I ntrospecting in the th century just as certainly, introspection may be as impersonal, as objective, as matter-of-fact, as is the observation of the natural sciences (Titchener 1912b, 434) In response to the kind of worries that had led Wundt to regard inner perception as the only source of legitimate data (which still needed to be manipulated appropriately with the help of various experimental set-ups), Titchener took a more sanguine approach He argued that these worries concern a former use of introspection in psychology, which is ‘precritical, pre-comparative and preexperimental’ (435) It involved introspective judgements that were infected by theoretical bias and the aim for metaphysical systematization However, Titchener maintained, the mature psychology of his day used introspection differently For example, in the case of introspective disagreement, a regimented and repeated application of the experimental introspective method could be relied upon to eradicate biased and confused reports Psychology is not the only science in which the strict application of the best available methods leads to opposite conclusions But is there the same hope, in psychology, that differences will presently be resolved? I see no reason for any but an affirmative answer (. . .) A more methodical series of observations, with variation of conditions, would either bring two observers into agreement or would give us the key to their disagreement (437) This echoes James’s insistence that introspective observation is just like any other form of scientific observation – fallible and subject to disagreement Titchener also emphasizes the role of agreement about introspective data in ensuring that the introspective data passes scientific muster More generally, the various ways in which the new generation of introspectionist psychologists conceived of their work constituted a rapprochement of sorts with the non-experimentalist British empiricist tradition and their use of introspection One loosening of Wundtian restraint concerned the proper scope of introspective method Külpe’s Würzburg laboratory, for example, specifically aimed to investigate conscious thought, judgement, emotions and thought’s relation to action (see the work of e.g Karl Marbe, Karl Bühler, Otto Selz, and Narziss Kaspar Ach) Titchener, too, endorsed a much larger domain of investigation, including memory and mental processes more generally (Titchener 1912b, 427–428) More importantly, and correlatively, the other substantial loosening of constraint concerned the kind of introspective access harnessed in psychology, i.e the proper method of investigation The new generation accepted retrospection as a central introspective method, along the lines of James and Mill (see, e.g., (Bühler 1908, 100–101; Külpe 1920; Müller 1911; Titchener 1912c)) Typically, they accepted both, use of a more direct introspective awareness along the lines of inner perception, as well 161