FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND SUBNATIONAL EXPENDITURE POLICY

FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND SUBNATIONAL EXPENDITURE POLICY Luiz de Mello,1 International Monetary Fund I INTRODUCTION The need to improve the quality and efficiency of government spending has placed subnational governments at the forefront of service delivery, particularly in the social sectors In many countries, it has been recognized that subnational governments have an important role to play in the implementation of public policies aimed at fostering social and human development The key argument for reliance on subnational governments for service delivery is that they are closer to the intended beneficiaries of public programs For this reason, subnational governments are believed to be better equipped to extract information on local preferences and needs more effectively than the central government, and to be more accountable to local residents With greater voice in the design and implementation of public policies, local residents can also benefit from greater choice in the goods and services delivered to them by the government Reliance on subnational governments, or the private sector, for the delivery of public goods and services is nevertheless not without pitfalls Fiscal decentralization may lead to the wasteful duplication of expenditure functions among the different levels of government and poor governance, thereby reducing the quality of public services and the overall efficiency of the government An open policy question is whether the central government should rely more heavily on subnational governments for the design, rather than simply the implementation, of The author is now at the Economics Department of the OECD Mailing address: Economics Department, OECD, 2, rue André Pascal, Paris 75775 Cedex 16, France Tel.: (33-1) 4524-8752, e-mail: luiz.demello@oecd.org public programs in general, and in the social sectors in particular In this case, rather than acting as agents of the center, subnational governments would enjoy greater policymaking autonomy In most countries, the share of subnational outlays in total government spending has increased reflecting their more active role in service delivery, and, in some cases, greater policymaking autonomy in the design and implementation of public policies Nevertheless, the central government still has an important role to play, even when subnational governments are key providers of public goods and services The central government is often called upon to finance provision, including in some cases the equalization of expenditure capacity among subnational jurisdictions; to avoid shortfalls in the financing of critical social services; and to provide technical assistance to subnational jurisdictions In a nutshell, this paper is aimed at, first, reviewing the international experience with the decentralization of government spending to subnational governments and to the private sector, with special emphasis on the social sectors, including education, health care, social assistance and welfare, and housing A second objective of the paper is to discuss the main challenges facing subnational governments in the design and implementation of public programs, including the earmarking of revenues, as well as economies of scale and spillover effects in the provision of public services The paper is organized as follows Section II reviews the conventional distribution of expenditure functions among the different levels of government and discusses recent developments in this area Section III presents some cross-country data on spending shares among different levels of government Section IV focuses on education, health care, housing and infrastructure, and social assistance and welfare Section V discusses pending issues and policy implications II THE FISCAL ROLE OF SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS: THE “OLD” AND THE “NEW” Public finance theory has traditionally assigned a limited role to subnational governments in the design of social policies The key argument is that, based on the Musgravean functions of government, the fiscal role of subnational governments is limited to allocative efficiency, whereas the central government should focus on income redistribution and welfare, as well as on macroeconomic stabilization Based on the principle of subsidiarity, the public goods and services that should be provided by subnational governments are those which generate benefits that can be internalized by those jurisdictions Accordingly, activities such as waste disposal, street maintenance, primary education, and urban transportation have been devolved or decentralized to subnational governments in most countries Delegation/decentralization is considered the most effective way to deliver these services because their benefits are mostly local and there is little scope for economies of scale and interjurisdictional spillover effects in their provision The role of subnational governments in the provision of public goods and services has been affected by a variety of factors These include demographics, technological changes in communication and transportation, for instance, and the development of market institutions, which allows for more active private sector involvement in service delivery (Wildasin, 1998) Moreover, it is often difficult to clearly define the benefits and beneficiaries of specific programs For example, the benefits of public spending on primary education are known to be local but, from the point of view of poverty alleviation, they are national in scope Economies of scale, particularly in administrative functions, may call for a more centralized management of service delivery even when services are provided locally More recently, public finance theory has reassessed the assignment of expenditure functions among the different levels of government based on principal-agent considerations What matters in this case is not allocative efficiency from the point of view of internalizing the benefits of provision within the jurisdictional boundaries of the provider, but the response of different layers of government to incentives for efficient, cost-effective service delivery The consideration of the principal-agent nature of decentralized service delivery has highlighted a finer distinction between delegation and decentralization Delegation is preferred when subnational governments are best suited as agents of the center and when clear incentives for efficiency gains can be put in place In addition, when expenditure functions can be unbundled, rather than treated as a whole, each layer of government can perform the role that best reflects its preferences and needs or comparative advantages For example, because primary education can be used as a tool of poverty alleviation, as mentioned above, national governments often provide financial support to ensure a minimum level of provision in all jurisdictions, while day-to-day management responsibilities are assigned to local governments or school boards Transportation services may be provided locally subject to regulations issued by the central government In line with their changing role in service delivery and program design, subnational governments have played a more active role in redistributive policies.2 Traditionally, it had been argued that the effectiveness of subnational redistributive policies depended on taxpayer mobility Factor mobility may prevent subnational governments from using the tax system for the purpose of redistribution, and locally-funded transfer payments may attract potential claimants from neighboring jurisdictions, thereby discouraging local funding for these programs More recently, the recognition that taxpayer mobility may be more limited than expected has provided some justification for subnational redistributive policies, particularly in terms of expenditure, rather than taxation, policies The central government should nevertheless remain at the forefront of redistributive policies In some cases, it may be better to use intergovernmental grants to address differences in average income levels in various subnational jurisdictions than to use taxes and transfers to individuals (McLure and Martinez-Vazquez, 2000) III SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT SPENDING: AN OVERVIEW Subnational governments, including middle-tier jurisdictions, such as states and provinces, and local governments, are important providers of public goods and services Fiscal decentralization indicators vary considerably among regions but, in more decentralized countries, such as large The role of subnational governments in macroeconomic stabilization, another classical function of government according to Musgrave, remains limited To avoid macroeconomic disarray due to decentralization, as highlighted in the literature (e.g., Ter-Minassian, 1997; de Mello, 2000), it has been recognized that the central government plays a crucial role in imposing hard budget constraints at the subnational levels of government federations, subnational governments account for over 36 percent of total governments spending on average, or approximately 14 percent of GDP (Table 1) A sizeable share of subnational spending is financed through local revenue mobilization, but subnational governments also rely heavily on grants and transfers from higher levels of government, which account for nearly a third of their revenues on average Interestingly, subnational governments tend to rely on grants and transfers regardless of their size, measured in terms of ratios of expenditure to GDP and total government spending An interesting question is how the changing role of subnational governments in service delivery has affected the composition of government spending among different tiers of government (Table 2) Internationally comparable information on public expenditure by function for the different levels of government is limited In general, education and health care account for a large share of subnational expenditures, particularly in the case of middle-tier jurisdictions Housing also accounts for a large share of local government spending, in addition to education and health care Over time, middle-tier governments have devoted a growing share of their total spending to health care programs Interestingly, although social security and welfare continues to weigh more heavily on central government budgets, these programs have accounted for a growing share of local governments spending over time Local government spending on housing, already high in relation to local government spending, has increased over time Cross-country indicators of fiscal decentralization should be interpreted with caution Subnational fiscal data are often less reliable than those of the central government and, more importantly, the quantitative indicators reported above not allow for a more in-depth analysis of the qualitative aspects of intergovernmental expenditure arrangements For instance, the rise in local government spending on social security and welfare programs, as noted above, may be due to the delegation of service delivery functions to these jurisdictions, rather than greater autonomy in the design and implementation of their own welfare programs Moreover, based on the data at hand, it is not possible to ascertain how much of subnational spending is financed through grants and transfers from higher levels of government, rather than local revenue mobilization.3 Intergovernmental grants and transfers differ considerably in their nature, and hence the incentives they create at the local level For instance, local governments tend to have greater autonomy in service delivery and in program design when spending is financed through block, rather than matching or earmarked, grants IV THE INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE A Education International experience varies on the role of subnational governments in the provision of education services In many countries, particularly in OECD member countries, the central government plays a key role in financing and standard setting, rather than service delivery, including personnel management, budget preparation, procurement activities, and administration Centralized financing and standard setting is justified on the grounds that education programs can be used as a poverty-alleviation instrument and as a means to equalize The GFS does not provide data on earmarked grants and transfers to, and within, subnational governments expenditure capacity among subnational units Outlays on education tend to account for a large share of subnational budgets, particularly at the local level Decentralization beyond the public sector is also common in many countries, where partnerships with the private sector have been encouraged and fully managed by subnational, particularly local, jurisdictions subject to the parameters set by the central government.4 In the developing world, unlike most industrial countries, the central government typically plays a more active role in service delivery due primarily to capacity constraints at the subnational level.5 Also, the decentralization of education services to subnational jurisdictions has been motivated by the need to take account of regional diversities, particularly of an ethnic and linguistic nature, in many industrial and developing countries Subnational governments may play an important role in personnel management in the education sector The decentralization of education programs typically begins with the delegation of administrative functions, particularly personnel management, to subnational governments In the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada, among other countries, emphasis has been Among OECD countries, the main education decentralization programs are GrantMaintained-Schools (United Kingdom); Charter Schools (United States, also in New Zealand and Canada), and Future Schools (Australia) According to the General Accounting Office of the United States, based on the study of Dade County (Florida), Prince William County (Virginia), and the Edmonton school district (Alberta, Canada), these decentralization programs have a positive impact on the adoption of innovative managerial and teaching practices, as well as the responsiveness to local preferences and needs (Rondeau, 1997) For instance, in Mexico, 65 percent of all schools and 75 percent of those in basic education (preschool and primary education) were federally funded and controlled until 1992 (Juarez, 1999) Federal involvement in education was unequally distributed across the country, but the federal government designed education policies, set the academic calendar, and assigned textbooks and other activities After 1992, when a comprehensive decentralization program was implemented, the states were granted autonomy to control and operate all schools in basic education, subject to federal funding and regulation placed on school districts, rather than local governments for the decentralization of personnel management functions When greater personnel management autonomy is granted to subnational governments, it is important to avoid the risk of overstaffing and excessive discretion over pay in the course of decentralization, particularly if governance is poor at the subnational level In some countries, unionization and issues related to civil servants’ benefits and entitlements have created resistance to decentralization efforts (i.e., Venezuela) Moreover, in a labor-intensive sector such as education, subnational budgets become excessively dependent on the central government’s personnel policy when teacher’s salaries are set by the center In many countries in Latin America, this situation created unfunded mandates at the local level and led to the implementation of special transfer programs to finance subnational payroll outlays (i.e., Colombia) In Brazil, income differentials among subnational units resulted in sizeable pay inequality between state and municipal schools and sometimes within the same state This problem has nevertheless been mitigated, at least in part, due to the earmarking, since 1998, of 60 percent of primary education spending to teacher’s salaries.7 Financing arrangements vary across countries In general, education programs are financed by the center, even when implemented by subnational governments When subnational cofinancing is required, some countries earmark subnational revenues to avoid financing shortfalls, in addition to the grants and transfers received from higher levels of government In In 1994, Venezuela implemented a decentralization program in the education sector by unifying the federal, state, and municipal school networks (pre-school, primary and secondary education) and transferring the respective assets and personnel to the states, which would be responsible for service delivery See Tracy (1996), for more information For more information on the decentralized service delivery in Latin America, see ECLAC (1998), and Burki, Perry and Dillinger (1999) 10 Brazil, for example, 15 percent of state and municipal revenues are earmarked to finance primary education programs In other countries, local education budgets may be financed entirely through grants and transfers from higher levels of government In many cases, transfers are formula-based and take expenditure needs into account, particularly when the equalization of subnational expenditure capacity is pursued Functions are costed subject to the minimum standards set by the center.8 Other countries also rely on the decentralization of service delivery to strengthen cost recovery through the collection of user charges and fees for the provision of some services (i.e., contingency fees, and (subsidized) school fees, among others) (Litvack and Seddon, 1999) Willingness to pay for service delivery is believed to increase when the services are provided by local governments Other cost recovery schemes such as community financing have also emerged as means for the central government to reduce the fiscal burden of education service provision.9 A critical policy question is whether subnational governments are more efficient than the center in the provision of education services Efficiency gains can be assessed when education attainment indicators (i.e., literacy rates and school enrollment rates, among others) are improved for the same consolidated spending level as a result of decentralization, or, In Brazil, for example, a national minimum spending level per primary school student is set annually with a federal top-up grant to subnational governments that cannot afford the minimum spending level set by the center See de Mello (2001), for more information Community financing has been an important aspect of decentralization in countries where governments have been unable to meet the demand for education services In this case, community-funded schools have coexisted with the public school network to offer schooling with particular religious, ethnic, political, or other orientations With the exception of Bolivia and Nicaragua, community financing has been less widespread in Latin America than in Africa and Asia (Bray, 1996; ECLAC, 1998) See also de Mello (2004), for cross-country evidence on the association between fiscal decentralization and social capital this program, the central government decides on the intercommunity allocation of funds, while local governments focus on intracommunity assignments They find that targeting is somewhat propoor, and local capture does not seem to be sizeable Anecdotal evidence available for Brazil’s Bolsa-Escola program—a transfer payment granted to poor households to keep at school school-age children who might otherwise drop out of school to work—points to high incidence rates The program, originally designed and funded by a few subnational governments, has now motivated the implementation of a federally-funded school attendancelinked income transfer program Some subnational governments in Brazil also have their own income support programs D Housing and Infrastructure Subnational provision of housing and infrastructure services has been carried out predominantly through the devolution, rather than decentralization, of expenditure functions Important deterrents to the decentralization of housing and infrastructure expenditure functions to subnational governments are the sunk costs involved in funding these programs in view of subnational governments’ more limited revenue mobilization capacity, including borrowing, and the spillovers associated with these services These spillover effects would reduce the incentives for subnational service delivery, as in the case of social assistance and welfare programs In fact, in many countries, government provision of housing and infrastructure services is justified as social assistance instruments and service delivery tends to be subsidized Many countries intervene in the housing market, particularly in the developing world This is because domestic capital markets are often shallow and to ensure the provision of shelter for poor households who would not have access to long-term credit from the domestic financial system, when available Subsidized credit is often provided by the central government, through its financial institutions, and subnational governments often participate as agents of the central government in identifying target groups (i.e., Colombia) and building housing financed through transfers from the center Examples of subnational government-financed housing projects are limited in number In Brazil, for example, richer states have their own housing programs, particularly in the area of slum upgrading and urbanization The decentralization of infrastructure services has some elements in common with that of education and health care As in education, unbundling is relatively easy in the case of infrastructure services and, as in health care, high provision costs would make programs unaffordable to most subnational governments Financing for costly infrastructure investment is often provided through block or matching grants from higher levels of government and subnational governments become agents of the center with limited policymaking autonomy As in education, the decentralization of infrastructure services often goes beyond the public sector, through partnerships and contracting-out arrangements with the private sector (i.e., water and transport companies) Cross-border joint ventures among subnational jurisdictions have been encouraged in many countries to maximize economies of scale and to internalize the externalities associated with the provision of regional public goods In France, for instance, small communes contract out service delivery to private regional water companies, and contiguous municipalities often create regional associations to manage services such as waste disposal Peru attempted to decentralize much of its road network to provincial and municipal governments but then failed to provide financing for operations and maintenance (Gutman, 1999) This resulted in widespread deterioration of the network and, ultimately, recentralization (Burki, Perry, and Dillinger, 1999; Humplick and Moini-Araghi, 1996) In Brazil, the privatization of water and sanitation services has been delayed due to disagreement over the jurisdictional power of states and municipalities in the provision of these services, particularly in the case of large metropolitan areas, where the water and sanitation networks straddle local government borders There is some empirical evidence that decentralization increases subnational spending on infrastructure projects, but the correlation between decentralization and performance indicators in the infrastructure sector is less clear-cut The cross-country evidence reported by Estache and Sinha (1995) suggests that decentralization is associated with higher spending on infrastructure projects, particularly in the developing world Decentralization tends to increase both total and subnational spending on infrastructure possibly because of differences in local preferences Moreover, using cross-country data, Humplick and Estache (1995) estimate the impact of decentralization on the performance of several infrastructure projects, including roads, electricity, and water Using different measures of decentralization in each sector, the authors find that at least one performance indicator improved in each sector under examination as a result of decentralization Nevertheless, the correlation between decentralization and performance was not strong in general V PENDING ISSUES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS The choice between administrative deconcentration and full decentralization depends on incentives Principal-agent considerations, rather than the Musgravean classical functions of government, have now become the main theoretical benchmark for the assignment of expenditure functions to subnational levels of government Subnational governments have become important providers of public services in sectors where activities can be more easily unbundled and incentives for performance can be more effectively put in place Education is a case in point Decentralization tends to be more difficult in sectors with significant spillover and economies of scale effects, such as infrastructure development and social welfare Decentralization can lead to the creation of unfunded mandates In certain cases, expenditure functions are decentralized to subnational governments without a commensurate assignment of revenue sources.25 In other cases, greater private-sector involvement is sought in the provision of public services to eliminate unfunded mandates at the central government level but the required principal-agent structure of incentives is not in place In this case, private-sector involvement may be deterred by lack of an adequate regulatory framework, particularly pricing regulations The infrastructure sector is a case in point Moreover, the quality of services may suffer as a result of decentralization when the center fails to set minimum standards for privatesector and/or subnational providers Again, principal-agent incentives can be strengthened 25 In transition economies, many social services were provided by state-owned enterprises With privatization, unfunded mandates were created and local government budgets were not adjusted for these new responsibilities, thus creating unfunded mandates or unmet local demands (Gupta and others, 2003) through adequate enforcement and performance monitoring, as well as the choice of financing instruments, such as reliance on matching grants and conditionality on block grants based on the fulfillment of explicit, quantifiable performance objectives, among others Open-ended, gapfilling block grants and lump-sum transfers seldom create strong incentives for costeffectiveness and efficiency in service delivery Greater private sector involvement in service delivery, and the need to increase cost recovery through the restructuring of publicly-provided services, may prevent the poor’s access to social services Central governments may also set minimum standards beyond the means of some subnational governments, thus raising operating costs and discouraging service delivery Decentralization has been motivated in many cases by theoretical, rather than empirical, considerations The measurement of efficiency gains in decentralized service delivery remains open to empirical investigation, particularly in the developing world, where decentralization programs have been more ambitious and implemented more recently The impact of decentralization on access to, and incidence of, public programs is harder to measure Most empirical evidence, often predominantly anecdotal, focuses on the education and social assistance sectors A crucial question that requires careful empirical study is whether decentralization results in significant innovations in program design and management, and changes in financing arrangements Vested interests may be a deterrent to decentralization For decentralization to be successful, there must be willingness on the part of central government to share power and on the part of local governments and communities to assume new responsibilities In many countries, civil servants have objected to decentralization efforts for fear of status loss when decentralization involves a transfer of personnel from the center to subnational governments Fear of loss of benefits, including pensions and a variety of nonpecuniary entitlements, has deterred decentralization programs in many countries Central government officials may also be reluctant to transfer functions to subnational governments for fear of loss of control and political prestige A precondition for successful decentralization is good governance at the implementing level There is some evidence in the literature that decentralization is correlated with corruption (Pritchett and Kaufmann, 1998; Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón, 1999; de Mello and Barenstein, 2002) Although decentralization tends to expand the volume of the service delivered, greater subnational spending on social programs does not generate efficiency gains when accompanied by overprovision of public service to local elites (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000) Table 1: Summary of Subnational Expenditure Functions Health Care Traditional assignment Primary schooling Preventive care Conventional financing General taxation, input-based block grants, equalization grants Output-orientation, rewards for extended coverage, penalties for poor performance; user charges apply in certain cases General taxation, input-based block grants, capitation, equalization grants Output-orientation, rewards for extended coverage; user charges apply in certain cases Universal in most countries for primary education; user charges apply in certain cases; access depends on coverage of service provision network; enrollment rates vary across and within countries Rates vary by type of program (typically higher for primary education); limited empirical evidence, particularly at subnational level Universal in most countries for preventive care (basic health package in some cases); access depends on coverage of service provision network Increasing over time for personnel management and local curriculum development Emphasis on school-level and community-based management Increasing for personnel management and administration Increased diversity in financing options and private-sector involvement New financing options Access to services Incidence of public spending 1/ Subnational policymaking autonomy Rates vary by type of program (typically higher for preventive care); limited empirical evidence, particularly at subnational level 1/ Defined as the share of public spending reaching the intended beneficiary Social Assistance and Welfare Only as agents of central government Block grants Infrastructure … Market-orientation; concession and privatization; user charges and price subsidies apply in many cases (i.e., urban transportation) Access varies according to type of service; access depends on coverage of service provision network Increased use of categorical and regional targeting in certain cases; access depends on coverage of service provision network; enrollment rates vary across programs Rates vary by type of program; middle class capture in poverty alleviation programs; limited empirical evidence, particularly at subnational level Delegation rather than decentralization Subnational-financed programs are more common in industrial countries Mainly as agents of higher levels of government Block and matching grants Rates vary by type of program (typically higher for sanitation services) Delegation rather than decentralization Central government subsidization combined with subnational service delivery is more common in the developing world Limited intervention in the housing market in industrial countries - 27 - Education - 27 - Table 1: Decentralization Indicators, 1980-97 (period averages, in percent) 1/ Fiscal decentralization 2/ Size Number of Tax Nontax Vertical Subnational Subnational autonomy autonomy imbalances spending in percent spending in percent of GDP of total gov spending Countries Africa 42.7 26.1 31.4 2.1 7.6 14 Asia 34.6 23.1 39.5 3.4 13.8 Latin America and Caribbean 49.5 23.8 28.4 3.3 14.7 16 30.5 1.0 1.5 OECD 3/ 41.3 18.0 40.4 14.7 30.8 24 Transition economies 53.5 11.0 34.7 9.6 30.3 17 Large federations 4/ 48.9 19.2 32.0 13.5 36.5 13 World 45.0 19.5 35.1 7.7 21.2 82 Middle East Sources: Government Finance Statistics, IMF 1/ Unweighted averages 2/ Tax (nontax) autonomy is defined as the share of subnational tax (nontax) revenues in total government revenues Nontax revenues include primarily royalties, fees, penalties, and user charges Vertical imbalances are defined as the share of grants and transfers from higher levels of government in total subnational revenues 3/ Includes Israel 4/ Comprises India, Malaysia, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Spain, Switzerland, and United States - 28 - Table Selected Social Spending by Government Level, 1970-2000 (In percent of total government spending by government level, period averages) Education Social Spending Health Social Security Care and Welfare Housing Sample Size All countries Cental government Middle-tier governments Local governments 13.5 28.7 22.0 8.7 15.3 12.2 19.6 12.9 9.6 4.6 3.3 14.0 108 15 44 Federations 1/ Cental government Middle-tier governments Local governments 7.3 25.4 20.9 7.4 18.0 8.0 33.7 10.2 8.4 1.9 3.3 12.2 13 Latin America and Caribbean Cental government Middle-tier governments Local governments 25.8 36.3 16.7 16.6 14.0 8.2 21.7 4.8 2.6 13.7 3.7 8.9 20 OECD 2/ Cental government Middle-tier governments Local governments 8.3 25.5 18.7 9.0 19.3 10.8 34.1 12.6 14.8 2.4 2.8 12.3 23 14 Source: Government Finance Statistics; and IMF staff calculations 1/ Based on the classification of federal states available from Elazar (1995) 2/ Excludes the new members admitted in the 1990s - 29 - Table 3: Decentralization and Benefit Incidence of Public Spending Percent share of public spending accruing to: 1/ Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Decentralization indicator 2/ Year of incidence data Health care Chile Colombia Indonesia Romania 32.0 27.4 11.5 12.2 26.0 25.6 16.1 14.8 21.0 18.7 19.3 20.2 15.0 15.9 24.4 24.3 6.0 12.5 28.7 28.6 0.02 0.22 0.26 9.59 1992 1992 1990 1994 1.82 0.20 0.78 0.51 2.09 1993 1990 1992 1992 1991 1.82 0.20 0.78 0.51 2.09 1993 1990 1992 1989 1994 Primary education Argentina Chile Colombia Guyana Pakistan 37.0 35.7 39.4 28.9 19.3 23.2 26.9 26.2 24.9 22.7 15.4 18.1 19.4 18.5 21.9 15.0 12.6 10.8 19.0 21.2 9.4 6.7 4.3 8.6 14.9 Secondary education Argentina Chile Colombia Indonesia Romania 22.0 23.5 20.6 5.4 18.3 20.8 24.1 26.8 10.6 21.7 21.4 21.0 25.3 16.5 21.7 21.4 18.1 17.7 25.5 20.7 14.5 13.3 9.6 42.0 17.6 Source: GFS and 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