Appeasement the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) A more important test occurred when Adolf Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland in 1936 The Western democracies did nothing: appeasement was habitual by then, and there was no public appetite for armed confrontation of the dictators Appeasement was becoming the only alternative to a general European war, which the Western Allies did not want and for which they were not ready economically, politically, or militarily The policy of seeking local settlements with Hitler at the expense of smaller powers culminated in surrender of the Sudetenland to Germany at the Munich Conference in September 1938 Hitler expected more opposition from the Western democracies than he encountered The British initially viewed the settlement as a great diplomatic success that averted a European war Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain regarded it as a personal and political triumph In fact, Hitler was always unappeasable He wanted war and was taken aback and disgusted by the Munich settlement Munich also discouraged Joseph Stalin from seeking a deal with the West for the Soviet Union to deter Germany and Japan The great dictator of the east instead sought a separate peace with Hitler, while opposing Japan with demonstrations of Red Army strength in 1938 and again at Nomonhan in 1939 The shift in the East Asia Squadron led to the Nazi–Soviet Pact (August 23, 1939), which divided eastern and central Europe between the Nazi and Soviet empires and cleared the way for a joint invasion of Poland in September Appeasement of Italy by the western powers predated and outlasted appeasement of Germany The French view was somewhat different than the British The French concurred in early British appeasement of Italy in response to Benito Mussolini’s bullying campaign leading into the invasion of Abyssinia, but Paris was not always subservient to London when it came to Mediterranean policy Admiral Jean Louis Darlan, among others, pressed for a much stronger response to Italian aggression and ambition for empire Other French leaders cleaved to Chamberlain’s side of the argument, fearing to lose the only major ally France had left That ensured continued division and debate inside the French government through the Munich crisis and throughout the nine months of the Phoney War Disputes within the Western Allied camp were shrewdly aggravated by Mussolini Chamberlain was convinced until May 1940 that appeasement of Mussolini was both necessary and possible His policy was demonstrated to be a total failure when Italy attacked France on June 10, 1940, with the German FALL GELB campaign already effectively decided Chamberlain even then personally thought that Italy might be lured out of alliance with Germany That extraordinary view was based on overestimation of Italy’s real military power and potential by British analysts, and on utter misreading by British diplomats of Mussolini’s true intentions and worldview The worst misunderstandings were communicated to London by the British ambassador in Rome, Sir Percy Loraine Policy toward Italy was also shaped by wishful thinking born of a rising sense of strategic desperation during the late 1930s: the Western Allies feared to face Italy and Germany in war at the same time Upon the defeat of France and withdrawal of the French Navy from the Allied order of battle, the Royal Navy was indeed stretched thin against the Kriegsmarine in the North Sea and North 63