H aywood v D row n
In 2007, inmate Keith Haywood filed a § 1983 lawsuit in New York Supreme Court against employees of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCS), claiming violations of his civil rights Haywood alleged that DOCS officers conspired to undermine his due process rights by fabricating a misbehavior report and falsifying urinalysis test results In response, the State, representing the DOCS defendants, sought to dismiss the case under New York Correction Law § 24.
Civil actions against officers or employees of the department for damages related to their official duties can only be initiated by the attorney general on behalf of the state Individuals cannot bring lawsuits in their personal capacity for actions taken or not taken while performing their job responsibilities.
Claims for damages related to actions or omissions by department officers or employees while performing their duties must be filed in the court of claims as claims against the state.
Thus, the State argued, Correction Law § 24 vests the New York Court of Claims with exclusive jurisdiction over all damages suits against DOCS
27 Id at 183 The plaintiff also alleged that DOCS employees conspired to fabricate the facts of a second misbehavior report.
28 N.Y EXEC LAW § 259-q(3) (McKinney 2009) (mandating that the state provide de- fense and indemnification).
29 N.Y CORRECT LAW § 24 (McKinney 2009); see also N.Y EXEC LAW § 259-q(2)
(McKinney 2009) (providing that all suits for damages against employees of the Division of Parole must be brought in the Court of Claims against the state).
The Supreme Court ruled that the lawsuit filed by the plaintiff, Haywood, was improper due to the statute that prohibits direct lawsuits against individual Department of Correction and Community Supervision (DOCS) employees Instead, he was required to sue the State in the Court of Claims Consequently, the trial court dismissed his claim, a decision that was upheld by New York's Appellate Division On appeal, Haywood contended that the Supremacy Clause of the U.S Constitution prevented the application of § 24, which barred his federal § 1983 suit, arguing that Congress had established a universal policy through the enactment of § 1983.
Section 24 obstructs § 1983 lawsuits by preventing damages claims against individual DOCS employees acting within their employment scope, while allowing such claims against other state actors and private defendants The State argues that § 24 is a legitimate exercise of its jurisdictional authority, emphasizing that when a DOCS employee is sued for actions within their job, the state is the true party in interest This aligns with New York's conditional waiver of sovereign immunity, justifying the requirement for plaintiffs to file claims in the Court of Claims.
The four-justice majority sided with the State While Correction Law § 24's removal of a fact-specific DOCS-defendant § 1983 suit from the New
30 See N.Y CORRECT LAW § 24 (McKinney 2009); see also CT CL ACT, art II §§ 8-9
(McKinney 2009); St Paul Fire & Marine Ins Co v State, 415 N.Y.S.2d 949 (N.Y Ct Cl
32 Haywood v Drown, 881 N.E.2d at 183 (quoting Mondou v N.Y., New Haven, &
Hartford R.R Co., 223 U.S 1, 57 (1912)); see also Monroe v Pape, 365 U.S 167, 180
34 See id at 185-86; see also City Const Dev., Inc v Comm'r of N.Y State Office of Gen Servs., 575 N.Y.S.2d 595, 596 (N.Y App Div 1991)
35 U.S CONST amend XI; Alden v Maine 527 U.S 706 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla v Florida, 517 U.S 44, 54 (1996)
36 See CT CL ACT § 8 (McKinney 2009); see also Woodward v State of New York,
The York Supreme Court's interpretation of the Supremacy Clause raises concerns, as it emphasizes the need for balance between state and federal claims The court stated that if a state permits a state cause of action, it is obligated to also allow related federal claims Conversely, if a state opts not to hear a specific state claim, it has the discretion to reject associated federal causes of action in its courts.
The removal of subject matter jurisdiction over state law damages claims against DOCS personnel by Correction Law § 24 allowed the New York Supreme Court to dismiss a related § 1983 claim This statute aligns with the Supremacy Clause's anti-discrimination principle, as highlighted by the Haywood majority.
The refusal of a state court to hear a case solely based on the fact that the cause of action is rooted in federal law is prohibited Correction Law § 24 fulfills this requirement by ensuring that claims against DOCS personnel are handled equally, regardless of whether they arise under state or federal law.
The court determined that Correction Law § 24 signifies the State's responsibility for lawsuits against DOCS, affirming that the State exercised its right to define the subject matter jurisdiction of state courts in line with New York's conditional waiver of sovereign immunity Consequently, the court upheld the dismissal and directed the plaintiff to the Court of Claims.
The dissenting opinion from three justices highlighted the conflict between the Supremacy Clause and New York's authority to define its court jurisdiction They argued that the analysis should focus on the Congressional policies that underpin federal rights, rather than the specifics of Correction Law § 24 The dissent emphasized the need to evaluate whether New York's rationale undermines these federal policies, particularly in relation to 42 U.S.C § 1983 They concluded that the goals of deterring state misconduct and compensating victims of civil rights violations outweigh the state's interest in limiting legal claims.
37 The court noted that "[c]onduct by persons acting under color of state law which is wrongful under 42 U.S.C § 1983 cannot be immunized by state law." Haywood, 881 N.E.2d at 183 (quoting Martinez v California, 444 U.S 277, 284 n.8 (1980)).
38 Haywood, 881 N.E.2d at 184 (citing Missouri ex rel S v Mayfield, 340 U.S 1, 4 (1950)).
40 See also N.Y PUB OFF LAW § 17(2)-(3) (McKinney 2008).
42 See id at 188 (Jones, J., dissenting) (citing Felder v Casey, 487 U.S 131, 139
The state's assertion that Correction Law § 24 served as a neutral judicial administration rule is misleading, as it specifically targets a particular cause of action for adverse treatment while preserving the state law remedy in the Court of Claims and eliminating the equivalent § 1983 remedy This statute's claim of simply determining state court jurisdiction is irrelevant when it contradicts federal law Ultimately, Correction Law § 24 represents a significant policy shift that transfers liability from individual DOCS employees to the State, which directly opposes the principles established by § 1983.
Defining "Analogous" State Law Claims
The Haywood case established a consensus among the majority and dissent regarding the antidiscrimination rule, which mandates that state courts cannot dismiss federal causes of action solely because they originate from Congress rather than state legislatures This rule requires state courts to consider federal claims that are "analogous" to existing state law claims they already adjudicate However, defining what constitutes an "analogous" state law claim presents challenges One interpretation suggests that it refers to state and federal claims arising from the same or closely related factual circumstances, exemplified by Correction Law § 24, which prohibits certain state law damage suits against DOCS employees acting within their employment scope.
44 See infra notes 90-102 and accompanying discussions (discussing the policy behind immunity statutes).
45 See Haywood, 881 N.E.2d at 192 (Jones, J., dissenting).
The Supreme Court observed that § 24 functions more as an "immunity-from-damages provision" rather than serving as a jurisdictional rule, indicating that the State's interest is not a pertinent factor in this context (Haywood v Drown, 129 S Ct 2108, 2115, 2009).
In the case of Rogers v Saylor, the Oregon court ruled that state law damages caps do not apply to § 1983 actions in state court This decision underscores the importance of providing full monetary relief for civil rights violations, as the damages cap would conflict with the objectives of § 1983 and offer partial immunity to certain state officials.
In the Haywood v Drown decision, the Supreme Court emphasized that it was not essential to determine if states could be forced to hear lawsuits under § 1983 The ruling was primarily influenced by the observation that New York courts consistently adjudicate similar § 1983 cases, highlighting the court's routine engagement with these types of actions.
FORDHAM URB L.J [Vol XXXVI gue that since the New York Supreme Court is powerless to hear such claims, the antidiscrimination rule imposes no obligation to entertain §
1983 damages suits against DOCS employees 5 1
The term "analogous" may refer to "generically similar," making Correction Law § 24 irrelevant to the New York Supreme Court's ability to hear analogous state law claims As a court of general jurisdiction, the New York Supreme Court is equipped to handle a wide range of tort suits against various defendants, and limiting its jurisdiction over a specific subcategory of tort does not diminish its overall authority to adjudicate cases.
"analogous" state law claims Under this view, any tort suit for damages is
"analogous" to the claim which Correction Law § 24 prohibits, and thus the antidiscrimination rule should apply and require that the state court enter- tain the § 1983 claim.
Haywood's interpretation of "analogous" fails to consider key aspects of the Supreme Court's Supremacy Clause jurisprudence A more precise understanding is that state courts have jurisdiction over "analogous" state law claims due to their authority to adjudicate claims similar to § 1983 actions, particularly tort suits for damages Once a state legislature establishes a court that can handle generic tort suits, it is required to address the complete spectrum of claims under § 1983.
In 1983, the New York Supreme Court consistently addresses claims under both state and federal law, including § 1983 claims against state employees and tort suits against private defendants Therefore, New York should not have the option to selectively enforce specific types of § 1983 claims.
51 See, e.g., Blount v Stroud, 877 N.E.2d 49, 61-62 (I1! App Ct 2007); cf Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S 356, 378-79 (1990) (rejecting the argument that a Florida immunity statute excluded § 1983 claims from the category of tort claims that the state court could hear).
52 See N.Y CONST art VI § 7; Haywood, 881 N.E.2d at 191 (Jones., J., dissenting);
53 See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (explaining the expanding conception of the antidiscrimination rule).
54 See, e.g., Neubome, supra note 5, at 747-66 (proposing an affirmative model under which state courts of general jurisdiction would be obligated to entertain all § 1983 claims).
55 Cf id.; see also James v Bd of Cent Sch Dist No 1, 340 N.E.2d 735, 737 (N.Y.
1975) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting); Young v Toia, 413 N.Y.S.2d 530 (N.Y App Div 1979) (deciding a United States Code issue); Brody v Leamy 393 N.Y.S.2d 243, 256-57 (N.Y. Sup Ct 1977) (holding that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts).
W hat Triggers the Obligation?
The Broad Scope of the Antidiscrimination Rule
The New York Court of Appeals held that Correction Law § 24 was a
The concept of a "valid excuse" for declining jurisdiction in federal § 1983 suits is often linked to the narrow applicability of state law in certain tort cases involving DOCS defendants This jurisdictional strategy, referred to by some as the "analogous state-created claim" excuse, lacks substantial backing from Supreme Court rulings Notably, the Supreme Court has not endorsed the selective exclusion of federal claims by state courts based on seemingly neutral jurisdictional restrictions, such as Correction Law § 24.
57 STEINGLASS, supra note 3, § 9:2 (noting that the Supreme Court could have clarified states' obligation to enforce § 1983 by explaining what specifically is meant by similar state law claims).
58 See Wilson v Garcia, 471 U.S 261, 272-76 (1985) (describing the proper charac- terization of § 1983 claims for the purposes of finding a state law analogue, whose statute of limitations would apply to § 1983 suits in that court).
59 See Haywood v Drown, 129 S Ct 2108, 2117 (2009) ("[We have never equated ,analogous claims' with 'identical claims."').
61 See Haywood 129 S Ct at 2116 ("[W]e now make clear that equality of treatment does not ensure that a state law will be deemed a neutral law of judicial administration and therefore a valid excuse for refusing to entertain a federal cause of action."); Redish & Muench, supra note 2, at 350-51; Neuborne, supra note 5, at 747-66.
FORDHAM URB L[JV support for such maneuvering lies in the Court's failure to squarely reject it 6 3
In the case of Mondou v New York, New Haven, & Hartford Railroad Co., a Connecticut court declined to hear a claim under the Federal Employer Liability Act (FELA), not due to a lack of jurisdiction over personal injury suits, but because it disagreed with the Act's pro-liability stance and felt no obligation to consider a claim stemming from an external legislative body This decision prompted a response from the Supreme Court.
The notion that a Congressional act conflicts with state policy, allowing state courts to refuse jurisdiction, is fundamentally flawed When Congress enacted this law under its constitutional authority, it represented the will of all citizens and states, establishing a unified national policy This policy is equally applicable to Connecticut, as if it had originated from the state's own legislature, and must be upheld by its courts.
The Supremacy Clause connects federal law and state courts by mandating the integration of Congressional policy into state law When a state court is authorized to handle specific legal actions under state law, it is required to also enforce corresponding federal law claims In the case of Mondou, the Connecticut court, possessing general jurisdiction over FELA-type actions from both Connecticut and other states, was obligated to consider the FELA claim.
In the Mondou case, the Connecticut court acknowledged its authority to address "analogous" state law claims, but the key question was whether it could dismiss a federal claim solely based on a disagreement with the policy underlying the Act The Supreme Court ruled against this dismissal, establishing that state courts that accept certain state law claims cannot reject "analogous" federal claims simply due to policy disagreements However, the ruling left open the question of whether a state can intentionally choose to dismiss such claims.
63 See Redish & Muench, supra note 2, at 351-53.
67 Id at 58 ("The existence of the jurisdiction creates an implication of duty to exercise it.").
956 [Vol XXXVI erately remove jurisdiction over state claims in an effort to defeat enforce- ment of their "analogous" federal counterparts 69
Professor Sandalow highlights that Mondou's assertion of federal policy as "policy for all" implies a broader obligation than what the case warranted The Court may not have needed to equate federal and state policies to reverse the Connecticut court's decision, as that court already acknowledged similar rights under state law, making the discrimination against FELA claims evident Consequently, Mondou's ruling could be interpreted narrowly, addressing discrimination only when there is an identical right enforced by the state court.
Nonetheless, the Court in Testa v Katt 72 and, more recently, Felder v.
In the case of Casey, the Supreme Court applied the antidiscrimination rule to prevent a state court from dismissing a federal claim, even if the state court would not enforce a similar state-based right This was exemplified in Testa, where a car buyer sued in Rhode Island state court under the Federal Emergency Price Control Act after overpaying for a vehicle The state court dismissed the case, arguing it had no obligation to address a claim from a foreign legislative body However, the Supreme Court reversed this decision, citing that Rhode Island would have enforced a similar claim under its own laws Notably, the state court's ability to hear such claims was supported by its routine enforcement of related federal statutes, despite lacking a specific state law for recovering excessive car prices Ultimately, the court's ruling emphasized that state courts must recognize federal claims when they align with state law rights that are generically similar.
69 Even the Supreme Court's opinion in Haywood declined to address this issue See Haywood v Drown, 129 S Ct 2108, 2116 (2009) ("[T]his case does not require us to de- cide whether Congress may compel a State to offer a forum, otherwise unavailable under state law, to hear suits brought pursuant to § 1983.").
70 Sandalow, supra note 8, at 205; Redish & Muench, supra note 2, at 356-57 n 195.
75 Id at 394; see Neuborne, supra note 5, at 757 n.140.
FORDHAM URB L.J. merely factually identical-to the federal right at issue, the antidiscrimina- tion rule imposes an obligation on the state court to take cognizance over the federal claim 76
In Felder v Casey, the Supreme Court broadened the scope of the antidiscrimination rule by recognizing discrimination even when state laws applied equally to both state and federal claims The case involved a plaintiff who sued Milwaukee police officers under § 1983 in Wisconsin state court, where a notice-of-claim statute mandated that plaintiffs notify state officials of their intent to sue and provide a detailed claim within a specific timeframe After the state court dismissed the plaintiff's case for not adhering to this requirement, the Supreme Court agreed to review whether such procedural rules should be applicable to § 1983 claims in state courts.
In the Felder case, the Supreme Court, led by Justice Stevens, determined that a statute discriminated against § 1983 claims by imposing additional burdens on claimants in state courts, a situation not faced in federal court or in state tort suits against private defendants The Court highlighted that the statute's focus on minimizing liability conflicted with the compensatory objectives of federal law, ultimately undermining the rights intended to be protected by Congress This discriminatory approach was seen as detrimental to federal rights, as it specifically targeted lawsuits against governmental defendants, thus conditioning the right to seek redress from those entities.
Felder's analysis is crucial because it seems to stand the antidiscrimina- tion rule on its head The Court found discrimination, not based on any
76 See Neuborne, supra note 5, at 757 n.140 But see Alden v Maine, 527 U.S 706
(1999) (rejecting expansion of Testa to include selective waivers of state sovereign immu- nity); Steinglass, supra note 8, at 445.
78 Id at 136; WIS STAT ANN § 893.80(1)(a)-(b) (West 2009).
The disparate treatment between state and federal rights, particularly in the context of § 1983 actions, highlights the impact of state rules on federal policies The notice-of-claim requirement, which equally burdens state law claims against police officers, is deemed irrelevant if it obstructs the deterrence and compensation objectives of § 1983 This obstruction is sufficient to assert that such a state statute violates the Supremacy Clause, which mandates the primacy of federal law Consequently, post-Felder analysis focuses on the federal right involved, assesses its underlying policies, and evaluates whether the state rule hinders those policies, irrespective of its effect on state claims.
The Court's comprehensive approach to the antidiscrimination principle raises challenges in justifying the selective exclusion of fact-specific federal causes of action from general jurisdiction trial courts The discrimination addressed in Testa and Felder highlights the importance of ensuring that all relevant cases are heard in the appropriate judicial forum.
86 Id at 139-40 Justice O'Connor, in dissent, admonished the majority's adoption of
A new theory of discrimination suggests that the statute in question limits the ability to sue local governments and officials, which Congress intended to hold accountable Justice O'Connor argued that the notice-of-claim requirement was applicable to both federal and state claims Despite her dissent, the current antidiscrimination rule seems to compare how state courts handle various classes of causes of action—such as torts and breach of contract—with the specific rights outlined in § 1983.
87 See Dice v Akron, 342 U.S 359 (1952) The Court held that federal law governs whether plaintiff waived his right to sue under FELA The state's waiver law substantially disfavored FELA plaintiffs and was, thus, incongruous with the general policy of the Act because the federal rights af- fording relief to injured railroad employees under a federally declared standard could be defeated if states were permitted to have the final say as to what defenses could and could not be properly interposed to suits under the act.
The Rule: Triggered by Jurisdictional Grant Over
a States' Discretion to Create State Forums
In Haywood, the New York Court of Appeals upheld Correction Law § 24 by creating a justification that distinguished it from the notice-of-claim issue in Felder While Felder addressed a procedural rule for handling § 1983 claims already in state court, Correction Law § 24 pertains to the state courts' initial authority to hear these claims However, this distinction lacks genuine significance.
The Supreme Court has consistently supported the extensive authority of state legislatures to regulate the jurisdictional aspects of their courts For example, in the Mondou case, the Court explicitly highlighted that the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) does not impose any restrictions on this legislative power.
The state courts have the authority to expand or adjust their jurisdiction as needed Although the Connecticut court's jurisdiction was sufficient, the state had the flexibility to reorganize its court system to ensure consistent treatment of actions enforcing federal law alongside those enforcing state law.
90 See Haywood v Drown, 881 N.E.2d 180, 185-86 (N.Y 2007) ("By restricting the forum for a certain type of claim to a particular state court, the Legislature did nothing more than exercise its prerogative to establish the subject matter jurisdiction of state courts in a manner consistent with New York's conditional waiver of sovereign immunity ); cf Janda v Detroit, 437 N.W.2d 326 (Mich Ct App 1989); Rogers v Saylor, 760 P.2d 232 (Or 1988) (en banc); see also Smith v Wade, 461 U.S 30 (1983); Carey v Piphus, 435 U.S 247 (1978).
91 See generally Neubome, supra note 5, at 747-66; Redish & Muench, supra note 2, at 340-59; Sandalow, supra note 8, at 205.
92 Mondou v N.Y., New Haven, & Hartford R.R Co., 223 U.S 1, 56 (1912).
In the case of McKnett v St Louis & San Francisco Railway Co., the court affirmed that an Alabama court must address a federal claim under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA), as the state had previously engaged with the matter This decision highlights the obligation of state courts to consider federal claims, ensuring that legal protections under FELA remain accessible.
The circuit courts were granted general jurisdiction over the actions related to this case, highlighting that Congress has not mandated states to establish courts for enforcing the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA).
In the recent case of Howlett v Rose, the Court emphasized that the Supremacy Clause limits states' autonomy in managing their judicial systems A high school student filed a § 1983 action in Florida state court against a school board, claiming violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments due to an alleged illegal search of his car Florida's statute waived sovereign immunity for state law claims but not for federal law claims, resulting in the school board being immune from § 1983 claims in state court while remaining liable in federal court The Florida District Court of Appeals upheld this statutory framework and dismissed the federal claim.
The State contended that federal law accepts state courts as they are, allowing the Florida legislature to eliminate state court jurisdiction over specific § 1983 claims However, the U.S Supreme Court dismissed this argument, emphasizing that jurisdictional limitations imposed by the state do not align with federal law.
94 Id at 233; see also Howlett v Rose, 496 U.S 356, 380 (1990); Boyd v Robeson County, 621 S.E.2d 1, 8 (N.C 2005) ("[Petitioners] would have us hold that, although a su- perior court has jurisdiction over sheriffs for tort claims because a sheriff is a local govern- mental officer, it does not have authority to hear a § 1983 claim against the sheriff because, for the federal claim, he is part of 'the State.' This constitutes discrimination against § 1983 claims in violation of the Supremacy Clause.") (citing McKnett, 292 U.S at 234).
99 In Howlett v Rose, the Court explained:
State courts are not mandated to establish a specific court for federal claims; rather, they must recognize federal law as the governing authority This principle underscores the significance of state autonomy in judicial processes, allowing federal law to be applied within the existing framework of state courts.
Howlett, 496 U.S at 372 (quoting Henry M Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Fed- eral Law, 54 COLUM L REv 489, 508 (1954)).
Florida's selective immunity statutes, rooted in substantive policy, do not align with the jurisdictional protections intended by legal rules, as they fail to uphold the Supremacy Clause The Florida court's willingness to enforce state law tort suits against school boards and § 1983 claims against individual officials highlights the lack of legitimate state interest, aside from protecting school boards from liability This statutory framework directly contradicts the remedial and deterrent goals of § 1983, and the Supreme Court emphasized that the Supremacy Clause cannot be circumvented by simply labeling a statute as jurisdictional.
Thus, after Howlett, merely characterizing a state law as "jurisdictional" will not, by itself, transform that law into a legitimate excuse to dismiss a §
Felder's preemption analysis remains relevant, emphasizing that state statutes attempting to exempt state courts from handling federal claims, including jurisdictional limitations, must be examined for their impact on federal law's substantive policies These policies, protected by the Supremacy Clause, are integral to each state's legal framework Additionally, the creation of adequate forums for addressing these claims is essential for maintaining the balance between state and federal judicial responsibilities.
States maintain significant discretion over the jurisdiction of their courts, which is a crucial aspect of legal doctrine In the Howlett case, the Court clarified that a state law labeled as "jurisdictional" cannot override the Supremacy Clause However, it left open the question of whether states are required to establish forums to hear § 1983 claims initially Notably, in instances where the Court invalidated a state's refusal to consider a federal claim, it was acknowledged that the state courts were competent to handle similar state law claims, leaving the issue of mandatory forums unaddressed.
102 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
103 See Howlett, 496 U.S at 378 n.20; Steinglass, supra note 8, at 439-40; see also su- pra note 69.
In their analysis, Steinglass highlights that Testa and Howlett operate under the basic assumption that states have established courts with ordinary jurisdiction to address certain cases However, they do not engage with the more intriguing theoretical question of whether states are mandated to create courts capable of hearing federal causes of action This omission is significant in understanding the broader implications of state court jurisdiction in federal matters, as illustrated in cases such as Howlett and Testa v Katt.
Since 1983, nearly every state has accepted § 1983 claims, eliminating the need to determine if states must establish forums for them If this issue is open for debate, states might argue that removing jurisdiction from state courts for § 1983 claims is effectively a choice not to create an appropriate forum This raises the question of what constitutes an adequate forum for hearing § 1983 claims There are two perspectives on this—one broad and one narrow—yet the Supreme Court's rulings favor the broader interpretation, suggesting that an adequate forum is one that addresses claims structurally similar to § 1983 claims.
What is the Nature of the Obligation?
The "Valid Excuse" Balancing
The "valid excuse" doctrine, rooted in the case Douglas v New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co., illustrates the balance between federal law enforcement and state jurisdiction The Supreme Court upheld a New York court's decision to dismiss a FELA claim, emphasizing that state courts are not mandated to hear such cases if there is a valid state interest In this instance, New York prioritized its residents' access to its courts, which were often overcrowded, thereby justifying the dismissal of out-of-state FELA claims.
131 See Howlett, 496 U.S at 357; Missouri ex rel S v Mayfield, 340 U.S 1, 5 (1950); Herb v Pitcairn, 324 U.S 117, 120 (1945); Douglas v N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 279 U.S 377, 388 (1929); cf McKnett v St Louis & S.F Ry Co., 292 U.S 230, 233 (1934).
The New York courts' decision to decline jurisdiction over certain claims was deemed fair, particularly because they continued to hear in-state FELA claims and other states offered suitable venues for plaintiffs The Court acknowledged the availability of adequate state forums for federal claims and noted that this did not undermine the principle of shared state responsibility in adjudicating such claims Consequently, the Court supported New York's interest in the matter.
In McKnett v St Louis & San Francisco Railway Co., the Court referenced Douglas but ruled that an Alabama statute, which barred federal claims from out-of-state accidents while allowing state claims, could not be used to dismiss a FELA claim The Court emphasized that the Alabama court had general jurisdiction over the type of action presented and that the dismissal was based solely on the legal source being enforced Consequently, there was no legitimate state interest in judicial administration to justify the dismissal, and since the Alabama court held general jurisdiction, the dismissal would likely render the federal claim unenforceable in any Alabama court.
In the case of Herb v Pitcairn, the court distinguished its ruling from McKnett, asserting that an Illinois city court, as defined by the Illinois Supreme Court, lacked the authority to enforce a plaintiff's FELA claim originating outside city limits This decision reflects a deliberate legislative intent to establish specialized courts that handle only local causes of action Mandating the city court to address federal claims from other jurisdictions would disrupt the efficient allocation of judicial resources and impede its operations Furthermore, such an obligation is unnecessary to support the policy of ensuring that state courts competently enforce federal law.
The Court's ruling was notably qualified by the absence of evidence suggesting that Illinois had interpreted its jurisdiction and venue laws in a discriminatory manner.
FORDHAM URB L.J. ternative state court-Illinois trial courts of general jurisdiction-would have been available to hear the FELA claim 4 8
In the case of Missouri ex rel Southern Railway Co v Mayfield, the Supreme Court upheld a state court's use of forum non conveniens to dismiss a FELA claim, provided that the state applies its policy fairly and without bias This endorsement aligns with the principle of balancing interests in legal proceedings.
The doctrine of forum non conveniens enables states to alleviate the "inconvenience and hardship" associated with handling transitory claims from non-residents, helping to prevent overcrowded court dockets However, it does not provide a basis for dismissing federal claims that originate within the state For a successful application of forum non conveniens, it is essential that the case is more appropriately brought in another state.
H aywood A pplied
The "valid excuse" doctrine serves dual purposes: it safeguards state judiciaries from the financial burden of handling foreign causes of action while ensuring that the fundamental policies of the Act and the enforcement of federal law by state courts remain intact This interpretation aligns with various aspects of Supreme Court case law but conflicts with how the New York Court of Appeals applies the "analogous" state claim exception.
First, the dual-purpose characterization accounts for Mondou's original admonishment that dismissing a federal claim solely because it is federal is
A state court that is already handling state tort claims faces minimal additional administrative costs when addressing similar § 1983 claims The primary challenges stem from the state's lack of familiarity with the § 1983 cause of action.
148 See generally Redish & Muench, supra note 2, at 349-50 (explaining that the court of limited jurisdiction validly dismissed a FELA claim).
151 See, e.g., McKnett v St Louis S.F Ry Co., 292 U.S 230 (1934).
152 Missouri, Kansas-Texas R.R Co v Dist Ct of Creek County, 294 P.2d 579, 582 (Okla 1956); see 36 AM JuR 2D Foreign Corporations § 468 (2009).
153 See Redish & Muench, supra note 2, at 353-54.
156 Mondou v N.Y., New Haven, & Hartford R.R Co., 223 U.S 1, 57 (1912); see Re- dish & Muench, supra note 2, at 355.
157 See Redish & Muench, supra note 2, at 355.
970 [Vol XXXVI tion, 5 8 or from the fact that many § 1983 claims are frivolous 5 9 Yet
Howlett, along with other cases, firmly found both assertions inadequate to trump the Supremacy Clause 1 60
The New York Supreme Court is unlikely to achieve significant cost savings by relinquishing its jurisdiction over specific fact-based claims, as it already handles similar cases without added burden This includes claims for injunctive or declaratory relief against DOCS employees and tort suits involving DOCS defendants outside their employment scope Furthermore, Correction Law § 24 undermines the Supremacy Clause by eliminating the § 1983 remedy in New York courts while preserving a state law remedy in the Court of Claims, effectively allowing the State to evade enforcement of federal rights.
Professor Redish highlights that selectively excluding "analogous" pairs of state and federal claims contradicts the restrictions established by the Supreme Court regarding the valid excuse doctrine This doctrine emphasizes that any "valid" excuse must adhere to specific limitations set by the Court.
158 Id at 355 n.191 It has also been contended that the Supremacy Clause does not re- quire state courts to afford special treatment to § 1983 claims See Dice v Akron, Canton,
In the dissenting opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Youngstown R.R Co., 342 U.S 359 (1952), it is emphasized that the existence of concurrent jurisdiction between Federal and State courts for actions under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) does not obligate a State to handle these cases differently from local negligence claims.
In Brody v Leamy, the New York Supreme Court highlighted the challenges state courts face when accepting jurisdiction over § 1983 suits, noting that it would require them to integrate federal legal concepts into the state system This integration could disrupt established common law practices and overwhelm state courts with an increasing number of civil rights claims, potentially leading to significant delays in trial proceedings for both federal and state cases The court warned that without additional judicial resources, this situation could worsen the dynamics between federal and state court systems.
160 Howlett v Rose, 496 U.S 356, 380 (1990) ("A state may not relieve congestion in its courts by declaring a whole category of federal claims to be frivolous."); see Mondou,
The exercise of judicial discretion may be challenging, but this does not undermine the principle that different legal rules can apply to various situations It is a well-established practice in judicial proceedings to implement distinct legal standards for different cases Courts are not permitted to refuse to hear cases of a specific class simply because the applicable legal rules differ from those in other cases.
In Dice v Akron, Canton, & Youngstown R.R Co., the dissent expressed concerns that requiring state courts to adopt different jury procedures for federal claims could lead to undesirable "judicial hybridization." However, this hybridization would not arise if the New York Supreme Court were to handle DOCS-defendant § 1983 suits, provided that the procedures used in these cases remain consistent with those applied in similar state law and § 1983 cases.
162 See, e.g., Ismail v Singh, 776 N.Y.S.2d 166, 169 (N.Y Sup Ct 2003); see also Neuborne, supra note 5, at 747-66.
The New York legislature's removal of subject matter jurisdiction effectively nullifies the right to sue DOCS employees for federal constitutional violations, undermining the intent of Congress in enacting § 1983 This action contradicts the Supremacy Clause, which should prevent New York from denying the existence of such federal rights Furthermore, the absence of a comparable state-based right does not justify this limitation, as the antidiscrimination rule applies whenever the state establishes a court capable of addressing similar state claims, aligning with federal policy.
The "Valid Excuse" Balancing Should Permit Selective Exclusion, so Long as an Alternative State Forum is
Long as an Alternative State Forum is Provided
The antidiscrimination rule mandates that states must promptly enforce all § 1983 actions once they establish a court capable of handling generic tort claims for damages However, the "valid excuse" balancing allows states the discretion to choose the appropriate forum for these actions.
In New York, the establishment of the New York Supreme Court allows for the hearing of generic tort suits, thereby subjecting the state to antidiscrimination regulations Correction Law § 24 mandates that all damage claims against Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCS) employees be directed to the Court of Claims, which exclusively handles claims against the State However, the U.S Supreme Court has determined that states cannot be sued under § 1983, compelling plaintiffs who initially file claims against DOCS employees in the New York Supreme Court to forfeit their § 1983 claims in favor of state claims This legislative framework effectively enables the State to circumvent federal law enforcement, challenging the principle of federal supremacy Furthermore, by compelling plaintiffs to pursue their claims in federal court, § 24 poses a significant risk to Congressional authority.
163 Redish & Muench, supra note 2, at 355-56.
164 See, e.g., McKnett v St Louis & S.F Ry Co., 292 U.S 230, 234 (1934).
165 Will v Mich Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S 58, 87 (1989); see also White v New York, 615 N.Y.S.2d 811, 815 (N.Y Ct Cl 1994).
166 This discriminatory impact was no object for the Haywood majority 881 N.E.2d
In 2007, the New York Court ruled that Congress exempted states from § 1983, indicating that the New York state legislature did not intentionally discriminate against federal law when enacting Correction Law § 24.
[Vol XXXVI chosen distribution of judicial resources among the state and federal judici- aries.
The New York legislature may consider transferring the state Supreme Court's jurisdiction over all claims against DOCS employees to a specialized tribunal capable of handling § 1983 claims This approach would not undermine federal law, as it would not eliminate the § 1983 cause of action but simply dictate the appropriate venue for such claims The primary motivation for this change would be to efficiently manage the high volume of claims, often deemed frivolous, by directing them to courts with lighter caseloads and more knowledgeable judges This strategy aligns with the principles established in Felder v Casey, provided it focuses solely on venue and does not significantly alter the right to recover By creating an accessible state forum for § 1983 claims, the state could enhance the rights and remedies available to civil rights plaintiffs, ensuring they are treated equitably compared to ordinary tort claimants.
The obligation of trial courts of general jurisdiction to hear § 1983 claims does not extend to all "non-analogous" claims Instead, the "valid excuse" cases and Felder allow for the removal of jurisdiction over specific pairs of state and federal claims from a court that would otherwise be fully competent to hear them without the state statute.
167 Cf Herb v Pitcairn, 324 U.S 117 (1945) Professor Neuborne argues that the
"court of limited jurisdiction" excuse illustrated by Herb is essentially the only "valid ex- cuse" the Supreme Court would have contemplated See Redish & Muench, supra note 2, at
In the context of § 1983 claims, trial courts with general, unlimited jurisdiction may invoke a neutral jurisdictional barrier as a "valid excuse" to decline to hear a case, even if they would normally have the authority to address the federal claim and serve process on the defendants This situation differs from instances where the court's jurisdiction is inherently limited by geographical constraints from the beginning.
In Howlett v Rose, the Supreme Court emphasized that a state cannot use unfamiliarity or inconvenience to evade enforcing federal law, nor can it dismiss entire categories of claims as frivolous In this hypothetical scenario, the state is not attempting to avoid enforcing § 1983 altogether but is instead seeking to apply it within a specific state court context.
A state court of general jurisdiction may avoid enforcing § 1983 by referencing a state statutory bar against "analogous" claims, provided that an alternative forum exists for enforcing the federal right This approach must not conflict with the substantive policies of the federal act or undermine the responsibility of state courts to uphold federal rights.
CONCLUSION: A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING STATES' OBLIGATION
Part III argued two seemingly conflicting points about the states' obliga- tion to enforce § 1983 and the means by which such an obligation must be carried out Part III.A argued that states who have opened their doors to generic tort suits have an affirmative obligation to enforce all § 1983 claims Yet Part III.B argued that a state could strip its courts of general jurisdiction-which have jurisdiction over such suits-from hearing certain fact-specific pairs of "analogous" state and federal law claims without vio- lating the Supremacy Clause.
A state court's duty to hear § 1983 claims is rooted in the overall judicial framework of the state rather than the specific jurisdiction of an individual court This means that the ability of a state court to refuse to acknowledge such claims is influenced by the broader judicial system in which it operates.
Professor Redish contends that courts have a duty to consider all federal causes of action, even in the absence of identical state claims, asserting that a state cannot selectively limit jurisdiction to undermine federal rights He believes that, even if both state and federal rights are barred from state court, the court must still address the related federal claim However, it can be argued that dismissing "analogous" state law claims may be justified if another state court is available to hear them, thus still providing a means for enforcing federal rights and avoiding the evasive tactics criticized in Mondou.
172 Id at 357 n.195 (noting that the Supreme Court has only struck down excuses that
The reasons presented undermine the federal substantive policy associated with the federal cause of action and excessively interfere with the federal jurisdictional principle that ensures a state forum is accessible for addressing federal claims.
Professor Neuborne emphasizes that every state is required to provide a judicial forum for § 1983 plaintiffs, as they must enforce both state and federal constitutional claims in their courts He suggests that a state fulfills its obligation by offering a forum for § 1983 redress, even if it differs from the court handling other constitutional claims Therefore, the focus regarding § 1983 claims should be on the legislature's approach to distributing judicial responsibilities throughout the state.
In determining whether a state court has an obligation to entertain a §
In a § 1983 claim, the primary consideration is whether the state is required to enforce this statute A reviewing court must first determine if the state legislature has established a court capable of handling tort suits for damages If such a court exists, the antidiscrimination rule mandates that the state must provide a mechanism for plaintiffs to assert their § 1983 rights Additionally, if the state contends that the court where the claim was filed is not suitable, the reviewing court should evaluate several factors to make its determination.
The extent to which an alternative state court forum exists for § 1983 en- forcement; 174
Filing in an alternative forum imposes specific burdens and conditions on claimants that are not typically faced by non-§ 1983 tort claimants, including potential discrepancies in the available remedies.
The state's interests in remitting the § 1983 claim to such an alternative forum, 176 and whether such interests are hostile to the § 1983's underlying policies.