Models for dynamic macroeconomics phần 1 doc
Models for dynamic macroeconomics phần 1 doc
... (1. 16), we can write saving at t as s t = y t − r 1+ r ∞ i=0 1 1+r i E t y t+i = 1 1+r y t − 1 1+r − 1 1+r 2 E t y t +1 − 1 1+r 2 − 1 1+r 3 E t y t+2 + = − ∞ i =1 1 1+r i E t y t+i , ... into (1. 15) for each period t +1+ i,wehave r 1 1+r ∞ i=0 1 1+r i Î i ε t +1 = ε t +1 r 1+ r ∞ i=0 Î 1+ r i , (1. 19) and solv...
Ngày tải lên: 09/08/2014, 19:21
Models for dynamic macroeconomics phần 2 pot
... accumulation constraint for period t becomes W t +1 = (1+ r ) A t +1 + 1 1+r ∞ i=0 1 1+r i y t +1+ i = (1+ r ) (1 + r )A t + y t − c t + 1 1+r ∞ i=0 1 1+r i y t +1+ i = (1+ r ) [ (1 + r )(A t + ... W t ,weobtain V t +1 (W t +1 ): V t (W t )=u (c t ) ∂c t ∂W t + 1+ r 1+ Ò V t +1 (W t +1 ) − 1+ r 1+ Ò V t +1 (W t +1 ) ∂c t ∂W t = u (c...
Ngày tải lên: 09/08/2014, 19:21
Models for dynamic macroeconomics phần 3 ppsx
... I t 1 = { y t 1 , x t 1 } , whereas the information set used by the econometrician to estimate the agents’ permanent income is t 1 = { y t 1 } . Therefore, the additional informat ion in x t 1 is ... Pagano (19 89, 19 94), Campbell and Mankiw (19 89, 19 91) and Attanasio (19 95, 19 99). Blanchard and Mankiw (19 88) stress the importance of the precautionary saving motive, and Caba...
Ngày tải lên: 09/08/2014, 19:21
Models for dynamic macroeconomics phần 4 potx
... Z K =K ∗ (Z) = F (K ∗ (Z)) (r − Ë)P k + A 1 ‚ 1 Z ‚ 1 1 . 90 INVESTMENT Setting this expression to zero we have A 1 = − F (K ∗ (Z))Z 1 ‚ 1 ‚ 1 (r − Ë)P k , and inserting this in (2.54) we ... = ‚ 1 ‚ 1 − 1 (r − Ë)P k , or, recalling that ‚ 1 is the positive solution of equation (2.53) and rearranging it to read ‚/(‚ − 1) = r + 1 2 ‚Û 2 /(r − Ë), F (K...
Ngày tải lên: 09/08/2014, 19:21
Models for dynamic macroeconomics phần 5 pptx
... E t ∞ i =1 1 1+r i (Ï(Z t+i , N t+i ) − w) = Ï(Z t , N t ) − w + 1 1+r E t ∞ i=0 1 1+r i (Ï(Z t +1+ i , N t +1+ i ) − w) . At date t + 1 agents know the realization of Z t +1 , while ... irrelevant for the evaluation of both Prob t (x t +1 = x g )andP t,t+i for i > 1. Since the transition probabilities in (3.A1) are valid between t +1andt +2, P t,t+2...
Ngày tải lên: 09/08/2014, 19:21
Models for dynamic macroeconomics phần 6 pdf
... E t +1 [x t +1+ i ]isitselfarandom variable, and we can therefore calculate its expected value: E t [E t +1 [x t+i ]] = P(x t +1 = x b |I t )E t +1 [x t+i |x t +1 = x b ] +P(x t +1 = x g |I t )E t +1 [x t+i |x t +1 = ... as P t,t+i =(P t +1, t+i |x t +1 = x b ) · P(x t +1 = x b |I t ) +(P t +1, t+i |x t +1 = x g ) · P(x t +1 = x g |I t ) (3.A7) (where P(x t +1 = x g |I t ) =1 p i...
Ngày tải lên: 09/08/2014, 19:21
Models for dynamic macroeconomics phần 7 ppt
... V M (t)andV C (t) respectively. For a money holder, the payoff is equal to V M (t)= 1 1+r { (1 − ‚) V M (t +1) +‚[ (1 − M) x (U + V C (t + 1) ) + (1 − (1 − M) x) V M (t + 1) ] } , (5 .15 ) where r is the rate ... Grossman and Helpman (19 91) , Barro and Sala-i-Martin (19 95), and Aghion and Howitt (19 98). Models of endogenous growth were originally formulated in Romer (19 86,...
Ngày tải lên: 09/08/2014, 19:21
Models for dynamic macroeconomics phần 8 pptx
... 1) . For a commodity holder, the payoff is V C (t)= 1 1+r (1 − ‚) V C (t +1) +‚ [ (1 − M) x 2 U ++M xV M (t +1) + (1 − Mx) V C (t + 1) ] } . (5 .16 ) Again, the term in square brackets gives the expected ... V M (t)=V M (t +1) ≡ V M and V C (t)=V C (t +1) ≡ V C . Using these properties in (5 .15 ) and (5 .16 ), multiplying by 1/ (1 + r ), and rearranging terms we get rV M = ‚...
Ngày tải lên: 09/08/2014, 19:21
Models for dynamic macroeconomics phần 9 potx
... H t ,weget H t = 1 1+r ∞ i=0 1 1+r i (Î i y t + (1 Î i ) ¯ y) = 1 1+r y t ∞ i=0 Î 1+ r i + ¯ y ∞ i=0 1 1+r i − ¯ y ∞ i=0 Î 1+ r i = 1 1+r y t 1+ r 1+ r − Î + ¯ y 1+ r r − 1+ r 1+ r − Î = 1 1+r − Î y t + 1 − Î r (1 + ... changes are foreseen for subsequent periods.) Saving in t +1andt + 2 is then s t +1 = − ∞ i =1 1 1+r i E t...
Ngày tải lên: 09/08/2014, 19:21
Models for dynamic macroeconomics phần 10 ppt
... since ∂V 1 ∂e 2 = ·e · 1 e · 1 2 > 0. The reaction function of agent 1 is obtained by maximizing this agents’s payoff: max e 1 V 1 (e 1 , e 2 ) ⇒ ·e · 1 1 e · 2 − 1= 0⇒ e 1 = · 1/ 1−· e · /1 · 2 , from ... ) „ +(ÎL) „ ] 1/ „ =[Î „ (K „ + L „ )] 1/ „ = Î(K „ + L „ ) 1/ „ = ÎF (K , L). (b) y = 1 L F (K , L )=[L −„ (K „ + L „ )] 1/ „ = K L „ +1 „ 1/ „ =(k „ +...
Ngày tải lên: 09/08/2014, 19:21