Social Approval as a Collective Good: Hechter on Intentional Goods
This article introduces Hechter’s general theory of cooperation in the production of collective goods, emphasizing the role of formal organization It critiques the assumptions underlying his theory, particularly in relation to the production of intentional (immanent) goods, which are comparable to social approval generated collectively.
2.1 Hechter’s Model of Solidarity: External Mechanisms for Cooperation
Hechter’s rational choice theory aligns more with transaction cost economics and new institutionalism, emphasizing the necessity of centralized, formal organizations for production, rather than relying solely on market-driven price systems He posits that the establishment and preservation of norms depend on external agencies—such as organized groups, firms, and states—that create sanctioning systems This perspective contrasts with Coleman’s more decentralized approach, which is examined in section III of this chapter.
Hechter’s Principles of Group Solidarity (1987: hereafter, PGS) seeks to explain how groups form, and then develop and maintain solidarity Solidarity for
Hechter defines compliance as a continuous variable that reflects the extent to which individuals adhere to group norms and the breadth of those norms Groups emerge to create joint goods, which necessitate the collaboration of multiple agents and can exclude non-members from access Consequently, collective goods are simpler to produce than pure public goods, as they can limit participation to contributors and mitigate free-riding from outside the group, though they still encounter free-rider challenges within the group itself.
Hechter posits that the provision of selective incentives, which are essential for forming groups and delivering collective goods, constitutes a collective good in itself This creates a second-order collective action problem, where one actor needs a selective incentive to impose sanctions on a non-contributor Consequently, there must be further selective incentives for those who provide the initial selective (dis-)incentives, leading to an ongoing regress in the production of these incentives, referred to as the metanorm regress problem.
11 Hechter is here following Buchanan’s (1965) pioneering discussion of the economic theory of clubs.
Hechter's theory addresses the metanorm regress problem by emphasizing that individuals commit to a group focused on achieving a collective good This commitment involves creating a system for monitoring performance, which includes mechanisms for sanctioning or rewarding non-performance to ensure the collective good is realized.
Hecther’s view then, individuals can only produce a collective good by committing to form a group which has the power to force that set of individuals to produce the good.
Hechter’s theory, described as “contractarian” (1987) or “solidaristic” (1991), emphasizes intentional design over market mechanisms for producing collective goods Key aspects include the intentional creation of obligations that members must fulfill to access their share of the collective benefit To ensure compliance with these obligations, groups can either compensate members for their efforts or reward them through the provision of benefits, as outlined by Hechter.
Immanent goods are non-compensatory goods that directly fulfill the utility of their members, setting solidary groups apart from organizations like firms that depend on material rewards for compliance The level of solidarity within a group is influenced by the extent of its obligations and the degree to which members adhere to those obligations Furthermore, compliance is affected by the overall dependence of group members on one another.
Hechter defines sanctions as either positive or negative, with negative sanctions serving as punishments for non-performance and positive sanctions acting as rewards for performance Additionally, he emphasizes the importance of immanent goods and the group's control capacity, which refers to the level of monitoring and sanctioning available to the group.
Hechter aims to demonstrate that rational choice theories more effectively explain group solidarity compared to the structuralism and normativism of sociological rivals, maintaining a close alignment with the standard model.
Hechter's contribution to sociological rational choice challenges the traditional wealth-maximizing model by emphasizing egoism in the pursuit of non-material goods He posits that individuals prefer collectively provided goods, such as social goods, yet are reluctant to contribute to their production Hechter asserts, "whenever people are faced with two divergent courses of action—one in pursuit of some individual end, the other in pursuit of some collective end—I will assume that they will invariably choose the former." This perspective highlights the tendency of actors to prioritize individual desires over collective benefits.
“social” good (i.e., approval), he is still unmotivated to act to get the good if he can get that good without effort
Note, then, that Hechter’s account does not rely at all on the idea of social pressure or normative expectations of compliance Even though there may be
Informal sanctions are driven by the presence of a formal agency that rewards individuals for exerting social pressure, as suggested by PGS This perspective posits that motivations for cooperative behavior are primarily rooted in egoism Hechter's critique of the normativist view on social sanctions, particularly in the context of rotating credit associations, exemplifies this argument.
In many societies, defaulters may face imprisonment; however, research on rotating credit associations indicates that social sanctions often play a more significant role Geertz (1966) highlights that defaults are uncommon due to the close relationships among members, who feel a strong sense of shame about failing to meet their obligations Individuals may even resort to extreme measures, such as theft or selling a family member, to honor their commitments Ultimately, the fear of social ostracism serves as a powerful deterrent, as those known to default are unlikely to gain acceptance in future credit associations.
The argument for a "simpler" explanation of community sanctioning lacks validity The reliance on future membership in rotating credit associations does not simplify the understanding; both the normativist and egoistic perspectives focus on a single actor's aim—social approval or future income The perception that material gain is more fundamental than social approval does not inherently justify this view Additionally, while a normative explanation may obscure egoistic motivations, asserting that this is the sole interpretation remains unsubstantiated.
Hechter and supporters of the standard account urge social scientists to favor egoism, suggesting that while some individuals may act out of normative motivations, most such motivations are merely rationalizations for egoistic behavior However, this assertion lacks substantive argumentation and relies on speculation Upon closer examination, it becomes evident that this reasoning is not logically coherent.
2.2.1 Can Egoists Make Agreements to Act Collectively?
While I contend that egoistic motivations are unnecessary to explain group solidarity, I also argue that this perspective ultimately falls short My analysis begins with two fundamental criticisms of the argument.
Social Approval as a Selective Incentive: Coleman on the Emergence of Norms20 4 Conclusion
Coleman’s perspective on the emergence of norms differs from Hechter’s, as he posits that norms can develop independently of formal organizations He emphasizes that social approval serves as a crucial incentive for the formation of these norms.
Coleman posits that social approval can foster a “moral code” and the internalization of societal norms However, I contend that a moral framework or sense of justice is essential for understanding social approval, indicating that normative motivation must precede social approval in the explanatory sequence.
Coleman's Foundations of Social Theory (1990) aims to elucidate social facts such as the formation and maintenance of norms, individual adherence to these norms, the evolution of moral codes, and the alignment of personal interests with collective well-being He posits that these phenomena must be understood under the premise that actors are "norm free, self-interested." However, this section argues that normative systems, moral codes, and compliance with norms should be assumed rather than explained solely through the lens of self-interest.
15 A related argument can be found in Mansbridge (1997).
Coleman’s social theory focuses on explaining the creation and maintenance of norms, aiming to address the issue of social cost by reducing negative externalities in interactions He emphasizes that norms involve specific actions that can be either encouraged or discouraged, targeting individuals whose behavior is expected to align with these norms The beneficiaries of these norms are those interested in minimizing negative externalities or fostering positive ones Norms can be categorized as conjoint, where the targets and beneficiaries are the same group, or disjoint, where they involve different actors.
For a norm to develop, it is essential that stakeholders recognize a need to mitigate externalities and possess mechanisms for enforcing the norm This situation highlights the second-order collective action problem, also known as the metanorm problem Norms are likely to arise when the beneficiaries, acting rationally, can either equitably distribute the costs associated with sanctioning non-compliant actors or establish second-order sanctions within the group.
Coleman introduces the concept of "normative sanctions," which is more fitting than "social disapproval" as it highlights the normative implications of social sanctions on individuals For these sanctions to be effective, the sanctioned agent must comprehend the normative content behind them, which is the focus of the normative sanctions framework Additionally, Coleman addresses the challenge of the metanorm regress problem by suggesting that the motivation to impose sanctions arises from supportive close social relationships, or networks with low exit opportunities, rather than relying solely on formal controls, as emphasized by Hechter.
The motivation for forming social networks or groups arises from the assumption of their closure, presenting a collective action problem that requires sociological explanation, as highlighted by Hechter Coleman addresses the metanorm regress problem by proposing that the desire for approval and fear of disapproval drive behavior, introducing the concept of “rationality of zeal.” This notion suggests that while individuals may be tempted to free ride, an additional incentive, such as encouraging others or receiving positive sanctions, can effectively motivate cooperation and address the shortcomings of the initial incentive.
Coleman highlights the concept of the second-order collective action problem, which involves the rational incentive to punish those who fail to cooperate This issue arises from the need to incentivize the rewarding of individuals who take action against non-cooperators Essentially, the motivation to impose social disapproval on non-cooperators stems from the social approval that the sanctioner gains from their community.
The collective action problem presents a challenge due to the incentive for individuals to free ride To address this issue, it is essential to sanction free-riders while also rewarding the sanctioners According to Coleman, sanctioners gain social approval as their reward; however, this assumption raises questions about the underlying motivation for social approval in fostering cooperation This leads to a potential third-order collective action problem, known as the metanorm problem, which Coleman seems to overlook by presuming that the second-order issue is resolved.
In his work on social norms, Coleman posits that when certain actors have a strong interest in establishing a norm, they are motivated to impose sanctions on those who do not comply He suggests that if the perceived benefits of a norm outweigh the costs of sanctioning, actors are incentivized to enforce compliance Coleman notes that this reduction in costs for norm beneficiaries can lead to the establishment of a sanctioning norm However, he also points out that the level of interest or the costs associated with sanctioning do not effectively address the higher-order collective action problem, known as the metanorm regress, nor do they adequately explain the effectiveness of sanctions in promoting cooperative behavior, which often lacks sufficient egoistic motivation.
Coleman's motivational assumptions suggest that actors are primarily self-interested rather than motivated by social norms, which leads to the emergence of the free-rider problem By temporarily setting aside the complexities of the metanorm regress issue, we can examine how the assumption of self-interest influences actors' motivations to impose and accept sanctions.
Understanding the motivations behind sanctions is crucial; specifically, we must explore why sanctioners are driven to incur costs for addressing non-cooperative behavior and why those being sanctioned would accept such rebukes Addressing these questions requires an examination of the normative motivations of the actors involved Focusing on the second question, we can gain insights by referencing significant perspectives on the matter.
The sanctioner may have relied on implicit support from the individual being sanctioned, believing that they acknowledged the normative definition of right actions and recognized their wrongdoing Additionally, the sanctioner could discuss the event later with others who share similar opinions, receiving encouraging feedback that reinforces their disciplinary actions.
Sanctioners often rely on implicit support from the target actor or subsequent approval from a third party, rooted in a shared understanding of right and wrong This reliance is guided by norms that dictate appropriate actions, offering the sanctioner an expectation of approval from those who uphold these norms Consequently, the presence of such norms creates a framework within which sanctioners anticipate validation for their actions from norm holders.
I will make four claims regarding Coleman’s argument in this section, all of which I shall show to be in contrast to the assumption of self-interest.
The concept of a "paradoxical" assumption arises when a sanctioned actor accepts the definition of what is right yet fails to act accordingly This raises the question: if the actor acknowledges the normative standard, why do they not follow it? While one might attribute this to weakness of will or myopia, the assumption of motivational conflict is not considered Although Coleman recognizes the presence of multiple interests, he does not clarify why normative interests prevail over selfish ones in the face of sanctions.