Franco, Francisco (1892–1975) broken and Great Britain seemingly teetering on the edge, Hitler did not see much to be gained for Germany by allowing another hyena to feed off the carcass of his French kill: he was already contending with Mussolini’s uninvited entry into the battle for France on June 10, and with Joseph Stalin taking the opportunity to move against Rumania and other eastern states From then until December 1940, Franco was willing and eager to join the Axis for ideological and opportunistic imperial reasons But he was much too skillful to make Mussolini’s grave error of going to war alongside Hitler without prior assurances of territorial and other gains, or the likelihood that these could be held onto in the long term Franco therefore kept Spain out of war, while awaiting a more opportune entry point During 1941 and 1942 he retreated from the prospect of belligerency without finally rejecting it, and allowed fascist volunteers to fight on the Eastern Front against the Soviet Union under auspices of the Blue Division He cooperated with Axis intelligence and sabotage projects, but not to the point of provoking major British or American retaliation against exposed Spanish interests He was especially sensitive to the possibility that the Western Allies would seize the Canary Islands Franco met Hitler only once, at Hendaye on the Spanish border on October 23, 1940 Their meeting became subject to much later mythologizing by Franco’s admirers, who claimed he outwitted the Führer and most cleverly kept Spain out of the war In fact, Franco pledged to enter the war, but once again no specific date was set Franco bored Hitler to frustration with endless chatter about minor issues, especially about Moroccan history and Spain’s rightful claim to that African colony They discussed plans to jointly seize Gibraltar and settled the outline of the Hendaye protocol committing Spain to join Germany’s war at some future date Shortly thereafter, Franco told his generals to prepare plans to invade Portugal Neither war came about, as Spain instead retreated into a claim of unreadiness by December 1940 Franco left the meeting still remarkably naïve about Hitler and the likely future for Spain in a Europe dominated by Nazi Germany He viewed the “Third Reich” mainly as a source of technical, military, and economic aid for Spain, not as any kind of threat as a dangerous hegemon if left unchallenged by other major powers He never understood that Hitler and other top Nazis viewed Spain as a neocolonial source of raw materials and cheap labor, not as a strong country they would help lift into conservative modernity as Franco wished Franco’s fellow dictator in Portugal, Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, did not share such naïvete or false optimism about future Iberian life inside a German-occupied Europe The crest of Spanish collaboration with Nazi Germany was reached over the two years that followed the Hendaye meeting, without Spain ever entering the war but with Franco still looking to so if he could negotiate the right price A real shift in Spanish–German relations did not occur until the tide of battle turned against Italy and Germany at El Alamein and Stalingrad The TORCH landings in North Africa in November 1942 then persuaded Franco and other Spanish leaders to stay out of the war From 1943 to 1945, Franco deflected Hitler’s repeated request that Spain enter the European war, having decided that would be imprudent as the tide of 405