A Dascalian Approach to the Polemics on Voices and Styles in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations

1 A Dascalian Approach to the Polemics on Voices and Styles in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations José María Ariso Introduction Kampits (1985) was right when, almost three decades ago now, he deplored the fact that the exceptional fascination aroused by Wittgenstein’s work had engendered not only an industry around the philosopher, but also a whole scholasticism that has feverishly debated and analysed each and every one of his pronouncements Among the many polemics raging among the commentators on the Wittgensteinian corpus I would like to highlight two: the identification of the voices appearing in his Philosophical Investigations – hereinafter simply the “Investigations”; and the clarification in this work of the role played by the style in which it was written Both polemics have been supported by different arguments On the one hand, von Savigny (1994) pointed out that in order to understand what Wittgenstein intended to say in the Investigations it is first essential to clarify which of the several voices that can be defined in the dialogue structure of this work is the one that expresses the opinion and ideas of the Viennese thinker Elsewhere, Schulte (1990) indicated that the style of thinking determines its space, as it imposes a particular universe of ideas whereby this space becomes impenetrable to other forms of thought Although both these polemics first arose many decades ago, they continue alive today with no signs of a solution in sight However, the present work takes as its reference the distinction established by Dascal (1995) between discussions, disputes and controversies in order to characterise the two polemics and the relationships between them, which places us in an ideal position for analysing to what extent the Dascalian propositions for the resolution of polemics can help point us towards a denouement for the polemics in our study The two polemics under study Recently, Kanterian (2012) clearly and brilliantly described the polemic among well-known Wittgensteinians on the relationship between the style and philosophy of the Viennese thinker, and my presentation of this debate will thus be reduced to a brief summary of Kanterian’s exposition 2 However, before proceeding to this summary, I will outline the main positions in the polemic on the role of the voices in Wittgenstein’s Investigations 2.1 The polemic on the voices This polemic first arose when Cavell (1968) distinguished two voices in the Investigations: the voice of temptation and the voice of correction Neither expresses the opinions or views of Wittgenstein, but both voices configure a particular type of confession aimed at forcing us to look at philosophical problems from a different perspective The importance of Cavell’s interpretation in the debate on the identification of the voices in the Investigations lies not only in the fact that he originated this debate, but also because it is the reference from which all the other opinions in this polemic have emanated Shortly after, Binkley (1973) conceded the confessional nature of the Investigations, but with the caveat that Cavell was only right if the voice of correction were understood not as the correct, but as the correcting: the Austrian philosopher’s aim was not to come up with true propositions but to achieve peace and freedom in his thoughts In the same line, Staten (1986) reported that to refer to a voice of correction or orthodoxy would be incompatible with Wittgenstein’s philosophical method In an attempt to resolve this matter, Barnett (1990) made a subtle reworking of Cavell’s model which referred to the two voices that can potentially be found within all philosophers: one voice that poses philosophical problems, and another explanatory voice that shows at what specific point the philosophical meditation has become separate from the ordinary use of language Rowe (1994) believed that when Wittgenstein wrote the Investigations he was in a similar state to Saint Augustine at the time of writing his Confessions, as the Austrian philosopher was by then capable of understanding and resisting a number of temptations that had their origin in the Tractatus This is why Rowe maintained that the voice of temptation often corresponds to what Wittgenstein was at some point in the past, while the voice of correction expresses what he is now Eldridge (1997) argues that Wittgenstein, far from presenting a theory, wants to show us a dialogue that does not lead to any discovery, because at no time are we told – to mention just one example − what thinking is; in fact, Eldridge points out that two very similar voices can be distinguished in this dialogue to the ones proposed by Cavell On the one hand, we have a voice embodying the indefatigable seeker of explanations; and on the other, a voice intent on showing that there is nothing hidden beyond the ordinary use of our language Precisely because Wittgenstein does not set out to offer any new discovery, but to reveal what has always been in plain sight, Heaton (2010) favours replacing the distinction between a voice of temptation and another of correction with a dialogue between a voice of temptation and another of truthfulness: thus Wittgenstein’s methodology can be seen as a talking cure which is distinctly confessional in nature As Schroeder (2006) rightly says, the staging of the therapist-patient interaction is particularly suited to the detailed illustration of the healing process McGinn (1997) also highlights the therapeutic character of these dialogues, and identifies two very similar voices to those described by Heaton: specifically, McGinn distinguishes a voice that illustrates the desire to seek explanations everywhere, and a therapeutic voice that aims to overcome these temptations by analysing specific cases The criticisms and qualifications of the initial model proposed by Cavell took on a new dimension when disagreements began to emerge as to the number of voices that can be distinguished in the Investigations The fact remains that most of the authors refer to two voices: in addition to the authors mentioned previously – and others to whom we will refer later, Eagleton (1993) and Sluga (1996) distinguish the voices of Wittgenstein and an imaginary interlocutor described by Dilman (2002) as the Viennese philosopher’s alter ego However, some authors have discerned more than two voices Stern (2004) alluded to the voice of a philosophical narrator, an interlocutor, and a commentator; whereas Brunner (1985) distinguished as many as five voices in passages §§156-178 of the Investigations Pichler (2004) was more incisive when he stated that the dialogue structure conceived around the figures of Wittgenstein and an opponent was inadequate, as it not only generated a debate in which the subject of discussion is simply whether the opponent in that dialogue is Wittgenstein himself or a fictitious philosopher, but had also failed to take into account that the structure of the conversations in the Investigations is polyphonic As if it were not enough, Cavell himself (1995), whose initial distinction between a voice of temptation and another of correction was the cornerstone of this polemic, subsequently indicated that the Investigations were not only the result of the pressure or influence of those two voices, but that furthermore a third particularly distinctive voice should be added: the attainment of silence In an attempt to shed light on this ambiguous contribution by Cavell, Peters (2010: 161) distinguishes three voices and a “nonvoice”: the voice of the child –innocent, and continually asking elementary questions−, the voice of madness –expressing philosophical questions that appear absurd from the point of view of ordinary language−, the voice of the cultural or tribal other –which makes it possible to illustrate both the familiarity and the strangeness of our own way of life−, and the “nonvoice” of animals who simply “do not use language” (PI §25), as is the case of the dog (cf PI §§250, 357, 650) or the famous lion, which we would be unable to understand even were he able to speak (cf PI: 223) 4 By this stage in the exposition it is already clear that the interpretations that have been made of the intricate play of voices in the Investigations correspond to a greater or lesser degree to a dialogue model in which a voice – or subject − that has fallen prey to linguistic complications receives the help of another voice – or individual − that guides him in dissolving these conceptual misunderstandings; or else they constitute variations on that model, as in the case of the peculiar interpretation of Peters I indicated last of all However, the interpretations I have alluded to so far not sufficiently emphasise the role allotted to the reader within this play of voices This role is far from negligible, because according to Payne (1995), we cannot approach the text of the Investigations as though we – as readers – were able to maintain a certain distance from it In fact, Leiber (1997) cautions that the Investigations constitute a first-person narrative in which the “I” that corresponds to Wittgenstein becomes a “we” when human understanding is put to the test; however according to Leiber the Investigations are also narrated in the second person, as the reader is addressed, and his or her possible replies are suggested or criticised Birk (2004) goes a little further in noting that on becoming immersed in the text, the reader must identify with each of the voices to such an extent that he ends by taking part in the discussion as an interlocutor and must decide for himself which voice expresses the correct opinion Birk considers this to be the reason the dialogues in the Investigations are not reduced to a merely linguistic dimension Therefore, when analysing these dialogues it is not enough to simply distinguish a voice of temptation and another of correctness; we must focus above all on the dialogue set up between the text and the reader This same dialogue between text and reader led Majetschak (2010) to call attention to a series of marked similarities between Freudian psychoanalysis and Wittgensteinian philosophical therapy; these similarities highlight above all the resistances to which the subject seeking to release himself from a philosophical problem must also respond In fact, I have indicated (Ariso, 2012) that the voices appearing in the Investigations verbalise both the resistances that arise in profound philosophical reflection, and the attempts to overcome these resistances There is a reason Wittgenstein (CV) declared that it is not a difficulty of the intellect what has to be overcome, but a difficulty of the will It is therefore hardly surprising that anyone who understands philosophy as a purely intellectual pursuit fails to see in the Investigations anything more than a work whose theories could have been formulated much more simply 2.2 The polemic on style As I said earlier, in this section I will summarise Kanterian’s exposition (2012) of the polemic arising with regard to the relationship between the style of the Investigations and its philosophical content Two distinct bands can be noted in this polemic In the first place, those who Kanterian labels “non-stylists” consider Wittgenstein’s style to be a personal – or at most cultural – peculiarity that is totally devoid of philosophical relevance The non-stylists include authors such as Kripke (1989) who see no relation between the style and the method of the Investigations, for the simple reason that in his opinion this supposed method corresponds to a therapeutic and non-theoretical discipline, but not to philosophy However there are also some commentators among the nonstylists who endorse Wittgenstein’s method, while considering his style to be a personal peculiarity lacking in philosophical interest For example, Strawson (1968) maintained that it was completely unnecessary to use Wittgenstein’s style as a basis for presenting his ideas clearly, although Strawson considered the Viennese thinker’s philosophical method to be an effective tool In this same line Hilmy (1987) also considers Wittgenstein’s style to have little importance in regard to his method based on the description of language games, whereas Glock (2004) sees deep and interesting arguments in the work of Wittgenstein which – as they are expressed in a highly idiosyncratic style – must be reconstructed and described by means of a conscientious exegesis In second place, Kanterian uses the term “hyper-stylists” to describe the commentators who not accept that the content of the Investigations can be disassociated from the style of this work The main defender of this idea is Cavell himself (1968), who perceives in the Investigations an extraordinary tension between the deep-seated human need to transcend the ordinary and the ultimate failure of this attempt: in the final analysis, Cavell (2001) believes there is no aesthetic aspect at all in the Investigations that is merely ornamental and can be separated from the content of the work without detracting from it Kanterian also includes among the hyper-stylists the authors who not see the Investigations as a work of dialogue but rather as “polyphonic” Stern (2004) – as we saw earlier − distinguishes three voices, none of which corresponds to Wittgenstein, whose opinions are expressed only at those times when he abandons his most serious tone and offers a simile or an observation on a trivial matter that philosophers not normally stop to consider However Pichler (2004) is the author who has been most insistent on the polyphonic nature of the Investigations, a work where an indefinite number of voices might be expected which – far from competing in pursuit of a supposed philosophical victory – merely negate any dogmatic stance through their very multiplicity Incidentally, Wallgren (2006) notes that Pichler’s polyphonic approach should not be confused with the therapeutic view of Wittgenstein’s philosophy According to Wallgren, Wittgenstein’s therapeutic philosophy is based on an authoritarian spirit as it presupposes that once philosophy disappears – at least provisionally − with the dissolution of the conceptual misunderstanding in question, there should be a general consensus as to what this misunderstanding consisted of, and what it prevented us from seeing; in contrast, the polyphonic approach does not demand such a consensus, but allows everyone to make up their own mind The two polemics according to Dascal’s model After this description of the polemics on the identification of the voices and the relationship between style and philosophical content in Wittgenstein’s Investigations, I will go on to offer a brief exposition of the three ideal types of polemics described by Dascal (1995) − “discussion”, “dispute” and “controversy”, thereby establishing the basis for an analysis of how the two polemics in this study can be characterised according to Dascal’s model To begin with, discussions are polemics that revolve around a clearly delimited theme In these cases the contenders tend to recognise that the main reason for their disagreement is an error of concept or procedure, although they not usually concur as to the nature of the error and who is committing it Another feature of discussions is that they can be solved when the error in question is corrected by applying procedures accepted by the contenders In contrast, subjects involved in disputes maintain that the reason for the disagreement is not an error, but rather a profound difference in attitudes, feelings or simply preferences As there are no commonly accepted procedures for correcting any error, disputes are not resolved, but – in the best of cases – dissolved Finally controversies tend to begin by revolving around a specific subject, but soon spread – following an unpredictable course − to other problems, reflecting profound disagreements about fundamental premises of a factual, methodological or conceptual nature Thus even though they are based on some common principles which prevents the controversy from becoming totally anarchical or arbitrary, there is constant disagreement as to the interpretation of the data, the methodology used, the basic theory, etc As these divergences involve both attitudes and preferences and disagreements on the procedures for problem-solving, they are not restricted to any of these aspects, and cannot therefore be either solved or dissolved In the best of cases, controversies can be resolved via one of these three routes: a)The contenders or their reference community can recognise that one of the bands involved in the controversy has accumulated sufficient arguments in their favour to settle it b)The controversy can facilitate the emergence of new positions that are acceptable to the parties in dispute c)Each of the parties involved can clarify to the other what the disagreements generating the controversy consist of Dascal adds that the common feature of disputes, discussions and controversies is that they not appear in their pure state: in other words, real polemics tend to contain elements of each of the three ideal types of debate, which does not prevent analysts from being able to distinguish which of these types is dominant in each case In view of this, I will proceed to analyse what is the predominant type in the two debates that are the object of the present study The polemic on the identification of the voices that can be discerned in the Investigations contains several elements typical of discussions After all, this polemic has a clearly defined theme – the identification of voices − and one of its main disagreements revolves around a conceptual error – namely the interpretation of the voice Cavell attributes to correction, in addition to which the contenders appear to be far from reaching a consensus as to who is committing this conceptual error and who is right about it However, I not believe this polemic can be solved, as there is no procedure accepted by the contenders that enables the conceptual error to be corrected: since Wittgenstein never clearly expressed which were the voices in the Investigations and what function or functions each one of them had, it is extremely difficult to reach a consensus on this point The polemic on the voices seems to have fewer similarities with a dispute, as there are apparently no significant differences in attitudes, feelings or preferences among the contenders However, and in spite of appearances, I consider there to be an important difference on this point As I outlined in my exposition on this polemic, most of the authors have focused on the conceptual error I indicated in the paragraph above, thereby merely confining themselves to an interpretation of the text which allots no place to the reader, while other authors go so far as to include the reader in one form or another in the play of voices in the Investigations Thus the first group of authors appear to be satisfied with a limited interpretation of the content of the text, whereas the second group places the onus on the reader who immerses himself in the text and identifies with the different voices to the point that he ultimately ends by confronting his own resistances In my opinion, the polemic on the voices can be understood as a controversy Let us see why In the first place, this polemic arose around a specific issue, but then took an unpredictable course 8 Indeed, when Cavell formulated the initial distinction between a voice of temptation and another of correction, it must have been difficult to predict that years later an author like Peters – taking Cavell himself as his basis − would find in the Investigations the voices of the child, madness, the cultural or tribal other, and even a “nonvoice” We have also seen that the initial interpretation as a dialogue was questioned as a conceptual error, and that alternative interpretations were proposed with a greater number of voices, even going so far as to include the reader himself in one way another It is clear that if this polemic did not follow an anarchical course it was because the contenders share the conviction that the plays of voices in the Investigations have a markedly therapeutic character It is also evident that the mutual criticisms between the participants in this polemic have been somewhat lukewarm: I believe that this is due precisely to the contenders’ shared conviction that the Investigations is a text with a therapeutic nature However, as I said earlier, the disagreements are not limited either to differences in attitudes and preferences or to judgements on conceptual errors, and thus in principle they can be neither solved nor dissolved Let us now analyse the polemic on style This polemic, which revolves around a very specific issue – namely the relationship between the style and the content of the Investigations, cannot be solved because although it is based on a profound discrepancy over a conceptual error – a characteristic element of discussions, there are no procedures accepted by the contenders capable of correcting it This error is none other than the view of “philosophy” championed by non-stylists and hyper-stylists: the first are mostly analytic philosophers who – unlike the second – not consider philosophy to be a therapeutic and non-theoretical discipline, and both bands therefore also have a very different understanding of what must be considered important from a philosophical point of view It is apparent that the polemic on style in the Investigations has much more of a dispute about it, as non-stylists and hyper-stylists are divided by such a profound difference in attitudes, feelings and preferences that it appears practically impossible for both sides ever to reach a point where they will accept a common notion of “philosophy” The fact that this polemic is not reduced either to divergences with regard to attitudes and preferences or to disagreements on the procedures to be followed for solving problems means it can be considered a controversy It is true that the positions of non-stylists and hyper-stylists are so far apart that the criticisms that they have levelled at each other tend to be somewhat predictable; however, and as we shall see below, any attempts to reconcile both positions constitute developments in the controversy which, as they appear and are enriched, become ever more difficult to predict Therefore, if this controversy has developed to its present point it is because it is based on certain common principles, such as the acceptance of the fact that the philosophical problems addressed by Wittgenstein are conceptual misunderstandings which are gradually resolved through a description of the uses of language Once we have considered both polemics as controversies, we are in a position to continue with their analysis To start with, the controversy of the voices can be understood as a polemic arising within the controversy on style After all, Wittgenstein ultimately uses the voices as a stylistic resource This relation of inclusion is perceived more clearly if we note that the controversy on style is between hyper-stylists and non-stylists, whereas the controversy of the voices occurs only within one of these bands: the hyper-stylists, i.e., the band formed by authors interested in exploring the peculiarities of style in the Investigations Evidence of this is that the three representatives of the hyper-stylist band mentioned by Kanterian are Cavell, Pichler and Stern; in other words, the authors who have arguably been most influential in the polemic on the identification of the voices An added proof of the inclusion of the controversy of the voices within the controversy on style is that the latter is very close to a dispute due to the profound disagreements between the opposing bands; whereas the first is much closer to a discussion than to a dispute, since the main disagreement does not involve significant differences in attitude, feelings or preferences between the contenders, but a conceptual error Possible resolutions of the controversies In this section I propose to analyse how far each of the three methods of resolving controversies indicated by Dascal could point the way to settling the two controversies in this study The first route to resolution highlighted by Dascal was to recognise that one of the bands had accumulated a sufficient number of arguments in its favour to settle the controversy conclusively But while in the controversy on the voices there are no objective proofs with which to devise arguments accepted by the parties involved, in the controversy on styles there are such deep-seated differences between non-stylists and hyper-stylists that the conditions never occur for one of these bands to concede that the other’s argument has become so overwhelming that it leaves no room for reply However on this point the problem is not the difficulty of compiling a sufficient number of weighty arguments, but that the basic premises espoused by each band mean the arguments of the opposing side are not only seen as incorrect but also as irrelevant or lacking in interest 10 The second option is much more interesting and promising Indeed, the evolution of both controversies has generated a series of models and interpretations that point to an acceptable position of equilibrium for the parties in dispute The main attempt to find an intermediate and stable position in the controversy of the voices was made by Pichler (2004), who expressly recognised that the fact that he himself set out to understand the Investigations as a polyphonic work in no way implied that any interpretation seeking to extract theses or theories from this work should be rejected In Pichler’s opinion, these types of interpretations not concur with Wittgenstein’s intention when writing the Investigations: although he admits that some commentators may choose to make an analysis in consonance with Wittgenstein, while others may approach this work based on the perspective of a systematic philosophy Therefore Pichler leaves room in his polyphonic interpretation for all the interpretations that have been made on the Investigations, both by hyper-stylists and non-stylists In fact, Pichler believes that Wittgenstein’s role in the Investigations is none other than to analyse successively the advantages and disadvantages of theoretical and therapeutic or dissolvent philosophy However I consider Pichler’s contribution to the controversies of the voices and style as merely a commendable invitation to admit the mere coexistence of these positions: since far from suggesting how these positions could be integrated into a global or common interpretation, Pichler leaves it to Wittgenstein – and by extension to the reader himself − to decide what approach he considers to be the most suitable, which unfortunately causes us to return to our original point of departure In the controversy on style we have seen the appearance of not one but several attempts to explain the way Wittgenstein adapted his particular style to the philosophical method exemplified in the Investigations Kanterian (2012) gathered these contributions under the label “moderate stylism”; specifically, he referred to the works of Kienzler (1997), Heal (1995) and Baker and Hacker (2005), whose basic ideas I will summarise briefly In the first place, Kienzler (1997) suggests that Wittgenstein may have adopted the style of the Investigations when he wrote the first draft of this work and became aware that the style he had used previously in the Brown Book did not allow him to reflect the conflictive aspects of a philosophical problem with the brilliance found in the prose of Frege In second place, Heal (1995) maintains that the Investigations are as full of arguments as any other work of traditional philosophy, but notes that if the style had been different, four basic aspects of the Wittgensteinian discourse would have been lost: placing ideas reminiscent of the Tractatus in the mouth of an interlocutor to demonstrate their vigour; referring to the reader as “you” or to the eternally-tempted philosopher at the heart of each subject through the “we”; highlighting the therapeutic character of the Investigations through a therapist-patient dialogue; and 11 proposing examples through the dialogue so as to emphasise they are extracted from real life Finally, Baker and Hacker (2005) maintain that the Investigations reveal evidence of a double unity of method and theme; which is why, according to these authors (Baker and Hacker 2005: 34), the Investigations must be seen as a book of sketches by a painter who was ultimately incapable of covering a canvas After this summary of the three versions of moderate stylism, I find Heal’s proposal to be of particular interest, as in my opinion the therapeutic aspect of the Investigations – which according to Wittgenstein releases us from “the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language” (PI § 109) − does not necessarily exclude the possibility that this work lays down sound philosophical arguments, despite being hidden to a greater or lesser degree in complex metaphors and dialogues In any case, it remains to be seen whether the hyper-stylists will be willing to concede that Wittgenstein did in fact supply philosophical arguments, and whether the non-stylists, who conceive of philosophy as a type of collection of theses and philosophical theories, will give any attention to the style of the Investigations and, by extension, to the play of voices to be found in this work Although I have declared myself in favour of the proposal I have just mentioned, I consider that its markedly impersonal character is a serious defect which I would like to explore by analysing the third route for resolving controversies suggested by Dascal: I refer to the proposal of mutually clarifying the disagreements that originated the controversy In my opinion, the controversy of the voices is marked by the role conferred on the reader Thus we can distinguish a group of authors who – in their eagerness to follow Wittgenstein to the letter – limit themselves to analysing the play of voices in the Investigations in the simplest possible way; i.e merely discussing certain aspects of the dialogue model, in which one voice poses problems while the other seeks to ponder those problems from different points of view in order to dissolve them Paradoxically, these authors attempt to decipher the play of voices in the Investigations – therefore indicating to potential readers how to read the work − but neglect to take the reader into account In contrast, a second group of authors focuses on the reader of the Investigations, as they consider that in Wittgenstein’s words (CV), working on philosophy is above all working on oneself This is why they set out from the same perspective as the reader, and from the difficulties he might encounter when engaged in working on himself The initial disagreement in the controversy on style is so clear it does not even require mutual clarification On the one hand, the hyper-stylists have rigorously followed the Wittgensteinian commandments and sought almost obsessively to find meaning in each and every one of his writings and resources: as could be expected, this devotion to Wittgenstein signified they were in no 12 way willing to renounce such a fundamental principle of the Investigations as the one that cautions that we should not postulate “any kind of theory” in this work (cf PI § 109) On the other hand, the non-stylists were predominantly analytic philosophers involved in one form or another of philosophical analysis, but always remaining strictly faithful to the clarity of the arguments, based both on formal logic and on the analysis of language, and seeking to present a series of conclusions whose marked impersonal character comes as close as possible to the aseptic and rigorous expositions to be found in any specialised journal on physics or engineering Existential questions are devoid of all interest to the analytic philosopher, as the value of the style is merely to contribute as best possible to the clarity of the exposition of the conclusions or theories In other words, what the non-stylist seeks in the Investigations is above all theories, whereas the hyper-stylist cannot concede that this work presents any theory at all Should we therefore conclude that the third route of resolution of controversies suggested by Dascal is of no use to us in this case? I not believe so In my opinion, the opposing bands could mutually reproach each other that the two controversies in the study originated not only from different premises, but also – and very particularly – because all of them have simply engaged in a philosophy which can to some extent be described as impersonal In principle, this approach to philosophy appears to be adequate for the Investigations As Holguín (2003) says, philosophical grammar – understood as the rules and criteria governing the use of concepts – is essentially public, and it is therefore an error to claim that for Wittgenstein, philosophical problems were personal problems Indeed, philosophical problems consisted of misunderstandings in the use of a language that is public and shared, so the problems deriving from it can be experienced by any user of the language However, this – although true – is not the whole truth Cordua (1997) noted that for Wittgenstein philosophy does not arise solely from linguistic misunderstandings, but also from unsatisfied desires and tendencies in everyday life, from prejudices and superstitions, and from illconsidered positions of will, among other things Thus, and as Baker (2004) rightly said, the Investigations target each specific reader, since there are no universal rules for dissolving the philosophical prejudices of each individual; depending on the person involved, this or that grammatical analysis, this or that metaphor, this or that question may be useful The normativity inherent in the rules of our language games cannot account for the way in which each individual becomes caught up in miscellaneous grammatical misunderstandings, and much less can it account for the resistances of each person and the way of responding to them: this is the reason it is necessary in each case to find resources tailor-made to the needs of each individual in order to dissolve his or her problem or philosophical misunderstanding To illustrate how far the problems 13 addressed in the Investigations become personal, I would like to give an example based on the interpretation of Wittgenstein’s observations regarding the impossibility of private language that I offered some time ago (cf Ariso 2008) In these observations Wittgenstein starts from the premise that we view sensations as being our own special property, like something we possess − like the beetle that no one else can see because we have put it in a box which only we can access – and with which we are intimately familiar In other words, we habitually take for granted that when we use the term “pain”, we are referring to something much more important than a mere natural expression of pain, such as a cry for example Wittgenstein described this concern in the following terms: “Yes, but there is something there all the same accompanying my cry of pain And it is on account of that that I utter it And this something is what is important – and frightful” (PI § 296) But why does Wittgenstein say that this “something” is “frightful”? To answer this question, let us analyse the whole fragment We tend to believe our access to this “something” – i.e., the private object − constitutes our intimate experience of pain But precisely because it is a private and intransferable experience, the public term “pain” cannot refer to a private object Therefore are we really prepared to assume this idea with all its consequences? Are we prepared to assume that, because public or everyday language is the sphere in which the individual’s possibilities of expressing himself take place, the limits of his linguistic expression are the limits of his inner life? Would it not be difficult to admit, when we suffer an agonising toothache, that the limits of our inner life are none other than the limits of linguistic expression? Let us now see why Wittgenstein warns that the “something” is what is important and frightful In my opinion, it is important because discarding the private object is an essential requisite for developing a public language But it is also frightful because letting go of the idea of the private object can be taken as the renunciation of our inner self, of our mental life The difficult task is to convince ourselves that we have nothing to fear The difficult task is to assimilate the fact that our inner self, however hard it may be to believe, is beyond all harm in the safest possible place: language Regardless of whether my interpretation of what Wittgenstein said is correct or not, it is only natural that reflection on an argument of such importance should generate resistances, particularly as this reflection moves towards the acceptance of the proposed argument Once we become immersed in the work of responding to these resistances, the controversies on the voices and style of the Investigations could be resolved in Dascal’s sense – divesting the second option of its impersonal character, consisting of developing a new proposition that is acceptable to both bands − and/or dissolved in Wittgenstein’s sense; as the play of voices in the Investigations then appears as a direct expression of the conflict undergone by the subject who is confronting his resistances, while 14 style is natural because we constantly strive to tackle a problem and a series of resistances from different points of view and with different resources From this perspective, controversies such as the two we have analysed in this work can be seen to be incorrectly focused from the start, as they are based on a highly impersonal approach In other words, the commentator who is ensconced in that impersonal approach will continue to find both the play of voices and the style of the Investigations to be highly peculiar, which is the reason controversies have risen and continue unabated on this subject Faced with this attitude, the question is – as highlighted by Deaño (1983) – to stop saying what philosophy is and devote ourselves to doing it; or in other words, it is a matter of ceasing to become perpetually caught up in the intricacies of Wittgenstein’s philosophy in order finally to begin to practice it In my view, this is how we can resolve the controversies of the voices and style in the Investigations: by an act of self-criticism, and particularly by practising that type of dissolvent philosophy which would help us recognise that polemics such as those studied in this work arise because we tend to take a distant approach to analysing a work that is actually the expression of a profound inner conflict, an unfinished conflict in which many commentators appear simply to seek theories and a supposed internal order, overlooking the fact that in these situations the subject immersed in the conflict simply does what he can, when he can and how he can to confront his own resistances From this standpoint, the plays of voices and style are simply expressions deriving from the conflict; 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