Hitler, Adolf (1889–1945) bombardment of London and Antwerp and contemplation of attacking Britain with gas weapons As Hitler’s wars in the eastern, western, and southern theaters were progressively lost from 1943 to 1945, and as he turned against the professional officer corps toward his fanciful inner lights, he displayed a deepening and fatuously “Nietzchean” superstition about the capability of “superior will” and the putative military utility of ideological resolution It was other men, most notably Albert Speer, who finally put Germany’s economy on a full war footing, cutting back civilian goods production and emphasizing defensive weapons systems It was once argued that Hitler only organized the economy to fight serial short wars, but this is no longer the view of most historians Instead, it is recognized that while the Nazis made a prewar effort to organize Germany’s economy for general war, Hitler and other top Nazis maintained a high level of civilian production to damp down potential unrest Fear of a second “stab-in-the-back” by dissatisfied folks on the home front was also persistent and powerful It was more important for German unreadiness that Hitler provoked war with France and Britain years before he expected to have to fight a long war, and in ignorance of the superior capacity for economic mobilization of the British and French economies He was similarly overconfident in the sure success of Vernichtungskrieg against the Soviet Union: barely a month into BARBAROSSA he ordered some war factories to revert to producing civilian goods Even on a full war-footing, Germany could not hope to win the great Materialschlacht contest against the Soviets and Western Allies Hitler instead indulged delusions about supposed limits to Allied production For example, he rejected Luftwaffe estimates of enemy fighter production as ridiculous; they were not He relied increasingly on assertions that men inspired by his correct racial ideology should overcome all physical obstacles and powerful opponents, performing feats in battle that were impossible for ordinary men Top commands were doled out on the basis of loyalty to the regime rather than military competence, so that even Heinrich Himmler received a field command Hitler habitually encouraged and exploited normal rivalries among generals to maintain overall control He was assisted in that scheme by sycophantic staff officers on the OKW and OKH who took it upon themselves to stroke his delusions and pass off all blame for failure to field commanders In the last two years of the war Hitler repeatedly issued orders to whole armies to stand fast, resulting in their premature annihilation In many cases, all military logic argued for tactical withdrawal to preserve men and weapons to fight another day, or defend from better ground selected for terrain advantages instead of symbolism Nor had Hitler any real or sound appreciation of military logistics He grossly overstretched Germany’s resources by tying down large garrisons in occupied countries such as Norway, Greece, and Yugoslavia, none of which were significant in the military balance or final outcome of the war The most spectacular example of his logistical ignorance was invasion of the Soviet Union in the face of information from the Wehrmacht logistical service that it could not support a deeper penetration than 500 km Among the major military setbacks for German military fortunes that were caused in whole or in part by Hitler’s interference in command decisions were: the 522