Italy Despite Mussolini’s rhetorical and diplomatic swagger, the Italian military was always woefully underequipped for the modern war in which it in fact was now engaged Italy faced a core strategic problem that Mussolini never admitted or overcame: it was not militarily equal to Britain or France, the powers which stood in the way of any imperial plan for domination of the Mediterranean and expanded Italian empire in Africa That says nothing about the Soviet Union and United States, whose armies Italy would later face as a result of the extraordinary miscalculation and uncontrolled bravado of the Italian “Duce” (Leader) The Regio Esercito was barely a modern force and had mostly outdated equipment For example, the standard rifle first saw active service at Adowa in 1898 The Regia Marina (Royal Navy) was superficially impressive In fact, it was grossly out-gunned by the combined Mediterranean fleets of Britain and France Until the defeat of France in 1940 removed the French navy from the Allied order of battle, Italy’s naval enemies could expect to bring major reserve flotillas into any Mediterranean confl ict Finally, the Regia Aeronautica (Royal Air Force) was wholly outclassed by every other major air force in Europe, in quantity and quality of aircraft, productive capacity, and pilot training schemes The hoped-for spoils that Mussolini sought were not easily secured The French badly bloodied Italian troops on the alpine front where the Italian Army managed to advance just two miles and capture only one significant town, yet paid dearly in blood even for that France agreed to an armistice with Italy on June 24 Hitler was annoyed by Italian intervention and rewarded Mussolini with only a small section of alpine southern France Henceforth, the only Italian territorial gains would be the least economically desirable bits of German conquests that Hitler saw fit to toss to Mussolini Meanwhile, Italy’s war with Britain continued in the Mediterranean and East Africa The Royal Navy savaged the Italian Mediterranean Fleet from the start The first blows to Mussolini’s imperial ambition were felt during the East African campaign in 1940–1941, at the end of which Italy lost all its old colonies in East Africa along with its most recent conquest in Abyssinia Next came the early desert campaign, during which the Italians were repeatedly defeated by British forces, and even the weak Free French made real gains at Italian expense Hitler would eventually be obliged to send the Afrika Korps to Tunisia to support his flailing ally Despite those martial failures—but also because of them—Mussolini greatly desired to attack Greece and Yugoslavia Italy’s feelers to Berlin about starting a fresh Balkan war met with a stern German veto and Hitler’s insistence that the Balkans must remain quiet Hitler did not tell Mussolini that he was already planning to use the northern Balkans as a launch pad for the southern wing of his BARBAROSSA offensive into the western Soviet Union The Italians were stunned and infuriated when they learned that German troops were moving into jumpoff positions in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary Mussolini decided to pay back his Axis partner in similar coin by launching an Italian-only “parallel war” in the Balkans: he gave Hitler no advance warning when he sent Italian forces to attack Greece on October 28, 1940 Italian armies were again humiliated They were not just beaten back by the Greek Army, but were left in dire need of rescue and reinforcement by German 590