... evaluate the desirability of ultra easy monetary policy byweighing up the balance of the desirable short run effects and the undesirable longer runeffects– the unintended ... uponwhichtheyincreasinglyrely126.Members of Class2alsoprofit,especiallyasinterestratesrise,sincetheyarenetsavers(creditors)withpredominantlyshorttermassets.Class3memberssufferfromhigherinterestratesas the recoverycontinues,butto the extenttheyhaveborrowedtobuyrealassets(especiallyhouses)theyalsoseemtogainas the prices of thoseassetsrise.Rajan(2010)contendsthatgovernmentsactivelyencouragedthisprocess127toallowlowerincomepeopletocontinuetoconsume,evenastheirincomes and jobprospectswerebeingfurthersqueezedbytechnologicaldevelopments and globalization. In the bustphase of the cycle,assetpricescollapse and Class1speculatorscanlosepart(thoughrarelyall) of the wealthaccumulatedearlier.Sharplyeasier monetary conditionseasetheirburdenmaterially.Again,thereislobbyingtoensurethat the otherforms of supportpromisedearlierbygovernmentsactuallymaterializes.Members of Class2bear the mainburden of thistransferfromcreditorstodebtors,eitherdirectly(astheirfinancialassetsearnverylittle)orindirectlyduetolowerpensions and higherinsurancecost.Asdebtors,members of Class3alsobenefitfrom ultra easy monetary policy 128.Overall,however,theysuffer the mostbecausetheirnetwealthisverylow,theiraccesstofurthercreditdisappears, and theyare the mostliabletolosetheirjobsin the downturn.Ironically,ifRajan’sthesisiscorrect, the policiesoriginallydesignedtohelp the poorhavehurtthem the most.Thisstoryishighlystylized and perhapsnottrueincertainrespects.Nevertheless,itseemstrueenoughtowarrantfurtherinterdisciplinaryresearchinto the potentialredistributiveimplications of ultra easy monetary policy. D. ... increasehasbeennotable,72Thisisnottodenysuccessfuleffortsbyanumber of countries,includingChina,toexpandmarketsinotherEME’s. Of coursethisstillleaves the broaderquestion of the robustness of the totality of thosemarketsin the event of aseriousdownturnin the AME’s.73ThisproblemisanalogoustothatfacedbyJapanesecorporationsin the 1990’s,aftermanyyears of debtfinancedinvestmentwhichprovedunprofitable.Koo(2003)stronglycontendsthat the weakness of investmentspendinginJapanin the 1990’swasduetothis“balancesheeteffect”, and wasnotduetoashortage of loanscausedbyaweakenedbankingsystem.74SeeBIS(2012)p29forafullerdocumentation.AlsoseeMcKinsey(2010)whoidentify the householdsectorinfive of the fourteencountriestheyconsiderashavingahighprobability of futuredeleveraging.TheyidentifySpain, the US, the UK,Canada and Korea.While the householdsectorsinBrazil,Russia,China and Indiawerenotjudgedtobeoverleveraged,notethat the dataconsideredextendedonlyto2009.Thus the reportmissed the recentsharpincreasesinhouseholddebtlevelsinthosecountries....