Eisenhower, Dwight (1890–1969) a commander and learned much from the fighting in North Africa But in Sicily and Italy he revealed a harmful tendency to remain much too far from the frontlines, even for a supreme commander Worse, his command repeatedly demonstrated excess caution and lack of imagination, where the Germans showed tough and innovative adaptability It became clear in Italy that the Western Allies were going to have a hard slog against the Germans right to the end of the war Yet, it was also from that point that Eisenhower’s excellent personal character allowed him to herd disparate and often vain subordinate commanders of many nationalities, to head them in the direction of ultimate defeat of the enemy In his dedication to preparation, grasp of crucial military concepts (and military history), understanding of the problems of amphibious and coalition warfare, and keen ability to inspire genuine “teamwork” by talented but egotistical subordinates working under joint operational commands, Eisenhower rose to the greatest challenge ever faced by an American general and succeeded brilliantly in most respects Eisenhower’s greatest task and achievement came in 1944, with D-Day ( June 6, 1944), the OVERLORD operation, and the Normandy campaign Eisenhower shone before and during the battle for France, the start of what he later called the “crusade in Europe.” He smoothed over command arguments; properly brought the independent-minded and even willful bomber chiefs into line by insisting on direct control of targeting decisions in the pre-invasion period and that they conduct massive preparatory tactical bombing at the expense of strategic bombing; made the difficult decision to send in three airborne divisions ahead of the main invasion; and made the call to go on June 6, despite tough weather conditions in the Channel Notwithstanding personal inexperience, after the breakout from Normandy was achieved and the second battle for France was won, Eisenhower insisted on assuming his first ever combat command He took over at the very top, as ground forces commander in charge of multiple army groups and several million troops He did so over the advice and objection of a number of American subordinates and a great many senior British officers The latter especially did not highly regard his ability as a field commander Eisenhower was not a superior or even very good field commander As a result, in his combined old and new roles he made a number of blunders, notably: approving the narrow and reduced “single thrust” MARKET GARDEN offensive to the Rhine through the Netherlands, before assuming a “broad front” approach to the Rhine thereafter; poor disposition prior to the Wehrmacht’s Ardennes offensive, which his forces were unprepared and slow to meet, before responding well over time; and in some of the final battles that followed during the conquest of Germany in 1945 Nonetheless, Eisenhower made an invaluable contribution to the Allied war effort, mainly in his original capacity as manager of the largest and most complex alliance ever assembled He was well-suited to overall political command, dealing with personal rivalries among prickly generals, most notably, Generals George Patton and Bernard Montgomery, but also General Omar Bradley and others He was able to sack commanders with appropriate ruthlessness whenever they failed, but more often build up their confidence when they were merely the victims of the 342