Stalingrad, Battle of (September 5, 1942–January 31, 1943) first angry signs of a “sniping movement” emerged spontaneously; and a newfound defiance-unto-death was seen among Russians whose boots were already dipping in the Volga, who thus had no place to go but toward the enemy or into a shallow grave Soviet forces had been pushed back through the western suburbs, until their backs were literally against the river They formed dense pockets of resistance in places holding just 200 yards from the riverbank Fighting was street-to-street and house-to-house, then room-to-room and hand-to-hand It coursed into cellars, drove through walls, climbed staircases with one side on the main floor and an enemy squad on the second It poured under the city into labyrinthine, mortally contested sewers whose dark and fi lthy bends made flamethrowers, grenades, and knives the most effective weapons Soviet companies broke into micro-units, or “storm groups,” and went out to hunt Germans Men descended into starving, frightened, enraged troglodytes, intent on smashing, burning, and gnawing each other to death in what Germans called “der Rattenkrieg” (“war of the rats”) The second crisis of the battle arrived on October 14 It began with heavy fighting to defend the “Orlovka salient,” where the defenders would be reduced to just 500 men after a week of combat Chuikov’s desperate request to evacuate his Army HQ to the east bank of the Volga was refused by the Stavka, even as the Stalingrad commander prepared to call down heavy artillery on his own position should the Germans reach it—they were only two city blocks away The German assault breached the Tractor Factory to reach the river It thereby broke 62nd Army into two isolated pieces It also reduced its supply operation to a single ferry crossing and a pontoon bridge behind the Red October Factory Still the defenders held They shouted a new fighting slogan: “there is no land for us beyond the Volga,” and fought back With belated reinforcements arriving in the form of 138th Division, finally sent across the river by the Stavka, the survivors of 62nd Army held on to a few broken positions on the west bank Then they formed storm groups and retook several key buildings in the days that followed Logistics emerged as the decisive factor as the tide of fighting slowly turned in favor of the Soviets despite the desperate fighting situation inside the city in late October During the battle viewed as a whole, the Red Army had much shorter lines of supply It had the extraordinary problem of having to carry everything— men, munitions, and all war matériel—across the Volga by barge and ferry while under direct and intense fire from Germans on the western bank It had to move supplies under constant Luftwaffe strafing and bombing Most crossings were carried out by night, though several truly desperate daylight crossings were made that incurred very heavy casualties The Germans were also brought under heavy attritional fire from late September as the Soviets massed all available heavy artillery on the eastern bank of the Volga, retaining only mortars and anti-tank guns on the western bank The river’s wide waters thus impeded Soviet resupply but prevented the Germans from crossing in force to outflank the last defenders, as was done earlier at Rostov-on-the-Don While Chuikov’s 62nd Army fought desperately to keep a toehold in the northern sections of the city three other armies from Stalingrad Front, headed by General Andrei Yeremenko, massed south of the city Another three armies of Don Front, 1036