A my K ind from one another for much of the second half of the century – proved to be a departure from Brentano’s own thinking about intentionality In the final decades of the 20th century (and continuing now in these early years of the 21st century), an increasing skepticism about and then rejection of separatism brought philosophers of mind back to something closer Brentano’s own treatment of intentionality In the final section of her chapter, Montague discusses contemporary theories of consciousness such as representationalism, higher-order theories, “consciousness first” views, and the phenomenal intentionality program (Here Montague’s discussion connects nicely with Crane’s discussion of these theories in Chapter 3.) In the course of this discussion, she shows how such theories do – and not – succeed in recapturing Brentano’s original insights about intentionality Much as Chapter serves as a chapter on the work and subsequent legacy of a towering figure in late 19th- and early 20th-century philosophy, Chapter 9 serves as a chapter on the work and subsequent legacy of a towering figure in early and mid-20th-century philosophy In this chapter, Severin Schroeder focuses on Ludwig Wittgenstein, particularly on his criticism of Cartesian dualism and the various misunderstandings that attend it Because it is difficult to understand these criticisms unless one understands Wittgenstein’s distinctive approach to philosophy, Schroeder begins his discussion with an introduction to Wittgenstein’s overall methodology The chapter then ends with a discussion of Wittgenstein’s influence on subsequent philosophy of mind, an influence that has been particularly prominent in the development of functionalist views (For more on functionalism, see Chapter 2.) Wittgenstein’s anti-Cartesianism is particularly evident in his trenchant criticisms of the inner-object model – a model according to which thoughts and feelings are taken to be mental objects analogous to physical objects such as rocks and tables In the course of this chapter, Schroeder aims to elucidate Wittgenstein’s attempts to show the problematic consequences of the inner-object model with respect to sensations and other minds, understanding, thinking, and voluntary action Consider, for example, Wittgenstein’s famous private-language argument Here Wittgenstein targets the assumption that sensations and other mental states are private, inner objects, inaccessible to others; his general strategy is to show that this assumption leads to absurd consequences – consequences such as the problem of other minds, i.e., our inability to have any way of knowing what others think and feel (and even if they think and feel), or the problem of communication, i.e., our inability to communicate anything about our thoughts and feelings to anyone else Schroeder reconstructs in detail four of Wittgenstein’s principal objections to the inner-object view of sensations Likewise, in his discussion of Wittgenstein’s attack on the inner-object view of voluntary action, a view presupposed not only by Descartes but also by British Empiricists such as John Locke, Schroeder differentiates three different objections posed by Wittgenstein Though the details differ, all three of these objections aim to show that words like “willing” not pick out some distinctive mental occurrence that either precedes or accompanies a movement and thereby makes it a voluntary one 16