Sho-Gō Huge orders were placed in North America shipyards from 1940 Canadian shipyards expanded dramatically in production rates and size of warships and cargo ships produced, as the British placed orders and financed whole new shipyards in Canada and even in the United States By 1942 U.S shipyards alone turned out 19 million GRT, vastly more than even a peak U-boat fleet could sink The defeat of France in 1940 permitted demobilized skilled workers to return to German shipyards from the Wehrmacht, but the invasion of the Soviet Union a year later pulled many back into uniform The Kriegsmarine had 14 shipyards turning out 238 U-boats in 1942 However, other yards were still devoted to working on capital ships whose hulls were first laid down under the outdated Z-Plan It was not until January 1943, that all German shipbuilding was urgently switched to U-boat construction A lot of German yard work was done in the open air, with yards, ships, and workers exposed to bombing Nevertheless, U-boat construction and launchings peaked in 1943 and 1944 See also anti-submarine warfare; Atlantic, Battle of; Liberty Ships SHLISSELBURG CORRIDOR See Leningrad, siege of; Siniavino offensive operation; SPARK SHOAH See Holocaust SHOCK ARMY A Soviet combined arms army built around a core infantry army that had proven itself in battle, which was then reinforced with additional artillery and special assault units Although not incapable of effective counterattack, Red Army formations at the start of the German–Soviet war were wholly unready to carry out the deep counteroffensive penetrations called for in Moscow’s operational doctrine Five Shock Armies were therefore created in the 18 months following initiation of major Red Army reforms, begun in the midst of the disaster of BARBAROSSA in July 1941 They were a direct response to discovery under fire that existing formations were unwieldy and immobile Shock Armies were used to overwhelm tough German resistance in the first stages of offensive or counteroffensive operations, opening a way for follow-on attack and exploitation by regular armies ¯ “Victory Operation.” Japanese code for a planned, last-ditch decisive SHO-GO battle for the home islands in 1944–1945 The core idea was to delay the American advance across the Pacific by inflicting maximum attrition of any forces that landed on the Philippines, Taiwan, the Kurils, or the Ryukyus The plan reflected lingering delusions within Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo that the Western Allies might be persuaded to negotiate a compromise peace, or at least permit Japan to retain the Kokutai principle and system If that ploy failed, an outer hard defense would at least provide time to prepare for a catastrophically bloody battle for the home islands, again with the idea of compelling the Allies to accept the 975