Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory edited by Fiona Macpherson and Fabian Dorsch 1 3 Great Clarendon.
Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory edited by Fiona Macpherson and Fabian Dorsch Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP, United Kingdom Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries © the several contributors 2018 The moral rights of the authors have been asserted First Edition published in 2018 Impression: All rights reserved No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Control Number: 2017964294 ISBN 978–0–19–871788–1 Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and for information only Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials contained in any third party website referenced in this work In memory of Fabian Dorsch (1974–2017) An honest man here lies at rest, The friend of man, the friend of truth, The friend of age, and guide of youth: Few hearts like his, with virtue warm’d, Few heads with knowledge so inform’d; If there’s another world, he lives in bliss; If there is none, he made the best of this —Epitaph On A Friend Robert Burns Contents Preface and Acknowledgements Notes on Contributors Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory: An Overview Fiona Macpherson ix xi Part I The Nature of Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory Aristotle on Distinguishing Phantasia and Memory R A H King Sensory Memories and Recollective Images Dominic Gregory 28 Imagining the Past: On the Nature of Episodic Memory Robert Hopkins 46 Memory, Imagination, and Narrative Dorothea Debus 72 Imaginative Content Paul Noordhof 96 Part II The Epistemic Role of Imagination and Memory Infusing Perception with Imagination Derek H Brown 133 Superimposed Mental Imagery: On the Uses of Make-Perceive Robert Eamon Briscoe 161 Visually Attending to Fictional Things Gregory Currie 186 10 Justification by Imagination Magdalena Balcerak Jackson 209 11 How Imagination Gives Rise to Knowledge Amy Kind 227 Index 247 Preface and Acknowledgements The chapters forming this volume were first presented as talks at a conference on ‘Perceptual Imagery and Perceptual Memory’ held at the Centre for the Study of Perceptual Experience at the University of Glasgow Further details of the Centre can be found at Fabian Dorsch and I were very grateful to the Scots Philosophical Association, the Mind Association, the University of Fribourg, and the College of Arts at the University of Glasgow for providing the funding to run the conference I would like to thank enormously all of the contributors for their essays, and for their quite considerable patience while we produced this volume containing them I would also like to thank Peter Langland-Hassan and an anonymous referee for their invaluable comments on the specific chapters, and the volume as a whole Finally, I thank Peter Momtchiloff and his staff at Oxford University Press for their help and advice in preparing the volume The writing of this preface coincided with my receiving the shocking news of Fabian’s unexpected and untimely death at the age of 42 Fabian wrote much important work about perception, imagination, and aesthetics throughout his career He graduated with a PhD from University College London in 2005, and thereafter spent time at several institutions around the world, including Berkeley, Paris, and Warwick I met him at various conferences and remember great nights talking to him over many a beer—not only about philosophy but about all concerns in life We became great friends Fabian took up a position in Fribourg, Switzerland, and not long after, we organized a conference there on ‘Phenomenal Presence’ in 2010 He spent the Spring semester of 2011 as a visiting faculty member at the University of Glasgow where he partook in all the various academic and social aspects of life at Glasgow with gusto During that time, we organized and held the conference on perceptual imagination and perceptual memory on which this volume is based Fabian founded the European Society for Aesthetics in 2008 The organization has now named the newly launched European Society for Aesthetics Essay Prize after him He served for over four years as an associate editor of the journal Dialectica and then became Editor-in-Chief of the journal Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics In 2009 he became the Research Coordinator of the Fribourg-based research group Experience & Reason (EXRE) Among other things, he recently published a monograph The Unity of Imagining (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012), and at the time of his death was preparing to publish a monograph on imagination with Routledge In addition to this volume, we were also jointly editing a volume on Phenomenal Presence (Oxford University Press, forthcoming) 240 Amy Kind relevance, it remains unclear how this relevance can be achieved Given the claims of Wittgenstein and Sartre that imagining is voluntary, not world-sensitive, and uninformative, as we discussed above in section 2, it is not yet clear why imagination would be able to play the epistemic role that I have suggested that it does in fact play In this final section of the chapter, I aim to answer both of these questions by providing a rough framework—what I call imagining under constraints—that distinguishes the cases in which imagining has epistemic relevance from the cases in which it does not.23 Individuals with extraordinary powers of imagination are often described as creative, and it is tempting to understand this creativity as a certain kind of freedom from the constraints of the ordinary world: It’s by casting off the shackles of reality that innovative discoveries arise.24 In some cases, this understanding of creative genius may well be the correct one But when we’re focused not on the generation of innovative new ideas but on their justification, this way of thinking about imaginative creativity gets things precisely backward When it comes to the epistemic relevance of imagination, what’s most important about the imaginative capacities of extraordinary imaginers like Tesla and Grandin is not their extraordinary ability to let their imagination run wild, but rather their extraordinary ability to keep their imagination under control One of the reasons that imagining is thought to lack epistemic relevance is that acts of imagining are under the imaginer’s own volition Since imagining, unlike perceiving, is subject to the will, I can imagine all kinds of things that don’t exist Whether or not I can perceive purple cows depends on facts about the world Whether or not I can imagine purple cows depends on facts about my will In fact, philosophers have taken it to be so obvious that this feature of imagining renders it epistemically irrelevant that few have even bothered to argue for it—recall, for example Wittgenstein’s simple remark that “It is just because imaging is subject to the will that it does not instruct us about the external world” (1948/1980: §80) O’Shaughnessy is one of very few philosophers to have made the argument explicit: All imaginings arise from the subject’s mind in such a way that the constraint of Reality is necessarily inoperative, whether through substituting one’s will for Reality or through confusing ‘subjective Reality’ with Reality itself The fact that the mind acts here, not as a representative of Reality but in direct opposition, guarantees that imaginings must be cognitively void (2000: 359)25 I develop this framework in considerably more detail in Kind (2016) Consider, for example, Gaut’s analysis of the connection between imagination and creativity: “Imagination is free from commitments to what is the case and to particular actions As such, imagination is peculiarly suited—suited of its nature—to be the vehicle for active creativity, since one can try out different views and approaches by imagining them, without being committed either to the truth of the claims or to acting on one’s imaginings Imagination allows one to be playful, to play with different hypotheses, and to play with different ways of making objects” (Gaut 2003: 160–1) 25 McGinn raises similar considerations: “Belief is a commitment to truth, and the truth cannot be willed into being But imagining is not a commitment to truth, even possible truth, so there is no obstacle to willing it ” (2004: 132) 23 24 how imagination gives rise to knowledge 241 But given our above discussion of Tesla and Grandin, I think we can see where O’Shaughnessy’s argument goes wrong When Tesla imagined the bladeless turbine, he was trying to get things right Likewise, when Grandin imagined cows walking through the new dip vat, she was trying to get things right In these imaginative exercises, they took themselves to be working within “the constraint of Reality”—in fact, it was critical to the success of their inventions that they so In short, contra O’Shaughnessy, the fact that imagining is subject to the will does not mean that the imaginer’s mind acts “in direct opposition” with reality A similar point allows us to better understand the second feature of imagining, namely, that it is not world-sensitive By their very nature, perception and belief are world-sensitive As the point is often put, belief has truth as its constitutive aim The contrast is then drawn with imagining, which does not have truth as its constitutive aim, and this is then taken to show that imagining cannot inform us about the world But this inference is a mistake Although imagining may not have truth as its constitutive aim, that does not mean it never has truth as its aim at all—that it is somehow constitutively divorced from truth Rather, an act of imagining can have truth as a non-constitutive aim Thus, although imagining is not world-sensitive by its nature, it would be a mistake to assume that this means that imagining must be completely world-insensitive It is precisely this mistake, I think, that underlies CEI Consider for example the following passage from McGinn: When I am in the business of investigating the world, I adopt an attitude of evidential sensitivity, and my beliefs are formed accordingly; but not so when I am merely imagining Here I am indifferent to how things actually are Perception and belief purport to get things right, so they involve sensitivity to evidence; but forming images and imagining-that not purport to depict how things really are (2004: 132) Parallel considerations to those we invoked above in response to O’Shaughnessy will apply here in response to McGinn In perceiving, I can’t be indifferent to how things are; in imagining, I can But the fact that imagining is not by its nature required to aim at depicting things how they actually are does not mean that it must always lack this aim completely In sum, once we properly understand what it means for imagining to be subject to the will and to lack world-sensitivity, we see that its having these features does not support the charge of epistemic irrelevance What about the third feature of imagining that we outlined above, namely, the claim that it is uninformative? Here we must take a slightly different tack and simply deny that imagining has the feature in question Although Sartre is right to claim that an imagining contains nothing more “than what was put into it”, this fact does not have the consequence of uninformativeness that he took it to have This point should already be familiar to us from our discussion of computer simulations above A computer simulation contains only the facts that are put into it, but it can nonetheless provide us with information about the world That this 242 Amy Kind point generalizes to imaginative simulations should not be surprising, especially since we can see applications of it in so many different domains A computer programmer can be provided with new information by the outputs of her program, even though the program contains nothing but what she put in it.26 A baker can be provided with new information once she tastes her newly baked cake, even though the cake contains nothing but what she put in it An artist can be provided with new information once she sees her artistic composition, even though the artwork contains nothing but what she put in it So too can an imaginer be provided with new information by an imagining that contains nothing but what she put in it I thus reject the claim that imagining is uninformative And although it is true that imagining is both subject to the will and not world-sensitive, these claims are no bar to its epistemic relevance Despite its long philosophical pedigree, CEI—the charge of epistemic irrelevance—is simply false Of course, in rejecting CEI, I by no means want to claim that all imaginings have epistemic relevance I thus owe an explanation of how we can distinguish the imaginings that have epistemic relevance from those that not Fortunately, having clarified the features of imagination in our discussion above, we are now well positioned to provide at least a rough framework for drawing the distinction We are also now well positioned to see how our reflection on extraordinary imaginers is relevant to the case of ordinary imaginers Although both Tesla and Grandin are unusually adept at visual imagining—their ability to create, maintain, and manipulate finely detailed images exceeds what most of us are able to do—the imaginative exercises in which they engage are not in themselves that unusual Consider a skilled mechanic who imaginatively runs an engine in her mind in order to figure out what is wrong with it, or an interior designer who imaginatively entertains different furniture arrangements in an effort to decide which will be the best use of the space And consider also all sorts of everyday decisions that we need to make, when we don’t have the time, or energy, or the ability to try out all the different alternatives: Which shoes would look better with this outfit? Would my kids be able to handle seeing The Wizard of Oz, or would the Wicked Witch be too scary for them? Which office should I pick in the new building—the one with the better view, or the one in the quieter location? Was my colleague’s email meant to be as nasty as it came across, or was he just clueless about how it would be received? In each of these situations, we might naturally use imaginative simulations to help answer the question posed I imagine myself first in one pair of shoes, and then the other, and I can thereby “see” that the second pair works better with the outfit I imagine sitting with my kids on the couch as the Wicked Witch first appears on screen, I imagine them hearing the witch’s cackle as she taunts Dorothy, and as I figure out what their reactions are going to be, I come to realize that they’re not quite ready to 26 This can be true even when the program’s algorithms are completely deterministic, i.e they contain no randomizing elements how imagination gives rise to knowledge 243 watch that movie I imagine myself sitting in the office with the gorgeous view of the snow-capped mountains, but hearing loud student cell-phone conversations in the hall, and I discover from the deep well of irritation brimming inside me that the quiet is more important to me than scenic beauty And as I imagine being in my colleague’s position, having his characteristic lack of social grace, and knowing only what he knows about the current situation, I conclude that there’s no reason to suppose that he had any nasty intentions when his email was sent In all of these cases, my imaginings are subject to my will, and the imaginings contain nothing but what I put into them Yet in each case they propel me to reach a conclusion that I had not previously believed Must we see these new conclusions as no better than guesses? That seems to me implausible When we engage in these kinds of imaginative simulations, if things have gone right, we will typically take ourselves to be justified in the conclusions that we reach We take ourselves to be justified in our beliefs about which shoes to wear We take ourselves to be justified in our decisions to bar our children from watching the movie We take ourselves to be justified in believing that the quieter office would be the better choice And we take ourselves to be justified in letting our colleagues off the hook for ill-advised emails I don’t think we’re wrong to so All of these cases have something important in common: In each of them, I am aiming to get things right I have various beliefs about the world—about what colour the shoes are, about what sorts of things have scared my children in the past, about the typical volume of students’ voices in the hallway, and about my colleague’s mental states These beliefs about the world infuse my imaginings In doing so, they act as constraints on my imagination, just as pre-programmed variables set constraints on computer simulations When I set myself these imaginative projects, I don’t take myself to be completely free In fact, I don’t take myself to be free at all My imagining is not governed by the world as it is before my eyes right now, as it is when I am perceiving But that does not mean that it is not governed by the world In fact, once we start to reflect on the matter, we see that all sorts of our imaginings are indeed governed by the world—not fully, but in part When I imagine myself basking in the sun with a good novel on a tropical beach, there are many ways in which what O’Shaughnessy called “the constraint of Reality” is inoperative—for as I’m imagining this I’m not basking in the sun, or reading a good novel, or on a tropical beach But my imagining is still about me, and hence is constrained in that way Insofar as I’m imagining purple cows, the constraint of reality is inoperative, but insofar as I’m imagining them in Times Square, it is Thus, though the imagination is not by its nature constrained, the introduction of constraints—even substantive constraints—in our mental processes should not be seen to suggest that these mental processes no longer count as imaginings.27 I might not always be good at setting the right constraints, and I might not always be good at abiding by the constraints that have been set It’s in these respects that Tesla 27 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this point 244 Amy Kind and Grandin are so good at engaging in imaginative exercises When they set themselves an imaginative project, the images that they produce stay true to their intentions Mine may not I might embellish the beauty of the mountain or the volume of the students’ voices But when I set the right constraints, and when I am good at abiding by them, my imagining can be as epistemically relevant to my project as their imaginings are to theirs What I’ve said here gives us just a very rough framework for when and how imagination justifies our beliefs, and developing this framework in complete detail is the project for another paper.28 The main project of this chapter, however, was the more modest one of showing us that such a framework deserves development, i.e that any full account of the sources of epistemic justification cannot ignore imagination My discussion of imagining under constraints thus brings us back to the fictional detective with whom we began: Sherlock Holmes, who refers to his own method of detection as the scientific use of imagination There are indeed many different uses to which imagination can be put, but when we constrain our imaginings to fit the facts of the world as we know them, we are using an epistemic procedure that is much more akin to scientific experimentation than it is to mere flights of fancy Although our imaginative experimentation will not be fool proof, neither is scientific experimentation But in both cases, when we proceed cautiously, the beliefs that we arrive at will, as Holmes tells Watson, usually be justified Thus, that we should reject the charge of epistemic irrelevance—that imagination is, after all, part of the cognitive circuit—is, as Holmes might also say, simply “elementary my dear Watson, elementary” Acknowledgements I am grateful for feedback on this paper to the participants at the ‘Perceptual Memory and Perceptual Imagination’ conference held at the University of Glasgow and to audiences at Rice University, Cal State University Los Angeles, Occidental College, and UC San Diego Thanks also to Dustin Locke, Peter Kung, and two anonymous referees for their comments and to my student Jake Wyrick for his research assistance The idea for this paper first took hold during a Q&A at the ‘Perceptual Presence’ conference held at the University of Fribourg in 2010; the paper itself was written shortly thereafter My paper ‘Imagining Under Constraints’ that has already appeared in print (Kind 2016) is really meant to be a sequel to the arguments presented here References Brewer, Bill (1999) Perception and Reason Oxford: Oxford University Press Conan Doyle, Arthur (2013) The Complete Sherlock Holmes New York: Race Point Publishing 28 See Kind (2016) how imagination gives rise to knowledge 245 Gaut, Berys (2003) ‘Creativity and imagination’, in Berys Gaut and Paisley Livingston (eds.), The Creation of Art Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 148–73 Gendler, Tamar S (2013) ‘Imagination’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013 edition) Gendler, Tamar S and John Hawthorne (2002) ‘Introduction’, in Tamar S Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1–70 Glotzer, Sharon et al (2009) ‘International assessment of research and development in simulation-based engineering and science’, World Technology Evaluation Center, Inc Grandin, Temple (1995) Thinking in Pictures New York: Random House Huemer, Michael (2001) Skepticism and the Veil of Perception Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Isaacson, Walter (2007) Einstein: His Life and Universe New York: Simon & Schuster Kant, Immanuel (1787/1997) Critique of Pure Reason, ed and trans Paul Guyer and Allen W Wood Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Kind, Amy (2001) ‘Putting the image back in imagination’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62: 85–109 Kind, Amy (2016) ‘Imagining under constraints’, in Amy Kind and Peter Kung (eds.), Knowledge Through Imagination Oxford: Oxford University Press, 145–59 Kosslyn, Stephen M (1995) ‘Mental imagery’, in Stephen M Kosslyn and Daniel N Osherson (eds.), Visual Cognition: An Invitation to Cognitive Science, vol Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 267–96 Luria, A R (1968) The Mind of a Menomonist, trans Lynn Solotaroff New York: Basic Books McGinn, Colin (2004) Mindsight: Image, Dream, Meaning Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press Markie, Peter (2005) ‘The mystery of direct perceptual justification’, Philosophical Studies 126: 347–73 Norton, John D (1996) ‘Are thought experiments just what you thought?’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26: 333–66 Norton, John D (2004) ‘Why thought experiments not transcend empiricism’, in Christopher Hitchcock (ed.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Science Oxford: Blackwell, 44–66 O’Shaughnessy, Brian (2000) Consciousness and the World Oxford: Clarendon Press Sacks, Oliver (1995) An Anthropologist on Mars New York: Vintage Books Sartre, Jean-Paul (1948) The Psychology of Imagination New York: Philosophical Library Sorensen, Roy (1992) Thought Experiments Oxford: Oxford University Press Spaulding, Shannon (2016) ‘Imagination through knowledge’, in Amy Kind and Peter Kung (eds.), Knowledge Through Imagination Oxford: Oxford University Press, 207–26 Stock, Kathleen (2007) ‘Sartre, Wittgenstein, and learning from imagination’, in Peter Goldie and Elisabeth Schellekens (eds.), Philosophy and Conceptual Art Oxford: Oxford University Press, 171–94 Strawson, P F (1970) ‘Imagination and perception’, in L Foster and J W Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 31–54 Taylor, Paul (1981) ‘Imagination and information’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42: 205–23 246 Amy Kind Tesla, Nikola (1919) My Inventions: The Autobiography of Nikola Tesla, edited by Ben Johnston N.p Tesla, Nikola (1921) ‘Making your imagination work for you’, American Magazine, April West, Thomas (2009) In the Mind’s Eye: Creative Visual Thinkers, Gifted Dyslexics, and the Rise of Visual Technologies Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1948/1980) Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol II, ed G. 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Von Wright and Heikki Nyman Chicago: University of Chicago Press Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1981) Zettel, trans G E M Anscombe, 2nd edition Oxford: Basil Blackwell Index Note: Figures are indicated by an italic f following the page number action and episodic memory 57–9 guidance 165 active imaginings 96–7 content of sensuous imaginings 97–129 Dependency Thesis vs the Similar Content Hypothesis 102–11 mental image 100–2 representationalism, defence of 119–27 suppositional element 111–27 infusing perception with imagination 136–7 Activist (Aristotle on phantasia and memory) 9, 11–13, 16, 18–19, 21–6, 24n ageing 19 agency remembering-how 59 loss of dissociative disorder 124 imaginative content 124 amodal completion infusing perception with imagination 152–3, 154, 155–7 make-perceive 170–6, 171f, 172f, 174f functional effects 176–8, 178f ampliative effect (infusing perception with imagination) 137–40, 143, 158 colour 148 overcoming stimulus poverty 151, 155–6, 157–8 animals memory 10–11, 12, 13, 17 recollection 25 anti-Cartesianism 74n anticipation 59–60, 68 Antipheron 25, 26 apparitions 14 appearances 14–15, 16, 18–19, 21–2 Aristotle 9–27 Canonical Formula 10, 11n, 13 memories 9–26 doubtful 24–5 hallucinatory 25–6 phantasia 9–26 attention see also fictional things, visually attending to episodic memory 63–4 imaginative content 119 autism 234 autobiographical memory 46n autobiographical stories 90 Embeddedness Claim 80–4 Narrative Claim 77–80 Necessity Claim 87 automaticity 204 Ayer, A J 55 Balint syndrome 199 Bargh, J A 204 Bazin, André 195, 196n beliefs episodic memory 56, 65–9 factual memory 46, 48 imagination 56 knowledge arising from imagination 227–32, 235–9, 240n, 241, 243–4 phantasia 15 recollective memories 75, 89–90, 91n Embeddedness Claim 80–4 Narrative Claim 77–80 Necessity Claim 85–9 Bergman, Ingmar, A Passion 192 Berkeley, George 102, 103 Black, John B 166 Bloch, David 11n Brewer, Bill 232 Briscoe, Robert 133, 135n, 136, 139 Broad, C D 31, 33n Bunuel, Luis, That Obscure Object of Desire 187n Campbell, John 80n Canonical Formula (Aristotle) 10, 11n, 13 Carroll, Lewis 211 Caston, Victor 17n causal reasoning 166–7 Chalmers, David J 216n change blindness 187n charge of epistemic irrelevance (CEI, imagination) 227, 229–32, 235–42 Child, William 74n cinema see fictional things, visually attending to Clark, Andy 179 cognition Aristotle 15, 16 cognitive blending 164 248 index cognition (cont.) cognitive imaginings 96 cognitive penetration (infusing perception with imagination) 140, 145 colour 146, 149, 150, 157 coherentism 82–3 colour exclusion principles 223, 224n memory-colour effect 162–3, 176–7 perception 146–51, 154–5, 157 computational vision 154–5 computer simulations 236–7, 238, 241–2 Conan Doyle, Arthur 227–8 conceivability 214 conceptual possibility 216 Coriscus 9–11, 15–19, 21–3, 25–6 Correlative Content Thesis (imaginative content) 104 creativity 233, 240 Currie, Gregory 134n, 217 daydreams Aristotle’s phantasmata 15 justification by imagination 212 Debus, Dorothea 28n, 42n de-emphasis (suppositional element) 112, 113–15, 118 Delk, John L 146–8, 149–50, 157 delusions Aristotle 14 fictive dominance 206–7 Dependency Thesis (imaginative content) 100, 102–11, 112, 122 depiction Deroy, Ophelia 174n design seeing 192n Deutscher, Max 87n, 122 diagrammatic reasoning 166–7, 166–7f directedness of experiences 156 dissociative disorder 124 distinctively sensory representations 38–40, 44 dogmatism 213n Donald, Merlin 203 Dorsch, Fabian 108 doubtful memories 24–5 drama, visually attending to 188, 194–7 drawings see pictures dreams see also daydreams apparent reality 124 Aristotle 14, 15, 17–18 infusing perception with imagination 147 knowledge arising from 230 as passive imaginings 97 as unrecognized imaginings 54n vivacity 136 Dretske, Fred 99 Einstein, Albert 211, 229, 230 Embeddedness Claim (recollective memories) 80–4, 89, 90 enactment-imagination (E-imagination) 217 Enns, James T 172 episodic (experiential) memory see also sensuous memories Acknowledgement-of-Origin Constraint 50, 67n Common Component View 47–8, 52, 54 Derivation Constraint 50, 55, 57, 60 Inclusion View 47–8, 51–69 nature of 46–71 action and receptivity 57–9, 62, 66 belief and presenting as real 65–9 Inclusion View 52–7 observing, possibility of 61–5 No Overlap View 47–8, 52, 54 originating experience 49 Origin Constraint 49, 51, 55, 57, 60, 66 Erastus 9n existence 126–7 experience 1–4 see also episodic (experiential) memory; experiential imagining imaginative content 97–127 infusing perception with imagination 133–59 justification by imagination 210, 213–25 knowledge arising from imagination 236, 238 make-perceive 162–4, 169, 173, 175–7, 179 recollective memories 72–93 sensory memories and recollective images 31–4, 41, 42n, 43 visually attending to fictional things 186–9, 191–3, 198–200, 202, 204 experiential imagining 46–7, 48n, 49, 56 action and receptivity 57–9 phenomenology 53–5 singular content 59–61 experiential memory see episodic (experiential) memory Experiential Thesis 102 see also Dependency Thesis (imaginative content) factual and episodic memory, contrast between 46, 48–9 false memory 84n, 90 Faraday, Michael 229, 230 Fauconnier, Gilles 164 fictional things, visually attending to 186–208 see also fictive dominance actors and characters, attending to 201–3 automaticity 204 cinema and photography compared 197–8 cinema and theatre compared 194–7 delusions 206–7 explanatory gap 205–6 index imaginative visual experience 188–9 mechanisms of attention 200–1 objects, visual attention to 199–200 other modalities 203 recessiveness of the film image 191–4 seeing, seeing-in, and transparency 189–91 sharing channels 204 transportation 204–5 fictive dominance 186–8 attending to actors and characters 201, 202 automaticity 204 cognitive conditions 198–9 delusions 206–7 evolution 203 explanatory gap 205–6 film and photography compared 197–8 film and theatre compared 195–6 modalities 203 phenomenology 189 sharing channels 204 transportation 204–5 Fillenbaum, Samuel 146–8, 149–50, 157 film see fictional things, visually attending to Finger of Instantiation (FINST) 200, 201, 202 Fodor, Jerry A 91n, 151n Frege, Gottlob 36, 39 Fregoli delusion 206–7 Gauker, Christopher 166–7 Gaut, Berys 240n gears problem 166, 166f Gendler, Tamar S 134n, 212n general experiential recollection 118 Gerbino, W 175 Gerrig, Richard 204n Gestalt tradition 179 Gibbs, Brian J 200 Gibson, James J 153n, 180 Glotzer, Sharon 237 Goldie, Peter 79n Goldman, Alvin 217, 218, 219 Gombrich, E H 163n Gosselin, Frédéric 163 Grandin, Temple 229, 232, 234–42, 244 grapheme-colour synaesthesia 162n Gregory, Dominic 34n, 105–6 habit memory 58–9 hallucinations Aristotle 25–6 content 126 infusing perception with imagination 138n, 147 justification by imagination 213 make-perceive 162, 176 as passive imaginings 96 as unrecognized imaginings 54n 249 vivacity 136 ways that things look 35n Hansen, Thorsten 162, 177 Hegarty, Mary 166 Hegdé, Jay 172 Hermias 9, 9n highest common factor view (seeing-in) 191 high-level visual processing 199–200 Hobbes, Thomas 73 Hopkins, Robert 186, 192n Hume, David imagination 126–7, 139n, 175, 176, 231 force and vivacity 2, 12n, 90–1, 136 memory 47n missing shade of blue 2, 138 perceptual experience 144 Strawson’s ‘Imagination and Perception’ 141, 142 Husserl, E 31 Hutchins, Edwin 164, 167–8 Hyman, Ira E Jr 84n identity 33 illusions infusing perception with imagination 138n justification by imagination 213 image-based completion 170, 174–8 images/imagery Aristotle’s phantasmata 15 episodic memory 46, 47–8, 49 Common Component View 52–3 Inclusion View 53n phenomenology 54 imaginative content 99, 100–2 representationalism 121 suppositional element 114–16, 121 infusing perception with imagination 137, 138 recollective see recollective images superimposed 161–85 amodal completion 170–4, 176–8 augmenting reality with mental imagery 161–4 image-based completion 174–6 phenomenal presence 169–70, 174–6 problem solving 164–8 imaginability 214–16 imagination 1–5 active nature 136–7 Aristotle (phantasia) 9–26 content 96–129 Dependency Thesis vs the Similar Content Hypothesis 102–11 mental image 100–2 representationalism, defence of 119–27 suppositional element 111–27 enactment- (E-imagination) 217 heterogeneity 210 250 index imagination (cont.) infusing perception with 133–60 colour 146–51 fictional things, visually attending to 198 imagination as self-generated contributions with ampliative effect 134–41 object-sameness/-kind 141–6 stimulus poverty, overcoming 151–8 justification by 209–26 possibility, imagination as a guide to 214–16 reach of imagination 222–5 recreative imagination and possible experiences 216–22 Up-To-Us Challenge 211–14 knowledge arising from 227–46 epistemic irrelevance charge 229–32 extraordinary imaginers 232–5 generation vs justification 235–9 ordinary imaginers and imagining under constraints 239–44 make-perceive see make-perceive memory and narrative 72–95 Embeddedness Claim 80–4 Narrative Claim 75–80 Necessity Claim 85–9 the past (episodic memory) 46–71 action and receptivity 57–9 belief and presenting as real 65–9 Inclusion View 52–7 observing, possibility of 61–5 recreative 216–22, 224–5 sensory see sensory imaginations (S-imaginations) sensory memories and recollective images 34, 37, 39, 41 sensuous see sensuous imaginings taxonomies 134n under constraints 229, 239–44 visually attending to fictional things 188–9, 195–6, 198–9, 202, 204–7 vivacity 136 Imagination-as-Deliberate 135, 137, 139, 143, 148, 156 Imagination-as-Faint 136, 137, 139, 143, 148, 156 Imagination-as-Fleeting 135–6, 137, 139, 143, 148, 156 imaginative perceptions 97 imaginative variation 223–4 imprints 15, 16–17, 19 inseparability view (imaginative visual experience) 189 interpretationism 74n Isaacson, Walter 229 James, William 12n Johnson, Jeffrey S 172 Johnson, M K 84n Jordan, Lucy 219 Judson, Lindsay 55 Kahneman, Daniel 200 Kanizsa, Gaetano 175 Kanizsa squares 170–1, 171f, 172 Kant, Immanuel 179 infusing perception with imagination 133, 138–9, 155 Strawson’s ‘Imagination and Perception’ 141, 142, 143, 189, 230–1 productive imagination 169–70, 230–1 Kanwisher, Nancy 172 Kekulé, Friedrich 230 Kellman, Philip J 179 Kind, Amy 2n, 133, 135n, 136–7, 138–9, 210 knowing what you are imagining vs knowing what you are thinking 113 knowledge arising from imagination 227–46 epistemic irrelevance charge 229–32 extraordinary imaginers 232–5 generation vs justification 235–9 ordinary imaginers and imagining under constraints 239–44 Kosslyn, Stephen M 230n Kozhevnikov, Maria 166n Kubovy, Michael 203 Kung, Peter 221n Land, Edwin H 155 Langdon, Robyn 206n Lennon, Kathleen 133 Locke, Don 76n Locke, John 31, 47n Lopes, Dominic 192n low-level visual processing 199–200, 201 Luria, A R 232–3n McDermott, Kathleen B 84n McGinn, Colin 96–7, 227n, 230n, 240n, 241 Macpherson, Fiona cognitive penetration 140n infusing perception with imagination 133, 134, 140–1, 146–9 Strawson’s contribution compared 149–51, 156–7 make-perceive 177 make-perceive 161–85 amodal completion 170–4, 176–8 augmenting reality with mental imagery 161–4 image-based completion 174–6 infusing perception with imagination 136 phenomenal presence 169–70, 174–6 problem solving 164–8 Malcolm, Norman 87n Maloney, L T 155 index Maltese Cross 173, 174f Markie, Peter 231 Marr, David 151n Martin, C B 87n, 122 Martin, M G F Dependency Thesis 102, 107–8, 112 imagination 101 memory 32, 34, 43 perceptual experience 75n sensory imagination 73n sensory properties 116 Matthen, Mohan 151n memory 1–5 see also episodic (experiential) memory; recollective memories (R-memories); sensory memories; sensuous memories Aristotle 9–26 conformity 84n contagion 84n doubtful 24–5 factivity 51 false 84n, 90 habit (remembering-how) 58–9 hallucinatory see hallucinations imagination and narrative 72–95 Embeddedness Claim 80–4 Narrative Claim 75–80 Necessity Claim 85–9 imaginative content 97, 99, 100, 102, 118, 121–7 infusing perception with imagination 142, 145, 147 knowledge arising from imagination 230, 233 make-perceive 161–2, 166n, 170, 173, 175–7 observer 29, 30, 33–4, 44 causal chains 42 memory-colour effect 162, 176–7 mental animation 166 mental files 200–1 delusions 206–7 shared 204 transfer 201–3 mental images see images/imagery metaphysical possibility 215 mind-reading, simulationist approach to 202n minimal awareness (seeing-in) 192 mini-narratives 79 mnemonics 15 modal completion 170–1, 171f movies see fictional things, visually attending to Multiple Use Thesis (imaginative content) 100–1, 110–11, 114–15, 117–18 naïve realism imaginative content 101 infusing perception with imagination 134, 158 Nakayama, Ken 169 251 Nanay, Bence infusing perception with imagination 133, 139, 152n, 158 make-perceive 170, 175, 176, 179 phenomenal presence 169, 170, 179 Narrative Claim (recollective memories) 75–80, 90 navigation 167–8, 168f Necessity Claim (recollective memories) 85–9, 90 neglect patients 199 Neleus 9n nonactual perceptions (infusing perception with imagination) 142 non-fictive dominance 187n non-sensory perceptual content 116–17 Noordhof, Paul 111 Norton, John D 238 object files 200, 201, 202 delusions 206 shared 204 object-kind recognition (infusing perception with imagination) 141–6, 149 objects, visual attention to 199–200 object-sameness recognition (infusing perception with imagination) 141–6, 149 observer memories 29, 30, 33–4, 44 causal chains 42 observing episodic memory 61–5 imaginative content 119 Olkkonen, Maria 146n Olshausen, Bruno A 172 ontological transparency 190, 193, 194, 196 O’Shaughnessy, Brian hallucinations 96 imagination 103, 104, 227 constraint of Reality 240–1, 243 make-perceive 162, 177 Owens, David J 31, 34, 43 paintings see pictures parity thesis 238–9n passive imaginings 96–7 past feelings of pastness 91–2 imagining the (episodic memory) 46–71 action and receptivity 57–9 belief and presenting as real 65–9 Inclusion View 52–7 observing, possibility of 61–5 memory 10, 12–13, 19–20 recollective memories 72–93 sensory memories and recollective images 29, 33, 39–40, 43–4 Peacocke, Christopher 93n, 99, 102, 113, 218 Pendlebury, Michael 133 252 index perception 1–5 Aristotle 10–26 and episodic memory 49 action and receptivity 57, 58, 62 belief and presenting as real 65 Inclusion View 52–4, 56 observing, possibility of 62–4 singular content 60n force and vivacity 91 imaginative content 96–112, 115–24, 126–7 infusing with imagination 133–60 colour 146–51 fictional things, visually attending to 189 imagination as self-generated contributions with ampliative effect 134–41 object-sameness/-kind 141–6 stimulus poverty, overcoming 151–8 justification by imagination 209–25 knowledge arising from imagination 227, 228, 235n epistemic irrelevance charge 230–2 generation vs justification 236, 238, 239 ordinary imaginers and imagining under constraints 240–1, 243 make-perceive see make-perceive passive nature 136–7 sensory memories and recollective images 31, 33n, 34, 41–2, 44 superstitious 163 visually attending to fictional things 187, 189, 191, 193, 199–203, 205, 207 actors and characters, attending to 202 delusions 207 explanatory gap 205 fictive dominance 187, 203 imaginative visual experience 189 mechanisms of attention 200, 201 other modalities 203 recessiveness of the film image 191, 193 seeing, seeing-in, and transparency 189 visual attention to objects 199 vivacity 136 perceptual constancies 152–3, 154, 155–7 perceptual justification 213–14 perceptual object-sameness (infusing perception with imagination) 141–2 Perky, C W 163 Perky effect 147 personal memory 46n phantasia 9–26 Phenomenalist (Aristotle on phantasia and memory) 9, 12–13, 16, 18–19, 21–3, 25–6 phenomenal presence 169–70, 173, 174–6, 177, 179 phenomenal transparency 193–4 phenomenology amodal completion 171, 175, 177 episodic memory 53–5, 67–8, 69 fictional things, visually attending to 189 image-based completion 175 imaginative content 97–128 infusing perception with imagination 136–9, 143, 158 colour 147–8 overcoming stimulus poverty 151, 156 recollective memories 72–3, 76, 81, 88–91, 93 recreative imagination 218–21 sensory memories, sensory episodes, and sensorily-based recognizings 43–4 photographs, visually attending to 186–7, 188, 194, 197–8 pictures perception 20–1, 23–4 sensory memories and recollective images 34–8 visually attending to 186–7, 191, 194 fictive dominance 196n Plato 9, 9n, 14, 17 pop-out effect 197–8 positing as nothingness 68–9 possibility, imagination as a guide to 214–16 problem solving 164–8 propositional imagining 46–7 pulley problem 166, 167f Pylyshyn, Zenon W 151n, 175, 200 Ravenscroft, Ian 134n, 217 real, presenting as episodic memory 65–9 imaginative content 1247 reality, augmenting with imagery 1614 Recanati, Franỗois 1223, 127 receptivity, and episodic memory 57–9, 62, 66 recollection see also memory; recollective images; recollective memories (R-memories) Aristotle 24, 25 imaginative content 118, 121, 125–6 recollective images 28–45 catholic account 38–40, 43, 44 causal chains 40–2 challenges 32–4 de se component 43 pictures, uses of 34–8 recollective memories (R-memories) 46n, 72–5, 89–93 Embeddedness Claim 80–4, 89, 90 force and vivacity 90–1 Narrative Claim 75–80 Necessity Claim 85–9 recreative imagination 216–22, 224–5 Reid, Thomas 67n index relationism (imaginative content) 98, 100, 101, 109 Similar Content Hypothesis 106–7 remembering see memory; recollection remembering-how 58–9 reminiscence 46n Rensink, Ronald A 172 representational properties 98–9 poised 99 representationalism imaginative content 98–100, 109, 127–8 Similar Content Hypothesis 107 suppositional element 119–27 infusing perception with imagination 134, 158 make-perceive 169–70 retrospective-visionary experiences 85–6 Roediger, Henry L 84n Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 214 Rubin, Edgar 173 Russell, Bertrand 91, 91n, 152 Sacks, Oliver 234 Sartre, Jean-Paul charge of epistemic irrelevance 231 imagination 68–9, 232, 240, 241 Up-To-Us Challenge 211, 212, 213 Multiple Use Thesis 118 Schellenberg, Susanna 220n schizophrenia 212 Scholl, Brian 200n Schwartz, Daniel L 166 Schyns, Philippe G 163 seamless infusion 140, 143, 156 colour 148 Searle, John 121 seeing-in 189–92, 194, 196, 201 self-occlusion 173, 176, 177 Sellars, Wilfrid 133, 169–70, 176, 179 semantic memory 46 sense-datum theory 134, 152, 158 sense of self 90 sensorily-based recognizings 43–4 sensory episodes 43–4 sensory imaginations (S-imaginations) 72–5, 89–91 Embeddedness Claim 83–4, 89 force and vivacity 91 imaginative content 121–7 Narrative Claim 76 Necessity Claim 88, 89 sensory memories 28–45 accurate and inaccurate 40–2 catholic account 38–40, 43, 44 causal chains 40–2 challenges 32–4 de se component 33, 43, 44 253 internal and external 30–4, 39, 40–4 pictures, uses of 34–8 sensuous imaginings 96 active 97–128 past-guided 125 recreative 96 sensuous memories 97 see also episodic (experiential) memory representationalism 99 standard particular 125 Shimojo, Shinsuke 172 Shipley, Thomas F 179 Similar Content Hypothesis (imaginative content) 102, 105–10, 127 Sims, Valerie K 166n simulationist approach to mind-reading 202n Simulation of Perception Thesis (imaginative content) 103, 104, 105 singular content, and episodic memory 56, 59–61 sleep see dreams Sorabji, Richard 11n, 13n, 15n, 24n Sorenson, Roy 238–9n soul 11–13, 16–17, 21, 24 source monitoring 84n Spaulding, Shannon 238n Spelke, Elizabeth S 154 Spence, Charles 174n Steinhoff, Kathryn 166n stimulus poverty, overcoming (infusing perception with imagination) 151–8 Stimulus Theory of perceptual experience 152–3 Stock, Kathleen 112, 114, 239n Stokes, Dustin 140n stored perceptual contents/assumptions 151–2, 155–7 Strawson, P F Hume’s approach to imagination 139n infusing perception with imagination 133, 134, 135, 140–2, 140n, 189 evaluation of contribution 143–6 Macpherson’s contribution compared 149–51, 156–7 Kant’s approach to imagination 139n, 141, 143, 230 Sugita, Yoichi 171 superposition 176, 177 superstitious perception 163 supplementation (suppositional element) 112, 113, 114–15, 118 suppositional element (imaginative content) 99, 111–27 Tesla, Nikola 228–9, 232–5, 237, 239–44 theatre, visually attending to 188, 194–7 Theophrastus 9n 254 index Thompson, Evan 103, 104, 111 thought experiments 238, 238–9n Top-down Constraint (infusing perception with imagination) 139, 140n, 145–6, 150–1 overcoming stimulus poverty 157 tracking, visual 166, 198, 199–201, 206–7 transparency ontological 190, 193, 194, 196 phenomenal 193–4 transportation 204–5 Treisman, Anne 200 trompe l’oeil 192, 195 Tse, Peter 173, 176 Tulving, Endel 49–50n, 91n twofoldness (seeing-in) 191, 192 two-stage view (imaginative visual experience) 189 Tye, Michael 99 visual buffer 161 visually attending to fictional things see fictional things, visually attending to visual tracking 166, 198, 199–201, 206–7 volume completion 173, 176n unrecognized remembering 122, 125 Up-To-Us Challenge (justification by imagination) 211–14, 215, 216, 222 Urmson, J O 89, 92–3 Walton, Kendall L imagination 134n, 135n, 188n transparency 190n, 193, 194, 196n Wandell, Brian A 155 White, Alan 212 Williams, Bernard 78–9, 114 Williamson, Timothy 219 Wittgenstein, Ludwig charge of epistemic irrelevance 231 imagination 119, 232, 240 Up-To-Us Challenge 211, 212, 213 Strawson’s ‘Imagination and Perception’ 141 Wokke, Martijn 172 Wollheim, Richard 189n, 191–2 Woozley, A D 85n Wu, Wayne 140n Velleman, J David 79 Vendler, Zeno 218, 221 Yablo, Stephen 219, 222 Yang, J N 155 .. .Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory edited by Fiona Macpherson and Fabian Dorsch Great Clarendon Street, Oxford,... Preface and Acknowledgements Notes on Contributors Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory: An Overview Fiona Macpherson ix xi Part I The Nature of Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory. .. metaphysics, and belief, self-deception, and delusion Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory An Overview Fiona Macpherson The essays in this volume explore the nature of perceptual imagination and