BARBAROSSA ( June 22–December 5, 1941) from Leningrad to take charge of the defense of Moscow Stalin agreed on October 19 to Zhukov’s insistent advice to pull back to a new defense line just 40 miles west of the Kremlin Hasty anti-tank ditches were dug by the citizens of Moscow even as that emergency withdrawal took place More important in slowing Army Group Center were heavy rains of the fall rasputitsa and the sea of glutinous mud they washed beneath the treads, hooves, and boots of the enemy German military intelligence failed yet again: Hitler and the OKW were unaware that so few defenders lay between Bock and Moscow, and commanders were unhurried about finishing a campaign they believed already won The first hard freeze was felt in early November, making mud roads passable again Army Group Center made its last lunge toward Moscow along a 200-milewide front starting on November 15 Deep penetrations were achieved by Bock’s Panzers racing ahead on either flank, ever in search of a decisive victory The bulk of the leg infantry moved directly toward the city, plodding ahead in the center Soviet spoiling attacks were premature and feeble But the Red Army had learned how to retreat, so that Bock failed to encircle the last straggling forces he thought he faced in front of Moscow Bock was opposed by scratch armies thrown into Moscow’s semiprepared defenses during October, and less happily, by more divisions of raw and militarily useless opolchentsy Bock’s extended delay in resuming the advance allowed freshly arriving Soviet divisions to fi ll in the line by late November Additional Soviet armies assembled farther back, beyond German awareness, where they readied to make a major counterattack when the moment ripened Withholding these formations as the Germans advanced on Moscow took supreme operational courage on the part of the Stavka, and even Stalin must receive some credit Bock’s momentum began to slow as German reserves dwindled Wehrmacht combat units were overstretched to cover a frontline that stretched from the Baltic to the Crimea, and there had never been enough troops in strategic reserve German supply lines and communications neared or passed snapping point; forward Luftwaffe airfields were rudimentary and few in number; every German combat arm was short on fuel and ammunition; tank and truck parts were scarce and repair facilities remote; and most Landser were bone weary from five months of marching, combat, and rising fear Germans were no longer fighting close to home in areas hostile to the Soviet regime such as western Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Baltic States They were deep inside territory populated by hostile, ethnic Russians: in German rear areas, broken and overrun Red Army units joined partisans to attack truck convoys, kill stragglers, and scorch everything of value The onset of a hard winter only confirmed that the Wehrmacht was always ill-prepared for a long campaign As temperatures fell to -35ºC Panzers stopped, literally frozen in their tracks Oil in engines congealed; turrets froze immovably in place “Stukas” and fighters could not fly, while bombs were set off by compression from severe cold Shells no longer fit breaches of self-propelled guns Men thought only about staying warm Most German troops were still in summer-issue uniforms They wore hodgepodge outfits stolen from local civilians kicked out of their peasant shacks or houses and left to die from exposure By early December 140