and -4 ) defines the aspects o f the knowledge o f entities as “the w isd om s o f directly realizing the basic nature o f the four realities as being personal identity lessness.” As for the three paths described above, the definition o f the uncontam inated path that serves as the rem edy for the afflictive obscurations is “the type o f hlnayana realization that ... characteristics o f the paths o f noble ones on the path o f accumulation) The familiarization by w ay o f the aspect o f aspiration refers to mentally engaging through the m otivation o f w ishing to attain... and conditions.” It is tw ofold ? ?the pure other-dependent cor responds to the subsequent attainments in the m ind streams o f noble ones and the impure one, to samsara The definition o f the. .. illusionlike and therefore the qualities o f the path are produced in a complete manner SCG (fol 69b.2-5) quotes the Aloka (p 47): “Imaginary form consists o f the im putations in the m an ner o