Rzhev-Sychevka Offensive Operation, First ( July–August, 1942) that the Ostheer held defensible, foreshortened lines Hitler’s confidence returned Reinforcing failure, Stalin demanded more aggressive attacks Exhaustion and the spring rasputitsa impeded movement by either side, even by the Soviet cavalry The lines held through most of March and April Model’s generalship and leadership skills, while impressive and important, were not the main cause of the Soviet failure The “strategic operation” failed because it lacked sufficient tanks to provide concentrated force and because other Soviet attacks on more distant German flanks—the Liuban offensive operation ( January 7–April 30, 1942) and the Orel-Bolkhov offensive operation ( January 7–February 18, 1942)—also ran out of momentum and stopped Those operations had been insisted upon by Stalin over strong objections by General Georgi Zhukov They were planned as outer pincers to envelop and eliminate Army Group Center while it was fighting to hold on at Rzhev-Viazma Instead, the additional operations dissipated Soviet combat strength, exactly as Zhukov predicted they would, so that all three operations failed in their large objectives Fighting continued behind German lines around Viazma for over two months after Soviet offensive movement ceased, as the Wehrmacht launched mopping-up sweeps against pockets of cut-off Soviet airborne and cavalry in Operations HANOVER in May–June and SEYDLITZ in July The entire offensive cost nearly 300,000 Red Army casualties Its failure left powerful Army Group Center forces in the Rzhev balcony dangerously close to Moscow RZHEV-SYCHEVKA OFFENSIVE OPERATION, FIRST ( JULY–AUGUST, 1942) A large-scale Red Army offensive from July to August 1942 It aimed to smash Army Group Center in front of Moscow and possibly clear an opening to a sustained Red Army drive into Germany itself If that was the long-term goal, it was greatly premature in the summer of 1942 The Soviets built up massive forces in the Toropets step—eight armies of Kalinin Front, under Ivan S Konev Opposing Konev were four Panzer armies and several infantry armies, all reduced in men and equipment by Adolf Hitler to provide forces for the more urgent German BLAU offensives in the Crimea and around Kharkov, and later for a drive to Stalingrad on the Volga Konev’s assault caved in part of the Rzhev balcony, but the Germans committed enough of their Panzer reserve to staunch the wound Then they developed an effective counterattack by General Walter Model into a full counteroffensive code named “WIRBELWIND.” See also KREML; MARS RZHEV-SYCHEVKA OFFENSIVE OPERATION, SECOND (NOVEMBER–DECEMBER, 1942) See MARS 949