8 INTENTIONALITY From Brentano to representationalism Michelle Montague 1. Introduction In this chapter, I want to say something about the role played by Franz Brentano (1838–1917) in bringing the topic of intentionality to the forefront of philosophical attention in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries The time period this chapter covers is substantial, and I will only be able to discuss a limited number of issues and philosophers I will only gesture at Brentano’s influence on the continental tradition, although one of the most remarkable features of his philosophy is precisely the extent of its influence on both the continental and analytic philosophical traditions.1 I will focus on three works: the first edition of Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint, published in 1874 (‘Psychology’); the Appendix of supplementary remarks that accompanied the republication of Book Two of Psychology in 1911 (‘the Appendix’); and certain essays from his Nachlass published in 1924 These works are collected in an English translation published in 1973 and 1995 with the title Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint.2 Brentano’s theory of mind is wide reaching and complex It covers such topics as the unity of consciousness, the fundamental classification of mental phenomena, and the role of emotions in our knowledge of value – in addition to offering theories of intentionality and consciousness Here I will focus on only two of Brentano’s central claims, and I will state them using the term ‘intentionality’, although Brentano never used this noun himself [1] Intentionality is the mark of the mental; all and only mental phenomena are intentional.3 [2] Consciousness and intentionality are constitutively related, and cannot be treated in isolation from one another [1] is undoubtedly what Brentano is best known for in present-day analytic philosophy In his Psychology he characterized mental phenomena in terms of ‘objectdirectedness’, and it is this that we have come to call ‘intentionality’ But we need 200