BARBAROSSA ( June 22–December 5, 1941) penetrations by the Panzers, some Red Army divisions and armies fought far past hope, to the death Army Group Center reached the “Smolensk Gate” in mid-July, entering the great land gap between bends of the Dvina and Dniepr rivers More war without pity took place from July 10, in another huge Kesselschlacht best remembered as the Battle of Smolensk Dispute continues among historians as to whether that protracted fight was a turning point leading to the ultimate failure of BARBAROSSA Several Soviet commanders later argued that German victory after two months of heavy fighting at Smolensk was pyrrhic, that the fight so badly attrited the Panzer spearheads and eroded Wehrmacht combat power that the enemy were unable to conduct further deep encirclement operations Several German generals later contended that the key moment in the campaign, and even in the entire war, was Hitler’s decision to weaken Army Group Center by shifting the weight of Panzer forces south into Ukraine, with some Panzers also sent to reinforce Army Group North Although that thesis found support among some military historians, it is not universally accepted After the fall of Smolensk, but with the larger battle on the central front still underway around that smoking city, Hitler did indeed reinforce the flanks of the invasion He was intent on crushing what he thought were the last standing Soviet armies to the north and south, but he could only that by drawing from the center It was at that point that the paucity of German operational and strategic reserves became manifest, along with the critical importance of hidden Soviet strength Self-exculpating memoirs by German generals argued after the war that Hitler so weakened the offensive power of Army Group Center that he doomed the whole BARBAROSSA invasion to failure That point is moot Indisputable is that he left a largely infantry force much reduced in striking power to slog more slowly toward Moscow, which the Wehrmacht never reached A more fundamental explanation of the German failure lies in fatal logistical, reserve, and other operational flaws contained in the original OKW plan and the conceit of any quick conquest of Russia In two “Führer orders” issued on July 19 and 23, the Panzer shift was ordered Hitler diverted General Hermann Hoth’s Panzergruppe northward to press home the flagging attack around Leningrad, and sent General Heinz Guderian’s Panzergruppe southward to reinforce Rundstedt’s encirclement of Kiev On July 30, over the nearly unanimous objection of his senior generals, Hitler ordered Bock to assume a defensive posture with Army Group Center while offensive operations were underway in Ukraine Persuaded of his own strategic vision and genius, Hitler aimed primarily at capture of food and other resources in Ukraine and beyond He now saw these as more vital than defeat of the main forces of the Red Army, an accomplishment he and many generals assumed was already well in hand in any case Hitler was thus lured deep into the First Battle of Ukraine ( June–September, 1941) by opportunities for Panzer maneuvers on the steppe, and hence for more dramatic and slashing attacks than were possible in the thick forest and lake country in front of Moscow As for reinforcing the Leningrad assault, Hitler thought that city was within Leeb’s easy reach He wanted to destroy it as a manufacturing center of tanks and other vital Soviet war matériel and end its service as a Baltic 132