INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME identity in Chapter 6 becomes particularly relevant: Would such a migration constitute survival? Here again, Schneider and Mandik suggest ways that philosophy of mind can help people of the late 21st century make sense of the decisions with which they will be confronted Finally, consider also the challenges that lie ahead as we confront the possibility of AI consciousness Analogous to what’s often referred to as the hard problem of consciousness (see Crane’s discussion in Chapter 3) is the hard problem of AI consciousness, a problem that concerns how we determine whether there is something that it is like to be an AI system Do such systems really feel pain when they are damaged? Can they experience suffering? The need to make progress on such questions seems particularly pressing when we recognize the ethical obligations we have to creatures that have the capacity to suffer In a sense, Schneider and Mandik’s chapter – a chapter that concludes not only this volume but also all six volumes of this series on philosophy of mind – serves as a vindication of the discipline itself As they convincingly argue, the problems that lie ahead are problems that philosophy of mind is distinctively qualified to address While scientists and artificial intelligence researchers will develop the coming technologies, philosophers of mind will be needed to help understand and assess the implications such technologies present In doing so, future philosophers will have a very long and fruitful history upon which to draw Notes These findings would later be corroborated in the 20th century; see Damasio et al (1994) For a useful survey of the advances made in neural imaging techniques in the second half of the 20th century, see Savoy (2001) In particular, this article provides a helpful and relatively accessible overview of techniques such as PET, MRI, and fMRI They take the publication of Patricia Churchland’s Neurophilosophy (1986) to be the turning point Alternatively, one might see philosophers’ use of “c-fiber” as explicitly serving a placeholder function See the discussion in Chapter 2 As of this writing in 2016, Google scholar lists this paper as having been cited more than 8400 times (For comparison, J.J.C Smart’s influential paper “Sensations and Brain Processes,” published in Philosophical Review in 1959, is listed as having been cited just over 1300 times.) All four of these elements of Turing’s work are discussed in the papers collected in Millican and Clark (1996) Indeed, programs like Siri are referred to as “intelligent personal assistants.” It’s worth noting that, having made this assessment, Whitby goes on to argue that focus on the Turing test eventually became a distraction from other promising avenues of AI research Wittgenstein (1967; 1980) explicitly addressed the notion of Turing machines Bibliography Anderson, Alan (ed.) (1964) Minds and Machines Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall Bickle, John, Mandik, Peter and Landreth, Anthony (2012) “The Philosophy of Neuroscience,” in Zalta, Edward N (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2012 Edition) http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/neuroscience/ 19