The Economics of Shame Values, Price and Sanctions in Public Goods Provision

The Economics of Shame: Values, Price and Sanctions in Public Goods Provision A thesis submitted to the Department of Sociology, University of Oxford, for the degree of D.Phil Shepley W Orr Balliol College Trinity Term, 2008 i The Economics of Shame: Values, Price and Sanctions in Public Goods Provision Shepley W Orr Department of Sociology and Balliol College, University of Oxford Trinity Term, 2008 Abstract The thesis is an attempt to develop a rational choice theory of social sanctions More specifically, the thesis is a theoretical (in Part I) and empirical-experimental (in Part II) enquiry into the optimal balance between informal and formal institutional approaches to solving the problem of cooperation In chapter I take a “negative” approach: that is, I develop my argument through a criticism of two of the most prominent attempts in sociology to explain social cooperation using a rational choice framework, Coleman’s Foundations of Social Theory and Hechter’s Principles of Group Solidarity I criticize these models for failing to explain either the motivations to comply when sanctioned, or the motivations of those who sanction Chapter argues that because an agent may recognize their own ability to act on their own best interests, subject to constraints on the level of social sanctions received, an agent may rationally rely on other people to help them enforce the agent’s own aims In an appendix to the thesis I provide a philosophical critique of one influential rational choice approach to self-control In chapter I apply the theoretical model developed in the first two chapters to the case of cooperation in work groups I use motivational crowding theory to argue that because the social rewards for cooperation that may develop through work are potentially based in a desire for pecuniary gain, withholding approval may matter less to initially cooperative agents Hence, mutual monitoring can decrease cooperation in teams Part II of the thesis attempts to subject some of the theoretical claims in part I to empirical, laboratory test In chapter I operationalize the notion of different motivational types using the scale of social value orientations, a trust scale, and a measure of cooperative reasoning I find that there is only roughly such a “cooperative type” In the experiment reported in chapter 5, my hypotheses are tested by providing a standard public goods design along with an opportunity for punishment at the end of each contribution round, such that after contributing (or not), each individual is given feedback on other group members’ contributions, and is allowed to assign monetary punishment points to them The prediction, therefore, is that cooperative types will contribute and punish less than individualists in the condition where there is a costly punishment mechanism This prediction is largely borne out in the results of the experiment ii Table of Contents ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS INTRODUCTION: SOCIAL SANCTIONS AND COOPERATION VI VIII PART I: A THEORETICAL INVESTIGATION INTO VALUES, SANCTIONS AND COOPERATION IN PUBLIC GOODS PROVISION CHAPTER 1: SOCIAL APPROVAL AS A SELECTIVE INCENTIVE AND A COLLECTIVE GOOD: A MOTIVATIONAL CROWDING CRITIQUE Approval Incentives in Sociological Models of Collective Action .2 Social Approval as a Collective Good: Hechter on Intentional Goods Social Approval as a Selective Incentive: Coleman on the Emergence of Norms20 Conclusion 34 CHAPTER 2: SHAME AND SELF-CONTROL: RESOLVING COLEMAN’S PARADOX AND DEFINING SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS 37 Introduction: Coleman’s Paradox and Weakness of Will 37 Defining Shame: Feeling Ashamed and Shaming Others 47 Rational Shame and Self-Conscious Emotions 60 Conclusion: Rational Shame as Reinforcing Reasons versus Reducing Costs 70 CHAPTER 3: THE ECONOMICS OF SHAME IN WORK GROUPS: HOW MUTUAL MONITORING CAN DECREASE COOPERATION IN TEAMS 73 Introduction: Social Pressure Through Monitoring in Agency Theory .73 Social Rewards and Sanctions in Work Groups: Previous Economic Models 77 Social Relationships as Supportive or Controlling External Intervention 82 93 Conclusion: Implication for Research on Incentives in Work Groups 94 Appendix to Chapter 3: Modifying Hollander’s Social Exchange Equilibrium to Account for Motivational Crowding .96 PART II: AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION INTO VALUES, SANCTIONS AND COOPERATION IN PUBLIC GOODS PROVISION 100 CHAPTER 4: BELIEFS, PREFERENCES AND PRINCIPLES: HOW BEST TO MEASURE COOPERATIVE DISPOSITIONS? 101 Introduction: Motivational Solutions in Promoting Cooperation .101 Social Value Orientation Measures: Construct and Operational Definitions 104 iii Measures of Social Value Orientation: History 105 Behavioural and Attitudinal Correlates of Social Value Orientations .116 Social Value Orientations and Sufficient Conditions for Identifying Cooperative Types: Study .119 Conclusion 126 CHAPTER 5: COOPERATION AND PUNISHMENT: THE EFFECTS OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN VALUES 129 Background: Sanctions in Promoting Cooperation 129 Value Orientations, Punishment and Cooperation: Study 133 Conclusion: Crowding out normative motivations 148 CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 150 Appendix II: Chapter 5: Psychometric Scales Used and Experimental Instructions for the Public Goods Experiments 201 REFERENCES 217 iv Tables and Figures Table 2.1: Preference Types and Functions of Other People 43 Figure 2.1: Shame as a Process which Induces Conformity 67 Figure 3.1: Crowding Out Normative Motivation 94 Figure 3.2: Cognitive Mechanisms of Motivational Crowding 95 Figure 4.1: Pruitt’s Decomposed Games 109 Figure 4.2: Liebrand’s Motivational Vectors 116 Table 4.1: The Triangle Hypothesis 118 Table 4.2: Reliability Analyses and Descriptive Statistics 125 Table 4.3: Correlation Results among Scales 126 Table 5.1: T-Tests on Individual Orientations and Cooperation 139 Figure 5.1: Contributions by Decision Heuristic Usage 141 Figure 5.2: Contributions by Trust Type 142 Figure 5.3: Contributions by Social Value Orientation 143 Table 5.2: T-Tests on Individual Orientations and Punishment 144 Figure 5.4: Punishment Points and Decision Heuristic Usage 145 Figure 5.5: Punishment Points and Trust Type 146 Figure 5.6: Punishment Points and Social Value Orientation 147 Table 5.3: Comparisons of T-Tests for Cooperation and Punishment 147 Figure A.1: Approaches to Intertemporal Choice 167 v Acknowledgements This document is the result of the help of many people’s assistance I must first and foremost thank the late Michael Bacharach Michael found me on his doorstep, as it were, questioning the philosophical foundations of rational choice theory He offered tutelage, advice and moral support in both the theoretical and experimental components of my work, and the thesis would not exist were it not for him He is sorely missed Avner Offer also deserves particular credit for showing faith and support, and for teaching me a great deal I also must thank Peter Abell, Michael Hechter and Gerry Mackie, who have all served as supervisors for my thesis, for their encouragement and advice in the early stages, which helped me discover what I wanted to say A special word of thanks should be offered to Ernst Fehr and Simon Gachter When I read an unpublished version of their paper “Cooperation and Punishment”, I was inspired to follow up their study using my own thoughts on informal sanctions I contacted them both and in the best spirit of academic practice, they made available their own experimental software so that I could conduct my study Simon especially has been a friendly critic and supporter since then Diego Gambetta also deserves special thanks for thinking it perfectly natural that I should become a sociological experimental economist, and for much appreciated encouragement over many years Steve Fisher and Iain McClean read a draft of the thesis in my confirmation of status, and made numerous suggestions, in addition to encouragement, for which I am extremely grateful Anthony Heath deserves warm thanks for picking up the ball at the last minute and very selflessly offering his time, advice and support to finish the job I must also thank Robert Sugden, who has read most of the thesis and offered his suggestions, and more vi importantly has encouraged me to not be afraid to experiment with my ideas and subject them to criticism In addition, I must list others with whom I have shared thoughts and who have shared their thoughts with me on topics related to those discussed in the thesis: Luca Corazzini, Nir Eyal, Steve Fisher, Natalie Gold, James Harris, Gerald Lang, Martin O’Neill, Micah Schwartzman Adam Swift, and Daniel Zizzo, and anonymous reviewers for comments on chapters and 3, and the appendix from the journals Rationality and Society, Kyklos, and Economics and Philosophy respectively.1 I must thank my parents for their love, support and encouragement Lastly, I must thank the person without whom this thesis would never have been completed, who, in addition to copyediting my horrendous writing, has supported, prodded and cared for me in every way while writing it: my wife Jo Chapter was published in Kyklos, while chapter is currently revise and resubmit at Rationality and Society vii Introduction: Social Sanctions and Cooperation This thesis is an attempt to develop a rational choice theory of social sanctions The “problem of cooperation” has become a prominent focus of enquiry across the social sciences in recent times, and this is another contribution to that enquiry More specifically, this thesis is a contribution to the enquiry into the optimal balance between informal and formal institutional approaches to solving the problem of cooperation, based on distinguishing between different value orientations in a population That is, I explore the interaction between the use of formal sanctioning techniques (e.g., through states, firms, voluntary organizations) with the use of informal sanctioning techniques (e.g., social sanctioning through expressions of disapproval) Let me be more specific about my basic claim concerning the aims of this thesis By a rational choice theory I mean one which explains action in terms of beliefs and desires, but also includes the intentional states of the agent as part of what matters in the outcomes of actions (i.e., one in which the concept of a consequence can include the intentional states of the agent) By social sanctions I mean forms of social approval and disapproval that lead to a particular acting in accordance with some social norm.2 The thesis is in two parts, with part one developing a theoretical model of social sanctions, and part two testing parts of that theory in the context of a public goods experiment Let me now briefly introduce the content of the chapters which follow In what follows, “complying with a social norm”, “contributing to a public good” and “cooperation” are treated as synonymous viii In chapter I take a “negative” approach: that is, I develop my argument through a criticism of two of the most prominent attempts in sociology to explain social cooperation using a rational choice framework, Coleman’s Foundations of Social Theory and Hechter’s Principles of Group Solidarity Coleman and Hechter are useful in particular because they represent the two main schools of thought on explaining the emergence of cooperation: through decentralized and centralized authority Coleman argues that cooperation can be explained without a centralized authority structure, and cooperation can instead emerge through the use of individual social sanctions, in which the sanction is an expression of social disapproval That is, where social approval is a selective incentive to promote cooperation I criticize this model for failing to explain either the motivations to comply when sanctioned, or the motivations of those who sanction I argue that by relying on self-interested motivation, the kind of moral content to intentions required to explain social sanctions (for either the sanctioner or sanctionee) are missing In contrast to Coleman, Hechter rejects the argument from explaining decentralized social sanctions and instead argues that centralized authority structures are required to explain cooperation, particularly in large groups I argue that, although formal controls work to promote cooperative behaviour, formal controls cannot explain cooperation in the production of what I call (modifying Hechter’s terminology) intentional immanent goods, in which approval is a kind of collective good Such goods require that agents act in accordance with the value that the intentional immanent good requires, not self-interest ix Chapter addresses two questions that were raised in chapter one concerning a situation which Coleman calls paradoxical First, if it is assumed that agents are rational, then they act on their all-things-considered best interest However, to accept a social sanction means that an agent failed to act on a desire that they feel they should have How is this possible? I argue that to explain the efficacy of social sanctions, it must be assumed that agents may fail to act on their all-thingsconsidered desires The second question is, if agents may fail to act in their best interests, why should other people be so effective in enforcing an agent’s own aims? I argue that because an agent may recognize their own ability to act on their own best interests, subject to constraints on the level of social sanctions received, an agent may rationally rely on other people to help them enforce the agent’s own aims In this argument I extend Ainslie’s (1992) and Schelling’s (1984) approach to myopic decision making, in which agents attempt to enforce rules on themselves which will prevent their myopia However, because these rules are subject to hedging, leading the agent to act contrary to the interests that led to the formation of the rule, other people may serve as better enforcers of the rule, as other people have no vested interest in hedging on the personal rules However, the same logic that applies to Ainslie’s “downside of willpower” (i.e., that one may become overly rigid in one’s self-control, or a “rule-worshipper”) also applies to social sanctions: other people may become too rigid in their enforcement of another agent’s personal rules Such external intervention in the agent’s activities may lead to resentment and an undermining of the agent’s (already diminished) sense of self-control, which may ultimately lead to even greater loss of self-control in future This is why certain types of intervention (i.e., social sanctioning) are resented by sanctioned agents when the sanctions not respect the sanctioned agent’s reasons I follow Elster’s x Bolton, Gary and Axel Oxenfels (2000) ERC – A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity and Competition, American Economic Review, 90: 166-193 Boudon, Raymond (2001) The Origin of Values: Sociology and Philosophy of Beliefs Piscataway, NJ, Transaction Publishers Bovens, Luc (1995) The Intentional Acquisition of Mental States Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55: 821-40 Bowles, Samuel (1998) Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Market and other Economic Institutions, Journal of Economic Literature, 36: 75111 Bowles, Samuel and Herbert Gintis (1998) Mutual Monitoring in Teams: The Effects of Residual Claimancy and Reciprocity Santa Fe Institute Working Paper #98-08-074E (http://www-unix.oit.umass.edu/~gintis/mumonit_abst.html) Boyd, Robert and Peter J Richerson (1992) Punishment Allows the Evolution of Cooperation (or Anything Else) in Sizable Groups, Ethology and Sociobiology 13: 171-195 Braithwaite, John (1989) Crime, Shame and Reintegration Cambridge, Cambridge University Press Bratman, Michael (1998) Toxin, Temptation and the Stability of Intention In Rational Commitment and Social Justice: Essays for Gregory S Kavka, Jules L Coleman and Christopher W Morris (eds.) Cambridge University Press, 59-83 (Cited after the reprint in Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency Cambridge University Press (1999), 58-90) Brennan, Geoffry and Philip Pettit (2000) The Hidden Economy of Esteem, Economics and Philosophy, 16: 77-98 219 Broome, John (2000) Instrumental Reasoning In Rationality, Rules, and Structure, Julian Nida-Rumelin and Wolfgang Spohn (eds.) Kluwer Academic Publishers, 195-207 Buchanan, James (1965) An Economic Theory of Clubs, Economica, 32: 1-14 Burawoy, Michael (1979) Manufacturing Consent: Changes in the Labor Process under Monopoly Capitalism Chicago, University of Chicago Press Campbell, Donald E (1995) Incentives: Motivation and the Economics of Information Cambridge, Cambridge University Press Calvert, Randall (1995) Rational Actors, Equilibrium, and Social Institutions In Explaining Social Institutions, Jack Knight and Itai Sened (eds.) Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan Press: 57-94 Coase, Ronald (1960) The Problem of Social Cost, Journal of Law and Economics, 3(1): 1-44 Coleman, James S (1990) Foundations of Social Theory Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press Davis, Douglas D and Charles A Holt (1993) Experimental Economics Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press De Dreu, Carsten K.W and Terry L Bowles (1998) Share and Share Alike or Winner Take All? The Influence of Social Value Orientation upon the Choice and Recall of Negotiation Heuristics Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 76: 253-76 Deutsch, Morton and Harold B Gerard (1955) A Study of Normative Individual Judgment, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 51: 629-36 220 Deutsch, Morton (1985) Distributive Justice New Haven, CT, Yale University Press Dickens, William H (1986) Crime and Punishment Again: The Economic Approach with a Psychological Twist, Journal of Public Economics 30(1): 97107 Elster, Jon (1983) Ulysees and the Sirens Cambridge University Press Elster, Jon (1999) Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions New York, Cambridge University Press Elster, Jon (2000) Ulysees Unbound Cambridge University Press Enzle, Michael E and Sharon C Anderson (1993) Surveillant Intentions and Intrinsic Motivation, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 64(2): 257266 Evans, George W and C.M Crumbaugh (1966) Effects of Prisoner's Dilemma Format on Cooperative Behavior, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 3: 486-488 Fehr, Ernst and Simon Gachter (2000) Cooperation and Punishment, American Economic Review, 90: 980-994 Fehr, Ernst and Karl Schmidt (1999) A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114: 817-868 Festinger, Leon (1954) A Theory of Social Comparison Processes, Human Relations, 7: 114-140 Frank, Robert H (1992) Melding sociology and economics: James Coleman’s Foundations of Social Theory, Journal of Economic Literature 30: 147-70 221 Frankfurt, Harry (1971) Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, Journal of Philosophy, 68: 5-20 Frey, Bruno S (1993) Does Monitoring Increase Work Effort? The Rivalry with Trust and Loyalty, Economic Inquiry 31: 663-670 Frey, Bruno S (1997a) A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues, The Economic Journal 107: 1043-1053 Frey, Bruno S (1997b) Not Just for the Money: An Economic Theory of Personal Motivation London, Elgar Frey, Bruno S and Reto Jegen (2001) Motivation Crowding Theory: A Survey of Empirical Evidence, Journal of Economic Surveys, 15: 589-681 Gallo, Philip S., Sandra G Funk, and Joseph R Levine (1969) Reward Size, Method of Presentation, and Number of Alternatives in a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 13: 239-244 Gauthier, David (1986) Morals by Agreement Oxford University Press Gauthier, David (1996) Commitment and Choice: An Essay on the Rationality of Plans In Ethics, Rationality and Economic Behavior, Francesco Farina, Frank Hahn and Stefano Vannucci (eds.) Clarendon Press, 217-43 Geertz, Clifford (1966) The Rotating Credit Association: A ‘Middle Rung’ in Development In Social Change: The Colonial Situation Immanuel Wallerstein (Ed.) New York, John Wiley: 420-6 Gilbert, Paul (1998) What is Shame?: Some Core Issues and Controversies In Shame: Interpersonal Behavior, Psychopathology, and Culture P Gilbert and B Andrews (Eds.) New York, Oxford University Press: 3-38 222 Gneezy, Uri and Aldo Rustichini (2000) A Fine is a Price, Journal of Legal Studies, 29: 1-18 Goldfarb, Robert.S and Warren B Griffith (1991) Amending the Economist’s “Rational Egoist” Model to Include Moral Values and Norms, Part 2: Alternative Solutions In Social Norms and Economic Institutions, K.J Koford and J.B Miller (Eds.) Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press: 59-84 Hampshire, Stuart (1959) Thought and Action Oxford University Press Hampton, Jean (1984) The Moral Education Theory of Punishment, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 14: 208-38 Hechter, Michael (1987) Principles of Group Solidarity Berkeley, CA, University of California Press Hechter, Michael (1991) The emergence of cooperative social institutions In Social Institutions: Their Emergence, Maintenance and Effects, Michael Hechter, Karl-Dieter Opp and Thomas Voss (eds.) New York, Aldine de Gruyter: 13-33 Heckathorn, Douglas D (1993) Collective Action and Group Heterogeneity: Voluntary Provision versus Selective Incentives, American Sociological Review 58(3): 329-50 Hobbes, Thomas 1960 (1651) Leviathan Blackwell Hollander, Heinz (1990) A Social Exchange Approach to Voluntary Cooperation, American Economic Review 80(5): 1157-1167 Hollis, Martin (1987) The Cunning of Reason Cambridge University Press Hollis, Martin (1994) The Philosophy of Social Science: An Introduction Cambridge University Press 223 Homans, George C (1951) The Human Group London, Routledge & Keegan Paul Ltd Horne, Christine (2001) Sociological Perspectives on the Emergence of Norms In Social Norms Michael Hechter and Karl-Dieter Opp (eds.) New York, Russell Sage Foundation Press: 3-34 Hubin, Donald C (2001) The Groundless Normativity of Instrumental Reason, Journal of Philosophy, 98: 445-68 Hurley, Susan and Nick Chater (Eds.) (2005) Perspectives on Imitation: From Neuroscience to Social Science Cambridge, MA, Bradford Books Jackson, Frank (1986) What Mary Didn’t Know, Journal of Philosophy, 83: 291-5 Jones, Stephen R.G (1984) The Economics of Conformism Oxford, Basil Blackwell Kandel, Eugene and Edward P Lazear (1992) Peer Pressure and Partnerships, Journal of Political Economy 100(4): 801-817 Kavka, Gregory (1983) The Toxin Puzzle, Analysis, 43: 33-6 Kelley, Harold H., and Anthony J Stahelski (1970) Social Interaction Basis of Cooperators and Competitors’ Beliefs About Others, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 16(1): 66-91 Keltner, David and L A Harker (1998) The forms and functions of the nonverbal signal of shame In Shame: Interpersonal Behavior, Psychopathology and Culture P Gilbert and B Andrews (eds) New York, Oxford University press: 77-98 224 Knight, George P and Alan F Dubro (1984) Cooperative, Competitive, and Individualistic Social Values: An Individualized Regression and Clustering Approach, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 46: 98-105 Kollock, Peter (1998) Social Dilemmas: The Anatomy of Cooperation, Annual Review of Sociology, 24: 183-214 Komorita, Samuel S and Craig D Parks (1996) Social Dilemmas Boulder, CO, Westview Press Korsgaard, Christine 1997 The Normativity of Instrumental Reason In Ethics and Practical Reason, Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut (eds.) Oxford University Press, 215-54 Kuran, Timur (1995) Private Truth, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press Lane, Robert (1991) The Market Experience Cambridge, Cambridge University Press Le Grand, Julian (2003) Motivation, Agency, and Public Policy Oxford, Oxford University Press Ledyard, James O (1995) Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research In The Handbook of Experimental Economics John H Kagel and Alvin E Roth (Eds.) Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press: 111-94 Levi, I (1986) Hard Choices: Decision Making Under Unresolved Conflict Cambridge, Cambridge University Press Levine, David I (1992) Piece Rates, Output Restriction, and Conformism, Journal of Economic Psychology 13: 473-489 225 Lewis, Michael (1998) Shame and stigma In Shame: Interpersonal Behavior, Psychopathology and Culture P Gilbert and B Andrews New York, Oxford University press: 126-140 Liebrand, Wim B.G (1984) The Effect of Social Motives, Communication and Group Size on Behavior in an N-Person Multi-Stage Mixed-Motive Game, European Journal of Social Psychology, 22:203-15 Liebrand, Wim B.G., Ronald W Jansen, Victor M Rijken, and Cor J Suhre (1986) Might Over Morality: Social Values and the Perception of Other Players in Experimental Games, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 22: 203-215 Lind, E.A and T Tyler (1988) The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice New York, Plenum Press Loomes, Graham and Robert Sugden (1982) Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice under Uncertainty, Economic Journal, 92: 805-24 Lurie, Steven (1987) A parametric model of utility for two-person distributions, Psychological Review, 94: 42-60 MacCrimmon, Kenneth R and David M Messick (1976) A Framework for Social Motives Behavioral Science, 21: 86-100 Macy, Michael (1993) Backward-looking social control, American Sociological Review, 58: 819-36 Mansbridge, J (1997) Starting with Nothing: On the Impossibility of Grounding Norms Solely in Self-Interest, In Economics, Values and Organization, A BenNer and L Putterman (eds.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 151-168 Massaro, Toni (1997) The Meanings of Shame: Implications for Legal Reform, Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 3: 645-704 226 McClean, Iain and Colin Jennings (2006) “Introduction: Public Finance, Public Choice, and Political Economy” In Applying the Dismal Science Iain McClean and Colin Jennings (Eds.) London, Palgrave: 1-23 McClennen, Edward F (1989) Justice and the Problem of Stability, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 18: 3-30 McClennen, Edward F (1990) Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations Cambridge University Press McClenen, Edward F (1997) Pragmatic rationality and Rules, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 26:210-58 McClintock, Charles G (1972) Social Motivation- A Set of Propositions, Behavioral Science, 17: 438-54 Messick, David M and Charles G McClintock (1968) Motivational Basis of Choice in Experimental Games Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 3: 85-101 Messick, David M and Keith P Sentis (1985) Estimating Social and Non-Social Utility Functions from Ordinal Data, European Journal of Social Psychology, 15: 389-99 Miceli, Maria (1992) How to Make Someone Feel Guilty: Strategies of Guilt Inducement and their Goals, Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 22: 81104 Milgrom, Paul and John Roberts (1990) Economics, Organization and Management New York, Prentice-Hall Miller, David (1976) Social Justice Oxford, Oxford University Press 227 Millgram, Elijah (1995) Was Hume a Humean?, Journal of Hume Studies, 21: 75-93 Millgram, Elijah 1997 Practical Induction Harvard University Press Mischel, Walter and Yuichi Shoda (1995) A Cognitive-Affective System Theory of Personality: Reconceptualizing Situations, Dispositions, Dynamics, and Invariance in Personality Structure, Psychological Review, 102: 246-68 Nagel, Thomas 1979 ‘What is it Like to be a Bat?, In Mortal Questions, Cambridge University Press, 165-180 North, Douglass (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance Cambridge, Cambridge University Press Nozick, Robert (1974) Anarchy, State and Utopia Basic Books Nozick, Robert (1983) Philosophical Explanations Cambridge, MA, Havard University Press Nozick, Robert (1993) The Nature of Rationality Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press Offer, Avner (1997) Between the Gift and the Market: The Economy of Regard, Economic History Review, 3: 450-76 Oskamp, Stuart and David Perlman (1965) Factors Affecting Cooperation in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 9: 359-74 Parfit, Derek (1984) Reasons and Persons Oxford University Press Pears, David (1968) Deciding and Predicting In Studies in the Philosophy of Thought and Action, P.F Strawson (ed.) Oxford University Press, 97-133 228 Petersen, Trond (1992a) Individual, Collective, and Systems Rationality in Work Groups: Dilemmas and Market-Type Solutions, American Journal of Sociology 98(3): 469-510 Petersen, Trond (1992b) Individual, Collective, and Systems Rationality in Work Groups: Dilemmas and Non-market Solutions, Rationality and Society 4(3): 332355 Pettit, Philip (1990) Virtus Normativa: Rational Choice Perspectives, Ethics, 100: 725-55 Pettit, Philip (1996) Institutional Design and Rational Choice In The Theory of Institutional Design Robert Goodin (Ed.) Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 54-89 Pruitt, Dean G (1967) Reward Structure and Cooperation: The Decomposed Prisoner’s Dilemma Game, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 7: 217 Pruitt, Dean G (1970) Motivational Processes in the Decomposed Prisoner’s Dilemma Game, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 14(3): 227-38 Quinn, Warren (1993) Putting Rationality in its Place In Morality and Action Cambridge University Press, 228-55 Rabin, Matthew (1995) Moral Preferences, Moral Constraints, and Self-Serving Bias Unpublished MS, Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley Ramsey, Frank P (1931) Truth and probability In The Foundations of Mathematics R B Braithwaite (ed.) London, Routledge Kegan and Paul: 15698 229 Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press Raz, Joseph (1990) Practical Reasoning and Norms, Rev Ed Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press Rotemberg, Julio J (1994) Human Relations in the Workplace, Journal of Political Economy, 102: 684-717 Roy, Donald (1952) Work Satisfaction and Social Reward in Quota Achievement: An Analysis of Piecework Incentive, American Sociological Review 18(5): 507514 Sabini, John and Maury Silver (1982) The Moralities of Everyday Life Oxford, Oxford University Press Sattler, Deborah and Norbert L Kerr (1991) Might vs Morality Explored: Motivational and Cognitive Bases for Social Motives, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60: 756-765 Sawyer, Jack (1969) The Altruism Scale: A Measure of Co-operative, Individualistic, and Competitive Interpersonal Orientation American Journal of Sociology, 71: 407-16 Scheff, Thomas J (1988) Shame and Conformity: The Deference-Emotion System, American Sociological Review, 53: 395-406 Schelling, Thomas C 1960 The Strategy of Conflict Harvard University Press Schelling, Thomas (1984) Enforcing Rules on Oneself Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 1: 357-74 Schick, Frederic (1991) Understanding Action: An Essay on Reasons Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 230 Schick, Frederic (1997) Making Choices: A Recasting of Decision Theory Cambridge, Cambridge University Press Searle, John (1980) Minds, Brains and Programs, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3: 450-6 Sen, Amartya (1977) Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6: 317-44 Sethi, Raji and E Somanathan (1996) The Evolution of Social Norms in Common Property Resource Use, American Economic Review 86(4):765-788 Singer, Peter (1973) Altruism and Commerce: A Defence of Titmuss against Arrow, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 2: 312-20 Sugden, Robert (1985a) Review of The Economics of Conformism- S.R.G Jones, Economic Journal 95: 502-4 Sugden, Robert (1985b) Regret, Recrimination and Rationality, Theory and Decision, 19: 77-99 Sugden, Robert (1986) The Economics of Rights, Cooperation and Welfare Oxford: Basil Blackwell Sugden, Robert (1993) Thinking as a Team: Towards an Explanation of NonSelfish Behaviour, Social Philosophy and Policy, 10: 69-89 Tangney, June P., R.S Miller, L Flicker, and D.H Barlow (1996) Are Shame, Guilt and Embarrassment Distinct Emotions? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70: 1256-1269 231 Tantam, Digby (1998) The Emotional Disorders of Shame In Shame: Interpersonal Behavior, Psychopathology, and Culture P Gilbert and B Andrews (Eds.) New York, Oxford University Press: 161-175 Taylor, Gabrielle (1985) Pride, Shame and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment Cambridge, Cambridge University Press Titmuss, Richard M (1971) The Gift Relationship London, Allen and Unwin Turner, Jonathan (1991) Social Influence Milton Keynes, Open University Press Van Lange, Paul A.M and Wim B.G Liebrand (1991) Social Value Orientation and Intelligence: A Test of the Goal Prescribes Rationality Principle, European Journal of Social Psychology, 21: 273-292 Van Lange, Paul A.M and D Michael Kuhlman (1994) Social value Orientations and Impressions of Partner's Honesty and Intelligence: A Test of the Might versus Morality Effect, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67: 126-141 Van Lange, Paul A.M , W Otten, E.M.N De Bruin and J.A Joiremann (1997) Development of Prosocial, Individualistic and Competitive Orientations: Theory and Preliminary Evidence, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73: 733-46 Van Lange, Paul A.M (1992) Confidence in Expectations: A Test of the Triangle Hypothesis, European Journal of Personality, 6: 371-79 Velleman, J.D (1997) Deciding How to Decide In Ethics and Practical Reason, Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut (eds.) Oxford University Press, 29-52 Whyte, William F (1955) Money and Motivation New York, Harper and Row 232 Williams, Bernard (1993) Shame and Necessity Berkeley, CA, University of California Press Williamson, Oliver (1985) The Economic Institutions of Capitalism New York, Free Press Wyer, Robert S (1969) Prediction of Behavior in Two-Person Games, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 13: 222-8 Yamagishi, Toshio and Kaori Sato (1986) Motivational Bases of the Public Goods Problem Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50(1): 67-73 Yamagishi, Toshio (1988) The Provision of a Sanctioning System in the United States and Japan, Social Psychology Quarterly, 51: 264-70 233 ... actions in the interests of persons other than the actor, internal and external sanctions constitute two forms of policing: internal and external policing The process of creating an internal policing.. .The Economics of Shame: Values, Price and Sanctions in Public Goods Provision Shepley W Orr Department of Sociology and Balliol College, University of Oxford Trinity Term, 2008 Abstract The thesis... social norm.2 The thesis is in two parts, with part one developing a theoretical model of social sanctions, and part two testing parts of that theory in the context of a public goods experiment