6a-veith

PowerPoint Presentation After the Paris Accords Politburo Decision Making and the 1975 Spring Offensive by Jay Veith Politburo watching – despite extensive efforts, piercing the veil was hit or miss [.]

After the Paris Accords: Politburo DecisionMaking and the 1975 Spring Offensive by Jay Veith Politburo watching – despite extensive efforts, piercing the veil was hit or miss      Virtually the same men for decades, very closed group, controlled information Few good wartime sources – captured documents and cadre, some intel from diplomatic and third-party sources, official pronouncements, some SIGINT Few purges in the Party during the war – “H Affair” in 1967 Only one major defection – Hoang Van Hoan in 1979 to China Other than Ho Chi Minh, only one death during the war years – Nguyen Chi Thanh Many questions remain from the 1975 conquest of SVN  Were there factions – (moderates vs hawks), waging a debate over developing the economy vs waging war in the South?  Did the DRV consider a US return practical?  What military decisions were made?  What sources can inform us?  Can we trust these sources? 14 Politburo Members          Le Duan – Lao Dong First Secretary Le Duc Tho – head of Organization Dept Senior General Vo Nguyen Giap – Minister of Defense Le Thanh Nghi – Minister of the Economy Ton Duc Thang – President of DRV Pham Hung – head of COSVN Nguyen Duy Trinh – Minister of Foreign Affairs Truong Chinh – Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly Pham Van Dong – DRV Prime Minister Politburo Members          Colonel General Van Tien Dung – Chief of the General Staff To Huu –head of Propaganda and Training Dept (Chief of bad poetry) Tran Quoc Hoan – Minister of Public Security Hoang Quoc Viet – head of the Fatherland Front Hoang Van Hoan – Vice Chairman of the National Assembly And three from the Party Secretariat Le Van Luong – Secretary of the Hanoi Party Committee Nguyen Con – member of the Party Secretariat Do Muoi – member of the Party Secretariat What are our best sources?      Three fronts - military, political, diplomatic Three political books – Le Duan’s “Letters to the South,” (1985) – cables from Duan to the southern front providing his strategic “guidance” – Compilation of various slogans and direction Hoang Van Hoan’s “A Drop in the Ocean.” (1982) “Collected Party Documents: Vol 36 -1975” [Van kiện Đảng toàn tập (Tập 36-1975)] – not seen yet, but should be this year One diplomatic - “Vietnamese Diplomacy: 19452000” [Ngoai Giao Viet Nam: 1945-2000] – Broad historical, not very helpful Thus, left mostly with military memoirs      Van Tien Dung’s “Great Spring Victory” Tran Van Tra’s “Bulwark B-2,” written in response to Dung’s book Hoang Van Thai’s “The Decisive Years,” written in response to Tra’s book Vo Nguyen Giap’s “The General HQ’s during the Spring of Total Victory.” (2000) Other official military histories – “People’s Army,” “COSVN Chronicles,” and other memoirs, which generally are not that helpful, but add insight to decision-making Initial guidance in 1973      While trying to finalize Paris Accords, late 72 until early ‘73, PAVN launches “Opportunity Plan” series of attacks Giap tells COSVN on 19 Jan 73 to hold the liberated zones, use local forces and sappers to launch attacks against ARVN, but main forces must be preserved COSVN Directive 2/73 appears to emphasize the political struggle over the military, but it is only part of the picture April 73, Giap forms “Central Team” to begin drafting “military strategic plans.” May 73 major Politburo meeting – Chinh, PVD, Trinh insist that “it was correct to wage parallel military and political struggle, but at this time, the military struggle must be the pillar and a support for the political struggle.” Giap fights back, presses for retaliation, expanding attacks to see “who is stronger militarily.” Giap gets a tie – “South Vietnam would have both peace and war.” A balance between war and re-building the North emerges – or is it the same thing?       By mid-73, however, public statements led many to believe that the “North-first” faction, led by Truong Chinh, had won May 73 Politburo meeting leads to 21st meeting of the Central Committee in June – Duan makes case that US/SVN are sabotaging Paris Accords Thus, “the revolution could only win victory through war.” Committee agreed The die is cast At the same time, continued fighting leads to June 73 Communique on Ceasefire between Tho and Kissinger After a period of lull, on 26 Sept, Ranger camp at Le Minh is overrun by NVA armor and infantry Oct talks in Paris between RVN & DRV are broken off Same day Resolution 21 is adopted Resolution 20 had launched the 1972 attacks On 15 Oct 73, VNA announces that the “Liberation Army” will respond to all attacks, expanding military operations “Central Team” continues to refine “strategic plan:” major logistics buildup, improvement of HCM trail complex, etc        Tho and Kissinger met again 20 Dec, but cannot agree on further efforts for ceasefire Attacks mount in South, and Thieu reacts on Jan 74, declaring “war has begun again.” 30 Jan 74 Politburo meeting notes improving PAVN position in the South However, at Feb 74 meeting of National Assembly, Le Thanh Nghi gives speech clearly stating economic development in North has priority Giap also disappears from sight, lending credence to this conclusion that no major attacks are planned, despite publication of Resolution 21 Giap actually ill and taken to SU for treatment, as was Dung later in the year Gen’s Hoang Van Thai & Le Trong Tan carry on Giap’s work Two military conferences are held in March and April 74, completing a draft plan “Outline Study of a Plan to Win the War in the South.” On 18 July, Giap reviews plan and instructs Thai to prepare plan to secure total victory in South by 1976       Duan asks to see plan, and approves concept of main force attacks in the South based upon ARVN weakening due to US aid cuts Giap's concept is for a two-stage offensive - a major attack by main-force regulars in the Central Highlands, followed by an assault against Saigon Giap and Duan believe that US too weakened by internal difficulties to re-intervene, but Giap’s plan included the requirement that PAVN forces be prepared for the possibility that the offensive might provoke a hostile amphibious landing on the coast, or a renewal of US bombing of North Vietnam Another conflicting signal – PVD gives Sept 74 speech noting economic reconstruction in the North has priority for DRV First test in I Corps at Thuong Duc, a district town west of Da Nang From late July 74 to late Oct, 304th Div makes major assault Requires two brigades of the Airborne Div to halt attack, but town not re-captured LTG Truong believes Airborne had saved Da Nang from capture NVA believe that they are now stronger than the best ARVN units October Politburo meeting discusses Thuong Duc and continued weakening of RVNAF forces and Thieu       The 1975 offensive plan was to be followed in 1976 by a "general offensive and general uprising" to complete the "liberation" of the South The plan's overall goal was to create what PAVN called a "strategic opportunity." When the “strategic opportunity” appeared, all PAVN forces were to launch an all-out offensive aimed at securing total victory in the shortest time possible before "countries inclined towards intervention," meaning primarily the United States and China, had time to react Although the Politburo approved the General Staff plan during its October session, it decided to meet again in December to review developments and make revisions in the plan At Dec meeting, approval given for major attacks No fear of U.S -Tho notes “diplomacy will not pose any problems for us.” Initial target was Duc Lap B-2 had secondary role, but Tra demands B-2 be allowed to conduct wider attacks After much wrangling, he can attack Song Be, resulting in capture of Phuoc Long Province B-2 victory convinces Politburo to try for greater gains Ban Me Thuot chosen as main target Tra drafts plan for attacks across III Corps, based on old Tet attack plans Giap sent one Strategic Reserve Division, the 341st, south to reinforce B-2      All memoirs note concern about ammunition and spare parts Soviet and Chinese military aid, especially armor and artillery, had declined significantly since the Paris cease-fire Giap notes Cuban help buying Japanese bulldozers Dec/Jan Politburo meeting was to “discuss and make a final decision on strategy.” It concluded even if US did re-intervene, it could not change the outcome PAVN had gained complete initiative Still, some (Chinh, Trinh), urge caution ARVN knew attacks were coming At Dec 74 meeting, ARVN intel believe attacks will be directed at Tay Ninh and Saigon during Feb Tet Thieu secretly orders Recon Companies from all 15 Ranger Groups sent to Duc My training center for urban combat training, then deployed to key points around Saigon Attacks instead aimed at Phuoc Long, but Nui Ba Den near Tay Ninh captured Thieu loses faith in J-2 316th Div and VTD deploy to Central Highlands, 968th Div moves from Laos to take over 320th Div positions, 10th Div moves south of BMT Radio deception plan initiated Notebook of NVA officer found indicating movement to BMT      NVA plan country-wide Giap summons MRTTH officers to Hanoi for briefing on their plans Chastises them for smallscale attacks Tra in B-2 revamps his plans, aims at attacking ARVN III & IV Corps forces on a wide front Design is to open “liberated zone” between B-2 and B-3 Fronts, and isolate Saigon from rest of country As is well-known today, ARVN II Corps G-2, and JGS J-2, predict attack at BMT, but MG Phu disagrees Meanwhile, U.S DAO accurately predicts scale and areas of B-2 Front attacks, but ARVN spread too thin to cope with vastly increased PAVN forces Oddly, I & IV Corps successful in containing enemy attacks Dung cables that BMT easily taken, insists on taking advantage of ARVN confusion in B-2 Instead of turning south, Dung wishes to continue toward coast Argument ensues over proper use of 10th Div on Rt 21 Tra wants additional troops 3/11 Politburo meeting supports Dung, delay move to Saigon Thieu convinced without US support, he needs to shorten his defenses Orders withdrawal of Airborne Division to Saigon, and re-taking of BMT Phu orders withdrawal using Rt 7B      Dung had positioned BN of 320th Division near Cheo Reo When alerted that ARVN withdrawing, chews out Div Cdr, who orders BN to close with city on forced march over a mountain LTG Truong re-deploys troops, leading to panic in Quang Tri Giap orders NVA to cut Rt south of Hue, pursue ARVN At 3/18 meeting, with attacks going well in three northern MR’s, Politburo decides to press on Giap believes he can liberate Hue, and destroy II Corps forces Believes US will not intervene, proposes to liberate South in 1975 While the main objective was still Saigon, they could destroy I & II Corps Politburo agrees, moves from a “strategic offensive” (limited scope), to a “strategic General Offensive.” NVA 1st Corps (the main Strategic Reserve), ordered to move south Amid rapid destruction of ARVN II Corps, and increasing weakness in I Corps (loss of Hue, Quang Ngai), Politburo meets again on 3/24 Giap wants to capture Da Nang, and then turn attention to Saigon, with goal of conquering SVN by end of May Politburo agrees “Our opportunity had arrived.” Dung presses onward, much debate over direction of 10 th Div Tho sent south to assist in final assault      Da Nang falls, Nha Trang threatened, Qui Nhon comes under attack B-2 Front forces are succeeding, but much slower 3/31 Politburo meeting – a historic meeting to discuss whether to deliver the final blow against Saigon Giap explains about 50% of ARVN destroyed or dispersed He doesn’t believe US will intervene Recommends attacking Saigon Politburo agrees, says to liberate Saigon by end of April Le Duan sends message: “One day equals 20 years.” Dung sent south to B-2 Most PAVN forces ordered to head south to various assembly area Coastal Column formed on Rt 1, rest moving down new Rt 14 High Command shows tremendous flexibility and staff skills in organizing massive road march south – essentially Corps of troops & vehicles Tra at B-2, however, pleads his case to Duan that he can take Saigon before rest of main forces arrive Duan agrees Giap believes that another hard blow and ARVN will crumble Dung doesn’t agree, but keeps his mouth shut Tra prepares another wave of attacks across B-2 Front Launches attack against Xuan Loc and Rt       Dung correct; ARVN not weakened in B-2 by earlier attacks, stand fast NVA suffer heavy losses at XL and Rt Dung sends Tra to XL to change strategy, orders 95B Reg to XL Tho arrives at COSVN early April Forward HQ begins planning for arrival of main force units, and attack on Saigon Plan of attack named “Ho Chi Minh Campaign.” Coastal Column sends armor column into Phan Rang, steamrollers ARVN defenses, sweeps into AA outside XL by 4/22 1st Corps elements begin arriving on 4/15 3rd Corps finishes around 4/18 By 4/26, NVA have more men in South Vietnam than the U.S at the height of the American involvement 450,000 men alone around Saigon Enough ammo to “frighten them for gen’s.” Keeping a careful eye on China, Politburo orders liberation of islands in South China Sea VTD plan for Saigon opposite of BMT: ARVN forces strong on the outside ring (Toan’s plan was to keep the NVA 130mm’s outside range of Saigon), but weak once penetrated      Dung organizes five main thrusts to capture five main targets Sappers would grab important bridges inside ARVN defensive belt to prevent destruction Once main attack had “fixed” ARVN forces, each thrust would organize a tank-led deep penetration strike to capture five main targets Targets are Independence Palace, JGS HQ, Capital Zone HQ National Police HQ, TSN airport Duan reaffirms that attack must start “by late April.” Giap wants attacks “from outside and inside,” so Saigon Party Committee readies leaflets, etc., to rally the population Even if ARVN holds against initial blows, attacks must continue “until total victory,” which means infantry in the streets Dung’s plan, unlike what is believed today, is actually part of old Tet 68 attack plan, updated by “Central Team.” Thieu re-signs, Huong takes over Although LTG Toan had submitted a defensive plan for Saigon to JGS, no one is placed in overall command of SVN forces LTG Truong had recovered, but was only an Assistant to the Chief ARVN had re-built some units, but defensively, not balanced like PAVN     Feverish attempts at negotiated ceasefire by French, Kissinger asks SU to intervene, rumblings from the Chinese NVN tell Soviets they will allow US to leave, supposed signals that a Duong Van Minh govt is acceptable “The U.S persuaded the Soviet Union to suggest to Vietnam that we agree to allow the evacuation of Americans from South Vietnam Vietnam agreed During the final days of the General Offensive to liberate Saigon, diplomacy helped to block belated efforts to act as intermediaries on the part of a number of large nations; defeated a plan suggested by the U.S for the United Nations to sponsor the evacuation; agreed to allow the U.S to evacuate the last Americans from Saigon; and prepared to take over the Saigon government’s diplomatic apparatus and facilities.” 4/22, Campaign plan approved On 4/24, LDT sends 10-page message to Politburo outlining their military position However, at 4/26 Politburo meeting, Truong Chinh “still concerned about our military strategy.” Attack from east begins at 1700 26 April Conclusions         Were there factions fighting over economic development vs increasing military attacks in the South? Long-standing debate, but public statements don’t match internal decision-making progress, so probably a diplomatic ploy to keep the Americans at bay Did DRV consider a US return practical? No, but very afraid of Nixon, and US air-power What military decisions were made? Without access to primary sources, it appears that Giap pushed early for a re-building of main forces, and an eventual resumption of attacks Le Duan supported it What sources can inform us? Can we trust them? Mostly from the military side, so hard to tell how much internal debate, but Giap seems to allude to it